Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
P1: JzG
0521812909c05 CB929-Bulmer 052181290 9 October 3, 2005 8:53
The Institutional Framework 187
U.S. constitution, and thus incompatible with local political needs. If Latin
American constitutional framers tried to lift the U.S. Constitution out of
its context and place it in their own, it could not be expected to perform
with the same effects. Its enforceability depended on social or cultural fac-
tors embedded in country-specific informal institutions. But, however valid
theoretically, the argument is not supported with evidence. Constitutional
rules may not have been socially optimal, but they were also not copies
of the U.S. or other foreign constitutions. Moreover, to the extent that
they borrowed articles from them, frequent revisions made Latin American
constitutions more Latin American. Their framers studied all the major
constitutions at their disposal and often preferred European models, except
in a few articles. In the first few years, the Spanish Constitution of 1812 and
the French Constitution of 1814 were influential. Subsequent European
and Latin American influences included the Bolivarian, Argentine, and
Chilean constitutions, as well as the Weimar Constitution of 1919.Fur-
thermore, though constitutional framers studied the existing models, they
did so with a critical eye and modified articles to suit the special needs of
their countries as they saw them.
Their choices often revealed preferences for designs that preserved cul-
tural, ideological, or institutional continuity. Notably, most set up uni-
tary governments, often with governance structures resembling Spanish or
French administrative designs. Though most early states experimented with
federalist schemes, federations fragmented, and fragmented states set up
unitary (centralist) governments. The few nations that eventually adopted
federalist institutions – Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela – each
adopted different federalist designs, but all were more centralist than the
U.S. model. The growth-enhancing consequences of sound fiscal federal-
ism or “market-preserving federalism,” thought to have unintended positive
economic consequences in the U.S. case, were generally not reproduced by
the Latin American federalist states.
Finally, the choice of the presidential over the parliamentary form of
government, which all Latin American countries adopted, seems to have
been adopted from the U.S. model. However, it can be argued that the
presidential model with strong executive powers would have been the pre-
ferred one anyway. Even in the first constitutions, presidential powers were
assigned differently than in the United States. Presidents had more pow-
ers to legislate by decree, greater unilateral powers to declare emergencies
or suspend constitutional rights, and fewer checks caused by the sepa-
ration of powers. As for federalist governments, presidents were usually