Danver Steven L. (Edited). Revolts, Protests, Demonstrations, and Rebellions in American History: An Encyclopedia (ENG)
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Bloody Monday (1855)
This name was given to the rioting on August 6, 1855, during the election in
the town of Louisville, Kentucky, which saw clashes between supporters of
the Democratic Party and the American Party (colloquially called the
“Know-Nothing Party”), which saw at least 22 people killed.
Members of the Know-Nothing Party w ere angered a t the number of immi-
grants arriving from Germany and Ireland in the United States during the 1840 s
and the early 1850s, and the resulting demographic change in many places.
Louisville was the 10th largest city in the United States, and in 1850, some 40 per-
cent of the population had been born in Germany, a large rise on the previous cen-
sus returns. This increase had been noticeable, and it had led to worries of violence
in the 1855 state elections, with the mayor, James S. Speed, forced from office by
the courts. He had recently married and converted to Roman Catholicism, height-
ening tensions against Catholics. Rumors had spread that the Irish and German
Roman Catholics had managed to interfere with the voting process, and as a result,
rioters supported by Know-Nothing Party politicians, and also thugs and looters,
attacked Irish and German homes.
The Kno w-Nothing supporters were inflamed by writings by George D. Prentice,
an influential Whig, and biographer of Henry Clay, the editor of the Louisville
Journal since 1830. He railed against the increasing power of newly arriv ed migrants
and urged for action, although he held back from advocating violence—this did not
prevent J. M. Lee from calling him “one of the greatest editors of the middle nine-
teenth century.”
Homes and businesses of Irish and Germans, including those of German Protestants
and German Jews, had been the targets of isolated attacks in 1854 and the first half of
1855 , with the Know-Nothing Party stockpiling weapons at the Louis ville Metro
Hall. However on August 6, 1855, there were major attacks on hundreds of homes
and businesses, with arsonists setting fire to some of these. The official death toll
was placed at 22, but the Roman Catholic bishop, Martin Spalding, put the death toll
at over 100.
Louisville’s mayor, John Barbee, a member of the Know-Nothing Party, inter-
vened to stop the rioting, and he personally managed to save the Cathedral of the
Assumption and also the German St. M artin of Tours church from being burned
down. T he rioting in Louisville resulted in a mass exo dus from the city as many
businessmen moved to Chic ago, Milwaukee, St. Louis, and Prairie City, Kansas.
There were copycat attacks in Chicago, Cincinnati, Columbus, New Orleans, and
St. Louis, but these were quickly stopped.
—Justin Corfield
377
Further Reading
Coulter, E. Merton. The Civil War and Readjustment in Kentucky. Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 1926.
Kleber, John E., ed. The Encyclopedia of Louisville. Lexington: University Press of
Kentucky, 2001.
Lee, James M elvin. A History of American Journalism. Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1917.
Nativism
The concept of nativism had been around since at least the late 18th century, emerg-
ing out of the American War of Independence in which people in the United States
wanted to rule themselves without interference from others. Although most accepted
immigration as the only way of swelling the U.S. population, many wanted to limit
the right to vote and especially the right to stand for office. Indeed, the U.S.
Constitution made it a prerequisite of standing for the presidency that a candidate
had to be “a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of
the Adoption of the Constitution.” W ith this requirement, many nativists argued that
all they were campaigning for was an extension of this to other elected offices.
It was the mass migration initially of Germans in the 1820s and 1830s, and then
the Irish in the 1840s, that essentially turned nativism into a major political force.
People who described themselves as “defenders of the Protestant faith” were
involved in attacks on Catholics and Catholic institutions, e specially churches,
and in 1834, a convent was burned in an arson attack. These attacks gradually
led to the formation of the Native American Party, which was founded in 1843
as the American Republican Party. It wanted to extend the period of naturalization
to 21 years, it did not want anybody who was not native born to be nominated for
public offi ce, and affirm ed that “the Protestant scriptures” sho uld be taught in all
schools. As Irish immigration increased in the 1840s because of the potato famine
in Ireland, anti-Catholic sentiment spread rapidly, and this was seen in the rise, in
the early 1850s, of the Know-Nothing Party.
Although the differences mooted by the nativists were largely religious and eth-
nic, they were exacer bated by another contrast that had begun to appear in U.S.
society. Many of the original British and northern European settlers in the United
States came to a rural America and settled in villages and townships, w here they
established farms and workshops. A large number brought with them some money
and tools. Most of the Irish immigrants who arrived in the 1840s were destitute,
and settled in urban slums. They worked for low w ages in factories, and gangs
378 Know-Nothing Riots (1855–1856)
started forming as portrayedinMartinScorsese’sfilmThe Gangs of New York
(2001), set during the Irish-nativist riots that took place in the Five Points area in
New York C ity. These factors combined together, and although nativism was
largely against equal rights for people born overseas, it was quickly translated into
dislike of urbanism and industrialization as well as immigration.
—Justin Corfield
Further Reading
Fry, Brian N. Nativism and Immigration: Regulating the American Dream. New York:
LFB Scholarly Publications, 2007.
Higham, John. Strangers in the L and: Patterns of American Nativism 1860–1925 .New
York: Atheneum, 1963.
Leonard, Ira M., and Robert D. Parmet. American Nativism 1830–1 860.NewYork:Van
Nostrand-Reinhold, 1971.
Plug Uglies
The Plug Uglies were a group who acted as a street gang on the west side of
Baltimore, Maryland, from 1854 until 1860. They made a show of force ar ound
elections, and as a result, it was important for politicians to get their support to pre-
vent any trouble as voters were heading to the polls. Their main focus was always
in Baltimore. There is some evidence that a few of t he members also may have
operated in New York City, but certainly not there as Plug Uglies, although the
term was occasionally freely used by journalists to describe criminal gangs operat-
ing in similar guises elsewhere in the United States.
Essentially, the Plu g Uglies owed their origin to the Mount Vernon Hook-and-
Ladder Comp any, which operated a private fire brigade. They quickly gained a
reputation for the provision of “muscle” in disputes, and soon its members became
closely associated with the American (Know-Nothing) Party. They first made a
show o f force in October 1855, and in October of the following yea r, they were
involved in battles alongside their allies, the Rip Raps and anot her gang called
the Wompanoag, during the Baltimore municipal elections, which saw Thomas
Swann, a Know-Nothing candidate, elected as mayor.
Members of the group were later involved in fighting in Washington, D.C.,
during a Know-Nothing riot, during which U.S. Marines were ordered to open fire
and shot dead 10 people. They also gained national prominence over press
coverage for the arrest and trial of Hen ry Gambrill, the owner of a public house,
for the murder of Be njamin Benton, a Baltimor e police office r, on t he night of
Know-Nothing Riots (1855–1856) 379
Wednesday, September 22, 1858. Benton was with two other policemen trying to
arrest two “disorderly characters,” but Gambrill, not one of the two being arrested,
intervened and shot Benton dead with a revolver. Benton had been in the police
force for eight years, and his death caused consternation. Ca ptain Linaweaver
arrested Gambri ll, and the coroner found that Gambrill had killed Benton. The
sensational press coverage of the trial resulted in much speculation on the state
of law and order in Baltimore. Gambrill was sentenced to death and executed.
The incident had the side effect of forci ng the municipal authorities in Baltimore
to have a modern and regulated police force and also a professional fire brigade.
The Plug Uglies proved less effective after Thomas Swann introduced reforms
in municipal elections in October 1860, an d then, with the outbreak of the Civil
War, they faded from the political scene.
—Justin Corfield
Further Reading
“Another Bloody Affray in Baltimore—Police Officer Killed.” New York T imes,September25,
1858, 1.
Melton, Tracy Matthew. Hanging Henry Gambrill: The Violent Career of Baltimore’s Plug
Uglies, 1854–1860. Baltimore: Maryland Historical Society, 2005.
Tuska, Benjamin. “Know Nothingism in Baltimore 1854–1860.” Catholic Historical
Review 11, no. 2 (July 1925): 217–251.
Rip Raps
This street gang operated in Baltimore, Maryland, and it was allied to the Plug
Uglies and another gang known as the Wompanoag, all three being supporters
of the American (Know-Nothing) Party. In favor of limiting (or ending) immigra-
tion, the group was nativist and anti-Catholic. It seems that they took their name
from the Rip Rap shoals in the Hampton Roads, and they fought against supporters
of the Democratic Party in various elections. In October 1856, during the munici-
pal elections in Baltimore, the Rip Raps were responsible for an attack on the New
Market Fire Company headquarters in the Lexington Market, where the Demo-
crats were located—the Rip Raps supporting the candidacy of Thomas Swann of
the Know-Nothing Party.
The Rip Raps later claimed that there had been provocation, but it seemed that
they did not really need this to attack the Democrats in the marketplace, which
was followed by the building being set on fire and trashed. Rip Raps were involved
in chasi ng fleeing Democrats around nearby streets where they were b eaten up.
380 Know-Nothing Riots (1855–1856)
By the time the fighting had subsided, 2 people were killed and 20 were seriously
wounded. Thomas Swann did win the election, defeating Wright, the Democrat
candidate.
Although the Rip Raps were heavily inv olv ed in the central fighting, their reputa-
tion was largely made by the press coverage that followed. Newspapers in New York
and Philadelphia proclaimed that anarchy had broken out in Baltimore, and during
the presidential and congressional elections a month later, in November 1856, there
was heavy intimidation of voters by the Rip Raps such that in the presidential
election, Millard Fillmore, the former president and the candidate for the
Know-Nothing Party, managed to win the state by a significant margin over James
Buchanan. It was the only state in the Union that Fillmore won, and his victory was
credited to the role of the Rip Raps.
Pressure was brought on the munic ipal authorities in Baltimore to crack down
on the Rip Raps, and Swann was forced to do this. By the time of the crucial 1860
U.S. presidential election, the gang had lost its p ower, and it disappeared as a
group with the Civil War. Indeed, Thomas Swann used his position as mayor—
gained with the support of the Rip Raps—to build up a professional police force
and fire brigade, undermining the power of the gangs that had helped in his elec-
tion. In 1864, Swann was elected governor of Maryland as a Unionist candidate.
—Justin Corfield
Further Reading
Melton, Tracy Matthew. Hanging Henry Gambrill: The Violent Career of Baltimore’s Plug
Uglies, 1854–1860. Baltimore: Maryland Historical Society, 2005.
Tuska, Benjamin. “Know Nothingism in Baltimore 1854–1860.” Catholic Historical
Review 11, no. 2 (July 1925): 217–251.
Vigilance Committees
The vigilance committees were established in parts of the United States in the 19th
century to provide protection for law-abiding citizens when either there was no
system of law and order, or the system operating had become corrupted. In the for-
mer situation, the vigilance committees operated in areas in the Midwest and also
the “Wild West,” but there were occasions when an existing police force was
unable to control a situation, and the system of vigilance committees was used to
protect people.
In the political violence which struck parts of the United States in the 1850s,
gangs associated with the American (Know-Nothing) Party such as the Plug
Know-Nothing Riots (1855–1856) 381
Uglies and the Rip Raps in Baltimore, Maryland, and similar groups in other
states, were involved in assaulting and, in extreme cases, killing supporters of rival
political parties, particularly the Democratic Party. The result was that many Irish
and other communities of newly arrived immigrants were worried about these
attacks, and they formed vigilance committees. The most well known of these
were the New York Committee of Vigilance and the New York State Vigilance Com-
mittee, both of which operated in New York City.
However, the main vigilance committee connected with the Know-Nothing
Party was one established in mid-1858 in New Orleans. It was formed by the
mayor, Charle s M. Waterman, with Captain J. K. Duncan of the U.S. Army as it s
president. Its stated aim was “freeing the city of New-Orleans of the well-known
and notorious ‘Thugs,’ outlaws, assassins, and murderers who infest it.” Certainly,
there was fear put around by nativists about rising crime from recently arrived
Irish and German migrants, and it was felt that there might be an attempt to disrupt
the municipal elections scheduled for June 7. Five days before the polling, Captain
Duncan took his men to Jackson Square in central New Orleans, where they occu-
pied the Cabildo, the seat of the city council and also a major courtroom, securing
the place for the elections.
The place was then secured, and when the elections were held, Gerard Stith of
the Native American Party, who was supported by the vigilance committee,
defeated Pierre G. T. Beauregar d. On the evening of the elections, Duncan wrote
an o pen letter to Brigadier General M. Grivot, the adjutant general of Louisiana,
informing him that “we took up the arms which were are about to replace in your
hands at the urgent request of o ur fellow citizens, with the object of freeing our
city from the p ublic malefactors who have infested it for these three ye ars past,”
from the “Camp of the Vigilance Committee, State Arsenal.” The vigilance com-
mittee stood down, and on June 21, Stith was sworn in as mayor. Beauregard went
on to become a general in the Confede rate Army, lea ding the attack on Fort
Sumter and being the victorious general at the First Battle of Bull Run in 1861.
—Justin Corfield
Further Reading
Basso, Hamilton. Beauregard: The Great Creole. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,
1933.
“New-Orleans Vigilance Committee.” New York Times, June 14, 1858.
“The Su rrender of the New-Orleans Vigilance Committee.” New York Times, J une 17,
1858.
382 Know-Nothing Riots (1855–1856)
Utah War (1857–1858)
The Utah War, often also called the “Mormon War,” was fought from March 1857
until July 1858, mostly in what is now Utah but also in parts of Wyoming. It took
place after the U.S. government, under orders from President James Buchanan,
sent federal troops to Utah to stop what th ey saw as a revolt by Mormons there.
Buchanan was concerned and then, after more reports, very worried that the Mor-
mons planned to secede from the United States.
The region containing the modern-day state of Utah had been acquired from
Mexico following the war in 1848, and many of the Mormons went there in the
following yea r, led by their leade r Brigham Young, to e scape persecution in the
eastern states. During the 185 0s, the federal government sent administrators to
Utah, and these often complained to Washington, D.C., of h arassment there. As
the M orm ons had m oved there to escape the problem s in the east, they resented
the idea of federal authorities trying to control their lives and interfering with their
religious beliefs. The administrators, however, viewed the actions by the Mormons
as similar to an act of undec lared rebellion. Indeed, in 1854, there were accusa-
tions that some Danish Mormons had arrived in Salt Lake City, and when they
decided to leave and head to California, they were attacked by other Mormons dis-
guised as Native Americans.
In 1857 , Buchanan decided to replac e the Mormon le ader Brigham Young as
governor of Uta h with Alfre d Cumming (1802–1873). Many in Was hington,
D.C., viewed Young’s governorship essentially as being theocratic, and the region
as being a theodemocracy. Cumming by contrast was from Augusta, Georgia, he
was not a Mormon, and the Mormons resented his initial appointment. I ndeed,
Cumming was scared about heading to Salt Lake City without protection. Bu-
chanan then received reports—variously described as erroneous, but certainly
exaggerated—that the Mormons were preparing to rebel against the government,
and even possibly secede from the Union. At that time, there was constant talk
of secession from the southern states over attempts to abolish slavery, and
Buchanan was anxious not to preside over the breakup of the country.
As a result, Buchanan sent over 2,500 soldiers in an expeditionary force under
the command of General William S. Harney. This was composed of the 5th
Infantry Regiment, some of the 10th Regiment, the 2nd Dragoons, and two artillery
batteries. On July 18, 1857, the soldiers set out from Fort Le avenworth, Kansas,
383
expecting that this show of force would see the Mormons quickly submit, and the
whole of Utah would be under military control by the end of the fall.
Captain Stewart Van Vliet (1815–1901), an a ssistant quartermaster in the U.S.
Army (and later a Union general), rode ahead of the main detachment from Kansas
to Salt Lake City. T hey demanded that t he citizenry in Utah furnish the soldiers
with provisions when they arrived. Halfway through his journey, and worried that
he might be attacked as he had a number of soldiers with him, Van Vliet decided to
continue on the remainder of the route alone. He reached Salt Lake City on
September 8 and met with Young, warning him that soldiers were on the way and
hoping to avoid a conflict. Young ensured that Van Vliet was well receiv ed—his pre-
vious dealing with Mormons in Iowa had been cordial. Young however, did not want
Cumming to take over and said that he would feel duty bound to resist.
While Van Vliet was me eting with Young, the remainder of the expeditionary
force was making slow progress. Young was certainly increasingly worried that
the soldiers might try to overrun Utah and impo se their will on the Mormons. As
a result, he had mobilized the local militia and started preparing for a guerilla
war to harass the U.S. soldiers as they marched into Utah. His militia was well
experienced, with many having served in the Nauvoo Legion, and a number
having had military training and having fought in the Mexican War.
With the federal soldiers slowing their advance, on September 11, command
was handed over from Harney to General Albert Sidney Johnston (1803–1862),
later to be come a distinguished officer in the Confederate Army in the American
Civil War. By this time, Mormon militia had continued to slow the advance of
the federal soldiers, who decided not to risk an open confrontation. Indeed, on
the same day that Johnston took command of the federal soldiers, some Mormo n
militia attacked about 120 settlers who were heading to California. The resulting
shoot-out be came known as the Mountain Meadows Ma ssacre, which saw
120 men, women, and children massacred. It was a brutal action, with the only sur-
vivors being 17 children under the age of eight. The event received much publicity
in the local press and quickly caused great worry in the federal camp, who decided
to act far more cautiously as they felt that the chances of the Mormons fighting
them was obviously high.
Subsequent scholarship on the Mountain Meadows Massacre tend to suggest
that the event was not directed by the Mormon leaders in Salt Lake City, but was
rather carried out by local Mormons, either out of worry about non-Mormon civil-
ians in the region or simply for plunder. They were also fueled by hatred of outsid-
ers. The incident was, however, merged in the public imagination with what
became known as the Aiken Massacre. This was quite different, as it involved
six wealthy men from California being arrested by Mormon militiamen who sus-
pected that they were spies. The men were soon released but murdered as they left.
384 Utah War (1857–1858)
By this time, the federal tr oops had reac hed South Pass, and they were
approaching the positions held by the Mormon Nauvoo Militia. Also, the Mormon
cavalry u nder Lot Smith was shadowing t he U.S. advance. The Mormons were
keen not to engage in open warfare with the federal troops as it was felt that this
would be totally counterproductive. On the one hand, it might increase the ire of
the politicians against the Mormons, and it might encourage a larger force to be
sent, but some of the Mormons were worried that they would not be able to hold
off the men under Johnston anyway. However, there was sufficient uncertainty in
Johnston’s mind as to what the Mormons might do for him to proceed extremely
cautiously.
There were also a number of other skirmishes, and the Mormon mission at Fort
Limhi in the east of Oregon Territory was attacked by Native Americans, and two
Mormons killed. Some historians link this t o the war as Mormons in the r egion
were collecting supplies, and it was because of this that tensions with the local
Native Americans resulted.
At this point, Johnston realized that he might not be able to take Salt Lake City
that year and the U.S. forces then established a winter camp near Fort Bridger.
Nearby, the Mormons starte d building their fortifications to resist when the fight-
ing was expected to start in the spring of 1858. This “winter intermission” allowed
time for Brigham Young to try to use diplomacy to achieve something more for his
cause. He contacted Thomas L. Kane of Pennsylvania and asked him whether he
could help—he had previously been favorable to the Mormons. It seems that Kane
persuaded Young that the Mormons would lose any major conflict, and that the
best route forwar d for Young was to accept Cumming as the governor and allow
the federal soldiers into Utah.
Kane did not get on at all well with Johnston—the two were to be on opposing
sides in the Civil War only three years later—but Kane had managed to work out a
diplomatic compromise, in which Cumming traveled to Salt Lake City under a
safe conduct pass, but without his military escort. In April 1858, Alfred Cumming
was officially sworn in as governor, and both sides decided to compromise.
Although Cumming was now governor, Brigham Young was still cautious about
the role of federal troops, which were not reinforced by further soldiers dispatched
from the east. H e had c ontemplated what was c alled the “Sevastopol Policy,” in
which he would burn down Salt Lake City and he and the Mormons would evacu-
ate the territory, possibly to Mexico. The idea of t he evacuation worried the
British, who were concerned that he might, in fact, head t o Canada, possibly to
Vancouver Island. However, there were attacks on Mormons in that region, and
the Mormons there started moving south.
The seriousness of this plan was shown by the fact that Brigham Young had
already, in February of that year, sent exploration parties to the White Mountains
Utah War (1857–1858) 385