Ward A.W. The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy. 1783-1919. Volume 3
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THE TRIPOLI
WAR
455
have to annex the
country,
and when
Jagow
announced
the
voyage
of the
Panther he
remarked
:
"
Tripoli's
hour is
nigh."
An ultimatum
was issued on
September
26th,
and war
was
declared
on
September
29th.
The
complaints
as
to
ill-treatment
of her nationals
and
opposition
to
her
trade
were mere
pretexts.
British
opinion
was
hostile;
but
no
word of
rebuke was
heard
from
the Minister
who had so
sharply
condemned
the
annexation of Bosnia.
British interests
were affected
in two
ways
—
first,
by
the
change
in
ownership,
and,
secondly,
by
the
proximity
of
Egypt
to
Tripoli.
It was
a relief
to the
British
Government that the
last
piece
of Turkish
territory
on
the
African
coast should fall
into
the hands
of
a
friendly
Power;
and
Mr
Maxse,
in
the National
Review,
welcomed the
War as a means
of
preventing
Germany
from
seizing
Tobruk
and
establishing
a naval base
in
the
Mediterranean.
The British
occupation
of
the
theoretically
Turkish
province
of
Egypt gave
rise to no difficulties
;
for
the
Sultan
did
not
ask
leave to send
troops
across the
Nile,
nor
did
he
request
the service
of
Egyptian troops,
as
in
the Crimea
and in
the
War of
1877. Egypt
was
declared
neutral,
and
the
Italian
Consuls
remained at their
posts.
The
only
friction occurred when
the
opportunity
was taken to
clear
up
the
question
of
the
Egyptian
frontier.
Turkey
and
Italy
had been
informed in
November,
1904,
that
Egypt
included
Solium
1
;
but,
in
notifying
the blockade of Turkish
Africa,
Italy
adopted
the
boundary
claimed
by Turkey.
The
Egyptian
Government
accordingly
sent
troops
to
Solium,
and
the eastern frontier
of
Tripoli
was
thus
definitely
drawn
to the
west
of
the
bay.
"
Italy
is
unpopular,"
reported
Benckendorff
on
November
6th,
"but the
Government
will
not
endanger good
relations."
This
passive
attitude
was
sharply challenged
on
November
27th
by
Mr
D. M.
Mason,
who
moved "that this House
protests against
the
unwarrantable seizure of
Tripoli by
Italy
and
desires to
express
its
horror
and
detestation
at
the recent massacre
of
Arabs,
and
urges
the
Government
to
protest
against
this
outrage
on
humanity."
"His
speech
puts
me
in an
absolutely
impossible
position,"
replied
the
Foreign
Secretary.
"He assumes
that
I
have
official
information
confirming
his
reports.
I
have not.
I
have no
means
of
investigating
all
the
statements.
A
neutral
Government cannot
collect
and
publish
information
about the War.
We
have
adopted
neutrality,
and
we
could
only
depart
from
it
under
circumstances
gravely
concerning
British
interests."
The
Foreign Secretary
was
less
pro-Italian
than
1
This fact was
revealed
by
the
Foreign Office,
December
19th, 191
1.
456
TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND
TRIPLE
ENTENTE
his critics
imagined,
and he had
to think of
the
damage
to British
trade.
He
twice invited
the Great Powers
to
address
a
joint
warning
to
Italy
not to
tamper
with
the
Dardanelles;
but
his
appeal
was in
vain.
Aehrenthal
handed
the second
invitation
to
the
Italian
Am-
bassador,
remarking:
"This
may
amuse
you;
I
shall
not answer
it
1
."
Though
the
War
involved
Great Britain
in
no
direct
controversy
with
Turkey,
its
result
was to
accentuate
the
estrangement
which
had
begun
with the
overthrow
of Kiamil
early
in
1909,
and had
been
intensified
by
the hideous
massacre
of
Armenians
in
Adana and
by
the
ruthless
policy
of
Ottomanisation
pursued
by
the
Young
Turks.
VIII.
Lord
Haldane's
Mission,
1912
The
spectacle
of
Great Britain
standing
in
shining
armour
beside
France
produced
its inevitable result
beyond
the Rhine.
"I
went to
Berlin in
the
autumn,"
writes
Tirpitz,
"and
represented
to the Chan-
cellor
that
we had
suffered
a
diplomatic
check,
and
must
salve
it
by
a
Supplementary
Naval Bill." The Kaiser
agreed,
and
the Chancellor
was
instructed to work the
Supplementary
Bill
into the
Budget
of
19
1
2.
But
while
Tirpitz
was
striving
'for an increase of
the
Fleet,
wiser heads
resolved on a
fresh
attempt
to relieve the tension
which
had
threatened
the
Peace of
the
World. At the
beginning
of
December,
the Kaiser
approved
a
suggested
sounding
of
British
statesmen,
and
shortly
before Christmas Count Wolff-Metternich
had a
promising
dis-
cussion
with
Sir Edward
Grey
2
. At
the
same
time,
a
Memorandum
was drawn
up by
Mr
Lloyd George
and
Mr
Churchill.
Germany
was to
recognise
British
superiority
at
sea,
not
to increase her
Navy
programme,
and
possibly
to
reduce it. Great
Britain,
on her
side,
was
not to
impede
German
Colonial
expansion.
Both
Powers were to
declare
that
they
would take
no
part
in
aggressive
plans
or
in
com-
binations
against
each other.
With the
approval
of
the
Foreign
Minister,
this Memorandum
was entrusted
to
Sir
Ernest
Cassel,
who
in
January,
19
12,
was
about to
pay
one
of his
periodical
visits
to
Berlin,
for
presentation
to the
Kaiser
3
.
Sir
Ernest Cassel returned
with
an
answer
that
all
steps
towards
better
relations would be
wel-
come. The German
Government
assented to the
Memorandum,
with
the
important
reservation
that its
standpoint
in
the
Navy
problem
1
Seton-Watson,
Europe
in
the
Melting-Pot, p. 94.
2
Bethmann-Hollweg, Betrachtungen,
1.
48-50.
3
Since
1908
Sir
Ernest
Cassel
and
Ballin
had
engaged
in
semi-official discussions
on naval
rivalry,
reporting
the
results
to their
respective
Governments.
See
Huldermann,
Albert
Ballin.
ch. 8.
MR CHURCHILL
ON THE "LUXURY
FLEET"
457
was the
Navy
Law
plus
the Novelle or
Supplementary
Law then
ready
for
production.
The
Kaiser
suggested
a
direct
exchange
of
views
between
the
Governments,
and an
early
visit
from
Sir
Edward
Grey
was
proposed.
Shortly
afterwards,
the German
Government
was
informed of his
readiness
to
come
to
Berlin,
if
the
conclusion
of
an
agreement appeared
assured; but,
meanwhile,
Lord Haldane
would
be
sent
on a
private
Mission. Sir
Edward Goschen
travelled
to
London
to make
arrangements
for
the
forthcoming
visit;
and
Lord
Haldane arrived in Berlin on
February
8th.
On the
day
after
Lord Haldane reached
Berlin,
the First
Lord
of
the
Admiralty
delivered a
speech
at
Glasgow
which was
scarcely
calculated
to facilitate the
pacific
efforts
of
his
colleague.
"
The
purposes
of
British naval
power
are
essentially
defensive. We
have
no
thoughts,
and
we
have never had
any
thoughts,
of
aggression,
and we
attribute
no
such
thoughts
to other Great Powers. There
is,
however,
this
difference between British naval
power
and
that of
the
great
friendly
empire
of
Germany.
The British
Navy
is
to
us
a
necessity,
and from some
points
of view
the German
Navy
is to them more in the nature
of a
luxury.
It
is
existence
to us
;
and
it is
expansion
to them. The whole fortunes
of our
race
and
empire,
the whole treasure accumulated
during
so
many
centuries
of
sacrifice
and
achievement,
would
perish
if our
naval
supremacy
were
to
be
impaired.
It is
the
British
Navy
which makes Great Britain
a
Great
Power. But
Germany
was
a
Great
Power,
respected
and
honoured all
over
the
world,
before she
had a
single ship.
The
Prime-Minister
and
his
colleagues
without
exception
are resolved to
maintain
the naval
supremacy
which this
country enjoys;
and
the
country
was
never more united
in its
resolve to see the
supremacy
of the
Navy
maintained. We learn
that there
are
prospects
of
further
naval
increases
among
the Powers
of
the Continent.
Whatever
may happen
abroad,
there
will be no
whining
here;
no
signals
of
distress will be
hoisted,
no cries for
help
or succour will
go up....
We
should
be the first Power to welcome
any
retardation
or
slackening
of
aval
rivalry.
We should
meet it not
by
words
but
by
deeds.
But,
if there
e to
be increases on the
Continent,
we shall have no
difficulty
in
meeting
em. We
shall
make
it clear
that
other
naval
Powers,
instead
of
over-
ing
us
by
additional
efforts,
will
only
be more outdistanced. I
say,
build
your
great
dock,
build it
long
and build it
deep,
and above all
build
it
wide.
We
will
provide
you
with
no lack of
great
vessels
to fill
it;
and
you
will know
that
your
citizens
are
aiding
the
British
Navy,
which enables
us
to
pursue
our
path
through
the
world,
seeking
no
quarrel
and
fearing
none."
The
reference to the
"luxury
fleet,"
though
not
inaccurate,
was
singularly
tactless,
and
strengthened
the
suspicions
with
which
Tirpitz
and
his
friends
regarded
the olive-branch
carried
by
Lord
Haldane.
S11UI
r
458
TRIPLE
ALLIANCE AND
TRIPLE ENTENTE
"
My
first
interview,"
relates the
Envoy,
"
was with
the
Imperial
Chan-
cellor
1
.
We met in the
British
Embassy,
and
the
conversation,
which was
quite
informal,
was a full and
agreeable
one.
My
impression,
and
I
still
retain
it,
was
that he was then as
sincerely
desirous
of
avoiding
war as
I
was
myself.
I
told him of
certain
dangers quite
frankly,
and
he listened
and
replied
with
what
seemed to me to
be
a full
understanding
of our
position.
I
said
that the
increasing
action
of
Germany
in
piling
up
mag-
nificent
armaments
was,
of
course,
within
the unfettered
rights
of the
German
people.
But the
policy
had an
inevitable
consequence
in the
drawing
together
of
other nations in the
interests
of
their
own
security.
This was
what
was
happening.
I
told
him
frankly
that we had made
naval
and
military
preparations,
but
only
such as defence
required,
and
as would
be
considered
in
Germany
matter
of
routine.
I
went
on
to
observe
that
our
faces
were set
against aggression
by
any
nation,
and I told
him,
what
seemed
to
relieve his
mind,
that we
had no
secret
military
treaties.
But,
I
added,
if
France were attacked
and an
attempt
made to
occupy
her
territory,
our
neutrality
must not
be
reckoned
on
by Germany.
For
one
thing,
it
was
obvious
that
our
position
as an island
protected
by
the
sea
would
be
affected
seriously,
if
Germany
had
possession
of
the
Channel
ports
on
the
northern
shores of
France.
Again,
we were
under
treaty
obligation
to
come
to
the
aid of
Belgium
in case
of
invasion,
just
as we
were
bound
to
defend
Portugal
and
Japan
in
certain eventualities.
In
the
third
place,
owing
to our
dependence
on
freedom
of sea-communications
for
food
and
raw
materials,
we could
not
sit
still if
Germany
elected
to
develop
her
fleet to such
an
extent as
to
imperil
our naval
protection.
She
might
build
more
ships,
but we
should in that case
lay
down two keels
for
each
one
she laid down. The Chancellor
said that he
did not take
my
observations at all in bad
part;
but
I must understand
that his
Admirals
and
Generals
were
pretty
difficult.
I
replied
that the
difficulty
would
be
felt
at
least as
much
with the Admirals
and Generals
in
my
own
country.
...
I
left
the Chancellor with the sense
that
I had
been
talking
with
an
honest man
struggling
somewhat
with
adversity.
Next
day
I was summoned to
luncheon
with the
Emperor
and
Empress
at
the
Schloss,
and
afterwards
had a
long
interview
with
the
Emperor
and
Admiral von
Tirpitz
in the
Emperor's
Cabinet
room
My
reception
by
the
Emperor
was
very
agreeable;
that
by
Tirpitz
seemed
to me
a
little
strained
The
Emperor
handed me
a confidential
copy
of the
draft
of
the
proposed
new Fleet
Law,
with
an
intimation
that he
had
no
objection
to
my
communicating
it
privately
to
my
colleagues.
I was careful
to
abstain
even from
looking
at it
then,
for
I
saw
that,
from its
complexity
and
bulk,
it
would
require
careful
study.
So
I
simply
put
it
in
my pocket.
But
I
repeated
what
I
had said to the
Chancellor,
that
the
necessity
for secure
sea-communications rendered
it vital
for us
to be able to
protect
ourselves
on the
seas.
Germany
was
quite
free
to
do as she
pleased;
but so
were
we,
and we
should
probably lay
down two
keels
for
every
one
which
she
added to her
programme.
The
initiative
in
slackening
competition
was
1
Haldane, Before
the
War,
pp.
57-70.
LORD HALDANE'S
REPORT
459
really
not
with
us,
but with
Germany.
Any agreement
for
settling
our
differences
and
introducing
a
new
spirit
into the
relations
of the
two
nations
would
be
bones without
flesh,
if
Germany began by
fresh
ship-
building,
and so
forced us
to do
twice as much.
Indeed,
the
world
would
laugh
at such
an
agreement,
and our
people
would think that we
had been
fooled.
I did not
myself
take
that
view,
because
I
thought
that
the
mere
fact
of an
agreement
was valuable.
But
the
Emperor
would see
that
the
public
would
attach
very
little
importance
to his
action,
unless
the
agreement largely
modified what it believed
to be his
shipbuilding
pro-
gramme.
We then discussed the
proposal
of the German
Admiralty
for the new
programme.
Admiral
von
Tirpitz
struggled
for it.
I
insisted that funda-
mental modification
was
essential,
if better relations were
to
ensue.
The
tone
was
friendly
;
but
I
felt that
I was
up against
the crucial
part
of
my
task.
The
Admiral
wanted
us
to
enter
into
some
understanding
about our
own
shipbuilding.
He
thought
the
Two-Power standard
a hard
one
for
Germany,
and,
indeed,
Germany
could not make
any
admission about it.
The idea
then
occurred
to us
that,
as
we
should never
agree
about
it,
we
should
avoid
trying
to define
a
standard
proportion
in
any general agree-
ment that we
might
come
to, and,
indeed,
say nothing
in it about
ship-
building;
but
that the
Emperor
should announce to the German
public
that the
agreement
on
general questions,
if
we should have concluded
one,
had
entirely
modified
his wish
for
the new Fleet
Law,
as
originally
con-
ceived,
and that it should be
delayed,
and future
shipbuilding
should
at
least be
spread
over
a
longer
period.
The
Emperor thought
such
an
agree-
ment
would
certainly
make
a
great
difference,
and
he informed me
that
his
Chancellor
would
propose
to me
a
formula
as a basis for
it.
I said that
I
would see the Chancellor and
discuss a
possible
formula,
as well
as
terri-
torial and
other
questions
with
him,
and
would
then return
to
London
and
report
to
the
King
(from
whom I had
brought
him a
special
and
friendly message)
and to
my colleagues
the
good
disposition
I had
found,
and leave
the difficulties
about
shipbuilding
and
indeed all other
matters
to
their
judgment.
For
I had
come
to
Berlin,
not to
make
an active
agree-
ment,
but
only
to
explore
the
ground
for
one with
the
Emperor
and his
Ministers.
I had
been
struck
with
the
friendly disposition
in
Berlin,
and
a
not
less
friendly
disposition
would be found in
London.
At
my
final
meeting
with the
German
Chancellor,
I
pressed
on
him
how
important
it
was for
public
opinion
and
the Peace of the
World
that
Germany
should
not force
us into
a
shipbuilding competition
with
her
—
a
competition
in
which
it was certain
that
we should have to
spare
no
effort
to
preserve
our
margin
of
safety by
greater
increases.
He
did
not
controvert
my
suggestion.
I could
see that
personally
he was
of the same
mind. But
he said that
the forces
he
had to
contend
with were
almost
insuperable.
The
question
of a retardation
of
building
under
the
proposed
Fleet
Law
was
not
susceptible
of
being
treated
apart
from
that
of the
formula
of
which
he and the
Emperor
had
both
spoken.
He
suggested
that
we
might agree
on the
following
formula
:
460
TRIPLE
ALLIANCE AND
TRIPLE
ENTENTE
I.
The
High
Contracting
Powers
assure
each
other
mutually
of
their
desire
for
peace
and
friendship.
II.
They
will
not,
either
of
them,
make
any
combination,
or
join
in
any
combination,
which
is
directed
against
the
other.
They
expressly
declare
that
they
are
not bound
by any
such
combination.
III.
If
either
of
the
High
Contracting
Parties
become
entangled
in a
war
with
one
or more other
Powers,
the
other of
the
High Contracting
Parties will at least observe toward the Power so
entangled
a benevolent
neutrality,
and
use its utmost endeavour for the localisation of
the conflict.
IV.
The
duty
of
neutrality
which arises
from
the
preceding
Article
has
no
application
in so far
as
it
may
not be reconcilable with
existing agree-
ments which the
High Contracting
Parties have
already
made. The
making
of
new
agreements
which make it
impossible
for
either
of
the
Contracting
Parties
to
observe
neutrality
toward
the other
beyond
what is
provided
by
the
preceding
limitations is
excluded
in
conformity
with
the
provisions
contained
in
Article
II.
Anxious as
I was
to
agree
with the
Chancellor,
who seemed as
keen
as
I
was to
meet me
with
expressions
which
I
might
take
back to
England
for
friendly
considerations,
I
was unable to
hold out
to
him
the least
prospect
that
we
could
accept
the
draft formula which he
had
just
proposed.
Under
Article
III,
for
example,
we
should
find
ourselves,
were
it
accepted, pre-
cluded
from
coming
to the assistance of France should
Germany
attack
her and aim at
getting possession
of such
ports
as
Dunkirk,
Calais,
and
Boulogne,
a
friendly occupation
of
which
was
so
important
for our
island
security.
Difficulties
might
also arise which
would
hamper
us
in the
discharge
of
our
existing treaty obligations
to
Belgium, Portugal,
and
Japan.
The most
hopeful way
out was
to
revise
the draft
fundamentally by
confining
its terms
to an
undertaking
by
each
Power not to make
any
unprovoked
attack
upon
the
other,
or
join
in
any
combination
or
design
against
the other
for
purposes
of
aggression,
or become
party
to
any
plan
or
naval
or
military
combination,
alone
or in
conjunction
with
any
other
Power,
directed to such
an end. He
and I then sat
down and redrafted
what he
had
prepared,
on this
basis,
but without
his
committing
himself
to the
view
that it would be sufficient.
We also
had a
satisfactory
conversa-
tion about
the
Bagdad
Railway
and other
things
in
Turkey
connected
with
the Persian
Gulf,
and we
discussed
possibilities
of the
rearrangement
of
certain interests of both Powers
in Africa.
He
said to
me
that he
was not
there
to make
any
immediate
bargain;
but
that we should
look
at
the
African
question
on both sides
from a
high
point
of
view,
and
that,
if we
had
any
difficulties we should tell
him,
and he
would see whether
he could
get
round them
for
us.
I
replied
that
I, also,
was not
there
to make
a
bargain,
but
only
to
explore
the
ground,
and
that
I much
appreciated
the tone
of
his conversation
with
me,
and the
good
feeling
he
had
shewn
I
entertain
no doubt
that
the German
Chancellor
was
sincerely
in
earnest in what
he said
to
me on these
occasions,
and in his desire
to
improve
relations
with us
and
keep
the
peace.
So
I think was the
Emperor;
but
he
was
pulled
at
by
his naval
and
military
advisers,
and
by
the
powerful,
if
THE CHANCELLOR
AND
TIRPITZ
461
then
small,
chauvinist
party
in
Germany.
But still
there
was
the
possibility
of
an
explosion
;
and,
when I returned
to
London,
although
I
was full
of
hope
that
relations
between the two
countries were
going
to be
improved,
and
told
my colleagues
so,
I
also
reported
that there
were three matters
about
which
I
was
uneasy.
The first was
my
strong impression
that the
new Fleet
Law
would be insisted on. The
second was the
possibility
that
Tirpitz might
be made
Chancellor
in
place
of
Bethmann-Hollweg.
The
third was the want of
continuity
in
the
supreme
direction of
German
policy.
"
Lord
Haldane's
picture
of the
friendliness and
frankness
of the
conversations
is
confirmed
by
the Memoirs
of
.
Bethmann-Hollweg,
who adds
one or two details
1
.
"
In
private
conversation
Lord
Haldane
expressed
himself as
extra-
ordinarily pleased
with
his
impressions
and
hopeful
as to
the success of
the line of
action here
begun.
In the discussion of
Colonial
questions
he
made
far-reaching
offers in return
for
German concessions*in
the
Bagdad
Railway.
In addition to
the
extension of
German South-West
Africa
on
the basis of an
understanding
as to
Angola,
he also threw
out the
possibility
of the cession of Zanzibar
and
Pemba
to
Germany."
The
naval discussion
with the
Kaiser and
Tirpitz,
adds
the
Chan-
cellor,
was,
also,
not
unsatisfactory.
"Haldane
admitted
to me that we must have a
novelle
and
a third
squadron.
The latter
would
compel England
to
keep
a
larger
North
Sea
fleet,
but
that was a matter
of
indifference to her. His
chief
point
was
that
she
should not be
compelled
to
reply
to
new German
Dreadnoughts
with double
the
number.
He
recognised
that it
would meet
English
wishes
for the
postponement
of
the
three
Dreadnoughts
if
they
were
laid down
in
1913,
1916,
1919.
He
then
asked
if
we could not
drop
all additions for
the next three
years.
If we
reached
a
political agreement,
our
relations
would be
so
good
that an addition at a later
period
would
do
no harm."
Tirpitz's
narrative,
as
might
be
expected,
is
written
in a
spirit
of
undisguised hostility
both to the
Chancellor and
to
the
guest
2
.
"
The audience
(with
the
Kaiser)
was
preceded by
a
lunch at which the
Chancellor
was
present.
No
politics
were talked
during
the
lunch;
but the
atmosphere
was
pretty
tense.
During
the
succeeding
audience
I
really only
played
the
part
of a
witness,
as
the
Emperor
led the conversation himself.
Haldane
began
to
open up
to
us the
prospect
of a
big
African
empire,
not
only
of
Portuguese
but of
Belgian
and French
territories as well.
The
extravagance
of this offer of colonial
possessions
which
did not
belong
to
the
English
suited the
Emperor's
temperament.
It made
a
painful
im-
pression upon
me,
because the
method was too crude and the
design
too
obvious.
I
admired
Haldane,
when he claimed with
simple
modesty 'only'
1
Betrachtungen,
I.
50-4.
2
Memoirs,
vol. 1.
218-224.
TheKaiser
shares
Tirpitz's
viewofthe
visit,#ttf.
ch.
5.
462
TRIPLE
ALLIANCE
AND TRIPLE ENTENTE
the
Cape
to
Cairo
Railway.
I
began
by
declaring
that I should
welcome
an
understanding.
He
politely
declined a
2
:
3
proportion
—
which
Lloyd
George
in
1908
and
later Churchill
proposed
—
and
maintained the
Two-
Power Standard.
He next
proposed
a
delay
in
the
building
of
the
three
ships.
I
tried to
make clear the difficulties which a
further
change
in
the
Bill
would
involve,
as
we had
already
reduced
our
programme
considerably
out
of
regard
for
England.
But,
when he
proposed
we
should
retard
the
rate
of our
increase, and,
'in
order to lubricate
the
negotiations,'
should
at
least
cancel the first of the three
ships,
I
sacrificed the
ship against
my
real
principles
and
without
any
return.
I
would
have sacrificed
the
whole
Bill for
a
really
solid
agreement
of
neutrality,
as I had
told
the Kaiser.
After
he
had
pocketed
this
concession,
he
cautiously
touched on
the
question
whether
the
Navy
Bill
itself must be carried out
;
but
here the Kaiser
inter-
vened,
and
he withdrew
his
feeler.
I
felt certain that the
real desires of
the
English
were not directed
against
the
bagatelle
of
the
three
supple-
mentary ships,
but
against
the Bill itself.
Though
the later
negotiations
came to
nothing,
I
kept
to
the sacrifice
of the
ship
so as to
leave
no
doubt
about our
goodwill.
As we left the
Castle,
Haldane
expressed
himself
satisfied
with
the conversation.
I had
gathered
:
1.
That
the
real
object
was
to
cripple
the
development
of
our
Fleet.
2. That
the
naval offer
was
not three
to two but two
keels
to
one.
3.
That Bethmann's
neutrality
formula was not
considered.
4.
That our naval
subjection
was
to be
rewarded
solely by
reversions
in Africa.
Haldane was not
ready
to
sugar
our
subjection
if we entered into
vassalage.
He
offered
us
nothing,
but
skilfully
sowed discord
among
us.
If
he had
made
a
reasonable offer
I
was
prepared
to
say,
When we
get
the 2
:
3
proportion
and a solid
friendship,
we
will discuss
the reduction of the
Navy
Bill."
The
visit
gave
genuine
pleasure
to
friends
of
peace
in
both
countries.
The
Tsar
privately
expressed
his satisfaction
with the
result
of
the mission.
Lord
Haldane
's
business
in Berlin was defined
by
M.
Jules
Cambon
as
"
a
detente,
not
an
entente
"and
it
was welcomed
as
such
by
M.
Poincare;
though
military
circles
in France feared that
a
naval
agreement
would allow
Germany
to
spend
more
on her
Army.
When
Parliament
met,
on
February
14th,
the
leaders
of
both
parties
expressed
their
goodwill
to
Germany
and their
desire
for cordial
relations.
"
Last
summer,"
observed
Lord
Lansdowne,
"we were
on the
eve of a
serious
quarrel
with the Power
with which
every right-thinking
Englishman
desires
not
only
to
live
at
peace
but to
cooperate.
It is
lamentable
that
such
misunderstandings
and
apprehensions
should
exist,
and it
is the
duty
of
all
right-thinking
persons
to
dispel
them.
If Lord Haldane
has
come back
with an
olive-branch
in
his
buttonhole,
we
shall
congratulate
him on this
side of
the
House as
warmly
as on his
own."
THE NEUTRALITY
NEGOTIATIONS
463
In his
first
conversation
with
the German Ambassador after
Lord
Haldane's
return,
Sir
Edward
Grey
declared himself
"immensely
impressed
"
with
his
colleague's report
of
his
conversations with
the
Chancellor,
and
declared
with
the
greatest
emphasis
his
determination
to
carry
on the
work
thus
begun.
He
hoped
it
would be
possible
gradually
to
disperse
the war-cloud.
Everything depended
on a
detailed
examination
of
the German
suggestions
1
.
But
when the
Novelle
was
studied
by
the
Admiralty,
it
was
discovered
to
involve
a
sensational
increase
in
the
size and
striking
power
of
the
Fleet.
If
it
became
law,
declared
the
Admiralty,
Great Britain would have
to
spend
eighteen
millions
a
year
more on
her
Navy.
"The
British mistrust
of
the
plans
of
the German
naval
authorities,"
writes
Bethmann-Hollweg,
"
was as
obvious
as
the
apprehension
in
German
naval
circles that
our naval armament
might
be
paralysed.
I
was
resolved
to
work
for the utmost
concessions
in the
Navy question
if I
could
secure
compensation
in a
political
arrangement.
But
that was
refused
by
England."
The
negotiations
began
with
the
presentation
and
rejection
of
the
neutrality
formula
which the Chancellor
had
outlined to Lord
Haldane
in Berlin.
Count
Metternich
upon
this
pressed
for
counter-proposals,
which
he
stated
would be
without
prejudice
and
not
binding
unless we
were satisfied
that
our wishes
were
met
on
the
naval
question
2
.
On
this
understanding,
Sir
Edward
Grey,
on
March
14th,
19
12,
gave
Count Metternich
the
following
draft
formula,
which
had
been
approved
by
the
Cabinet :
"England
will
make
no
unprovoked
attack
upon
Germany,
and
pursue
no
aggressive
policy
towards her.
Aggression
upon
Germany
is not the
subject,
and
forms no
part
of
any
treaty,
understanding,
or
combination to which
England
is now
a
party,
nor
will she become
a
party
to
anything
that
has such an
object."
Count
Metternich
thought
this formula
inadequate,
and
suggested
two
alternative
additional clauses
:
"England
will therefore
observe
at
least
a
benevolent
neutrality,
should
war be
forced
upon Germany;
or
England
will
therefore,
as
a matter of
course,
remain
neutral if a war
is forced
upon
Germany.
This,"
he
added,
"would
not be
binding
unless our
wishes
were
met
with
regard
to the naval
programme."
Sir Edward
Grey
considered
that the
British
proposals
were
sufficient.
He
explained
that,
if
Germany
desired
to
crush
France,
England might
not
be able
to
sit
still,
though,
if France
were
aggressive
or
attacked
Germany,
no
support
would
be
given
by
His
Majesty's
Government or
approved by
1
Bethmann-Hollweg,
I.
54-5.
2
This official account of the
negotiations
was
issued
by
the
Foreign
Office
in
1915.
464
TRIPLE ALLIANCE
AND
TRIPLE ENTENTE
England.
"
It is
obvious that
the real
object
of
the
German
proposal
was to
obtain the
neutrality
of
England
in
all
eventualities,
since,
should a war
break
out,
Germany
would
certainly
contend
that
it
had
been forced
upon
her,
and would
claim that
England
should
remain
neutral."
Sir Edward
Grey eventually
proposed
the
following
formula :
"
The
two Powers
being
mutually
desirous of
securing peace
and
friend-
ship
between
them,
England
declares
that she
will
neither
make,
nor
join
in,
any unprovoked
attack
upon
Germany.
Aggression
upon
Germany
is
not
the
subject,
and
forms
no
part
of
any
treaty,
understanding,
or
com-
bination
to which
England
is now a
party,
nor will
she become a
party
to
anything
that has such an
object."
Sir
Edward
Grey,
when he
handed this
formula
to
Count
Metternich,
said that the use of
the
word
"neutrality"
would
convey
the
impression
that more was
meant
than was
warranted
by
the
text;
he
suggested
that
the substance of what was
required
would be
obtained and
more
accurately
expressed
by
the words "will neither
make,
nor
join
in,
any
unprovoked
attack."
Count
Metternich
thereupon
received
Instructions
to make it
quite
clear
that
the
Chancellor
could
recommend the
Emperor
to
give up
the
essential
parts
of the Novelle
(the
Bill then
pending
for
the increase of the
German
Navy) only
if
we could
conclude
an
agreement
guaranteeing
neutrality
of a
far-reaching
character and
leaving
no
doubt as to
any
interpretation.
He admitted
that the
Chancellor's wish amounted to a
guarantee
of absolute
neutrality,
failing
which the
Novelle must
proceed.
Count Metternich
stated that there was no
chance
of
the withdrawal
of
the
Novelle,
but said that it
might
be modified
;
it would
be
disappointing
to the
Chancellor
if
we
did not
go
beyond
the formula
we
had
suggested.
Sir
Edward
Grey
said
that he could understand that
there
would
be
disappointment
if
His
Majesty's
Government
were
to
state
that
the
carrying
out of
the Novelle
would
put
an end to
the
negotiations
and
form
an
insurmountable obstacle
to
better
relations.
His
Majesty's
Government
did not
say
this,
and
they
hoped
the formula which
they
had
suggested
might
be considered
in
connexion
with
the discussion of territorial
arrangements,
even
if it did
not
prove
effective
in
preventing
the
increase
of
naval
expenditure.
Sir
Edward
Grey
added
that,
if some
arrangement
could be
made
between the two
Governments,
it
would
have
a
favourable
though
indirect
effect
upon
naval
expenditure
as time went
on;
it would
have,
moreover,
a
favourable
and direct
effect
upon
public opinion
in both
countries.
A few
days
afterwards Count
Metternich
communicated to Sir Edward
Grey
the
substance of a
letter
from
the
Chancellor,
in
which
the
latter said
that,
as the
formula
suggested by
His
Majesty's
Government
was
from the
German
point
of view
insufficient,
and as His
Majesty's
Government
could not
agree
to the
larger
formula
for which he
had
asked,
the
Novelle
must
proceed
on
the lines on which it
had been
presented
to
the
Federal
Council. The
negotiations
then came
to
an
end,
and with them the
hope
of
a mutual
reduction
in
the
expenditure
of the two countries.