Danver Steven L. (Edited). Revolts, Protests, Demonstrations, and Rebellions in American History: An Encyclopedia (ENG)
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The Position Paper called for radical alterations to the relationship between
American Indian nations and the federal government. First on its list of demands
was a restoration of the treaty relationship that had existed between Indian nations
and th e federal government from colonial ti mes until the passage of the Indian
Appropriations Act of 1871. Among its other demands were the establishment of
a treaty commissi on to oversee the new treaties, the establishment of a c ommi s-
sion to review earlier treaties and violations of those treaties by the federal
government, judicial r ecognition of the right of Indian nations to interpret the
meanings of treaties for themselves, the restoration of a 110-million-acre land base
for American Indian people, restoration of all rights taken away from certain tribes
during the “termination” era of the 1950s–1960s (when federal policy was to end
the trust relationship between the federal government and the tribes), replacement
of the Bureau of Indian A ffairs with an Office of Federa l I ndian Relations and
Community Reconstruction, protection of American Indian religious freedom,
and numerous initiatives aimed at creating econo mic and educational opportuni-
ties for Indian people (American Indian Movement 1972).
1068 Trail of Broken Treaties (1972)
Dennis Banks (left) and preacher Carl McEntire during the 1972 Trail of Broken Treaties
occupation of the Bureau of Indian Affairs headquarters in Washington, D.C. (Bettmann/
Corbis)
On the evening of November 2, 1972, the caravan arrived in Washington. AIM
leaders had two immediate goals: first, to present the “20-Point Position Paper” to
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) or other high-level Nixon administration officials;
and second, to find hou sing for the nearly 1,000 Indian protesters who had made
their way to Washington. The next morning, AIM leaders arrived at the BIA head-
quarters to meet with officials and present their de mands. AIM l eaders met with
BIA commissioner Louis R . Bruce, but as the day went on, they became increas-
ingly frustrated by the intransigence of the federal officials and their unwillingness
to help the protesters find adequate accommodations. As Suzan Shown Harjo
recalls, “It was the end of the workday for Washington bureaucrats and few BIA
employees remained in the building after 4:30 p.m. TBT [Trail of Broken Treaties]
negotiators accepted the federal offer to move from the BIA to the Labor Depart-
ment, but no one clued in the Gene ral Services Adminis tration (GSA) officers,
who h ad orders to clear the building at 5:00 p.m.” (Harjo 2002). GSA officers
began to attempt to remove the AIM pro testers from the BIA headquarters. AIM
leaders decided that it would be better both to house the protesters and to gain
the me dia spotlight if they occupied the headqua rters building, beginning a six-
day standoff with federal officials. Police surrounded the building, which was only
six blocks from the White House, with snipers.
Henry L. Adams, who had written the Position Paper, was appointed lead nego-
tiator, and the Position Paper became the list of demands protesters wanted met to
end the occupation. Threats of an armed assault and the detonation of explosives
were made by federal officials attempting to force the protes te rs into sur re nde r,
but to no effect. Some AIM leaders, lik e Russell Mea ns, wanted to destroy the
BIA headquarters, but cooler heads prevailed just barely, literally stomping out
the fuses to Molotov cocktails that had already been lit. Although federal officials
showed restraint (largely because a violent altercation in the days before an elec-
tion was not a good idea), President Richard Nixon felt nothing but antipathy
toward the protesters. Years later, Nixon aide John Ehrlichman recalled that
Nixon’s only comment regarding the protest was “Get those godd amn Indians
out of town” (Harjo 2002).
By November 8, the protest began to run out of steam. It officially came to an
end when Nixon administration officials agreed to create a commission to look
into the demands stated in the “20-Point Position Paper,” promised not to charge
any of the protesters with any crimes associated with the protest, and paid the
expenses for the protesters to return home. With the crisis averted and a landslide
victory for President Nixon, in January 1973, the administration issued its
response to the Position Paper, in which it merely sung the praises of BIA and
administration officials in dealing with Indians and denying the central part of
the Position Paper—the demand for a restoration of the treaty relationship.
Trail of Broken Treaties (1972) 1069
Although ordinary protesters were not prosecuted, the FBI added AIM leaders to
their list of possible subversive protest leaders, a decision that would have dra-
matic ramifications with the occupation and violence that took place the following
year at the site of the 1890 Wounded Knee Massacre.
—Steven L. Danver
See also all entries under Pueblo Revolt (1680); Pima Revolt (1751); Pontiac’s Rebellion
(1973); Flight of the Nez Perce
´
(1877); Wounded Knee I (1890); Alcatraz Island Occupation
(1969–1971); Wounded Knee II (1973).
Further Reading
American Indian Movement. “Trail of Broken Treaties 20-Point Position Paper: An Indian
Manifesto.” October 31, 1972. Copy available at the American Indian Movement
website, http://www.aimovement.org/archives/index.html (accessed April 1, 2010).
Deloria, Vine, Jr. Behind the Trail of Broken Treaties: An Indian Declaration of Independence.
New York: Dell Publishing, 1974.
Grossman, Mark. The Native Amer ican Rights Movement. Santa Barbara , CA: ABC-
CLIO, 1996.
Harjo, Suzan Shown. “Trail of Broken Treaties: A 30th Anniversary M emory.” Indian
Country Today, November 1, 2002.
1070 Trail of Broken Treaties (1972)
American Indian Movement (AIM)
Probably the single group most responsible for Indian rights protests in the 1970s
was the American Indian Movement (AIM). In 1968, a group of Indians living in
the Minneapolis–St. Paul area decided that they had had enough of discrimination
and poverty. They formed AIM as an organization to coordinate protests nati on-
wide. Some of the movement’s leaders were former inmates in the Minnesota prison
system and knew well the dark side of the law. They were accustomed to police bru-
tality and discrimination, and were determined to stop the harassment of Indians.
As their fame spread, they began to travel to conferences to find out what other
groups around the nation were doing. But their investigations revealed that, for the
most part, tribal leaders were concerned with their own status in the eyes of federal
officials and not with the welfare of their people. This only caused the AIM leaders
to become more determined to make a difference.
On Thanksgiving Day 1970, AIM declared the day a “national day of mourn-
ing” and seized control of the Mayflower replica in Plymouth Harbor, Massachu-
setts. There was some pol itical progress that year, though. Presi dent Nixon
formally brought the policy of terminating the relationship between tribes and
the federal government to an end. Announcing a new federal policy of Indian
self-determination without termination of federal services, he also signed a bill
recognizing the return of Blue Lake, a holy site, to the Taos Pueblo Indians.
The year 1972 was t he time for the Indian to gain the nation’s spotlight. The
government, fearful of the quickened pace of Indian discontent, created its own
organization, called the National Tribal Chairman’s Association, as a rubber stamp
to give “Indian approval” to government policies. Their public statements con-
sisted mainly of paranoid reactions to the protests staged by the American Indian
Movement. AIM held a protest that year that they called the “Trail of Broken Trea-
ties.” AIM leaders started with a few vehicles in San Francisco, driving across the
country with the goal of calling attention to the long history of the U.S. govern-
ment’s breaking of treaties with Indian tribes. By the time the caravan reached
Washington, D.C., it had crossed countless reservations along the way. As people
on the reservations learned of AIM’s mission, many vehicles joined the caravan.
By the time they arrived in Washington, the line of cars was four miles long.
However, the caravan was only the first of AIM’s goals. AIM leaders wrote a
position paper on Indian rights with the goal of giving it to President Richard M.
Nixon. What began as a simple protest intensified after a meeting with BIA officials.
The attitude of government officials toward their grievances led AIM to occupy the
BIA headquarters for six days. Because it was only two days before the presidential
election that year, the administration negotiated an end of the occupation rather than
1071
conducting a military assault. But once the election was over, Nixon wasted no time
in formally rejecting all 20 points of the AIM position paper. The occupation, how-
ever, did succeed in bringing Indian rights to the national agenda.
AIM has continued to advocate for Indian rights since their heyday in the early
1970s. Though their efforts have become more localized, their views on the
federal government’s ina d equate res ponse to questi ons of Indian rights has been
no less strident.
—Steven L. Danver
Further Reading
Crow Dog, Mary, and Richard Erdoes. Lakota Woman. New York: Grove-Weidenfeld, 1990.
Deloria, Vine, Jr. Behind the Trail of Broken Treaties: An Indian Declaration of Indepen-
dence. New York: Dell Publishing, 1974.
Means, Russell, and Marvin J. Wolf. Where White Men Fear to Tread: The Autobiography
of Russell Means. New York: Macmillan, 1996.
Indian Treaties
The United States began concluding treaties with Indian nations almost immedi-
ately after declaring its independence, a policy begun by colonies acting as agents
for the British Empire. By the early 19th century, the U.S. government made it clear
that the Indian treaties were not agreements between sovereign nations, but between
the United States and, according to Chief Justice John Marshall, “domestic depen-
dent nations.” With the passage of the General Allotment Act in 1887, Congress
finally repudiated Indian sovereignty, bringing the treaty era to an official end.
Throughout the treaty era, Americans and Indians used treaties to achieve multi-
ple and often contradictory ends: to protect and acquire land, to initiate and end hos-
tilities, to destroy and preserve tribal and national identities, and to affirm or deny
political, cultural, and social power. Typically, however, as in the case of the Treaty
of Fort Greenville concluded between the United States and some of the tribes of
the Old Northwest, treaties were part of the ongoing process of western expansion.
Settlers, prospectors, and land speculators inevitably provoked conflict. The U.S.
Army followed in their wake to punish the offending Indians, and when total vic-
tory and removal of the Indians proved either too difficult or too costly, the United
States concluded treaties to secure the peace and to consolidate territorial gains.
Among the first American politicians to recognize the power that treaties had in
separating Indians from their land, Andrew Jackson used his power as a treaty
commissioner to negotiate settlements with Creek Indians: the 1814 Treaty of Fort
Jackson that gave individual Indians title to land while stripping the tribes of vast,
1072 Trail of Broken Treaties (1972)
communally held territories. From 1814 to 1824, in a series of treaties with the
southern Indians, whites took over most of the Indian lands remaining in Alabama,
Florida, Tennessee, Georgia, Mississippi, and parts of Kentucky and North Carolina.
Jackson also proved the ephemeral nature of treaties as president of the United
Stat es: in some 90 tr eaties concluded during his eight years in office, the United
States compelled Indians to move west of the Mis sissippi. Over 60,000 Indians
vacated some 25 million acres of land.
On the Great Plains, the po werful Dakotas compelled the United States to turn to
treaty making as it slowly inc orporated the Louisiana Purchase and the territory
won during the 1848 Mexican-American War . Explorer Zebulon Pike signed the first
treaty with the Dakota in 1805, secur ing the site of F ort Snelli ng along the Missi ssip pi
Riv er. In the 1851 Trav erse des Sioux Treaty, the United States gained all Dakota land
in Minnesota and restricted the Indians to two reservations along the Minnesota River.
The 1862 Minnesota Uprising resulted in part from Indian resentment over the 1851
treaty. The series of conflicts initia ted in 1862 ended when the Dakotas, together with
the Arapaho, signed the Fort Laramie Tr eaty in April 1868 and agreed to back out of
Nebraska and Kansas, leaving the territories to the settlers who inhabited the prairies
during the previous decade. In this treaty, the United States promised the Indians sup-
plies, secure possession of their remaining lands, and the abandonment of military
forts along the Powder and Bighorn rivers. This would be the last major treaty of
the 19th century, however, when an economic downturn in the 1870s spurred incur-
sions into the rich Black Hills, leading to a series of wars ultimately settled by the
attempt to eliminate tribal sovereig nty embodied by the General Allotment Act.
—Gerald Ronning
Further Reading
Fixico, Dona ld L. Treaties with American Indians: An Encyclopedia of Rights, Conflicts
and Sovereignty. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2008.
Prucha, Francis Paul. American Indian Treaties: The History of a Political Anomaly.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
Red Power
The rise of the Afr ican American civil rights movement during the 1950s did not
go without notice in Indian Country. Although some of the issues concerned were
quite different (although they shared the common ground of economic justice), the
tactics used by the civil rights movement, namely nonviolent disobedience and
gaining exposure through the national media, inspired a new generation of Ameri-
can Indian youth to take action. The “Red Power” movement era is usually defined
Trail of Broken Treaties (1972) 1073
as starting with the formation of the National Indian Youth Council (NIYC) in
1961, and t he so-called fish-ins in the Pacific Northwest, through the American
Indian Movement’s (AIM) Longest Walk demonstration in 1978.
As the 1950s drew to a close, the twin federal policies of the termination of the
trust relationship with Indian tribes and the relocation of Indian people to Ameri-
can urba n centers had begun to mobilize a new generation of Indian leaders hip.
The suppression of Indian religions, languages, and cultures, and the powerless-
ness of tribal governments in the face of termination, along with a general sense
of discontent at the economic hopelessness of reservation life and the cultural dis-
placement of urban life made young American Indians look for a way to take
action. The civil rights movement showed many that civil disobedience and protest
were effective tactics, and the Indian youth of the 1960s began to look for the best
ways to get their cause before the American public.
In 1961, a conference was held in Chicago that resulted in the founding of the
NIYC, which sought to correct the idea that the only way for American Indians to
succeed in the modern world was to accommodate to white American culture.
Rather, the NIYC called on Indians to celebrate and preserve their own cultural tra-
ditions while working to direct public attention to the federal government’s long his-
tory of not honoring the terms of treaties that it had signed with American Indian
tribes. Throughout the early 1960s, the NIYC concentrated on the fishing rights of
tribes in the Pacific Northwest as illustrative of the disregard with which the federal
government viewed treaties. Public attention followed, with the involvement of sym-
pathetic celebrities such as Marlon Brando, who was arrested at a 1964 fish-in. The
last two years of the decade brought about two momentous events in the Red Power
movement: the founding of AIM in 1968 and the takeover and occupation of Alca-
traz Island in 1969 . Although the Alcatr az occupation was no t officially an AIM
action, it showed that a sustained, high-profile action could get the public’s attention,
and formed a model used by groups like AIM over the rest of the Red Power era.
The Alcatraz takeover inspired later occupations, such as AIM’s occupation of
the Bureau of Indian Affairs headquarters in Washington, D.C., at the end of their
1972 Trail of Broken Treaties caravan, as well as countless other similar actions.
Although the Trail of Broken Treaties was but one action in the long history of
the R ed Power movement, it certainly r eceived heavy press coverage and was
instrumental in bringing the nascent movement to the public consciousness.
—Steven L. Danver
Further Reading
Johnson, Troy R. , Duane Champagne, and Joane Nagel, eds. American Indian Activism:
Alcatraz to the Longest Walk. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997.
Nagel, Joane. American Indian Ethnic Renewal: Red Power and the Resurgence of Identity
and Culture. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
1074 Trail of Broken Treaties (1972)
Wounded Knee II (1973)
On February 27, 1973, approximately 250 members of the Americ an Indian
Movement (AIM), the Oglala Sioux Civil Rights Organization (OSCRO), and
their supporters occupied the town of Wounded Knee, South Dakota, on the Pine
Ridge Reservation. The occupation was the culmination of months of conflict
between the activists and tribal chairman Dick Wilson, whom they accused of
being corrupt, nepotistic, and despotic. AIM leaders first came to the area in early
February, after the murder of an Oglala Lakota by a white man. Relatives of the
murdered man asked AIM to help them seek justice, and after a protest in nearby
Custer, South Dakota, Wilson became concerned that he would be AIM’s next
target. With the help of the Bur eau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and the United States
marshals, Wilson fortified his headquarters, further aggravating his opponents.
At the same time, the anti-Wilson members o f the tribal government began
impeachment proceedings against the chairma n. When Wilson survived the
impeachment, his opponents invited AIM to come to the reservation to protest
his administration.
AIM leader Russell Means was a member of the Pine Ridge tribe and had been
present on the reservation during the impeachmen t hearings. After the invitation
from th e tribe members, Dennis Banks and others joined Mea ns at Pine Ridge,
where they met with OSCRO and traditional tribal chiefs. On February 27,
Wilson’s opponents gathered at a meeting hall in the town of Calico. In private
meetings, the chiefs advised the activists to hold their protest at Wounded Knee.
Not wanting to reveal the plan to any potential Wilson informants, Means
announced to the crowd that the meeting was to move to a larger hall in Porcupine,
and they formed a caravan to move across the reservation. Along the way, how-
ever, the caravan stopped at Wounded Knee, where a small group of AIM
members had already begun to seize the town’s trading post and churches. Within
hours, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the BIA, and the U.S. marshals
set up roadblocks around the town.
By February 28, the federal presence had expanded to approximately 250 offi-
cers using army-provided armed personnel carriers (APC), and military jets began
flying reconnaissance. Soon after, military advisors from the Pentagon arrived. As
their presence violated federal law, they remained dressed in civilian clothes at all
times. Inside Wounded Knee, occupants formed a security team led by those who
1075
had served in Vietnam. They began fortifying the village with trenches and
bunkers. The occupiers soon realized that they were overmatched and outgunned.
One of AIM’s veterans had an AK-47 assault rifle that he had brought home from
Vietnam, but otherwise, they were armed mostly with hunting rifles and shotguns.
In contrast, the federal officers had automatic weapons, over 100,000 rounds of
ammunition, grenade launchers, and tear gas, in addition to APCs and helicopters.
Not long after the siege began, the protesters provid ed the government with a
list of demands. The occupiers wanted the Senate to hold hearings on Indian trea-
ties, to investigate operations at the BIA, and to inspect conditions on South Dako-
ta’s reservations. The document listing these stipulations also stated that the
protesters had the support of eigh t Oglala chiefs and medicine men. Within two
days, government negotiators were on the scene. On March 1, South Dakota’s
U.S. senators, James Abourezk and George McGovern, visited Wounded Knee to
check on hostages that the FBI reported AIM had taken. Although the hostages,
all permane nt residents of Wounded Knee, probabl y were taken as prisoners at
the beginning of the siege, they infor med the senators tha t they were staying on
their own accord to watch their property and to help ensure that the government
did not kill the protesters.
Shortly following the senators’ visit, negotiations began between the occupiers
and officials representing the Justice Department, who had primary responsibility
for brokering a solution to the siege. On March 4, the two si des met in a canvass
tepee between Wounded Knee and the federal roadblocks. Talks soon broke down
over the issue of amnesty, which federal negotiators would not grant. However, the
National Council of Churches was able to bargain a cease-fire, and on March 10,
the Justice Department took down their roadblocks. Although many of the Pine
Ridge Oglalas returned home, Indians from the across the country filed into
the village and rejuvena ted the occupation. On March 11, those inside Wounded
Knee proclaimed themselves the Independent Oglala Nation. The roadblocks went
back up. Just beyond the federal perimeter, Dick Wilson, who had become a minor
figure in the drama, established his own roadblocks using his private police force,
commonly called the “goon squad” by its critics. Wilson’s men turned the slur into
an acronym standing for “Guardians of the Oglala Nation” (GOON) and used the
name with pride.
Those inside Wounded Knee faced increased hardship after the reestablishment
of the roadblocks. Food and medical supplies were more difficult to obtain. In defi-
ance of a court order, the GOON roadblocks prevented supplies from entering
Wounded Knee. The occupiers relied upon provisions brought in on foot at night,
and in one incident, supporters organized an ai rlift. Although firefights had
occurred since the beginning, violence also intensified in the second phase of the
siege. In add ition to gunfire from I ndian s and federal officers, local white s came
1076 Wounded Knee II (1973)
to Wounded Knee at night and fired at both sides, hoping to provoke governmental
action against the Indians. By late March, the gunfights had become so frequent
and so intense that the government warned reporters that they co uld not longer
guarantee their safety. In the first four weeks of the siege, both sides suffered
minor wounds. Then, on March 26, U.S. marshal Lloyd Grimm was paralyzed in
a firefight. In April, North Carolina Cherokee Frank Clearwater and Pine Ridge
Oglala Buddy Lamont were killed by gunfire while inside Wounded Knee.
Following Lamont’s funeral on May 6, the protesters and federal negotiators
finalized an agreement to end the siege. On May 8, after 71 days at Wounded
Knee, the Indians disarmed. Those AIM leaders still present were arrested.
Although the Oglala leaders did get their meeting with officials in Washington,
nothing came of their talks. The most significant benefit of the occupation wa s
increased awareness of AIM and Indian issues in general. The siege was widely
covered by the nationa l media, and Wounded Knee became a cause ce
´
le
`
bre.
Wounded Knee drew more attention than any o ther AIM protest. Leftist activists
from around the country voiced the ir sup port for AIM, an d s ome even traveled
to South Dakota to join the occupation. Federal officers arrested hundreds of sup-
porters bringing supplies to Wounded Knee. Yet, the protest also reduced the pro-
ductivity of the organization. For more than a year after the end of the siege, AIM
leaders and resources were tied up in trials stemming from the occupation.
Although eventually thrown out because of FBI tampering, the court cases dis-
tracted AIM from activism and contributed to the group’s growing ineffectiveness
in the mid-1970s.
—Jacob F. Lee
See also all entries under Pueblo Revolt (1680); Pima Revolt (1751); Pontiac’s Rebellion
(1763); Flight of the Nez Perce
´
(1877); Wounded Knee I (1890); Alcatraz Island Occupation
(1969–1971); Trail of Broken Treaties (1972).
Further Reading
Lyman, Stanley David. Wounded Knee 1973: A Personal Account. Edited by Floyd A.
O’Neil, June K. Lyman, and Susan McKay. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1991.
Matthiessen, Peter. In the Spirit of Crazy Horse: The Sto ry of Leonard Peltier and the
FBI’s War on the American Indian Movement. New York: Viking, 1983.
Sayer, John William. Ghost Dancing the Law: The Wounded Knee Trials. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1997.
Smith, Paul Chaat, and Ro bert Allen Warrior. Like a Hurricane: The Indian Movement
from Alcatraz to Wounded Knee. New York: New Press, 1996.
Wounded Knee II (1973) 1077