Danver Steven L. (Edited). Revolts, Protests, Demonstrations, and Rebellions in American History: An Encyclopedia (ENG)

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victor ies against the Supreme Court over segregation and the grandfather clause,

building circulation for The Crisis, and pursuing a neo-abolitionist agenda

(McPherson 1975, 390).

—Merrill Evans

Further Reading

Deegan, Mary Jo. Race, Hull-House, and the University of Chicago: A N ew Conscience

against Ancient Evils. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002.

McPherson, James M. The Aboli tionist Legacy: From Reconstruction to the NAACP.

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975.

Ovington, Mary White. The Walls Came Tumbling Down. New York: Harcourt, Brace and

Company, 1947.

Rudwick, Elliott M. “The National Negro Committee Conference of 1909.” Phylon Quar-

terly 18 (4th Quarter 1 957): 413–419.

Thornbrough, Emma Lou. “The National Afro-American League.” Journal of Southern

History 27 (November 1961): 494–512.

696 Springfield Race Riot (1908)

Black Patch War (1909)

The Black Patch War of 1904–1909 involved a violent uprising of farmers against

a cartel of tobacco buyers who were attempting to keep tobacco prices low. The

conﬂict pitted neighbor against neighbor in the Black Patch counties of Logan,

Todd, a nd Christian in Kentucky and Roberts on and Montgomery in Tennessee .

The revol t is not able for being one o f the few violent affairs to involve agrarian

workers.

The term “Black Patch” comes from the production of black, or dark-ﬁred,

tobacco in weste rn Kentucky and middle Tennessee. The dark green, heavy-

leafed tobacco was cured with open ﬁres and smoke in the 19th century for sale

primarily to the European market. After the Civil War, the Black Patch region

gradually reduced production of wheat and corn to focus on the cash crop of

tobacco.

By the 1880s and 1890s, Black Patch tobacco growers were ensnared in the

same debt, tax, and mortgage problems that plagued other farmers in the South

and the West. They searched for solutions to their problems by joining such groups

as the Grangers, the Farmers’ Alliance, and the Populist Party. By 1904, when

tobacco sold for three cents a pound or less, growers blamed much of the farming

crisis on price ﬁxing by thre e tobacco buyers: the American Tobacco Company,

the Italian Regie, and the British Imperial. The companies would not compete with

each other, offering only one price instead of competitive bids. P rices for good

tobacco had never been so low, falling far below the cost of production. Overpro-

duction of tobacco and a change in American consumer preferences from chewing

tobacco to mild smoking blends compounded the economic problems of the

growers, but the majority of farmers were unaware of these trends within the

industry. They blame d their poverty on monopolies. Black Patch growers feared

the loss of their homes, their tobacco barns, and everything else that they pos-

sessed. Getting rid of the monopolies would save the Black Patch way of life.

To address their plight, tobacco growers in 1904 formed the Planters’ Protective

Association (PPA) and a secret force of vigilantes, known as the Possum Hunters,

the Silent Brigade, or the Night Riders. Economics were not the only motivatio n

for joining the PPA. Many growers joined because of a belief in the cultural ideal

of uniting as a community to oppose outside forces and to preserve a way of life.

Joining the PPA seemed the best way to both gain high tobacco prices and preserve

697

the community. Both white and black growers joined the PPA, which promised

African Americans equal treatment in the handling and sale of their cr ops. How-

ever, some Black Patch growers held values that conﬂicted with collectivism.

Growers with an individualistic temperament and a belief in freedom of choice

proudly identiﬁed themselves as “independents.” Combining with others in an

association threatened their sense of freedom. They feared losing control over

their crops, the sales method, and the prices. The Black Patch War would p it the

PPA, consisting of about 70 percent of the growers, against the independents.

PPA members viewed independents, known pejoratively as “hillbillies,” as a

threat to the very existence of the Black Patch economy and culture. In essence,

the independents blocked the success of the PPA. The collective needed greater than

70 percent grower participation to succeed. They viewed the refusal of the indepen-

dents to join the collective as selﬁsh, contemptible behavior. Further complicating

matters, tobacco company agents attacked the PPA by offering higher prices to inde-

pendent farmers, which, in turn, widened the rift between the PPA and the indepen-

dents. The clash contributed to the rise of vigilante action designed to intimidate the

independents into cooperating with the PPA.

The PPA promoted a po licy of shunning independents. Newspapers sympa-

thetic to the collective published the names of independents. Association leaders

read these names at their meetings and urged members to shun the hillbilly fami-

lies. Business owners and professionals who refused to back the PPA found them-

selves ostracized and their businesses boycotted. As these conﬂicts between

families and neighbors intensiﬁed, the Black Patch cultural proclivity for violence

in the face of threats to one’s person, family, home, economic way of life, and cul-

ture produced the Black Patch War.

Vigilantes from the PPA fought the war, but the PPA always denied knowledge

of vigilante action and condemned violence despite the clear aim of the Night

Riders to coerce cooperation among the growers. The vigilantes relied upon

secrecy a nd ritual to recruit and intimidate people. Blindfolded initiates held a

skull to remind them of their fate if they revealed the Night Riders’s plans of

action. Not all of the vigilantes participating in vigilantism did so willingly. People

who refused to cooperate with the Night Riders might be whipped or worse, result-

ing in a lingering fear decades later of speaking openly of the Black Patch War.

Mary Lou Hollowell, shot and kicked in May 1907 in an attack in which her hus-

band was badly whipped by vigilantes in front of their young son, had violated the

rule of silence by loudly opposing the Night Riders.

The vigilantes, operating in bands, initial ly targeted recalcitrant independents.

They burned tobac co storage buildings, destroyed plant beds, dynamited tobacco

barns, and threatened men afﬁliated with tobacco companies. Subsequently, under

a second distinctive phase of night riding, violence was directed at African

698 Black Patch War (1909)

Americans who seemed to threaten the social and economic status quo. Most dra-

matically, the Night Riders conducted raids on the regional tobacco towns, such as

Princeton, Kentucky. In this case, masked Night Riders rode into town in Novem-

ber 1906, captured the police ofﬁcers, seized the telephone station, and then burned

two large tobacco warehouses connected to the American Tobacco Company.

Most Black Patch War attacks were smaller. The case of Henry Bennett is typ-

ical. Bennett, whipped by Night Riders in February 1908, owned a tobacco ware-

house and had ignored previous Night Rider orders to stop buying tobacco for

the American Tobacco Company. Typically, the Night Riders ordere d Bennett to

scream loudly so that people within hearing distance would be intimidated by

the beating being inﬂicted upon him. Bennett never fully recovered from his

wounds and died in October 1910 in Metropolis, Il linois, where he had ﬂed with

his family.

By 1908, lawsuits against the Night Riders had become common and helped

weaken the group. Bennett had ﬁled suit in October 1908 for damages relating to

his business losses and medical injuries. He named Dr. David Amoss, the alleged

leader of th e Night Riders, as well as over 100 other suspected Night Riders.

Bennett received $100 for medical expenses and $15,000 for the loss of his busi-

ness. Robert Hollowell, the husband of Mary Lou, won $35,000 in damages in

May 1908. Hollowell’s victory prompted other victims to ﬁle damage suits. Most

aggressive Night Rider activities were then abandoned, and the Black Patch War

drew to a close. Tobacco farmers had also entered an era of prosperity, making col-

lective action less necessary for survival.

—Caryn E. Neumann

See also all entries under Shays’ Rebellion (1787); Whiskey Rebellion (1794);

Dorr Rebellion (1841–1842); Molly Maguires (1870s); Brooks-Baxter War (1874);

Bonus Army (1932); Battle of Athens (1946); Sagebrush Rebellion (1979–1981); World

Trade Organization Protests (1999).

Further Reading

Marshall, Suza nne. Violence in the Black Patch of Kentucky a nd Tennessee. Columbia:

University of Missouri Press, 1994.

Miller, John G. The Black Patch War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,

1936.

Black Patch War (1909) 699

American Tobacco Company (ATC)

During the decade between 1889 and 1899, the American Tobacco Company

(ATC), through acquisitions, mergers, and backroom deals, came to dominate the

tobacco trade of the American South, and thus, the world. During that decade,

ATC’s founder, James B. Duke, moved to consolidate his dominance by undercut-

ting the prices changed by the other four of the “Big Five” tobacco companies. By

pursuing a similar business strategy to Standard Oil’s John D. Rockefeller, D uke

soon drove his competitors to his own door, looking to join forces with the ATC

juggernaut. Finally, in October 1899, an agreement was signed that merged the

“Big Five” into ATC, ensuring that the company would have an overwhelming

controlling interest in the tobacco industry for the foreseeable future. That domi-

nance, however, came with a price for the small, independent tobacco farmers of

Kentucky and Tennessee (Campbell 1993, 21–23).

During the early 1900s, the consolidation of the “Big Five” resulted in tobacco

prices falling so far as to dip below the cost of production. Small family tobacco

farmers in Tennessee and Kentucky d ecided to take action. Meeting in churches,

schoolhouses, and courthouses, tobacco farmers fought back by forming coopera-

tives that would be able to collectively bargain with ATC, resulting in fairer pric-

ing for the farmers (Campbell 1993, 2). This protectionist impulse ultimately led

to the formation of the Dark Tobacco District Planters’ Protective Association

(DTDPPA) on September 24, 1904, the group that would directly challenge ATC’s

control over tobacco prices.

The goal of the DTDPPA was to f orce ATC to raise tobacco prices through

cooperative marketing. The conﬂict became violent during 1905–1907, when

some DTDPPA members, dissatisﬁed with the response of ATC, took more radical

action, forming an unofﬁcial group known as the Night Riders, who used violence

both to force ATC’s hand and to force reluctant farmers to join the DTDPPA. By

1908, the persistent actions of the DTDPPA and the Night Riders were able to con-

vince ATC to abandon its tactic, even going so far as to force James B. Duke out of

the business altogether.

—Steven L. Danver

Further Reading

Campbell, Tracey. The Polit ics of Despair: Power and Resistance in the Tobacco Wars.

Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1993.

Gregory, Rick. “Beliefs of Their Fathers: Violence, R eligion, and the Black Patch War,

1904–1914.” Border States: Journal of the Kentucky-Tennessee American Studies Asso-

ciation 9 (1993).

701

Marshall, Suzanne. Violence in the Black Pa tch of Kentucky and Tennessee . Columbia:

University of Missouri Press, 1994.

Waldrep, Christopher. Night Riders: Defending Community in the Black Patch, 1890–

1915. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993.

Dark Tobacco District Planters’

Protective Association (DTDPPA)

During the ﬁrst years of the 20th century, the American Tobacco Company (ATC)

embarked on an attempt to corner the southern tobacco supply and, in cooperation

with the Italian Regie Tobacco Company, the world market. Through eliminating

competition, ATC drove down the price paid to small family farmers for tobacco.

However, small tobacco farmers in what was known as the “Black Patch” of Ten-

nessee and Kentucky staged a populist revolt, ta king collaborative action in what

would become an extremely successful model of standing up to “the trust,” as they

called ATC, during the Progressive Era in America.

The consolidation of the tobacco industry was not the only factor leading to

hard times for tobacco farmers. Subject to the same pressures that impacted all

farmers during the late 19th century, tobacco farmers began the 20th century with

massive debt and high mortgage payments (Marshall 1994, 107). Increased pro-

duction levels, tha nks to the mechanization of agriculture during the Industrial

Revolution, ﬂooded the market. This left the farmers extremely vulnerable to

any vacillations in the price of tobacco, making ATC’s move to dominate the

industry that much more of a threat.

Sporadic meetings taking place in local communities throughout the Black

Patch were not creating the desi red results, as ATC buyers would simpl y bypass

less cooperative towns for those who were more desperate to sell their tobacco.

In addition, the other organizations they had joined, includin g the National

Grange, the Farmer’s Alliance, and the Populist Party, were not responsive to the

needs of such a speciﬁc subset of their constituencies. As community leaders

began to communicate with one another across the region, it became abundantly

clear to them that the only way that they could defeat ATC was through coordi-

nated action across the Black Patch. This led to the founding of a local chapter

of the Planters’ Protective Association, called the Dark Tobacco District Planters’

Protective Association (DTDPPA) on September 24, 1904, to coordinate efforts to

combat ATC’s control over tobacco prices.

702 Black Patch War (1909)

One of many examples of southern populism, the new movement was not with-

out its paternalist and racist aspects. Speaking before Congress, Charl es H. Fort,

the president of the DTDPPA, explained that they were not seeking to overt hrow

the souther n social system, but rat her to reinforce it. The elite, those white land-

owners who dealt directly with the trust, had a responsibility to the poorer, unedu-

cated tenant farmers, many of whom were African American. Thus, the DTDPPA’s

efforts on behalf of landowners really were on behalf of the entire southern social

and economic order.

The DTDPPA operated on a representative basi s, with the landowners of each

district electing a district chair, and the district chairs electing a county chair.

These c ounty chairmen formed the executive committee of the DTDPPA as a

whole. Their objective, forcing ATC to compete with other tobacco buyers to cre-

ate a better situation for the farmers, was difﬁcult. Some members, unhappy with

the slow progress of the group, organized into vigilante groups known as the Night

Riders, who used violence to reach their goals.

Just as there were multiple causes for tobacco farmers’ troubles in the ﬁrst de-

cade of the 20th century, a combination of f actors resulted in improvements in

the situation by the end of the decade. The DTDPPA and Night Riders put pressure

on ATC, and the Progressive agenda of American politics at the time resulted in

the breakup of the ATC’s monopoly. That, combined with declining production,

led to higher prices for tobacco. However, community action by the DTDPPA cer-

tainly played a large part in the successful conclusion of the Black Patch War.

—Steven L. Danver

Further Reading

Campbell, Tracey. The Polit ics of Despair: Power and Resistance in the Tobacco Wars.

Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1993.

Gregory, Rick. “Beliefs of Their Fathers: Violence, R eligion, and the Black Patch War,

1904–1914.” Border States: Journal of the Kentucky-Tennessee American Studies Asso-

ciation 9 (1993).

Marshall, Suza nne. Violence in the Black Patch of Kentucky a nd Tennessee. Columbia:

University of Missouri Press, 1994.

Wald rep, Christopher. Night Riders: Defending Community in the Black Patch, 1890–

1915. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993.

Statement of Charles H. Fort, President of the Tobacco

Growers’ Association of the United States, February 4, 1904

In this congressional testimony, Charles H. Fort, a tobacco farmer from Robertson County,

Tennessee, and president of the Dark Tobacco District Planters’ Protective Association, tells

about the hardships of tobacco farming and the impact of the “Regie” contractors,

Black Patch War (1909) 703

representatives of the three big tobacco producers, working in collusion to drive down the prices

being paid to farmers.

Mr. Fort: Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, I am glad to be

before you. I want to say that I am no speaker. I am a humble farmer.

I was raised on the farm and have made tobacco all my life. I know

nothing else, and I know nothing about the statistics and facts these

gentlemen are getting up here, but I do know the hardships that have

been brought on our people.

Mr. Stanley: I just want to get you to say to this committee, because you raise the

same tobacco as there is in my district, the amount of work that is

necessary to produce a crop of tobacco; the amount that one ordinary

tenant, working with his family, would produce to the acre, the work

necessary to do it, and the price that tobacco would bring under

present conditions. Just take your time and state that to the committee.

Mr. Gaines: In the course of your remarks as you go along, just as you please.

Mr. Fort: Thank you, gentlemen. I do not know anything but to raise tobacco.

We had one of the biggest meetings the other day that we ever had in

our country, and we worked all day in getting up the statistics of what

it cost our farmers in Robinson County to make a pound of tobacco,

and we decided that it cost us 6 cents a pound. Before these trusts

came in there we had the advantage of the balance of the counties of

this district, and we have sold tobacco as high as 20 cents a pound. I

have one neighbor close to me, and this Regie contractor offered him

a price one afternoon, and I telephoned him and tried to get him to sell

his crop of tobacco, and he said, “I can not do it; I have to consult my

tenants and hired hands and men who raise tobacco on shares.” In our

county we work mostly colored labor, and we give them half of the

tobacco and corn they raise. We furnish all the land and all the stock

and tools and we furnish them a house to live in and furnish them all

the fertilizer and then give them half of what they make.

Well, now, this agent came along and offered this gentleman a price for

his tobacco, and he could not take it until the next morning. Next

morning he went to close out the trade with this agent, and the agent

would not take it, and he knocked him down $100. Of course he could

not take that until he had consulted again with his people, and when he

went back the agent knocked him down again; and in the next three

weeks he knocked him down $250. We have our hands tied down

there and we can not do a thing.

Mr. Gaines: Who does this knocking?

Mr. Fort: The “Regie” contractors.

Mr. Stanley: Tell this committee how many acres of tobacco land a man can

cultivate.

704 Black Patch War (1909)

Mr. Fort: Three acres is, in our country, a good crop for one hand.

Mr. Stanley: Just describe it like you see it on your place.

Mr. Fort: We have croppers. I do not work anything but negroes on my place,

and they have women and children, and they all work, and manage to

work about three acres to the 8 hand—that is, the man. Now, you

may not know it, but tobacco is the most slavish crop—and the dark

tobacco is the worst—in the United States, without exception. We

have to work fifteen months in a year on a crop of tobacco. I have my

last year’s crop of tobacco in the barn now, hung up, just like that leaf

that you have there, and we have to work from sunup until sundown,

fifteen hours a day.

Mr. Gaines: Do you have to worm your tobacco very much?

Mr. Fort: Sometimes the worms are so bad that you can not cultivate an acre, if

the worms get as bad as I have seen them. The result is that the crop

is eaten up.My brother and I own our farm in partnership, and he was

down in Mississippi several years ago working on a levee contract,

and I was staying on the farm, and I sent some tobacco down there to

him, and if this tax had been removed from this tobacco we could

have sold our entire crop for 15 to 20 cents a pound, and as it was

we sold it for 5 cents.

Mr. Gaines: What do you mean by “twist”?

Mr. Fort: Without any medication at all.

Mr. Gaines: The way the manufacturers sell it now, they put some sort of

medication in it?

Mr. Fort: Yes, sir. I will explain to you why we can handle it and why we want to be

able to handle it and make it into a twist and stem it ourselves. When the

rainy days come the tobacco leaf is moist and pliant, and you can take it

and twist it or roll it or do anything that you please with it—make cigars

out of it, or anything—and you can take the stem out of it and twist it, in

this way [indicating], or you can do anything you like with it at all.

I would like to answer the question of the gentleman over there. We

are not fighting any trust. We want competition. We need

competition. This thing has gone on down in our country until we

have only one or two buyers there, and they actually have the

territory prescribed and limited and laid off until there is one of my

neighbors who had a barn full of tobacco on one side of the road and

another barn full of tobacco on the other side, and a buyer came

there and he offered him this tobacco on one side of the road and he

bought that, and then he offered him the tobacco in the barn on the

other side of the road and the buyer said, “I can not buy that tobacco

over there; it is not in my territory.” And that man lost $2 on all the

tobacco in that barn on the other side, because he could not sell to

this buyer his whole crop, because it was not in his territory.

Black Patch War (1909) 705