
Paper F1: Accountant in business
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The discovery of fraud can also be disruptive. Senior management are likely to
want an investigation into how the fraud occurred and why it was not detected
sooner. Investigations or audits of this time take up time and divert attention away
from normal day-to-day operational activities.
5.4 Detection of fraud
The directors of a company and senior management are responsible for detecting or
preventing fraud (internal and external). Fraud can be difficult to detect, because a
fraudster hides his illegal activities, and fraud might not be discovered until
someone actually looks for fraud, or until the losses become so large that they
cannot be covered up any more.
Example: consequences of fraud and failure to detect
A very well-known example of fraud arising due to weaknesses in internal control is
the collapse of Barings Bank, Britain’s oldest merchant bank, in 1995. The collapse of
the bank was the direct consequence of fraudulent activity by a rogue trader, Nick
Leeson.
In 1992, Leeson was transferred to the Singapore office of the bank as a general
manager. He then qualified to become an authorised trader on the Singapore
exchange (SIMEX). The branch also relied on his administrative abilities, and he
took on the responsibility for ‘back office’ administration. He therefore acquired a
powerful position in the Singapore branch as general manager, head trader and
effective head of back office operations.
Leeson and his team engaged in two types of trading:
They handled client orders and traded in financial derivative instruments
(futures and options) for the bank’s clients.
They also traded speculatively, seeking to make profits from price differences in
similar derivatives traded on the SIMEX exchange and Japan’s Osaka exchange.
Leeson took unauthorised speculative positions in futures and options, and he hid
his trading activities and trading position in an unused error account, number
88888.
He lost money on the speculative trading. Account 88888 had losses of £2 million by
the end of 1992, and these rose to £23 million by the end of 1993 and £208 million by
the end of 1994. In all this time, the losses were not noticed by the bank’s senior
managers. Barings management were totally unaware of the situation.
Early in 1995, Leeson felt that he could not hide the losses any more. They had now
risen to over £800 million He boarded a plane for Kuala Lumpur and left Singapore.
Weak controls and procedures within the bank help to explain why Leeson’s losses
were able to continue for so long without notice. Leeson had to pay large sums of
money to SIMEX to cover his losses, but he was able to obtain the cash from other
parts of Barings and from client accounts by falsifying accounts and other
documentation. Leeson reported to more than one ‘boss’ in London, but his lines of