Woolrych Austin. Britain in Revolution, 1625-1660
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who in the previous August had refused to declare the Scottish invaders to be
enemies and traitors, and those who had just voted in support of the king’s
latest answer. By 7 a.m. on 6 December several regiments were posted in the
precincts of the parliament-house, and Colonel Pride stood in the lobby to
execute the operation so widely known by his name. Lord Grey of Groby was
at his side to help him identify who was to be excluded and who arrested.
Fairfax seems to have given Ireton free rein and kept out of the business him-
self, but he must have known what was going on; his lodging was close by in
Whitehall. When a committee of six MPs waited on him to explain the previ-
ous morning’s vote he kept them waiting for three hours, and then would give
them no straight answer to their questions about what his army was up to.
Later in the day Cromwell arrived at last from the north. He declared then
and later that he had not been acquainted with the purge beforehand, ‘yet
since it was done he was glad of it, and would endeavour to maintain it’.
19
It
is scarcely conceivable that Ireton had kept his father-in-law and immediate
superior in the dark about his intentions, but Cromwell probably took care
not to know too much and timed his arrival so as not to be personally
involved in the day’s business.
But Pride’s Purge was not the work of just one day. The military watch on
the entrance to the House continued until the 12th, by which time forty-five
members had been imprisoned (though all but twenty were released by the
20th). A rather larger number had been physically prevented from taking their
seats. Just how many Pride actually excluded is not known, and estimates vary
widely, but many members avoided his attentions by staying away, and many
more expressed their outrage at the army’s violation by voluntarily absenting
themselves, either permanently or for a considerable period. The pre-Purge
strength of the House was 471, since 18 seats were vacant and 18 more held
by men who had already long been absent. Eventually just over 200 members
would take their seats in the Rump, as the purged parliament came to be
called, but at the time the army’s action alienated most of the parliamentary
independents as well as all the presbyterians. It was a thin company that
carried on parliament’s business during the dangerous weeks in which the
king was tried and executed, and several times in December the House was
short of a quorum. The number of members who attended at any time
between 6 December and 5 February, or who signed the king’s death warrant,
totalled only just over seventy, and Vane, St John, and Haselrig were not
among them. The attendance of the peers rarely reached double figures.
20
428 Towards a Kingless Britain 1646–1649
19
Memoirs of Edmund Ludlow, I, 211–12.
20
The indispensable work on the Purge and the numbers of members affected by it is Under-
down, Pride’s Purge. Equally essential on the Rump and its membership is Blair Worden, The
Rump Parliament (Cambridge, 1974), esp. Appendix A, pp. 387–91; on pp. 391–2 he convinc-
ingly revises Underdown’s estimate of the number of members physically excluded by the army.
ch13.y8 27/9/02 11:30 AM Page 428
The army moved into the City on 8 December, since the corporation had
failed to meet Fairfax’s deadline for the demanded payment of £40,000. Fair-
fax had no compunction about helping his unpaid troops to £27,000 which
his officers found in Weavers’ Hall, banked there by the Committee for
Advance of Money. The shrunken Commons spent the 8th as a day of fasting
and humiliation, and then adjourned until the 12th, as the Lords had already
done. Somehow during these hectic days of early December the committee
which Ireton had conceded to the Levellers just before the army’s Remon-
strance was finalized managed to meet and thrash out a new Agreement of the
People. We do not know how many of its sixteen members took part; though
the chief negotiators were Lilburne, Ireton, Colonel Tichborne, and Henry
Marten, the only MP who attended. By Lilburne’s own account he and Ireton
argued keenly over the contents of the document, which was much longer
than the original Agreement, but it was drafted in time to be presented to the
General Council of Officers on 11 December. Lilburne claimed to have
understood that its text was final, to be accepted or rejected as it stood, but to
the Levellers’ disgust the Council of Officers examined it closely, debated it at
intervals for five weeks, and modified it in significant respects. William Clarke
recorded much of the proceedings, which took place in the Palace of White-
hall, and they are scarcely inferior in interest to the more famous Putney
debates. At leat seventy-three officers participated at one time or another,
attendances of over fifty being not uncommon. Some historians have sup-
posed that Ireton conceded the drafting of a new Agreement only in order to
neutralize the Levellers while the army went ahead with prosecuting the king,
to which Lilburne for one was thoroughly opposed, but the length and inten-
sity of the Whitehall debates surely prove that this blueprint for a settlement
was being taken very seriously, not least by Ireton himself.
21
First, however, the Council of Officers had to decide what to do about the
king. It resolved on 15 December that he should be ‘brought speedily to just-
ice’, and appointed a committee to consider how this should be done.
Cromwell and Ireton were conspicuously missing from its membership, but
this may be because they were too busy behind the scenes. The small number
of MPs who still attended the House contained many who were more resent-
ful of the Purge than keen to proceed against the king, and it was not until the
28th that they gave a first reading to an ordinance for the establishment of a
High Court of Justice to try him. Nine days earlier they had driven out the
few remaining seekers after accommodation by requiring members, as a
condition of their continuing to sit, to make a formal declaration that they
The Second Civil War 429
21
Two articles by Barbara Taft illumine the evolution of the second Agreement: ‘The Coun-
cil of Officers’ Agreement of the People’, Historical Journal 28 (1985), 169–85, and ‘Voting lists
of the Council of Officers, December 1648’, Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research
LII (1978), 138–54.
ch13.y8 27/9/02 11:30 AM Page 429
dissented from the vote on 5 December which had accepted the king’s answer
as grounds for proceeding to a settlement.
Predictably, Pride’s Purge was denounced by most of the Presbyterian
clergy in London and acclaimed by most of the Independents—specially
rapturously by the army’s champion Hugh Peter. Before the end of the year
parliament received a spate of petitions and declarations, by one account over
a hundred, from radical puritans and commonwealthsmen in various coun-
ties and towns, praising the army, urging the members to complete the work
of reformation, and in many cases calling for stern justice upon the king. They
represented the views of a minority, but an articulate and organized minor-
ity. The majority who looked upon the proceedings against the king with hor-
ror were powerless to resist them, for they had spent what force they could
command in the spring and summer. A presbyterian City corporation might
just have attempted resistance, despite the military occupation, but no such
body now existed. Just before the annual elections to the Common Council
on 21 December, the Rump rushed through legislation disqualifying all who
had sided with the king in the wars or signed the engagement of the previous
June which had called for a personal treaty with him. As a result only a third
of the old common-councilmen were re-elected, and the corporation’s sup-
port for the revolution in progress was assured.
Since the motive force behind that revolution lay so much in the army, it is
a strange thing that the attitude of both its senior commanders was equivocal.
Fairfax seems to have been genuinely convinced that the treaty of Newport
was a potential disaster and must be stopped, but he was deeply unhappy
about the consequential moves to put the king on trial. Cromwell’s standpoint
during December is hard to penetrate, and historians continue to disagree
about it. He had no qualms about terminating the Newport treaty and needed
no convincing now that Charles was unfit to govern, but that did not neces-
sarily justify pursuing him to his death or abolishing monarchy in Britain. If a
way could have been found of sparing his life—if Charles could have been per-
suaded to abdicate in favour of his youngest son the Duke of Gloucester—
Cromwell would probably have welcomed it. He may have found parts of the
new Agreement of the People too radical for him, and he held three meetings
with the old middle group men Bulstrode Whitelocke and Sir Thomas Wid-
drington, with Lenthall present at the third, to discuss proposals for a more
conservative settlement. He was not at one with his son-in-law Ireton, at least
until late in December. He was half drawn to a scheme advanced by the peers
Denbigh, Pembroke, Salisbury, and North whereby Charles might even have
remained king, with drastically reduced powers, and through Denbigh a final
approach was made to him. But Charles was utterly unwilling to consider
such terms, and rather than compromise his crown any further he was now
resigned to what he saw as martyrdom. By 26 December the quest for a blood-
430 Towards a Kingless Britain 1646–1649
ch13.y8 27/9/02 11:30 AM Page 430
less solution was over, and Cromwell was fully convinced that the king must
pay the penalty for making war upon his people. He said in the House, prob-
ably during the debate on the first reading of the ordinance for a High Court
of Justice, that if any man had pursued a design to put the king on trial and
depose him he would be the greatest traitor in the world, but that since
providence and necessity had cast it upon them he would pray God to bless
their counsels, though he could as yet offer them no counsel himself.
22
The Commons passed the ordinance for a High Court of Justice on 1 Janu-
ary, but next day the Lords unanimously threw it out and adjourned for a
week. In an attempt to cover the legal and constitutional nakedness of their
revolutionary tribunal, the Commons passed a vote on the 4th that was to
provide the ideological basis for the Commonwealth to come. They resolved:
That the people are, under God, the original of all just power; that the Commons of
England, in parliament assembled, being chosen by and representing the people, have
the supreme power in this nation; that whatsoever is enacted or declared for law by the
Commons . . . hath the force of law, and all the people of this nation are concluded
thereby, although the consent and concurrence of king or House of Peers be not had
thereunto.
23
The ordinance, as first drafted, intended the court to consist of 150 commis-
sioners, presided over by the Chief Justices of King’s Bench and Common
Pleas (St John now held the latter post) and the Chief Baron of Exchequer. But
none of these three, nor any judge in the central courts, was willing to act, so
they chose the best man they could find. He was John Bradshaw, the Chief Just-
ice of Chester, a convinced republican and a friend of John Milton. Such was
the unwillingness to serve that they had to reduce the number of commission-
ers to 135, but of these 55, including most of the lawyers named and all 6 of
the peers, never attended the trial. Vane, Skippon, and Brereton were among
those appointed who never appeared. Fairfax came to the initial meeting of
the court for preliminary business on 8 January, when attendance was so poor
that it adjourned until the 10th, but he never came again. The 26-year-old
Colonel Algernon Sidney, later famous as a republican theorist and a Whig
martyr, withdrew after the preliminary meetings, declaring that the king
could not be tried by any court and that no one could be tried by this one. But
at least one man of law had no doubts about its legality: John Cook, who was
appointed solicitor to the Commonwealth on 10 January so that he could lead
the prosecution. He was a thorough-paced republican and a puritan fanatic.
On the 20th General Council of Officers presented its amended Agreement
The Second Civil War 431
22
Abbott, Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell, I, 719. For differing opinions as to
when Cromwell became fully convinced of the necessity of trying the king, see Underdown,
Pride’s Purge, ch. 6, and Gentles, New Model Army, pp. 284–5, 297ff. I incline here towards
Underdown, but both readings are possible.
23
Commons’ Journals, VI, 110–11, quoted in Gardiner, Great Civil War, III, 561.
ch13.y8 27/9/02 11:30 AM Page 431
of the People, in a fair parchment copy, to the Commons, but the eyes of the
country were on the adjacent Westminster Hall, where the king’s trial opened
that day. The great building had been filled with tiered seats, so as to make as
public a spectacle as possible of the hoped-for demonstration of his war-guilt.
He had been at Windsor since 23 December, but he was brought on 19 Janu-
ary to St James’s, where he spent the last eleven nights of his life. He appeared
before the court dressed all in black, and he kept a high-crowned hat on his
head throughout in token that he did not accept its authority. His hair was
streaked with grey now, and his face betrayed the long-drawn strain he had
been under, but when he spoke his voice was firm and quite free of its old
stammer. His attempted objections could not prevent Cook from reading out
the lengthy charge which he and others had (with some difficulty) prepared.
Its main burden was that Charles Stuart, having been entrusted with a limit-
ed power to govern by the laws of the land, for the good of the people and the
preservation of their rights, had pursued a wicked design to arrogate to him-
self an unlimited and tyrannical power, in order to rule as he pleased. To that
end he had ‘traitorously and maliciously levied war against the present par-
liament, and the people therein represented’, and he had compounded his
guilt by deliberately causing the war to be renewed during the past year.
24
Nothing was said, however, of the Engagement or the Scottish invasion; he
was on trial solely as King of England, though the Scottish parliament had
just been pressing that proceedings should be suspended until their country
had been heard in the matter. But his traffic with Irish rebels and his encour-
agement of an Irish invasion of England formed part of the charge.
At the end of the reading he laughed in the face of his judges. Time and
again, on this and subsequent days, he challenged Bradshaw to say by what
authority the court sat, and when told that it was by the authority of the Com-
mons of England he poured justified scorn on the idea that the Lower House
of parliament was a court of judicature or that a small fraction of it, first
elected more than eight years ago, had any claim to speak for the commons of
England in the broader sense. If he had recognized the court’s jurisdiction and
been prepared to abdicate he could still have saved his life, but by refusing to
plead guilty or not guilty he frustrated one purpose of his accusers, since until
he did so the thirty-three witnesses who had been assembled to testify to his
responsibility for the two wars could not be publicly heard. The further price
he paid for refusing to plead was that he was not allowed to address the court
himself; yet his regal dignity and self-possession on all three of his appear-
ances before it won him many sympathizers. Finally the witnesses were heard
by a committee on the 24th, and their depositions were read out in a public
session in the Painted Chamber next day. Only forty-six commissioners
432 Towards a Kingless Britain 1646–1649
24
Text in Gardiner (ed.), Constitutional Documents, pp. 371–4.
ch13.y8 27/9/02 11:30 AM Page 432
attended it, but they resolved that they could now proceed to a death sen-
tence. In face of his brave defiance it was a foregone conclusion, and Charles
was brought before the court to hear it on the 27th. He pleaded eloquently to
be heard before the full body of the Lords and Commons, and in doing so he
had the better of yet another exchange with Bradshaw, but all he won was a
brief adjournment. In the course of it Cromwell used all his powers of angry
rhetoric to bring round the waverers among the commissioners. The sentence
was then read in open court, and all the sixty-seven commissioners present
rose to signify their assent to Bradshaw’s declaration that it was the judgment
of the whole court. They must all be counted among the regicides, even
though the king’s death warrant was signed by only fifty-nine; indeed the regi-
cides numbered sixty-nine, since two commissioners signed the warrant who
were not present when the sentence was read.
25
We are in the presence of tragedy in the final scene that was enacted three
days later on a black-draped platform outside the upper windows of the Ban-
queting House of the Palace of Whitehall. Charles had passed up chance after
chance of saving his life because he thought that by doing so he would com-
promise the sacred prerogatives of his kingly office. Those who had brought
him to the scaffold were driven by a no less sincere conviction that they were
doing justice upon a man against whom God had witnessed for shedding the
blood of thousands of his subjects in an evil cause. His final ordeal was cruel-
ly prolonged, largely because the Rump belatedly realized on that very morn-
ing that it was the custom, upon the death of a king, immediately to proclaim
his successor, so they had to rush through an act to make such a proclamation
illegal. The courage and dignity with which Charles bore his last hours sur-
passed even what he had shown during his trial, and probably did more for
the future of the monarchy than all his acts of war. Not many of the thous-
ands present on that wintry day can have heard his last words on the scaffold,
but in them he recalled Strafford’s fate, and accepted his own ‘unjust
sentence’ as God’s punishment for letting that earlier one take effect. He reaf-
firmed his central political beliefs, and rejected the charge that he was the
enemy of the people; indeed he claimed to be ‘the martyr of the people’:
Truly I desire their liberty and freedom as much as anybody whomsoever; but I must
tell you their liberty and freedom consists in having of government, those laws by
which their life and their goods may be most their own. It is not for having a share in
government, sir, that is nothing pertaining to them. A subject and a sovereign are clear
different things.
26
So most of his subjects still believed, and the groan that went up from the huge
crowd as the axe severed his head has echoed down our history.
The Second Civil War 433
25
A. W. McIntosh, ‘The numbers of the English regicides’, History 67 (1982), 195–216.
26
Quoted in C. V. Wedgwood, The Trial of Charles I (1964), p. 191.
ch13.y8 27/9/02 11:30 AM Page 433
w
fourteen
w
Quest for a Settlement
Neither the people of England, nor those who watched aghast from Scot-
land, Ireland, and continental Europe, could tell what the outcome would be
of that horrifying act at Whitehall on 30 January 1649. It seemed there might
be no end to its revolutionary consequences. An anointed king had been
brought to trial and execution by a fragment of one house of parliament, first
elected more than eight years earlier, and now claiming to act by the supreme
authority of the sovereign people’s representatives. The Rump followed up
the regicide with acts abolishing the office of king and the House of Lords. It
called them acts, not ordinances, because they required no other assent now
but that of the Commons. But behind the Rump stood the army, to whose
force it owed its power, and the army might not sustain it for long, since its
first intention had been to dissolve the parliament rather than purge it. The
Rumpers themselves promised, in their act of 17 March that abolished the
monarchy, ‘that they will put a period to the sitting of the present parliament,
and dissolve the same so soon as may possibly stand with the safety of the
people that hath betrusted them’.
1
The army had seemingly committed itself
to supporting a programme of radical reform, embodied in the revised Agree-
ment of the People that it had presented to the Rump—a programme that
would have transformed the constitution of parliament itself, regulated the
frequency and duration of its sitting, brought large alterations to the law of
the land, and changed the whole relationship between the church (or churches)
and the state. The army and its supporters hoped and expected that this
caretaker regime, as they saw it, would soon make way for a reformed and
reforming parliament, elected on a far broader franchise than ever in the past.
And what might the consequences of that be? The Levellers had reached the
peak of their influence, through the share they had taken in drafting the new
Agreement. From the early months of 1649 onward there was a burgeoning
of various groups even more radical than the Levellers: the Fifth Monarchists,
who felt a divine call to set up a regime ruled exclusively by their fellow
‘saints’ in preparation for Christ’s prophesied kingdom on earth; the Diggers,
1
Gardiner (ed.), Constitutional Documents, p. 380.
ch14.y8 27/9/02 11:34 AM Page 434
who called themselves True Levellers, and preached and practised the com-
munity of property; and people known as Ranters who believed that those
who had discovered the godhead within them were liberated from all con-
ventional morality. Of these groups only the Fifth Monarchists had any con-
siderable following in the army, but there was an understandable fear in
conservative hearts that with dissolution threatening the ancient constitu-
tion, the established church, and the known laws of the land, a dark and
revolutionary future lay ahead.
Who could have foreseen that the Rump would go on wielding sovereign
authority over England and Wales for four and a quarter years after the king’s
execution—longer than the whole duration of the first Civil War, and almost
as long as Cromwell’s whole rule as Lord Protector? The Rump, moreover,
proved to be a far from revolutionary body, and its temper became more con-
servative with time. The majority of its members were deeply unsympathetic
towards the aspirations of Levellers, Diggers, Fifth Monarchists, Ranters,
and extremist sects of all kinds. Its concessions to religious liberty were to be
limited and grudging, its record in social reform miserably meagre, and the
professional interests of its influential lawyer-members made it deeply suspi-
cious of any changes in the substance and operation of the law, where mod-
erate reform was overdue. In the folk memory, the period in which the
Commonwealth was ruled by the Rump is the least remembered and least
known phase of the Great Rebellion, and the mistaken notion that Cromwell
was the great shaper of national policy from the Civil Wars onward dies hard.
He was of course immensely influential, but he was away on his campaigns
in Ireland and Scotland for long periods, and when his military commit-
ments did leave him free to attend the House he by no means always got his
way in it.
The politics of the Rump defy simple analysis, because its lines of division
were seldom clear-cut, and they changed considerably with time. The first dis-
tinction to be made is between the small core of members who led the House
and bore the burden of responsibility during the critical, dangerous period
between Pride’s Purge and the execution of the king, and the much larger
number who resumed their seats later. This committed nucleus totalled just
over seventy, though the daily attendance was much smaller. The most
prominent of them, apart from Cromwell, who had much military business to
see to, were Thomas Scot, a Buckinghamshire attorney elected late in 1645,
Henry Marten, and Thomas Chaloner, another ‘recruiter’. All three were
republicans and regicides. Two future leaders of the Rump were conspicu-
ously absent, Haselrig because he was carrying out important military duties
as governor of Newcastle, and Vane because he was opposed to putting the
king on trial, as he had been to Pride’s Purge. Forty-three MPs, less than one
in ten of the unpurged House, sat in judgement on the king and subscribed his
Quest for a Settlement 435
ch14.y8 27/9/02 11:34 AM Page 435
death warrant, though three of these seem to have been bullied into signing,
for they withdrew from parliament soon afterwards. The forty unrepentant
regicides can be regarded as committed revolutionaries, though not necessar-
ily as allies of the army, for some of these hard-core Rumpers were as much
concerned to assert parliament’s rights against a military takeover as to
condemn monarchical tyranny. Rather more members complied with the
requirement, imposed from 20 December onward, that as a condition of
sitting they must record their dissent from the unpurged House’s vote to
accept the king’s answers to the Newport propositions as a basis for a settle-
ment; thirty did so at once, and about twice as many more before the end of
January. Not all of these, however, approved of the proceedings against the
king. Most of them were more strongly committed to the new regime than the
large number who resumed their seats even later, but some safeguarded their
right to sit mainly out of a resolve to uphold parliament’s authority against
any threat of usurpation by the army.
By the end of January the House still had an active membership of only sev-
enty or so and a much smaller average attendance. This worried it. So far it
had excluded members who had voted on 5 December to keep the Newport
treaty going, but on 1 February it resolved that during that month it would
admit without further scrutiny any who would now register their dissent
from that vote. Thirty at least took advantage at once, and at least forty more
in the next three weeks. Most of these ‘February dissenters’ were cautious
souls who had not cared to be politically involved while they might have been
thought complicit in the act of regicide, but they were not all conservatives.
They included those committed republicans Haslerig and Vane, who with
Cromwell (or rather, usually, against him) were to be perhaps the most influ-
ential of all the actors on the political stage in the next four years. But most of
them were opposed to radical change in religion, the law, and the social basis
of political power, and most were strongly concerned to thwart any threat to
parliamentary power by the army. Yet the Rump’s historian has argued con-
vincingly that the man most responsible for broadening its power-base and
persuading so many members to return was Oliver Cromwell.
2
For all his
record as a breaker of parliaments, he was a lifelong believer in parliamentary
authority, and he could see no future for the Commonwealth under a narrow
oligarchy upheld only by the sword.
Only about fifty more members were readmitted after February, and they
were subjected to rather closer scrutiny. They tended to reinforce the Rump’s
unrevolutionary temper, though most of the latecomers, including the Febru-
ary intake, proved more dilatory in attendance than the original nucleus.
Between the House’s nominal membership and the actual presence in it there
436 Towards a Kingless Britain 1646–1649
2
Worden, Rump Parliament, pp. 67–9. I am indebted to Worden’s masterly study through-
out this chapter.
ch14.y8 27/9/02 11:34 AM Page 436
was a huge gulf. Two hundred and eleven members took their seats at some
time in the course of its existence, including nine added through by-elections
after the Purge, but the average number present at divisions remained
steadily in the fifties over the years, falling to forty-nine in 1653; the highest
total ever recorded was seventy-one, including the four tellers. Only about
thirty Rumpers treated their membership as a full-time occupation, though
thirty or forty more sat reasonably often. These figures, however, do not
convey a full picture of the active members’ involvement, since the House
delegated an increasing amount of business to committees, in whose demand-
ing work they widely shared.
Much the most important delegation was that of general executive author-
ity to a Council of State. The decision to establish it was taken on 7 February,
immediately after the Rump had voted to abolish the monarchy, and the pur-
pose was to fill the great gap in government left thereby. A powerful commit-
tee was set up to define the council’s powers and propose the names of its
initial members. The latter were to number forty-one, of whom thirty-one
were MPs; the others included five peers, the three chief judges, an alderman
to represent the City, and John Bradshaw, who had added to his stature by
presiding over the king’s trial with what dignity that difficult role permitted
him. But only three of the peers, Denbigh, Pembroke, and Salisbury, proved
willing to serve, and among the committee’s nominees the House rejected Ire-
ton and Harrison. This was a heavy slight to the army, whose only members
on the council for the next two years were Fairfax, Cromwell, and Skippon.
Since Fairfax was seldom seen and would eventually resign his command,
and since Cromwell was to be absent most of the time in Ireland and Scotland,
the army (to whom the Rump owed its being) was most unwisely under-
represented. That ill-considered vote can indeed be seen as an initial move in
the quarrel that would one day lead to the Rump’s expulsion.
The council was empowered to raise forces, conduct relations with foreign
powers and their ambassadors, and imprison anyone who disobeyed its com-
mands, but it was firmly subjected to whatever orders parliament gave it, and
it was appointed for one year only. There was never a question of who was
master, and the Rump elected a new council in every year of its existence.
Barely half the original one was committed to the regime to the extent of hav-
ing signed the king’s death warrant or registered their dissents before Febru-
ary, and the political complexion of its successors did not change very much.
Councillors were required, however, to formally engage themselves to pursue
whatever instructions they received from parliament, and specifically to
uphold whatever parliament settled with regard to ‘the government of the
nation for the future in way of a republic, without king or House of Lords’.
3
Quest for a Settlement 437
3
Gardiner, Constitutional Documents, p. 384; cf. pp. 381–3 for the act appointing a
Council of State.
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