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ENGINE YEARBOOK 2005
ENGINE YEARBOOK 2005
originally thought was a declining
market. The JT8D was not without
its woes, however, and in the late
1980s and early 1990s the engine was
considered a declining asset. By 1993
when UPS decided to re-engine its
B727-100 fleet with Rolls-Royce
engines, JT8Ds were trading in the
$50,000 to $75,000 range and they
were not easily saleable even at those
prices. In a similar manner, JT8D
lease rates hit the floor.
When the airline industry started
to pick up in 1996 and B727s and
B737-200s started to be redeployed
worldwide, JT8D values started to
climb again. By 1998 the earliest
model of JT8D, the -7A engine, had
climbed in value to $600,000 and the
JT8D-17 exceeded $1,500,000 in
value. There was a market frenzy and
lease rates for the higher-thrust
models climbed to near $20,000 per
month plus maintenance reserves.
Core engines were being traded at
$300,000 to $500,000 and part-outs
became frequent, as there was a need
for spare parts for engine overhaul.
Many new trading and leasing
companies emerged on the back of
the engines were interchangeable
with little modification between
Boeing and Douglas applications; an
uneconomical option in today’s jet
engine market.
I think it is safe to say that the
JT8D was Pratt & Whitney’s jewel in
the crown: it was an engine with a
relatively simplistic design that
became the industry dominant
engine type by virtue of the numbers
installed in what the manufacturer
the JT8D and quickly consolidated.
Part-out programmes across fleets
became common with financial
players entering the fray to make a
quick buck. All of this happened
despite a January 1, 2000 deadline to
convert the engines to become Stage
III noise compliant.
By the end of 1999 many had seen
the writing on the wall, but it was
not until after the September 11
attacks that it became obvious that
the JT8D was on its way down the
product life cycle curve. Airlines
reacted to the sudden downturn by
parking or retiring JT8D-powered
aircraft. By the middle of 2003, JT8D-
17 core engine sale transactions were
being logged at $15,000 per engine
and operating leasing was not even
on the radar. Good serviceable half-
life engines were trading at barely
$100,000 per unit with full QEC and
it was evident to most that the JT8D
was never going to recover. Or was it?
Northwest Airlines took a serious
look at the market and decided that it
would shut-down its JT8D maintenance
base in Atlanta and develop a more
cost-effective programme for its JT8D-
powered fleet. It developed a no-risk,
no-return condition, hybrid cost-per-
flight hour leasing programme with
rates as low as $35 per hour with no
monthly minima. This compared with
an average cost of approximately $200
per hour in 1999. In basic terms
Northwest was operating the JT8D,
with no maintenance risk, no return
conditions and very basic and almost
non-existent FOD coverage for less than
20 per cent of what it had done just a
few years previously. And when the
engines became tired and no longer
performed they simply swapped them
out with another engines. At first,
many traders and lessors were resistant
to the programme, but they soon
realised that Northwest was one of only
a few airlines remaining active in the
JT8D market.
By the first quarter of 2004 air travel
had increased a little, the market had
started to marginally recover and more
JT8D-powered aircraft were redeployed.
As Northwest took more engines, the
surplus market started to dry up and
values rose again. Indeed, engine
When trying to understand
values for newer engine types,it is
important to realise that the
value drivers in today’s market
are not dissimilar to those of
previous engine markets. Supply
and demand are obvious,but
utility, reduced
interchangeability, noise and
emissions and aircraft volatility
are probably more important
when considering value.
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