Bulmer-Thomas V., Coatsworth J., Cortes-Conde R. The Cambridge Economic History of Latin America: Volume 2, The Long Twentieth Century

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222 Roberto Cort

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created in Peru in 1922.InColombia, the Bank of the Republic, founded

in 1923, was the second of its type in Latin America. In Chile, in 1925,

during the Kemmerer mission, a mixed bank was created, with the partic-

ipation of national and foreign banks. In Mexico, the 1917 Constitution

had acknowledged the need to have a monetary authority and reserved the

money-issue monopoly for the state. In 1925, after implementing a ﬁscal

austerity program, Secretary of Finance Alberto Pani founded the Bank of

Mexico. Nevertheless, the right to issue money had to be postponed until

the next decade because people were reluctant to accept paper money. In

its earliest years, up to 1931, the Bank of Mexico operated like a commercial

bank with monopoly of issue. Central banks were also created in Guatemala

(1925), Ecuador (1927), Bolivia (1929), El Salvador (1934), Argentina (1935),

Costa Rica (1936), and Venezuela (1939). By the 1950s, central banks had

been created in nearly every Latin American country.

Latin American central banks were closer to the U.S. Federal Reserve

model (Banking School) than to the Currency Board model. They could

issue money backed not only by reserves but also by commercial credit. In

Chile, in the 1920s, the Central Bank had a conservative policy, accumu-

lating reserves equal to 100 percent of the currency and deposits. It could

not lend the public sector more than 20 percent of its paid capital and

reserves.

Regulations were established for the banking system, and min-

imum bank reserves were increased from 10 percent to 20 percent. By the

end of the 1920s, additional credit institutions with Central Bank backing

were created, such as the Agrarian Credit Bank, the Mining Credit Bank,

and the Industrial Credit Institute.

In the ﬁrst half of the 1920s, Colombia reestablished its earlier monetary

and exchange rate policy: money issued was convertible (at an exchange

rate of 1 peso = 0.96 dollars that lasted until 1932). That meant its Central

Bank was closer to the Federal Reserve than to the Bank of England because

money issues were backed not only by reserves but also by credits to the

government and the private sector. Between 1923 and 1931, the country

returned to the gold standard and the correlation between currency and

reserves was remarkably high (0.98). In fact, it was a gold exchange standard

that allowed the country to have its reserves in foreign currency (as, in fact,

happened, because it had most of its reserves in the United States).

Several other countries, in order to converge domestic prices to interna-

tional levels, also returned to the gold standard. By the middle of the 1920s,

Mexico and Chile had done so. Brazil reentered the gold standard in 1926

Drake, “La Creaci

on de Bancos Centrales,” 96–8.

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Fiscal and Monetary Regimes 223

with a new currency unit, the cruceiro, equivalent to one milreis,atanew

exchange rate of sixpence. Until 1930, there was a ﬁxed exchange rate backed

by the Caixa de Estabilizac¸

ao (CE), an institution similar to a Currency

Board. The CE had a monopoly of issuing money backed by gold – after

the Banco do Brasil lost that right – and used it to increase the monetary

supply by around 30 percent over the next three years. However, in 1929,

when exports went down and capital ﬂight began, the system showed its

weakness and convertibility was suspended.

In Argentina, the Currency

Board reopened in 1927, and the country reentered the gold standard at the

same prewar parity: 0.44 gold peso per each national paper money peso.

That entailed a substantial price deﬂation.

the 1930–1945 period

The decline in foreign trade during the 1930s crisis was greater than during

World War I and was no longer perceived as temporary. This provoked

a not-always-successful implementation of more thoughtful tax reforms.

Greater importance was now given to income taxes and taxes on domestic

consumption. In several countries, especially Argentina, Brazil, and Colom-

bia, a new and increasingly substantial source of nontax resources became

available from the moment exchange controls were established: the gap

between the exchange rate paid to exporters and the one paid by importers.

Because of the need to depart from the gold standard and the subsequent

devaluation, this gap allowed government to take a share of exporters’

excess proﬁts (mainly in the case of natural resource-intensive exports).

This so-called exchange rate differential was a substantial source of foreign

currency that could be assigned to pay the foreign debt (a practice that

Argentine administrations followed). In Colombia, the Special Exchange

Account (including the gaps for foreign bills of exchange and those for gold

revaluation cashed in 1938) was used to service the debts incurred by the

government during the war with Peru. It also served to create a Stabiliza-

tion Fund, designed to keep the prices of government bonds stable and to

regulate monetary policy.

Compared with taxes, this mechanism had some advantages because no

parliamentary approval was required, which spared the government hard

negotiations with politicians to pass taxes. In federal countries, this provided

an income that national governments did not have to share with states or

provinces.

Steven Topik, The Political Economy of the Brazilian State, 1889–1930 (Austin, TX, 1987), 50.

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224 Roberto Cort

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Another nonﬁscal income source was money issue. Although the powers

of the new central banks followed the Federal Reserve model (designed to

promote private credit), the crisis forced them to become a main source of

government ﬁnancing. Probably the most important feature of this period –

because of its impact on economies and subsequent economic policies –

was the fact that the 1930s crisis and World War II put an end to interna-

tional capital markets. When that source was lost, governments resorted to

ﬁnancing through money issue, which appeared as a convenient response

mainly because, attributable to the deﬂation of the 1930s, there was a high

money demand and people apparently accepted the new issues. As a source

of revenue not dependent on parliamentary approval, it had an enormous

political appeal for governments because they could make a better impres-

sion on voters without having to negotiate approval. In addition, nobody

felt deprived of anything; ﬁnally, in federal countries, money issuing was a

resource that fell under the jurisdiction of the central authority.

There was a general fall in revenues because of the decrease in foreign

trade, in spite of the new taxes created to make up for the loss. In Argentina,

55 percent of the tax system relied on foreign trade, so when it shrank,

customs duties decreased between 1930 and 1932 by more than 20 percent.

As substitutes, an income tax (a short-lived turnover tax) and a tax on sales

were created.

In Mexico, the situation was similar: taxes on foreign trade, which rep-

resented 50 percent of the ﬁscal revenue in 1930,went down to less than

30 percent in 1935. This was compensated, to some extent, by an increase

in export taxes (oil), especially during World War II. From then on, direct

taxes experienced a substantial increase, especially those levied on income,

which, after 1943,represented on average 25 percent of ﬁscal revenue.

The impact of World War II varied according to the country with which

trade was mainly conducted. Those countries having a closer commercial

relationship with Great Britain, such as Argentina, suffered a substantial

decline in import and customs revenues. Those with a closer relationship

to the United States, such as Brazil and especially Mexico, went through a

commercial reactivation that improved their import capacity and produced

ﬁscal revenue increases. In Colombia, a tax reform in 1935 was aimed at

a fairer distribution of the ﬁscal burden, levying higher taxes on higher

incomes by imposing a gradual increase in income tax rates up to a maxi-

mum 17 percent as well as a capital levy and an excess proﬁts tax. By the end

of the 1930s, taxes were producing more ﬁscal income than were customs

revenues.

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Fiscal and Monetary Regimes 225

In Chile, copper replaced nitrates as the main source of mining revenues

but suffered a 40 percent decline between 1930 and 1935.Mining’s share in

ﬁscal revenues went down to 10 percent in those same years. In Mexico,

when foreign companies were ﬁnally forced to pay royalties, those on min-

eral extraction, especially oil, became substantial, going from 16 million

pesos in 1930 to 33 million pesos in 1935.

The consensus that made import taxes the main source of revenue, which

had been the basis for the consolidation of the nation-states during the

export boom, broke down. Changes implemented in nonmining countries

were unable to enjoy a similar consensus because they resorted to taxing

income or wealth; those countries with mining-derived revenues had fewer

problems. In the search for alternatives, several governments relied increas-

ingly on new sources of nontax revenue, such as exchange rate differentials

(a rent on natural resources) and on the inﬂationary tax (in fact, a tax on

labor). As time went by, exporters realized how damaging the exchange rate

gap was for them and in many cases, such as in Argentina, exports stag-

nated even after the war, when international trade recovered and exceeded

its previous volume.

In the face of the deep fall in revenues, the initial response con-

sisted of cutting expenses. From 1929,Mexico adopted orthodox poli-

cies

and, from 1930,Brazil and Argentina did the same. Governments

found themselves facing a complicated problem. They had to pay the

bureaucracies they had enlarged and the huge payments – mostly in for-

eign currency – due on their debts, which had grown rapidly during the

1920s almost everywhere. In Mexico, administrative expenses grew after

1930 until they reached 63 percent of expenditure in 1933–4.InArgentina,

this share was about 58 percent for the same period. Argentina’s payments

on the public debt amounted to 29 percent of the outlays of the national

government.

Between 1932 and 1937,asubstantial change took place in expenditure

policies. Although at ﬁrst in a mild way, governments started spending

beyond revenues. The resulting deﬁcits were ﬁnanced by the central banks.

In addition, the composition of expenditures changed: there were increases

in expenses related to public works (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile), agri-

culture and irrigation (Chile and Colombia), and social policies (Chile).

Subsidies, ﬁnancing of private business projects, and outlays for companies

Enrique C

ardenas, La hacienda p

ublica y la pol

ıtica econ

omica, 1929–1958 (Mexico City, 1994).

Gerchunoff and Llach, El ciclo de la ilusi

on y el desencanto, 134.

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226 Roberto Cort

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managed by the state also grew. In Mexico, agricultural (irrigation) and

infrastructure projects were implemented, in many cases ﬁnanced by the

national development banks. During 1938, oil companies were expropri-

ated, but they were not included in the budget and were only incorporated

after the budgetary reform of 1966.State intervention grew not only in

the form of exchange and price controls during the war but also through

subsidies granted via credit agencies (e.g., Cr

edito Agr

ıcola in Chile and

the regulatory boards in Argentina).

The departure from the gold standard and the resulting devaluation

made payments owed in strong currencies more difﬁcult. In the face of

this problem, which implied that a much stronger effort would be needed

to comply with foreign obligations, most countries decided to suspend

payments abroad and found immediate relief. The rareﬁed international

situation, the almost complete closure of international capital markets, the

long world war, and the postwar controls on capital movements made the

consequences of default less serious than in normal conditions. In Latin

America, all the major countries except Argentina defaulted.

Governments deliberately ran up deﬁcits. It is true that, unlike the United

States, the historical experience in most countries during the nineteenth

century had been of generalized deﬁcits. But, during the 1930s, the idea

that deﬁcits could contribute to the expansion of the economy took root.

Formerly considered taboo, deﬁcits turned into a recommended practice

to foster economic activity.

As a consequence of the 1930 crisis, convertibility was suspended and the

gold standard abandoned. By departing from the gold standard, govern-

ments could resort to the central banks for the ﬁnance previously supplied

by capital markets. The domestic debt started decreasing as a consequence

of the inﬂation that had caused an increase in prices during wartime. In

turn, the foreign debt increased, but in most cases it ceased to be paid until

later, when new payments were agreed upon.

Chile had returned to the gold standard in 1926, but the 1930 crisis hit

the mining sector and led to a rapid loss of reserves (about 50%). In spite of

Kemmerer’s recommendation to maintain the gold standard by applying

restrictive monetary policies and high interest rates, exchange controls were

implemented in July 1931 and payments on foreign debt suspended. The

gold standard was only maintained for six years (until April 1932), when it

was formally abandoned and followed by a big devaluation and the creation

of an Exchange Control Committee. In 1932, the Central Bank’s reserves

fell to 25 percent. Afterward, gold was revalued to double its value in pesos.

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Fiscal and Monetary Regimes 227

Credit institutions were created and, during the war, gold inﬂows were

sterilized.

In Argentina, the Currency Board was closed in 1929.InApril 1931, the

fall in economic activity was such that the country had to resort to two laws

passed in 1914 to allow the Currency Board, for the ﬁrst time in the twentieth

century, to issue money with no gold backing. As Britain unexpectedly

announced its departure from the gold standard and let the pound devalue

in September 1931, Argentina attempted to improvise exchange controls

in October. A new administration allowed the peso to depreciate in 1932,

by applying a contractionary ﬁscal policy together with an expansionary

monetary one. In May, the Currency Board was allowed to issue money

backed by public bonds. Thus, for the ﬁrst time since the Convertibility

Act of 1899, the government could obtain ﬁnancing by issuing money, and

for the second time, money issue took place without an increase in reserves.

In 1935, the Central Bank was created and granted faculties to stabilize the

currency and smooth the economic cycle, for which it was allowed to resort

to rediscounts and open market interventions.

In Brazil during 1929, after the ﬁrst evidences of the crisis, there was an

outﬂow of reserves, and in 1930, convertibility was suspended and devalu-

ation followed. In 1931,Brazil established exchange controls. At the begin-

ning of the 1930s, after being excluded from international capital markets,

the government did not resort to the Bank of Brazil for ﬁnancing. How-

ever, from 1937 on, the Bank ﬁnanced ﬁscal deﬁcits through money issues

(between 1939 and 1945,itprovided 2 billion milreis to the treasury).

In Colombia, as in other countries, the initial reaction to the crisis con-

sisted of lowering expenditures and contracting the monetary supply. As the

crisis deepened, pressure increased for the Bank of the Republic to depart

from the gold standard and ease credit to the government. On Septem-

ber 24, 1931, following the British steps, convertibility was abandoned and

exchange controls introduced. Despite the lack of reserves, the Bank of

the Republic granted credits to the government. One year before, in 1930,

the Congress had authorized the Bank of the Republic to take a share of

the bonds issued and issue money in exchange. The Bank’s legal reserves

requirement was lowered from 60 percent to 50 percent of the total circu-

lating notes and demand deposits. Monetary policy became more ﬂexible

and had a more active role.

The peso was devalued, and in 1933 it was 50

percent under its 1931 level; in 1936, the exchange was 1 dollar = 1.7 peso.

Adolfo Meisel Roca, “La segunda misi

on Kemmerer,” in Banco de la Rep

ublica (Bogot

a, 1990), 343–5.

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228 Roberto Cort

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FROM WORLD WAR II TO THE 1980s

growth with inﬂationary ﬁnancing: 1945–1960

The war years had made clearer the changes that had occurred since the

1930 crisis and the long depression. A growing autarky produced a fall in

ﬁscal revenues coming from foreign trade, which had to be compensated

with other sources. Fiscal reforms attempted earlier but never completed

were now implemented. The changes included taxes on wealth and domes-

tic consumption (sales taxes), aimed at obtaining a more stable source of

revenue.

In Argentina, the tax regime had already changed in the 1930s with

the establishment of an income tax and the transformation of the excise

tax into a sales tax. The Brazilian tax structure did not experience major

changes either. The taxes on consumption, income, and imports continually

decreased because inﬂation eroded tariff revenues based on speciﬁc duties.

In 1953, customs revenues did not exceed 4 percent of overall ﬁscal income.

The situation changed when the 1957 reform established a different tax

structure. States started ﬁnancing themselves through sales taxes.

In Mexico, the tax ratio to GDP was low and the tax system was under-

developed. With the purpose of increasing tax collection, the Income Tax

Law was reformed in 1951, and new taxes (commonly called internal taxes)

were levied on the sale of certain products such as beer, cigarettes, spirits,

cars, and trucks. Partly because of this, and because of the great increase

in foreign trade, tax revenues grew by 25.1 percent between 1949 and 1951,

generating a surplus beyond the expenditure increase.

In 1948,

a tax

on commercial income was created (ISIM, Impuestos Sobre Ingresos Mercan-

tiles). It was very much criticized because it was a “cascade” tax. It lasted until

the end of the 1970s, when it was replaced by a Value Added Tax (VAT).

Since the 1920s, there had been three unsuccessful attempts to amend the

Constitution with the aim of providing a more solid institutional frame-

work for the Mexican tax system. It was necessary for the states to adhere to

the regime, but by 1957, only seventeen of them had joined. The remaining

fourteen did not do so until 1971–2.

ardenas, La hacienda p

ublica, 146.

Luis Aboites Aguilar, “Imposici

on Directa, Combate a la ‘Anarqu

ıa’ y Cambio en la Relaci

Federaci

on-Estados” (Mexico City, 2001), 48.

Ibid., 18.

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Fiscal and Monetary Regimes 229

During the postwar years, resources not derived from taxation (already

in use since the 1930s) became the most relevant source of revenue. They

consisted of exchange differentials and the appropriation of bank deposits

by means of increases in legal bank reserves or the nationalization of deposits

in the ﬁnancial system.

In Argentina, signiﬁcant nontax resources were raised through the estab-

lishment of a multiple-rate exchange control system. In fact, this became

the main source of payments on the external debt. When the gold stan-

dard was abandoned in the 1930s and depreciations occurred, export prices

in local currency signiﬁcantly increased, and the government decided it

should share in the exporters’ extraordinary proﬁts. This could happen as

long as local prices (wages) did not increase to catch up with devaluation.

When wages ﬁnally went up, the exporters’ beneﬁts vanished because the

peso had become overvalued. The income of thousands of producers was

affected. For this reason, producers covertly opposed this tax by diminishing

production and, consequently, exports.

In 1946, with Per

on in ofﬁce, ﬁscal and monetary instruments were put

at the disposal of the administration’s goals. Public expenditure increased,

taking the government’s share in the GDP from about 20 percent in 1945

to more than 30 percent in 1955. This was the result of several factors:

among them, construction of infrastructure, purchase of companies that

became part of the public sector, and a rise in public-sector wages. The

ﬁnancing of foreign trade transactions was done directly through Central

Bank rediscounts. Also, there were rediscounts given for credits provided

to companies and mortgage loans to help private building construction.

The Brazilian case was different. For a long time, the country enjoyed a

de facto monopoly in international coffee markets and was able to transfer

the cost of devaluation to foreign consumers.

Since 1950,exchange rate

manipulation had been the main tool of economic policy. Nontax ﬁnancing

mechanisms appeared (exchange differentials, compulsory deposits, and the

inﬂationary tax). The exchange policy was different with regard to coffee:

sometimes a negative differential rate was applied (agio), as happened in

1954, when the exchange rate for exports of all products was 28.36 Cr./ US$,

and the one applied to coffee exports was 23.36.

At other times, coffee

ul Prebisch, “Plan 1955,” Memoria anual del Banco Central (Buenos Aires, 1955).

ergio Besserman Viana, “Duas tentativas de estabilizac¸

ao: 1951–1954,” in Marcelo de Paiva Abreu, A

Ordem do Progresso. Cem anos de pol

ıtica econ

omica republicana 1889–1989 (R

ıo de Janeiro, 1990), 140.

Ibid., 140.

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230 Roberto Cort

es Conde

received subsidies, as happened in the second half of 1954,when–inthe

face of a drop in coffee production because of adverse weather conditions –

the government established by decree a minimum price for coffee with the

aim of optimizing the exchange proﬁt.

During the Kubitschek administration (1956–60), it was decided to pro-

mote economic development through increased government intervention.

The Plan de Metas aimed at making Brazil advance in ﬁve years a distance

it would have taken ﬁfty years to cover otherwise. The economy grew,

between 1957 and 1961,at8.2 percent per annum; between 1945 and 1964,

public expenditure rose from 14.6 percent to 18.9 percent of GDP. The

share of the federal government was about 50 percent, but there was greater

decentralization between 1950 and 1960.Until 1953,revenues and expendi-

tures grew at comparable rates, with minor deﬁcits. Between 1955 and 1964,

the deﬁcit increased, together with inﬂation. The investment rate was high,

and the state had an active share in it (almost 20%ofoverall national capital

formation). The corresponding expenses were not completely covered by

tax revenues, which translated into the need for deﬁcit ﬁnancing.

In Mexico, the state had always played an important role in the econ-

omy, but after the Constitution of 1917 its participation grew. The govern-

ment fostered the “stabilizing development” program by means of public

investment, subsidies, and protection of domestic production. Initially, all

these measures had no inﬂationary effects.

Between 1959 and 1967, public

expenditure rose to 9.2 percent of GDP, while in the 1950–1958 period, it

amounted to 7.4 percent.

The postwar era also witnessed the widespread development of public

enterprise. When a high level of investment was required or a sector was

considered strategic, Latin American governments assumed direct control

over the production of those goods and services. This was done by buying

enterprises (nationalization) or by creating new ones. These companies, in

many cases, had the highest volume of personnel and sales. They included

oil and other mineral extracting companies, public utilities, and companies

devoted to direct production of goods such as steel and petrochemicals.

The administration of state-owned companies often escaped strict

accounting controls and suffered from a double managerial problem. On

the one hand, for the political parties in power, they became “booty” where

they could give employment to their people without being subject to bud-

get limitations. On the other hand, as happened with public utilities, tariffs

Because they did not resort to money issuing but to deposits from the private sector.

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Fiscal and Monetary Regimes 231

were subsidized in order to maintain real wages (Argentina, Mexico, Brazil,

and Chile), contributing to the deﬁcit. To cover these deﬁcits, state-owned

companies obtained loans abroad, increasing the overall public debt, or

received treasury contributions or loans through rediscounts by the Central

Bank, widening the deﬁcit and feeding inﬂation.

In Brazil, by the mid-1950s, the state started to take control of many basic

resources, such as water (through the three most important water plants:

CSN, Cosipa and Usiminas); oil production and reﬁning (Petrobras); iron

ore production and exportation (Companhia Vale do Rio Doce); and caustic

soda production (Companhia Nacional de Alcalis). The Brazilian state also

increased its share in the production of electricity.

In Chile, the government created CORFO (Corporaci

on de Fomento de

la Producci

on)in1939 and used it to create public utilities such as ENDESA

(Empresa Nacional de Electricidad, 1944), CAP (Compa

ıa de Acero del

Pac

ıﬁco, 1946), ENAP (Empresa Nacional del Petr

oleo, 1950), and IANSA

(Industria Azucarera Nacional, 1952). Between 1939 and 1973, CORFO

played a signiﬁcant role in the economic life of the country by direct

investment and through credit allocation to foster new industries.

In Argentina after 1945, the state’s direct participation in the economy

also became stronger. Nationalizations focused on public utilities: Gas del

Estado was created in 1945 and Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones

(ENTEL) in 1946.During the years 1947–50, state investment concentrated

in public transportation: mainly trains, ships, and planes.

Policy goals in this period were different from those of the previous

period. On the one hand, state intervention aimed at sustaining economic

development by promoting domestic industry. On the other hand, gov-

ernments attempted to improve income distribution by means of transfers,

more marked in the case of Chile and Argentina than in Brazil and Mexico,

with programs ending up in persistent inﬂation. Precisely for this reason,

in Argentina and Chile – where social pressure was stronger – growth stag-

nated in the 1950s, much earlier than in Brazil and Mexico.

The state understood that, wherever natural resources or idle private

savings existed, it had the power to mobilize them. Then it could provide

economic rents for those sectors it wanted to promote and, by sharing

Luiz Orenstein et al., “Democracia com Desenvolvimento: 1956–1961”inMarcelo de Paiva Abreu, A

Ordem do Progresso, Cem anos de pol

ıtica econ

omica republicana 1889–1989 (R

ıo de Janeiro, 1990), 182.

Patricio Meller, Un Siglo de Econom

ıa Pol

ıtica Chilena: 1890–1990 (Santiago, 1996).

Marie-Ange V

eganzon

es and Carlos Winograd, Argentina en el Siglo XX: Cr

onica de un Crecimiento

Anunciado (Paris, 1997), 164.