Woolrych Austin. Britain in Revolution, 1625-1660

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nine

The Conﬂict Widens

Now that parliament realized that the path to victory would be long and

hard, it was inevitable that it should pursue an alliance with the Scottish

Covenanters. The king, however, had been ﬁrst in seeking allies outside his

English kingdom, and the diplomatic efforts of both sides in the course of

1643 turned what had begun as an English civil war into a true war of three

kingdoms.

The situation in Ireland was complicated for both king and parliament.

The Confederated catholics had established a form of provisional govern-

ment, but they continued to profess their loyalty to the king, and they had

strong reasons for wishing that he and not the parliament should win the war

in England. The ﬁrst General Assembly, which they summoned to Kilkenny

in October 1642, had abjured the title of parliament because their oath of

confederacy bound them to defend the king’s rights, which included the sole

authority to summon a parliament. It had accepted the English common law

as the law of Ireland and recognized the binding force of existing English

statutes that legislated for Ireland, so long as they were not against the Roman

Catholic religion or the liberties of the Irish people. It had petitioned the king

for the free exercise of their religion and security for their estates and liberties,

‘which granted [it said], we will convert our forces upon any design your

majesty may appoint’.

Charles had no personal compunction about enlisting Irish catholics to

ﬁght for him, but he had publicly condemned all those in arms against the

Dublin government as rebels and traitors. At this stage he was more interested

in neutralizing the Confederates than in bringing them over to ﬁght for him.

Ormond, his most loyal servant in Ireland, was ﬁghting against them, and

Charles’s primary aim was to release Ormond and his mainly English troops

for service in England. But Ormond’s was only one voice in the council in

Dublin, which was divided in its loyalties, with the majority leaning towards

the English parliament because of their fear and hatred of the rebels. Late in

New History of Ireland, III, 302, quoting T. Carte, Life of Ormonde (6 vols., Oxford,

1851), V, 368–70.

ch9.y8 27/9/02 10:59 AM Page 268

October 1642 the parliament sent a committee to Dublin with the object of

winning the council wholly to its side and detaching the army from its obedi-

ence to Ormond. But Ormond’s ofﬁcers remained loyal to him and the king,

and when the Irish parliament reassembled for a brief session in November

and December it too continued to be divided in its allegiance.

Early in the new year Charles ordered the Dublin council to expel the

committee from Westminster, which it did, and then sent a commission to

Ormond, Clanricard, and ﬁve others, authorizing them to meet representa-

tives of the Irish catholics and to hear their grievances. Ormond and his col-

leagues set fairly stiff conditions before agreeing to a meeting with delegates

of the confederates, who reciprocated his caution. This was understandable,

for the council was planning a military campaign to capture New Ross and

Wexford, and had appointed the parliamentarian Lord Lisle, son and heir to

Lord Lieutenant Leicester, to command it. Ormond sensed in this another

ploy to take the command of the army away from him, and insisted on lead-

ing the expedition himself. But it failed to take New Ross, and Ormond had

to ﬁght his way past the confederate army of Leinster on 18 March to bring it

safely back to Dublin. The ﬁrst meetings with the Confederates’ delegates

took place while the siege of New Ross was still in progress. They asked for the

repeal of the penal laws, so as to allow catholics full admission to public ofﬁce

as well as freedom of worship, and for the redress of their grievances by an

Irish parliament, free of the shackles of Poynings’ law. These things were

more than Charles could grant, but he did comply with their request for the

removal of Sir William Parsons, the senior Lord Justice and the dominant par-

liamentarian in the Dublin council. This strengthened the hand of Ormond,

to whom Charles sent a commission on 23 April, directing him to seek a

one-year truce with his ‘Roman Catholic subjects in arms’.

That was to bear fruit in September, but it was not the king’s only iron in

the diplomatic ﬁre, either in Ireland or Scotland. Earlier in the year the Earl of

Antrim was in correspondence with such Scottish royalists as Nithsdale,

Aboyne (Huntly’s son), and Airlie, and also with Newcastle in England, about

a plan for raising the king’s supporters in Scotland and making common

cause with his own people in Ulster. Most of Antrim’s Ulster estates were

under the occupation of Colonel Robert Monro and the Covenanting forces

that he brought from Scotland in April 1642, and he was prepared to do any-

thing to get them back. He was not the only proponent of a rising in Scotland,

for Charles’s future champion Montrose visited the queen soon after her

landing at Bridlington and urged her to persuade her husband to authorize

one. Antrim came to see her in April, and she sent him back to Ireland to

negotiate a cessation of arms and raise Confederate support for the king.

But Antrim was captured at sea in mid-May, with a number of letters which

revealed all too plainly what he and the queen had been planning. The

The Conﬂict Widens 269

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English parliament published them, and their disclosure helped to win public

support for its own negotiation of a treaty with the Scots.

During the spring and early summer Charles was inclined to see his best

hope of support outside England neither in Irish catholics nor in uncompro-

mising Scottish royalists like Huntly, Aboyne, and Airlie but in an emerging

party of ‘royalist Covenanters’. They were mainly allies of Hamilton, who

was raised to a dukedom in April, and whose advice Charles was probably

following. Hamilton was hoping to ally this group with non-Covenanting

royalists of a more moderate stamp than Huntly, and with their support to

build bridges between the king and the central Covenanting leadership per-

soniﬁed by Argyll. The latter asked Charles to call a new Scottish parliament

in 1643, and it was because he refused that Argyll summoned a convention of

estates instead. That in itself, however, was an invasion of the royal preroga-

tive, and Charles’s ﬁrst reaction was to forbid it to meet; but Hamilton per-

suaded him to accept the concession as an act of grace and to give him a

chance to try and manage the convention. His hopes of success, however,

were all but wrecked by the revelations that followed the capture of Antrim,

and by the interception of a letter from six Scottish earls to the queen, offer-

ing advice on how the war against the parliament in England should be con-

ducted. Even so Hamilton had the support of most of the nobles present,

though the lairds and burgesses were almost solidly for Argyll. Their party

carried an ‘act of constitution’ which enlarged the convention’s powers far

beyond what the king had sanctioned, whereupon Hamilton and many of his

allies withdrew, leaving the ﬁeld to Argyll and the strict Covenanters.

The convention of estates was all the better disposed towards the English

parliament’s plea for military help by the fact that on 1 July, soon after it

opened, the promised assembly of divines met at Westminster. It consisted of

121 ordained ministers, with ten peers and twenty MPs as lay assessors, and

the Scots were invited to send commissioners. They sent eight, ﬁve clerics and

three laymen. It is fascinating to speculate on what the Westminster Assem-

bly would have prescribed for the Church of England if the Scots had not been

involved. A moderate episcopalian solution, which would have had the

broadest national support, was ruled out because parliament, shorn of its

royalist members, had already abolished episcopacy. A Presbyterian settle-

ment was a possibility, for a Presbyterian party was developing among the

puritan clergy, but little or nothing was left of the old Elizabethan Presbyter-

ian movement, and lay support for such a system must at this stage have been

small indeed. When English puritan settlers in New England had had a free

hand to establish a church polity after their own hearts, it was a congrega-

tional model that they followed, not a Presbyterian one, and congregational-

ism or Independency was a growing force in the England of the mid-1640s.

The balance between Presbyterians, Independents, and Erastians would

270 War in Three Kingdoms 1640–1646

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surely have been different if the English parliament’s need for a Scottish

army, and the consequent Solemn League and Covenant, had not skewed the

Westminster Assembly’s agenda; there might even have been a tincture of

toleration.

The parliamentary commissioners arrived in Edinburgh on 7 August 1643

with the prime object of obtaining at least 10,000 Scottish foot and 1,000

horse to ﬁght in England. But the Covenanters were more intent on bringing

the two kingdoms into a closer and more equal union, and in particular on so

reforming the Church of England as to bring it into line with the Scottish Kirk.

A General Assembly had just met in Edinburgh, and it politely maintained the

pressure for ecclesiastical conformity. The Scots would not discuss the terms

of a military alliance until the English commissioners had agreed to a joint

band or covenant that would commit them to the religious and political

objectives which were an essential part of its price. The result was the Solemn

League and Covenant, which was drafted mainly by Alexander Henderson

and approved unanimously by both the General Assembly and the conven-

tion of estates on 17 August. Vane, the chief negotiator on the English side,

strove hard to keep ‘a door open in England to Independency’, which is where

his own convictions lay, but the Scots were adamant against it.

The Covenant was adopted by the English parliament with small amend-

ments, and all the members of the Commons and the Assembly of Divines

solemnly swore to it in St Margaret’s church on 25 September. Parliament

then passed an ordinance requiring all male Englishmen over eighteen to sub-

scribe it, and in Scotland a committee of estates joined with the commission

of the Kirk to impose it on all Scottish subjects, on pain of having their goods

and rents conﬁscated. In theory it imposed a common religion on every sub-

ject of both nations, with no concessions to any who might conscientiously

dissent from it; and since it also rigidly deﬁned England’s and Scotland’s war

aims, and hugely affected their subsequent relations with the king and

between each other, its terms were of unusual importance. In form it was an

oath, to be sworn by the subjects of England, Scotland, and Ireland, ‘living

under one king, and being of one reformed religion’, to preserve the religion

of the Church of Scotland and reform that of England and Ireland, ‘accord-

ing to the word of God, and the example of the best reformed churches’, and

to bring the churches of all three kingdoms into uniformity of creed, liturgy,

and government. Vane was later credited by Bishop Burnet with getting

‘according to the word of God’ inserted, so that the example of the Scottish

Kirk should not be the sole pattern for the settlement of the Church of Eng-

land, but it was the narrowest of loopholes since the rest of the clause so clear-

ly implied uniformity on the Scottish model. Next came a pledge to extirpate

The Conﬂict Widens 271

Stevenson, Scottish Revolution 1637–44, pp. 283–6.

ch9.y8 27/9/02 10:59 AM Page 271

popery, episcopacy, superstition, heresy, and schism (another rejection of tol-

eration), so ‘that the Lord may be one, and his name one in the three king-

doms’. The Covenant further bound those who swore to it to preserve both

the rights and privileges of the two parliaments and the king’s person and

authority, to bring all incendiaries and malignants to public trial and condign

punishment, and when the war had been concluded to endeavour that

the allied kingdoms ‘may remain conjoined in a ﬁrm peace and union to all

posterity’.

When political union was eventually achieved on a lasting basis sixty-four

years later, it recognized the enduring religious diversity between England

and Scotland. The Covenant, by failing to do so, was to prove a grave obs-

tacle to a peaceful settlement when the war ended, both because the king

would never submit to what he regarded as the betrayal of the church of

which he was Supreme Governor, and the English people would never let

themselves be forced into an ecclesiastical strait-jacket in which only a frac-

tion of them felt comfortable. Parliament anyway lacked the will to attempt

it seriously; many in both Houses tried at the time to save it from committing

itself to a Presbyterian Church of England, but the need for a Scottish army

after the run of royalist victories in the summer of 1643 overruled them. From

now on, however, religion was to be an even greater source of division in the

parliamentarian ranks than it had been before.

The commissioners whom the General Assembly in Edinburgh sent to the

Westminster Assembly included Henderson and Baillie among the ministers

and Johnston of Wariston among the laymen. They were no more troubled

about imposing an alien religious system on an unwilling nation than a group

of Soviet commissaries would be when delivering the pure milk of Marxist-

Leninist orthodoxy to a satellite country after the Second World War. They

did not see themselves as engaged with the Westminster divines in a common

quest for a confession of faith and a form of church polity that accorded most

closely with the word of God, for they knew the answers already. What they

brought was the truth, which their Kirk possessed in unique perfection, and

they assumed that its blessings had only to be experienced to be eventually

embraced. They were not content just to sit on the Assembly; they insisted on

treating formally with a committee of representatives of both parliament and

the divines on the speciﬁc point of uniformity, and they got their way. The

Scottish army under negotiation in the simultaneous but separate military

treaty was now raised to 21,000 men under the command of the veteran Earl

of Leven, and it was an offer that the English parliament could not refuse.

Parliament’s acceptance of the Covenant was encouraged by the king’s

conclusion of a truce with the confederate Irish, initially to release Ormond’s

272 War in Three Kingdoms 1640–1646

Text in Gardiner (ed.), Constitutional Documents, pp. 267–71.

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troops to return and ﬁght for him in England, but with who knew what

possibilities of further military aid from Irish catholics. Ormond’s cautious

negotiation with the Confederates was opposed by a papal envoy called Pier

Francesco Scarampi who joined them in mid-July, but the Marquis’s position

had been strengthened, and theirs weakened, by a severe defeat that Owen Roe

O’Neill had suffered at the battle of Clones on 13 June. In it O’Neill had lost

many of the ofﬁcers who had returned to Ireland with him, and he needed a

breathing-space in which to recruit his army and give it some serious military

training. Ormond’s fellow protestant commanders such as Thomond and

Inchiquin and Coote had misgivings about his treating with the Confederates,

but in accordance with the king’s instructions he concluded with them, on

15 September, a one year’s armistice that became known as the Cessation. It

exposed the king to much propaganda in England about the iniquity of enlist-

ing murdering Irish papists against his English subjects, but in fact the 5,000

or so troops that Ormond sent home after its conclusion were all protestants

and nearly all English. Their military value to the royalists was small com-

pared with that of Leven’s Scottish army to their opponents, and many of

them, when captured in England, cheerfully changed sides. But Ormond

deserved his reward of the ofﬁce of Lord Lieutenant, and his stature grew

steadily over the next ﬁve years. He was still only just thirty-three, and as an

Old English magnate most of his kinsmen and former friends were with the

Confederates, but he remained ﬁrm in his protestant faith and his loyalty to

the king was unwavering.

He was not, however, the only channel of communication between Charles

and the catholic Irish. Antrim was as usual pursuing grandiose projects which

might have been of advantage to himself, and even to his king, if he had been

able to deliver what he proposed. He was currently angling for the position of

Lieutenant-General of all the Confederate forces in Ireland. He visited

Charles in Oxford in December 1643 and won him over to a plan whereby

10,000 Confederate troops would be sent over to ﬁght against the Scottish

army that was about to enter England. Ormond was excluded from this nego-

tiation, and justly resented the fact. The scheme eventually came to nothing

because the Confederates’ supreme council refused to sanction it, though (as

will be seen) they would be willing to send a small force to ﬁght alongside

Montrose.

When the year 1643 began, there had still been a widespread hope that the

war might soon be wound up and a common desire to preserve as far as pos-

sible the forms of government known to the law. Since then, however, both

sides had had to devise the measures and institutions needed to recruit,

pay, and supply ﬁeld armies and garrisons on a long-term basis. The result

by the end of the year was that England had what amounted to two rival

The Conﬂict Widens 273

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governments, and a large part of that which operated in parliamentary

territory was of necessity new.

The king was naturally better able to act through time-honoured channels,

and he made a virtue of so doing. When he appointed ofﬁcers of state, privy

councillors, and military commanders he was exercising what had until very

recently been his unquestioned prerogative, and he could denounce parlia-

ment’s attempts to usurp it as a breach of the fundamental laws. In practice

the privy council’s function was now partly taken over by his new council of

war, in which his generals sat side by side with selected civilian councillors

and ofﬁcials. This was the centre from which his war effort was directed, and

it gave instructions to the commissioners of array who continued to impress

soldiers for his armies in the territories that he controlled. For civil adminis-

tration and justice, however, he went on working as far as possible through

the JPs, sheriffs, constables, borough corporations, and other traditional

authorities. The chief ofﬁcers of state from the Lord Chancellor and Lord

Treasurer downward had moved to Oxford with him, along with much of his

central bureaucracy, and continued to perform most of their old functions,

though the ﬁnancial demands of his armies led to the increasing use of a spe-

cial treasury of war. Late in the year he tried to take some of the constitution-

al wind out of his enemies’ sails by summoning parliament to meet in Oxford.

His objects were to lure peace party members away from Westminster, to

broaden support for his war effort and to add some legitimacy to the ﬁnancial

exactions that he was being forced to make. The royalist peers and MPs

whom he addressed in Christ Church Hall on 22 January 1642 were quite

impressive in number, but the Oxford ‘Parliament’ disappointed his hopes. If

the members who fought for him in the ﬁeld are added to those who sat in

Oxford they amounted to not far short of a third of the original House of

Commons, and the peers at Oxford greatly outnumbered those at Westmin-

ster, though their ranks were swollen by his many new creations. But very few

MPs seem actually to have left Westminster for Oxford, and most of the roy-

alists who did answer his summons brought their constitutionalist notions

with them. Often they seemed more interested in terms of peace than in pros-

ecuting the war, and he became increasingly exasperated with them. In his

council of war Rupert and Digby, who were usually at daggers drawn, were

at one in detesting the Oxford parliament, with its paciﬁc and legalistic

tendencies.

The Westminster parliament, which in normal times had had no executive

authority except in respect of its own members and privileges, almost had to

invent a system of central and local government as it went along. During most

of 1643 the bicameral Committee of Safety acted tolerably effectively as a

national executive, though it depended far more constantly on the votes of the

two Houses than a modern cabinet does. Pym’s unique authority in both the

274 War in Three Kingdoms 1640–1646

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Committee and the Commons had helped to keep the wheels turning until his

ﬁnal illness laid him low. A new solution was then needed, not only because

of the vacuum that he left but because the Solemn League and Covenant

demanded a Scottish presence in whatever body directed the joint war effort.

It was found in the Committee of Both Kingdoms, which was established in

February 1644 and consisted of seven peers, fourteen MPs, and four Scottish

commissioners. The man who did most to pilot its formation through a sus-

picious parliament was Oliver St John, the one-time counsellor to Hampden

and prosecutor of Strafford, and his main ally in the Commons was the

younger Vane. St John was emerging as the chief successor to Pym, who had

greatly trusted him, and he carried on Pym’s efforts to hold together a middle

group of politicians who steered a path between the defeatism of the peace

party on the one hand and the disruptively radical aspirations of some mem-

bers of the war party on the other. Despite his strong commitment to winning

the war he remained a friend of Essex, and strove to avoid a fatal breach

between the Lord General’s supporters and those who wanted him removed.

He was a reserved, unsmiling man, very much of ‘the godly interest’ and lean-

ing towards Independency—his correspondence with Cromwell is full of the

language of the saints—but broad enough in his sympathies to enjoy the

respect and trust of moderate Presbyterians.

The Committee, which was given larger powers to direct the conduct of the

war than the Committee of Safety had had, was a well balanced body. Its

commoners included, besides St John and the elder and younger Vanes, such

advocates of an aggressive war policy as Waller, Haselrig, and Cromwell, as

well as supporters of Essex like Sir Philip Stapleton, John Glyn, Sir Gilbert

Gerard, and William Pierrepoint. Essex and his brother-in-law Warwick were

naturally among the peers on the Committee, as was Manchester, but so were

three men who were to be closely associated with the New Model Army in

1647, Saye, Northumberland, and Wharton. The Scots who sat with them

were Loudoun (the Lord Chancellor), Johnston of Wariston, Lord Maitland

(the future Earl of Lauderdale), and Robert Barclay. This disparate body of

men seems to have worked together better than might have been expected,

but during 1644 it made the mistake of trying to direct the commanders in the

ﬁeld more closely than was wise, robbing them of initiative and causing them

to miss opportunities because the information on which it acted was often

stale long before its consequent orders got to their headquarters. The Com-

mittee had rather more success in directing the county committees, which

were the parliament’s main agencies at the local level, but its instructions to

them were not always obeyed.

The Conﬂict Widens 275

Valerie Pearl, ‘Oliver St John and the “middle group” in the Long Parliament: August

1643–May 1644’, English Historical Review CCCXX (1966), 490–519.

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The county committees, which became hugely unpopular during the war

and after, were an almost haphazard growth, and they differed in structure

and function from shire to shire. They had two origins. One was in the

Deputy Lieutenants, whom the parliament had so greatly relied upon when

ﬁrst raising armed forces, and who continued to hold regular meetings of reli-

able fellow-magistrates in many counties. In others the committees grew out

of the various ﬁnancial measures whereby parliament ﬁnanced the war,

including the regular direct tax on every county and major town under its

control, called the assessment (ﬁrst weekly, later monthly), and the seques-

tration of the estates and rents of royalists. Each of these involved the

appointment of county commissioners, answerable to central committees or

commissions; so did the ordinances regulating the militia and governing the

removal of refractory or unworthy parish clergy and their replacement by

‘godly’ ministers. In many counties, though by no means all, these functions

all came to be performed by a single committee. However they took shape,

the county committees generally consisted mainly of JPs, including the

Deputy Lieutenants, but their powers went far beyond those exercised by the

bench in peacetime and were not subject to the same legal restraints. Milton,

in the proposals that he published on the very eve of the Restoration in an

attempt to shore up the tottering commonwealth, hoped that the local demo-

cratic assemblies that he then advocated ‘will henceforth quite annihilate the

odious power and name of committees’,

so enduring was their unpopularity

a decade after they had lapsed.

Their role in bringing in the revenue was a major cause of their unpopular-

ity, for the burden of taxation was extremely heavy. The monthly assessment

alone was ﬁxed at about double the total regular revenue that Charles had

had at his accession, and it was levied upon a much higher proportion of the

population than the old parliamentary subsidies. It all had to be found from

those regions over which parliament had effective control, and it was none

the better liked for being assessed on much the same basis as Ship Money. It

was by no means the only new imposition. The excise, introduced in 1643

and destined to continue till the Restoration (and beyond), was especially

hated. It was charged at ﬁrst on beer, tobacco, and other non-essentials (if

beer can be so called in the seventeenth century when water was so often

lethal), but it was extended as the war went on to such basic commodities as

meat and salt. By the end of the ﬁrst Civil War it was yielding about £330,000

a year, which was more than half as much again as the highest annual demand

for Ship Money. The excisemen, unlike the constables who collected the

assessment, were not always local men, and their inquisitorial searches for

excisable commodities were quite often met with violence. Royalists at ﬁrst

276 War in Three Kingdoms 1640–1646

Complete Prose Works of John Milton, VII (New Haven, rev. ed., 1980), 443.

ch9.y8 27/9/02 10:59 AM Page 276

denounced the excise as another example of parliamentary tyranny, but the

king soon introduced it in the regions under his control. He levied his own

equivalent of the assessment too, though less systematically and effectively.

The differences between living in a parliamentarian and a royalist-controlled

country was a matter of swings and roundabouts. The parliament’s tax bur-

den was heavier because it was more efﬁcient, but where the king’s forces held

sway the population was more subject to irregular demands and casual

pillage, and had no hope of recovering the cost of what had been comman-

deered when the war was over. The unluckiest people were those who lived

in disputed territory, for they had difﬁculty in not paying the demands of

both sides.

Heavy taxation was a cross borne by the whole country; so to a varying

extent was the disruption by war of normal commercial life, though some

trades and manufactures ﬂourished, especially those which supplied

weapons, ammunition, armour, shoes, stockings, and other clothing to the

armies. The other miseries of war fell more unequally on the civil population,

according to whether or not they lived in areas much crossed by ﬁeld armies

or in the vicinity of hungry garrisons. The approach or proximity of troops in

large numbers was always bad news, whichever side they were on. The dam-

age that they did through pillage, theft, and wanton destruction, as well as the

scars inﬂicted on civilians and their property by military action, will be con-

sidered further when the time comes to reckon the overall cost of the war in

terms of human suffering. But two of its inevitable burdens, free quarter and

the commandeering of goods and services, may be reckoned alongside that of

taxation, of which they could be considered a form. For all the initial prom-

ises by both sides that their armies would pay their way, money was always

short, soldiers were very irregularly paid, and discipline was never perfect.

Soldiers needed food for themselves, utensils to cook it in, fodder for their

horses, and whenever possible beds to sleep in. Looking at the last ﬁrst, they

had to be billeted on civilians, and they were rarely welcome guests. Strictly,

the householders concerned should have been given ‘tickets’ for quarter, and

the sums recorded should have been reclaimable or deductible from taxes

due, at any rate on the parliamentary side. But it did not always work out like

that, and there was no redress after the war for those who had been forced to

billet royalist troops—indeed they might even be penalized for assisting the

enemy.

As for the commandeering of goods and services, the line between requisi-

tioning and robbery was a blurred one in active service conditions. Horses

were very frequently taken, both as mounts and for transport, and to a small

husbandman the consequent loss to his livelihood could be severe, whether he

was later compensated or not. Soldiers helped themselves to untold quantities

of livestock and chickens and corn and hay, and when poor housewives lost

The Conﬂict Widens 277

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