Ward A.W. The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy. 1783-1919. Volume 3
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BRITISH
VIEWS
OF THE TREATY
315
The
Treaty
was
accepted
in
the
spirit
which
had
inspired
its
authors.
Lord
Spencer
having
hailed
it
as
a
great
achievement,
Lord
Lansdowne
declared
that its
reception
had been
all
that
he
could
have
expected
or desired.
In
a
memorable debate
on
the
second
reading
of
the
Anglo-French
Convention
Bill
(necessitated
by
the
monetary indemnity
for French
private
rights
in
Newfoundland
and
by
cessions
of
territory)
the House of
Commons found an
opportunity
for
expressing
its not
less
hearty
satisfaction
;
and
the
tribute
of
the
Under-Secretary
to
his Chief was
warmly
cheered:
"It
is
due to
Lord
Lansdowne to
say
that the result
would
never have been
obtained
at all
but
for his
patient perseverance
and
sympathetic
tact,
with
which he has insisted
through
these
long
months
on sub-
ordinating
all
minor
considerations to the
great
object
he had
at
heart.
"
Earl
Percy
proceeded
to
summarise the
provisions
of
the
Treaty, pointing
out the
value of our
gains
in Newfoundland and the
slenderness
of our sacrifices
in
West
Africa.
Egypt gained
virtual
control
of
her
own finances
and of
the
surplus
hitherto locked
up,
with
power
to
pay
off her
debt
in
the most
economical
manner.
Above
all,
she
could
enter
on
capital expenditure
without
charging
it to
annual revenue.
The mixed administration
of
the Port
of
Alexandria
and of
the
railways
and
telegraphs
would
disappear,
and
the
functions
of
the
Caisse
de la Dette would be limited
to
securing
the
punctual payment
of
interest.
The
regularisation
of
our
position
as a
Signatory
of
the
Suez Canal Convention
had
always
been
the
aim of Lord
Salisbury.
While we had
purchased
a
free
hand
in
Egypt,
we
had
given
up nothing
in
Morocco,
where
indeed we
should
be substantial
gainers.
Our
trade
would
increase,
as it
had
increased
in
Tunis,
and our
strategic
position
would be
strengthened
by
the veto
on
the fortification
of
the Straits
of Gibraltar.
In Mada-
gascar
we
merely
recognised
a
fait
accompli,
and
in
Siam we reaffirmed
the
agreement
of
1896.
"The distinctive
feature,"
he
concluded,
"is that the
parties
pledge
themselves
not
merely
to abstain
from
poaching
on
each other's
preserves
but
to
do all
in their
power
to further
one another's interests. We
promise
to
give
one
another,
as
friends,
advantages
which
are
ordinarily given
only
to
allies
;
and
it
is as the
pledges
of
friendship
rather
than as
the terms
of a
compromise
between
jealous
and
exacting
litigants
that
we
ask
the House
to
assent
to
these
concessions.
I
hope
the
agreement
will
prove
a
working
model for the
adjustment
in other
parts
of
differences
between
ourselves
and
rival nations."
Sir
Edward
Grey
and
Campbell-
Bannerman
followed
with
a
316
CONTINENTAL
AGREEMENTS,
1902-1907
benediction
from the Front
Opposition
bench. In
a
speech
to the
Liberal
League
Lord
Rosebery
declared
that
no more one-sided
agreement
was ever concluded between two Powers
at
peace,
and
that
he
hoped
that
the
country
which held
Gibraltar
might
never have
cause
to
regret
having
handed over Morocco
to
a
great
military
Power.
Lord
Cromer,
on
the other
hand,
records
that the
day
of
the
signature
of the
Treaty
was the
happiest
of
his life.
England
gained
by
the
removal of
financial restrictions and
obtaining
a
practically
valid
sanction
to a
position
which was
previously
to
some
extent
irregular.
France also
gained.
The
large
French interests
at stake
in
Egypt
are
secured
by specific engagements,
and
are still more
amply
secured
by
the
traditional character of British
predominance.
The Governments
of
Germany,
Austria
and
Italy subsequently
adhered to the Khedivial
Decree,
and "the
Egyptian
Question"
ceased
to
be an international
problem.
The French
Yellow-book,
issued
on
May
26th,
expounded
our
partner's
view
of
the
bargain.
Both
Governments,
declared
M.
Delcasse,
recognised
that
great
moral
and material
interests
demanded
an amicable settlement.
In
New-
foundland,
France had
only
abandoned
privileges
which were difficult
to maintain
and
in no
way
necessary,
while
the essential
right
of
fishing
in
territorial waters
was
preserved,
and
the
right
of
fishing
for
and
purchasing
bait
along
the
whole extent
of
"
the French
Shore
"
was
explicitly recognised.
In
West
Africa,
the British
concessions
were
of
considerable
importance.
"Under
our
influence,"
the French
Minister
continued,
"Morocco
would
be
a
source
of
strength
for our North
African
Empire.
If
subject
to
a
foreign
Power,
our
North African
possessions
would be
permanently
menaced
and
paralysed.
The
moment
had arrived
to
decide
who was
to
exercise
preponderant
influence.
The
present
state
can
only
last
on con-
dition
that it
is
sustained
and
improved.
On
the
importance
of
securing
from
England
the
promise
not to
hamper
us
it is
superfluous
to
insist."
The sacrifice
in
Egypt
was small.
No
change
was
to
be made
in
the
political
status,
and
all
necessary
guarantees
for French financial
interests
had
been
obtained.
M.Delcasse's
unreserved satisfaction
with
his handiwork was shared
by
few
of
his
countrymen.
M.
Hanotaux,
who had
directed
the
Foreign
Policy
of France
from
1894
to
1898
with
firmness,
if
not
always
with
success,
denounced
the
long
list
of
his concessions
since
1898.
"On
the
Nile,
in
China, Siam, Muscat,
Constantinople, Egypt,
Newfound-
land,
Tripoli,
it
is
only
retreat."
The
Foreign
Minister
should
have
FRENCH VIEWS OF
THE
TREATY
317
profited
by
the
unique
opportunity
of
the
Boer
War to
solve both
the
Egyptian
and
the Moroccan
problems
1
.
"It
is a retreat
in
good
order,"
commented Rene
Millet,
ex-Governor
of
Algeria.
"The
error
of
twenty-five years
ago
perhaps
rendered
it
inevitable;
but
why
celebrate
it
as a
diplomatic
triumph?
We are
not
yet
in
Morocco,
while
England
is in
Egypt.
We
exchange rights
for
hopes.
To
hold
Morocco we lack
just
a
trifle
—
the consent
of
the Sultan."
Moreover,
though
Italy
had been
satisfied,
Germany
had
been
deliberately
set
aside.
"It
is
impossible
for France
to
undertake
anything
without
knowing
the inner
mind of
Germany.
Of all
pretensions
the maddest
would be
to
wish
to
isolate
her. One does
not isolate
a
strong
Govern-
ment
—
one
exposes
oneself
to
its resentment."
The
veteran
Freycinet,
on
the other
hand,
though
lamenting
the
final surrender
of
French
aspirations
in
Egypt,
declared the
entente worth
the
price
2
.
The
Treaty
was far
more
sharply
criticised
in the
Palais
Bourbon
than at
St
Stephen's.
England,
declared
M.
Deschanel,
had
nowhere
made a real sacrifice
;
for she
retained
in
Morocco
all
that
mattered to
her
—
liberty
of
commerce.
One sees
a
powerful
school
of
diplomacy,
resting
on
long
tradition,
admirably
informed
and
served,
which
yields
nothing
essential,
which
manages
to
create new
guarantees
even
in
what it
appears
to
surrender,
which
always
keeps
the
marrow
and throws
away
the
bone.
Tendencies
were
driving
British
policy
towards
us. We
should
have
obtained better
conditions
if
we
had
arranged
our
affairs one
by
one.
All
speakers,
however,
approved
the
policy
of accord
with
England
;
and,
on
November
12th,
the
Chamber
by
a vote
of
443
to
105
sanc-
tioned the Convention
concerning
Newfoundland
and West
Africa,
though
M. Delcasse was forced to
accept
a
motion
pledging
him
to
further
negotiations
with
regard
to the
Newfoundland
fishermen
3
.
The Senatorial Committee
of
Foreign
Affairs
reported
that,
though
not
beyond
reproach,
it
was
useful
to the
country,
and the
Senate
ratified it
by
a
majority
of
215
to
37.
The
process
of
cleaning
the
slate,
so
auspiciously
begun
in
1904,
was
completed
at
leisure.
The friction between
French
and British
traders
and
missionaries
who
had settled
in
the
New
Hebrides
in the
course of
the
nineteenth
century
led,
in
1887,
to
an
Anglo-French
1
Preface to R.
Millet,
Notre
politique
exteneure.
2
La
Question
d'figypte,
ch.
4.
3
In
1905
445
fishermen received
compensation
from the
British
Government;
but the
regulations
to be issued
by
the two
Governments
relating
to the
marine
police
on "the French Shore"
gave
rise
to
prolonged
discussion.
318
CONTINENTAL
AGREEMENTS,
1902-1907
Convention,
which
provided
for
supervision
by
a mixed commission
of naval
officers.
The
remedy
proved
inadequate,
and
annexation
or
partition
was demanded
by
different schools of
politicians,
not
only
in the
islands,
but
in
France,
Great
Britain and
Australia.
On
October
20th,
1906,
a
Convention
was
signed
in
London
declaring
the
New Hebrides
"a
region
of
joint
influence,"
each
Power
exercising
jurisdiction
over
its
own
nationals.
A
British and
French
High
Com-
missioner
were
appointed,
with
authority
over
the
native
chiefs,
while
order
continued to
be
maintained
by
the Naval Commission
and
police
forces
of
equal strength.
A
mixed
Tribunal was
created
with
three
Judges,
the President
of
the Court
being
chosen
by
the
King
of
Spain.
A
further
question
was
settled,
which had
troubled the
relations
of
the
two
Powers since
1896.
A
French
railway company,
formed
to
construct
a line
from
Jibuti
to
Addis
Abeba,
obtained assistance
from the
French
Government
in
1902;
but a
British
group
had
secured
a
majority
of
the
shares.
In
1902
the frontier between
Abyssinia
and
the
Sudan was
delimited,
and
the
Negus
bound
himself
not to
construct
any
work
on
the
Blue Nile or
the Sobat
which
could
interfere
with its
flow,
and
authorised the
passage
of
the
Cape
to
Cairo
Railway through
his
territory.
British
influence was
supreme,
and
in
April,
1905,
Menelek
contemptuously
refused the
French
Company
permission
to continue the
railway
to
the
capital.
The
British
financiers
urged
that the line should be
neutralised
or
built
with
funds advanced
by
the
Bank
of
Abyssinia,
that
is,
with
English
money.
On
July
6th,
1906,
Great
Britain,
France and
Italy signed
an
Accord
recognising
the
interests
and
the
status
quo
in
Abyssinia.
Great Britain
received
assurances as
to the
flow
of
the
Nile,
Italy
was authorised to
continue
her
railways
in
Eritrea,
and
the construc-
tion
and
exploitation
of
the
whole line
from
Jibuti
to the
capital
remained
in
the
hands
of
the
French
Company,
with
an
English,
Italian
and
Abyssinian representative
on
the
Board.
A
year
later,
a Franco-
Siamese
Treaty
secured for France
the
territory
bordering
on
Cambodia in return
for
the abolition
of ex-
territoriality.
The
goodwill displayed by
Great Britain
in
this
matter
was
rewarded
when France smiled
on
the
doubling
of
British
posses-
sions
in the
Malay
peninsula.
Finally,
in
June,
1907,
Great Britain
and
France
concluded
an
arrangement
with
Spain
guaranteeing
their
respective
possessions
in
the Mediterranean
and
the
Atlantic,
and thus
securing
an additional
pledge
for
the
safety
of
the
road
to
India.
LORD
CURZON ON
RUSSIA
319
III.
Great
Britain
and
Russia,
1900-1905
While
British
and
French
statesmen
were
joyfully
burying
the
hatchet,
the
antagonism
between
Great Britain
and Russia
remained
a
source
of acute
anxiety.
The
Anglo-
German
Treaty
of
1900
and th
e
Anglo-
Japanese
Alliance
of
1902 proclaimed,
as from
the
h
ousetops,
our
suspicion
of
her aims
in
the Far
East;
and our
responsibility
for
the
defence
of India led us
to watch
her
activities
in
the
Middle East
with
even
more
jealous eyes.
A
conterminous
frontier and the
weak-
ness
of Persia
furnished
Russia
with
constant
opportunities
of
exerting
political
and
economic
pressure;
and in
the
closing years
of
the
nineteenth
century
the
rivalry
of
the two Powers
at Teheran
was
unconcealed.
Though
the
Imperial
Bank
of
Persia
represented
British
interests
in
the
capital,
Russian influence
predominated;
and the
Shah's need
of
money
enabled our
competitor
to rivet her
yoke
more
firmly
on
the
neck
of a
decadent State.
The
position
was
closely analysed
by
Lord
Curzon,
in a
lengthy
despatch
dated
September
21st,
1899,
the
first_year^of
his
Viceroyalty
,
in
response
to
a
request
from
the Cabinet
for
the
views
of
the
Govern-
ment
of
India
1
: "The
political
interests
of
Great Britain are
mainly,
but
no
longer
exclusively,
Indian. Ever
since the first visit
of
the
late
Shah
to
Europe,
Persia has been
drawn
increasingly
into
the
vortex
of
European politics.
She is one
of
those countries
which must
inevitably
have attracted the attention
of
Europe, partly
from in-
creasing infirmity,
but still
more from
the
opportunities~^uggested
by
their latent
though neglected
sources
of
strength. Closely pressing
upon
Persia and
Afghanistan
is
the
ever-growing
momentum
of a
Power whose interests
in
Asia are
not
always
in
accord
with
our
own,
while
the
Gulf is
beginning
to
attract the interest
of
other
and
some-
times
rival
nations.
For
the
present,
our
ambitions are limited to
prevent
the interest
we
have
built
up
from
being
undermined.
We
have no
desire to disturb the
political
status
quo
as
long
as
it
can
be
maintained;
but
we
press
for
an
early
decision and
for
early
action,
since,
unless we
bestir
ourselves,
there
is
good
reason
for
fearing
that
the
already trembling
balance
may
be
disturbed
to
our
disadvantage.
The advance of Russia
across
the deserts
that
form
the natural
barrier
between
West
and
East Persia could not be
regarded
without
uneasi-
ness
by
the
Government
of India
;
for
Russian
pledges
to
respect
the
interests
and
independence
of Persia
are
quite
insufficient
to
save
Persian or
British
interests
from
erosive
agencies."
1
Persia,
No.
1
(1908).
320
CONTINENTAL
AGREEMENTS,
1902-1907
At the
moment
when
this
weighty despatch
reached
London,
the
attention
of
the
Cabinet
was
monopolised
by
the Boer War. It
was
a
time
rather
for
graceful
concessions
than for
valiant
resistance to
future
dangers,
and Russian influence
in
Persia
increased
apace.
Fresh
advances from
the
Russian Bank
brought
the total
loan
up
to
four
millions;
Russian
concessionaires were allowed
to
build roads
from Tabriz
to
Teheran
and to
Kazvin,
and in
1902
a Russo-Persian
Commercial
Treaty
threatened
the
Indian
tea-trade. Not content
with
dominating
the
north,
Russia
pushed
forth her
tentacles
in
the
east
and
south.
Though
Seistan
adjoined
the Indian
frontier,
she
despatched
a
Consul
in
1900
to
fish
there
in
troubled
waters,
and
the
Russian Bank
opened
branches
in
the
province.
To
counterwork
her
influence,
Lord
Curzon built
a
railway
from
Quetta
to
Nushki,
thence
across the
plains
to the
frontier,
and
finally
to
Nasratabad,
the
chief
town
of
Seistan,
opening
post
and
telegraph
offices
en route and
establishing
a
Consul
at the
terminus.
Though
there was little trade
in
this remote
province,
Russian
intrigues
were
thus
held
in
check.
Even more vital to
the
safety
of India and
the
prestige
of the
empire
was
the
maintenance
of our
position
in
the Persian
Gulf,
where Russian emissaries
—
officers,
"explorers,"
doctors
"studying
plague"
—
were
beginning
to
swarm.
In
February, 1900,
a small
Russian
gunboat
anchored
off
Bunder
Abbas. The Commander
asked
for
coal,
and
three
hundred
tons
were ordered
from
Bombay.
When
it
arrived,
he
declared
that
he
could
not
take it
all on
board,
and
proposed
to
land a
portion.
It
occurred
to
the
Governor,
however,
that
it
would need Russian
guards,
who
might stay;
and,
when
a
British
cruiser
arrived,
he
plucked up courage
to
refuse
permission.
Thus
the
attempt
was foiled to create
a nucleus store
from which
a
coaling
station
might
develop. During
the
next three
years,
Russian
warships
toured the
Gulf;
but
no
further
attempts
were
made
to
acquire
a
footing.
Consulates
were,
nevertheless,
established
at
Basra,
Bushire and Bunder
Abbas,
though
no Russian nationals
were
to
be found
there
and
little
trade,
despite
the visits
of four
ships
a
year
belonging
to
a subsidised
Company
formed at
Odessa
in
1901.
The
termination
of
the
Boer
War
had
restored to
Great Britain
her freedom
of
action; and,
on
May 15th, 1903,
Lord
Lansdowne
made
the most momentous
declaration
of
British
policy
since
Sir
Edward
Grey's
pronouncement
in
1895.
"Firstly,
we should
protect
and
promote
British
trade
in
the
Gulf.
Secondly,
we should
not
exclude
the
legitimate
trade
of
others.
Thirdly,
we
should
regard
the
THE
PERSIAN
GULF
321
establishment
of
a
naval
base or a
fortified
port
in
the
Gulf
by
any
other
Power as a
very
grave
menace
to
British
interests,
and we
should
certainly
resist
it
by
all
the
means
at
our
disposal."
The
announcement,
he
added,
was
made in
no
minatory
spirit,
because he
knew of
no
such
proposal.
This
emphatic
warning
was reinforced
by
Lord
Curzon's
demonstration
in
the
Gulf
in
November,
1903.
It
was
the
first visit
of
a
Viceroy
during
his
term
of
office,
and no such
assemblage
of
warships
had
ever
been
seen
on
its
quiet
waters. After
touching
at
Muscat,
an
independent
Arab
State
under
British
influ-
ence,
the
squadron
entered
the
Gulf,
and
a
Durbar
was held on
board
the
Argonaut
at
Shargah,
where
the
Chiefs of
the
Arab
coast
in
treaty
relations with us were
addressed
by
the
Viceroy
in
a
speech
of
sonorous
eloquence
1
.
He
reminded
his hearers of
the
steps
by
which
the
British Government
became,
with
their
own
consent,
their
overlords
and
protectors
and
the
guardians
of
intertribal
peace.
Why
should
Great Britain continue to
exercise
these
powers?
The
history
of
your
States and of
your
families,
and
the
present
condition of
the
Gulf,
are the answer. We
were here before
any
other
Power,
in
modern
times,
had
shown
its face
in
these
waters. We found
strife,
and
we
have
created order. It was our
commerce
as well as
your
security
that
was
threatened and
called
for
protection.
At
every port along
these coasts the
subjects
of the
King
of
England
still
reside
and
trade.
We saved
you
from
extinction
at the hands of
your
neighbours.
We
opened
these seas to the
ships
of all
nations,
and
enabled their
flags
to
fly
in
peace.
We have not
seized nor
held
your territory.
We have not
destroyed your independence,
but
preserved
it
The
peace
of
these
waters must still be
maintained;
your
independence
will
continue to be
upheld;
and
the
influence
of the
British
Government must remain
supreme.
The
Sovereign
of the British
Empire
lives so
far
away
that none of
you
has ever
seen
or will ever
see
his
face;
but
his
orders are carried out
everywhere
throughout
his
vast
dominions,
and
it
is as his
representative
in
India,
who is
responsible
to
him
for
your
welfare,
that I am
here
today
to
exchange
greetings
with
you,
to
renew old
assurances,
and
to wish
you
prosperity
in
the
future.
British
prestige
was enhanced
by
the
journey,
which
proclaimed,
not
only
to
those who
saw
the
squadron
and
heard the voice
of
the
Viceroy,
but
to
listeners far
away
in
Teheran,
Petrograd
and
Berlin,
the
determination
of
Great Britain
to
defend her
position
in
the
Gulf
from
challenge
or
attack.
The
struggle
against
Russian
encroachments
was
waged,
not
only
in
Manchuria and
Persia,
but
on
the
lofty plateaus
of
Tibet,
where
1
Reprinted
in
Lord
Curzon in
India,
pp.
500-503.
Cf.
Lovat
Fraser,
India
under
Lord
Curzon,
pp.
78-115.
w.&g.iii
21
322
CONTINENTAL
AGREEMENTS,
1902-1907
the
priestly
hierarchy
which
governed
the
country
under the
shadowy
suzerainty
of
China
had
done its
utmost to
close
the
gates against
approach
from
the south. Warren
Hastings
sent
envoys
to
Tibet;
but their
work
bore
no
lasting
fruit.
A
hundred
years
later
a Mission
to
Lhasa was
organised
in
1886
but countermanded
;
and
the Tibetans
took
advantage
of
the
collapse
of
the
project
to
invade
Sikkim in
1887.
They
were
expelled
in
the
following
year,
but received
no
punishment
for
their offence.
In
1890,
the senior of
the two Chinese
Ambans who
represent
the Suzerain
at
Lhasa
journeyed
to
Calcutta,
and
signed
a
Treaty fixing
the
boundary
between
Tibet
and
Sikkim
(over
which China
recognised
a
British
Protectorate), reserving
for a
joint
Commission
questions
of
trade,
pasturage
and
communication.
The
Tibetans
refused
to
recognise
the
boundary,
and a second
Agreement,
signed
in
1893,
proved
equally
worthless
1
.
A
mart
was
established
at
Yatung
;
but the Tibetans
built
a wall
to
prevent
their
own
traders from
approaching
it,
levied
an unauthorised
duty
on
Indian
goods,
and
overthrew
the
boundary pillars
erected
by
British
and
Chinese
Representatives.
In
March,
1899,
Lord
Curzon
de-
scribed
the
situation to the
Secretary
of
State.
"
We
seem to be
moving
in
a
vicious
circle.
If
we
apply
to
Tibet,
we either receive no
reply
or
are
referred to the Chinese
Resident.
If
we
apply
to the
latter,
he
excuses his
failure
by
his
inability
to
put
any
pressure
on
Tibet."
Lord
Salisbury
was
consulted and advised
that,
since
the
Tibetans
argued
that China had no
authority
to act
for
them,
the
Government
of
India should
try
to
negotiate
directly
with Lhasa. The
advice was
followed;
but a
letter
from
the
Viceroy
to the Dalai
Lama
in
1900
was
returned
unopened,
no
one
having
dared
to
forward
it to
the
capital.
In
the
following year
the
Viceroy
wrote
again, adding
that
discourtesy
would
be
followed
by steps
to enforce the
Treaty.
The
letter was
delivered to
the Dalai
Lama,
who returned
it
unopened,
on
the
ground
that he could
not
correspond
with
foreign
Govern-
ments
without the
consent
of
the
Ambans.
The
exasperation
provoked
by
this
studied insolence was
inten-
sified
by
the
simultaneous
reception
at
Petrograd,
in
September,
1900,
of a
mysterious
emissary
named
Dorjieff,
a
Siberian
Buddhist,
who had
resided for
many
years
at
Lhasa,
where
he had
gained
influence
as
tutor to
the Dalai
Lama.
A
year
later,
he
reappeared
in
Russia as
the head
of
a
Mission,
the
political
character
of
which was
1
See
Papers relating
to
Tibet,
1904,
Cd.
1920,
Cd.
2054
and
2370;
and
1910
Cd.
5240;
and
Younghusband,
India and Tibet.
RUSSIAN
INTRIGUES
IN TIBET
323
emphasised
by
the Russian Press.
"
Tibet
has
heard
of
the
taking
of
Peking,"
wrote
the
Novoye
Vremya,
"and
perhaps
also
of
the
valiant
resistance
of
the
Boers. A
rapprochement
with
Russia
must
seem
to
the
Lama the
most natural
step,
as Russia is
the
only
Power able
to
counteract
the
intrigues
of
Great
Britain,
who
has
so
long
been
trying
to
obtain
admission and
only
awaits the
opportunity
to
force an
entrance."
The
Foreign
Minister,
naturally,
told
the British
Am-
bassador
a
very
different
story.
"The conclusion of
certain
Russian
papers
that Tibetans
have
any diplomatic
or
political
mission
is
ridiculous
and unfounded.
Dorjieff
comes to
Russia
occasionally
to
collect
for his Order
from Russian
Buddhists,
and
has
no
official
character
whatever." After
the
Mission had been
received
by
the
Tsar,
de
Witte
and Lamsdorff
himself,
and announced
in
the
official
journal
as
"Envoys
Extraordinary
of
the
Dalai
Lama,"
the
British
Ambassador
again
visited the
Foreign
Secretary,
who
reiterated
that
the
Mission had
no
political
character.
The Dalai
Lama,
he
explained,
was
a
Buddhist
Pontiff,
and
the mission
was of the
kind
which
the
Pope
was
accustomed
to
send
to Catholics
in
other
lands. Lord
Lansdowne,
hereupon,
instructed
the
Ambassador to
tell
Lamsdorff
that
his
assurances had been received with
satisfaction,
and
to
add
that the
British
Government
could
not
regard
with indifference
any
pro-
ceedings
that
might
have a
tendency
to
alter
or
disturb the
existing
status
of
Tibet.
Dorjieffs
journeys
had
taught
Tibet to
look
to
Russia for
pro-
tection
and
Russia
to
regard
Tibet
as a
pawn
in her
world-wide
game against
Great Britain.
Lord Curzon's
patience
was
wearing
thin,
and
on
July
28th,
1
901,
he
proposed
coercion
if
a third
attempt
to communicate with
the
Dalai
Lama
broke
down
;
but
the Boer War
was
still in
progress,
and
Lord
George
Hamilton
deprecated
strong
measures.
When,
however,
the
third
attempt
proved equally
fruitless,
the
Viceroy
suggested
that the
Political Officer
for Sikkim
should
set
up
pillars
where
the
Tibetans
had
encroached,
and
that,
if
these
pillars
were
overthrown,
we
should
occupy
the Chumbi
valley.
The
time seems
to us to have
arrived when we should decline
any
longer
to allow our
boundary
to be
transgressed,
our
trade to be
strangled,
and
the
rights
secured
to us
by
treaty
defied.
It
is
the
most
extraordinary
anachronism of the twentieth
century
that
there
should
exist
within
less
than
three hundred
miles of
the borders
of
British
India a State
and a
Government
with whom
political
relations
do not
exist
and with whom it
is
impossible
even
to
exchange
a written communication.
21
—
2
324
CONTINENTAL
AGREEMENTS,
1902-1907
The
approval
of
the
Cabinet
having
been
secured,
the
Political
Officer
proceeded,
in
the
summer of
1902,
to the
north
of
Sikkim
and
ordered
the
Tibetans
inside the
frontier to
withdraw
;
and
on
January
18th,
1903,
the
Government
of India
proposed
an
expedition
to
Lhasa,
where
we should
meet
Chinese
Representatives,
and
negotiate
a
treaty,
to
be
signed
both
by
the Chinese
and
the
Tibetans,
a
British
Representative
being
hereupon
installed in
the
capital.
The
suggestion
leaked
out; and,
before the
Cabinet
had
time to consider
the
proposal
of the
Indian
Government,
a Memorandum
was
presented
by
Count
Benckendorff.
"A British
military expedition
to
Tibet
has
been
reported.
Such
an
expedition
would
produce
a
situation of con-
siderable
gravity,
and
might oblige
Russia
to take measures
to
protect
her
interests
in those
regions."
The
British
Foreign
Secretary
replied
that this
Note
was
unusual and
almost
minatory,
and
that the
rumour
was
baseless.
"Russia,"
retorted the
Ambassador,
"has
no
designs
at
Tibet,
and
I
presume you
have
not."
A
week
later,
Lord
Lansdowne
informed
him
that
he
learned
from
apparently trustworthy
sources,
of Russia
having
lately
concluded
an
agreement
for
a
Pro-
tectorate
over
Tibet
and
intending
to
appoint
Agents,
or
Consular
Officers
at
Lhasa.
"I
believe
there
is no
foundation
for
the
report/*
replied
the
Ambassador,
"but
I
will
enquire."
"As
we are much
more
closely
interested
in
Tibet
than
Russia,"
rejoined
the
Foreign
Secretary,
"if
Russia
displays
activity,
we must
reply by
a
greater
display.
We are
simply trying
to
get
the Tibetans to
fulfil
the
Treaty
of
1890,
and it
is
no use
trying
through
China."
Sparks
had
already
begun
to
fly;
and,
on
February
27th,
the
Secretary
of
State
for
India,
Lord
George
Hamilton,
sent a
cautious
reply
to
the
despatch
of
January
8th.
The
Cabinet
recognised
the
importance
of
the
problem,
and feared
that
Tibet
under
Russian
influence
might
press
Nepal
into
her
orbit.
But it
could
not
sanction
armed
intervention,
which
might
lead
to
permanent occupation
or
a
Protectorate.
The Russian
Ambassador informed
Lord Lansdowne
that
no
Russian
Agents
were in Tibet
;
that there
was
no
intention
to
send
any
;
and that Count
LamsdorrT was
astounded to
find
we could
believe
it.
Russia,
on
the other
hand,
was
not
indifferent to
any
seri-
ous
disturbance
of
the
status
quo.
Lord
Lansdowne
explained
in
reply
that,
where
an uncivilised
country adjoined
a
civilised,
a
certain
local
predominance
was
inevitable,
but that
this
did
not
involve
designs
on
its
independence.
Now that
the
diplomatic
situation
had been to
some
extent