
4.4 Total Theory Model Elimination — MSR-Version 113
4.4.5 A Sample Application: Terminological Reasoning
Terminological reasoning was mentioned above in Section 4.1.2 as an instance
of total theory reasoning. We will show here how TTME-MSR can be used to
reason about clauses containing both ordinary and A-Box literals; the latter
will be interpreted over a background theory given by a T-Box. After some
preliminary remarks we will go to a more formal treatment.
As a prerequisite we will assume a language for the T-Box which contains
the usual constructs such as “atomic concept”, “concept conjunction”, etc.,
but allows also “concept definition, ˙=”. See
[
Hollunder, 1990
]
for a brief
introduction.
For the assertional formalism (“A-Box”), we allow object descriptions
of the form a : A, where a is an object (i.e. a symbol taken from some
alphabet), and A is a concept name. For instance, Peter : Male is an ob-
ject description. Furthermore, the A-Box may contain relation descriptions
of the form (a, b):R, where a and b are objects and R is a role (e.g.
(Peter, Beate):Married). Obviously, both object and relation descriptions can
be formulated in first-order logic. For this, simply take the objects as con-
stants symbols, let “:” be a two place predicate symbol and let “(., .)” by a
2-ary function symbol. With this view we talk of A-Box literals, and we let
an A-Box consists of a finite set A-Box literals.
Usually, terminological reasoning system provide (among others) a service
to decide the consistency of an A-Box wrt. a T-Box (see e.g.
[
Hollunder, 1990;
Schmidt-Schauß and Smolka, 1991
]
), i.e. whether there is a model of both
the A-Box and the T-Box. Consistency is the most elementary problem, in
the sense that many other interesting problems, such as the subsumption,
instance, realization and retrieval problem are instances of it (see
[
Hollunder,
1990
]
).
18
The algorithm in
[
Hollunder, 1990
]
presupposes that an A-Box literal is
always positive, i.e. unnegated. In order to bring in negative information for
A-Box literals one defines in the T-Box a new concept which expresses the
complement of a given concept. For instance, in order to express that Peter
is not a Male state the A-Box literal Peter :
Male where Male is a new concept
which is defined in the T-Box by adding
Male
.
= ¬Male to it.
As mentioned above, we are concerned with a more general proof task,
in that instead of an A-Box we allow arbitrary clauses which contain both
ordinary and A-Box literals. This clearly increases expressive power. Such an
18
As shown in
[
Paramasivam and Plaisted, 1995
]
even good ordinary theorem
provers can compete well with dedicated implementations for common services
such as “concept subsumption” and “classification”. For this, the knowledge
base (i.e. T-Box + A-Box) is translated into predicate logic, as usual. In order to
achieve good performance some preprocessing on the translation of the knowl-
edge base (e.g. a relevance analysis for the clauses) is needed. Further, since the
common services are quite often decidable, a theorem prover being capable of
finding finite models (if they exist) is most suitable.