Cambridge Companion to Modern Japanese Culture
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74 Hugh Clarke
modern Japan has shown us that change comes slowly. The contest between
progressive and conservative elements seems bound to continue.
Notes
1. For an excellent coverage of the linguistic aspects see Shibatani (1990).
2. The reference here is to Dixon’s theory of ‘punctuated equilibrium’ (1997).
3. For a detailed account see Loveday (1996: 26–46).
4. This is not entirely true. The Satsuma fief (present-day Kagoshima prefecture) had
access to foreign trade through the Ryukyuan kingdom, which had become its vassal
state after Satsuma’s invasion in 1609.
5. See Loveday (1996: 46–51).
6. Miller (1977; 1982).
7. Gottlieb (2005: 93).
8. See Miller (1975).
9. Murayama (1977: 14–21).
10. Unger (1996) claims that American misunderstanding of the nature of the Sino-
Japanese writing system was one reason why change to a phonetic writing system,
either kana or Romanisation, was rejected.
11. See http://www.kokken.go.jp/public/gairaigo/.
12. According to the Institute’s survey on the reception of loanwords, not one in four
Japanese understands the meaning of this word.
13. See also Gottlieb (2005: 13–15, 109).
14. The divisions of Northern Ryukyuan are; the Kikaijima dialects, the North Amami
Oshima dialects, the South Amami Oshima dialects, the Tokunoshima dialects, the
Okinoerabu dialects, the Yoron dialects, the North Okinawan dialects and the South
Okinawan dialects. Uemura (2003: 23).
15. Uemura (2003)
16. Nagata (1996: 10–12).
17. For an excellent account of the success of the revitalisation of Catalan, see McRoberts
(2001
). For a report on success in the revival of Scottish Gaelic, see Carroll (2001: 231,
n. 215).
18. Sadami
Suzuki (2005: 303).
19. Unger (1996: 59).
20. Seeley translates the term as ‘characters for current use’, but endorses the interpretation
given here (2000: 158).
21. The term ‘kana’ is used to cover both the hiragana and katakana syllabaries.
22. In the words of Unger (1996: 121), the ‘meyasu’ epithet has in effect changed what
reformers had considered the ‘ceiling’ for the number of kanji to be used under the
List of Characters for Interim Use (t
¯
oy
¯
okanji) into the ‘floor’ for List of Characters
for General Use (j
¯
oy
¯
okanji). In other words, what had previously been seen as the
maximum number of kanji required to read and write the language has become the
minimum expected of an educated Japanese and people should now be encouraged to
use kanji outside the j
¯
oy
¯
okanjilist if they so desire. The 20th meeting of the Kokugo
Shingikai endorsed this principle in turning its attention to the form of characters
outside the j
¯
oy
¯
okanjilist, giving its approval for the use of a range of non-standard
abbreviations often used in computer-generated text.
Language 75
23. See Twine (1991); Gottlieb (1994; 1995); Seeley (2000); Unger (1996); Carroll (1997;
2001).
24. Hisashi Inoue (2002: 11).
25. Hisashi Inoue (2002: 6–7).
26. For a linguistic description of Ainu see Tamura (2000); Shibatani (1990); and Kamei,
K
¯
ono and Chino (1997).
27. DeChicchis (1995: 115).
28. DeChicchis (1995: 109). This latter – hypothetical – figure includes those individuals
who, it is claimed, would identify themselves as Ainu if only they were aware of their
Ainu ancestry.
29. DeChicchis (1995: 110).
30. DeChicchis (1995: 115).
31. Gottlieb (2005: 70).
32. Miller (1982: 245).
Further reading
Gottlieb, Nanette (2005), Language and Society in Japan, Cambridge UK: Cambridge
University Press.
Maher, John C andKy
¯
oko Yashiro (eds) (1995),Multilingual Japan, Clevedon: Multilingual
Matters.
Unger, J Marshall (1996), Literacy and Script Reform in Occupation Japan: Reading
Between the Lines, New York: Oxford University Press.
anne e imamura
4
Family culture
All societies have a family system, but few are as consciously aware of
their family system as the Japanese.
1
Family system carries the image of components fitting into an organised
whole; a sense of permanence and function. Family culture, in contrast,
seems much less structured:
a loose but identifiable set of assumptions and preferences that people
use to make the critical decisions in their lives. Children absorb these
preferences . . . but they also may resist them, or rethink them . . .
they apply their assumptions and preferences to real problems . . .
Through the choices . . . they create and re-create the institutions of
society.
2
Culture both shapes and is shaped by the choices and patterns of people.
This chapter examines Japanese family culture from the Meiji period (1868–
1912) to the present, as a living and developing culture, and will shed light
on the decisions that have shaped and continue to shape the institution of
the family in Japan.
Changes over time
The contemporary Japanese family exists in a framework of social expec-
tations that stem from both the real and the imagined Japanese household
or ie that provided the basis for the family system developed by the Meiji
state.
Well aware that the Japanese family and the low status of women had
been criticised by the West, the Meiji government enacted laws to produce
Family culture 77
a modern family that was based on values acceptable to the Japanese state.
From the recent historical past, they drew from the household (ie) model
that had previously applied to the samurai class.
The ie was a patriarchal/patrilineal household system geared to produc-
tion and reproduction based on principles of cross-generational continuity,
hierarchy by age and gender, duty and gender-based division of labour.
The male head of the ie controlled the behaviour of the members. His wife
(the shufu) had maintenance and managerial responsibilities related to the
domestic resources of the ie, including training her successor, the bride of
the heir, in the customs of the household. A single heir inherited the prop-
erty, as well as the responsibility to care for aged members and improve or
maintain the resources for the next generation. The heir was second only
to the head in status. He earned this position not merely by birth order
but by showing that he was capable of managing the ie. Eldest sons could
be replaced as heirs by more capable younger sons. The heir had status,
but not the freedom to develop other talents that might conflict with ie
responsibility. His younger brothers might be given more education so that
they could make their way outside the ie.
Women were subordinate to men and the in-marrying bride was the
lowest member of the ie, under the training thumb of her mother-in-law;
expected to be up first and go to bed last, to work hard and produce heirs.
In the event that there were no suitable heirs, successors could be brought
in by adoption, that is, a groom could be adopted for the most suitable
daughter. Although as a male, his position was higher than a bride who
joined the ie, in many ways his entire tenure was seen as a transition until
his son could take charge: as in the case of the bride, he no longer belonged
to his natal ie.
Marriage was a union of households decided by the heads of ie. Unsat-
isfactory brides were returned to their parents and a new bride sought.
Children belonged to the ie, not to the mother.
In contrast, peasants and poorer townsfolk had a much more casual
approach to marriage, and relatively free sexual relationships. Walthall’s
work on the mores of farm women suggests that even after marriage, there
were variations in the control of sexual behaviour; importance of the con-
jugal relationship of the couple; and whether sexual indiscretions after mar-
riage would automatically remove a woman from the household into which
she married.
3
In addition Walthall found cases indicating that even when
a woman produced a son and heir, she might be sent back for not being a
78 Anne Imamura
good manager of the household. Thus, being a good manager was important
to women’s security.
Under the new Meiji Civil Code, select features of the ie became law and
applied to all Japanese citizens. The term kazoku was coined to translate
the term ‘family’. The structure of the kazoku was defined administratively
by family registries (koseki), civil documents certifying family membership.
Each household head had the right and legal obligation to determine who
was entered into his family registry, and to approve the marriage of his
children until a son reached the age of 30 or a daughter the age of 25.
Property was inherited by a single heir who was responsible to care for his
parents and to maintain the household graves and honour the ancestors.
Through these reforms, the legacy of the real or imagined ie applied to
everyone in Japan.
Modern Japan required an educated citizenry and from Meiji on the state
emphasised women’s roles as mothers and educators of the next generation.
Nolte and Hastings point out that the broader Meiji policy toward women
was:
. . . based on two assumptions: that the family was an essential building
block of the national structure and that the management of the
household was increasingly in women’s hands. The family relieved the
state of responsibility for the old, young, and ill; taught acceptance of
one’s proper place in the social hierarchy; and performed as a more
efficient economic and productive unit than the individual. The
orthodox “goodwife” was one who pursued whatever employment and
education would serve her family and the society.
4
The family and the importance of women’s domestic management role were
now linked to the welfare of the state rather than ‘just’ the welfare of the
household.
Although the economic role of the ie declined as Japan industrialised,
the rural household provided both a source of young labour for industry
and a place to which those labourers could return after several years to
marry and start their own families. Through the Second World War and
the Occupation, urban dwellers returned to their rural ie when they needed
shelter from urban bombing, a place to live and/or food to eat. Thus the
ie retained both cultural and economic significance. In Japan today, people
know where their family came from, where the main house is located and
where the family graves remain.
In developing the Japanese family system to meet the political and eco-
nomic needs of the state, the Meiji government launched changes whose
Family culture 79
impact resonates today. Over time, the interaction of international influ-
ences, decisions by power brokers such as the state and/or economic insti-
tutions and choices by individual actors shaped and defined the institution
of the family.
After the Second World War, the new Constitution gave women equality;
universal suffrage gave women the vote, but protective labour legislation
and gender-based employment limited women’s economic potential. Their
primary roles were housewife and mother and the family was still the basic
unit of society. Even so, substantial changes occurred. The household head
no longer controlled who was added or removed and individuals could
establish their own koseki. However, to this day, the koseki system defines
‘the Japanese family’ because it requires that all family members, including
married couples, have the same surname; individuals continue to move from
their current koseki to that of the family they are entering at marriage or
adoption; children are listed on the koseki, making their birth order and
legitimacy apparent; and each household must have a head, who tends to
be the male breadwinner. The concept of seki carries a sense of belonging
that in turn carries a sense of responsibility to fulfil ones’ roles both within
the family and as a member of the family to the broader society. Thus, the
koseki system both contributes to social stability and order and constrains
choice.
The new Civil Code defined marriage as a union between individuals
rather than families, and spouses as legal equals. Thus marriage became
by law a horizontal rather than a hierarchical relationship. Property was
to be divided among heirs and all children were responsible for the care
of their parents. Although this was the legal principle, in practice daugh-
ters considered that they married ‘out’ and into their husband’s family and
that their male siblings (especially the eldest son) were responsible for the
care of their parents. Thus when daughters married they could renounce
both their right to inheritance and responsibility to care for their parents.
This contributed to retaining a conservative view of family roles in spite of
legal changes and is a good example of culture/people applying preferences
and shaping or reshaping institutions. Legal change alone did not make
all nuclear families equal. Eldest sons were still expected to be respon-
sible for their parents, which lowered their desirability in the marriage
market.
Another legal change was the Eugenics Protection Law that provided
a very liberal basis to the right to obtain an abortion.
5
This was a direct
contrast to the pro-natalist policy of the state during the war years and
reflected a concern with overpopulation at a time when the economy was
80 Anne Imamura
struggling to revive after the devastation of war.
6
It is both an example
of the state shaping ‘the Japanese family’ by swinging from supporting
high birthrates to encouraging limitation of births, and an increase in the
opportunity for individual decisions (about abortion).
The structure of the postwar family was directly connected to economic
growth. A new family form developed, composed of a salary-earning hus-
band, his wife and their children. The salaryman family was numerically a
minority, coexisting with other family types that continued to centre around
an heir for the farm, fishing or small business household.
7
In addition, as
discussed below, patterns of marriage and divorce varied by geographic
region.
The salaryman lifestyle was modern, connected to the growing urban
economy, and set the tone for the expectations of young Japanese men and
women. Men wanted to be salarymen because their earnings and benefits
were predictable and they had job security. Women wanted to marry salary-
men because of this security and also because living near their husband’s jobs
meant they would not have to live under the roof of their mother-in-law.
They could raise their two children in small modern apartments, and virtu-
ally did not see their hard-working husbands for six days a week. Women
wanted to marry reliable providers, and salarymen wanted wives they could
rely on to manage their homes and educate their children. Reflecting the
fixed retirement age for men, the salaryman family developed a fairly stan-
dard pattern of marriage with two children born soon enough that they
would be raised before their father retired. These expectations affected both
the ideal age for marriage and women’s opportunities outside the home.
The corporate world made use of the ‘Japanese family model’ to invent
the ‘corporation as family’ based on the strict gendered division of labour.
The company relied on the husband’s ability to focus his entire attention
on work and expected that his wife would manage all domestic aspects of
their family. This gendered division of labour made the wife a member of
the corporate family and while it provided her with the economic security
that came from her husband’s job stability, it constrained her from seek-
ing full-time employment or engaging in any activity that would make her
less available to manage the home. The allowances for dependent spouses
that augment husbands’ salaries and tax laws that provide economic disin-
centives if the dependent spouse exceeds a very low annual income ceiling
reinforce the wife’s domestic role. The wife was ‘free’ to take on economic
activities that did not conflict with her managerial responsibilities. One such
activity was piece work in the home, which gave her a source of income
Family culture 81
and provided corporations, and thus the national economy, with a source
of cheap labour that became the foundation for Japan’s economic growth.
8
Hamada, however, argues this model was actually anti-family.
9
The spouses
operated in separate spheres and fathers had virtually no time to interact
with their children because of their long hours at work.
By the 1970s, an adaptation of the salaryman family occurred. The ‘new
family’ (as it was called in Japanese) developed both due to increased stan-
dards of living and to disillusionment with the salaryman lifestyle that had
seemed ideal to the previous generation. Whereas marriage in the salary-
man family was based upon finding a suitable partner with whom to build
a household, marriage in the ‘new family’ should include ‘companionship’
and affection between the spouses. As a young family they tried to spend
leisure time together. However, as the couple moved into their 30stheir
behaviour seemed to parallel that of the previous generation. The husband
was gone long hours at work and the wife focused on educating their chil-
dren. They were not entirely the same as the previous generation, however,
for at least two reasons. Their hopes for companionship raised the level of
expectation and today impacts on the divorce rate. The second reason is
that the service sector developed, providing new opportunities for women
to earn income.
International events and pressure continued to influence the Japanese
family. As a result of Japan’s signing the UN Declaration on Women, Japan’s
employment laws changed and although many hurdles remain, new oppor-
tunities became available to women. Women began to marry later and to
indicate that marriage is not the only way for them to attain happiness.
At the same time the economic bubble of the 1980s was accompanied by
sharply rising housing costs. Competition to get into the best universities
led to years of cram school preparation and mothers returned to the labour
force, justifying their return by the cost of housing and children’s educa-
tion. Each of these decision patterns shaped the institution of the family.
The male breadwinner was likely to be accompanied by a wife who worked
until childbirth and returned to the (part-time/temporary) work force as
soon as possible, depending on her childcare responsibilities. This pattern
also fits well within Japanese family culture as women pursue whatever
work serves their family. (Of course, individual women can use this ratio-
nalisation to obtain social approval for activities they wish to engage in for
personal reasons.)
From the late 1980s, other family-related issues and trends have emerged.
The mean age at first marriage continued to rise, the birthrate declined
82 Anne Imamura
and it became difficult for men in some occupations (particularly eldest
sons in the agricultural sector) to find Japanese wives, prompting them
to seek spouses abroad. The Japanese government raised concerns about
the declining birthrate that was leading to both a labour and a population
shortage. By the 1990s the salaryman lifestyle was much less predictable. At
least partially in response to international influence,
10
Japan enacted laws
prohibiting domestic violence and child abuse, providing protections and
at the same time allowing the state to intervene in what had previously been
considered family matters. The economic bubble burst, and the security of
a salaried position was shaken as major companies went bankrupt or hired
new recruits without lifetime guarantees. Part-time and temporary workers
now included young graduates and full-time ‘permanent’ work became
difficult to obtain. Many young people became ‘freeters’, in temporary jobs
that they quit when they wish and return to when they need more money.
In contrast to their parents’ generation or contemporaries who are tied
to salaryman-like positions, freeters are not bound by commitment, but
neither are their employers. It is unknown what percentage are freeters by
choice, preferring freedom to security, and what percentage simply cannot
find secure jobs in the post-bubble Japanese economy. Questions for the
immediate future include the impact of freeters on marriage and family and
the impact of the legacy of the family on this younger generation.
Debate and controversy
The underlying issue is whether the family is changing or breaking down
and how that impacts Japanese society. Major debates include the effect
of increased individualism on the family; how families balance work and
domestic life; the causes and effects of the postponement of marriage and
the significance of the rising divorce rate.
Increased individualism
As we enter the 21st century, delayed marriage and the low birthrate are
viewed as indicators that increased individualism is diminishing the impor-
tance of the family. ‘Selfish’ women who reject traditional gender roles
11
have been blamed for the low birthrate and the state has been criticised
for its inability to provide a climate in which young people may balance
marriage, child rearing and paid work.
12
A counter argument states that in the climate of new freedom and global-
isation since the 1990s the family has become increasingly essential because
Family culture 83
it is the only institution that really values the existence of a particular indi-
vidual, the only entity to which that individual is necessary.
13
Balancing family and work
The good wife was expected to engage in whatever work suited her fam-
ily (or the needs of the state). Today, some 20 years after the passage of
the first Equal Employment Opportunity Law, the pattern of women’s
employment still graphs as an M-shaped curve relating to women’s moving
in and out of the labour force due to family obligations. The question is
whether this pattern is an indication of the strength of the Japanese family
or, as Ochiai
14
argues, the result of policies influenced by the economic and
political spheres.
A major factor in balancing family and work is policy decisions con-
cerning the connection between economic growth and social welfare.
15
In
the early 1970s the social and environmental costs of the high rate of eco-
nomic development became apparent and the Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP) declared 1973 the ‘first year of the welfare era’ (Fukushi Gannen).
However, by 1974 the growth of the Japanese economy slowed and policy
emphasis changed to self help and relying on the family and local society
rather than depending on the state. The state would only become involved
if the family was unable to provide the necessary care. This policy relied on
women as caretakers, and housewives working part time had that flexibility.
Similarly, the 1980s focus on women’s community participation was based
on a breadwinning husband and a housewife who could and should partic-
ipate in the local community as both a representative of her family and a
contributor to society.
16
Thus political and economic institutions relied on
the ‘Japanese family’ model.
Rising age at first marriage and declining birthrate
A notable feature of Japanese family culture is the strong belief that chil-
dren should be born within marriage.
17
The percentage of births to unwed
mothers is very low, only 1 per cent, in contrast to 33 per cent in the United
States and 55 per cent in Sweden.
18
The koseki system that reveals whether
or not a woman has a child outside of marriage, along with social stigma,
work against an increase in such births.
19
The birthrate for married couples according to the 2005 census was 2.15,
above replacement, thus the way to increase the birthrate seems to be to
encourage people to marry.
20
New permissiveness toward pre-marital sex
is notable. One example is the Christmas Eve packages marketed by very