Ward A.W. The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy. 1783-1919. Volume 3
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THE GERMAN
FLEET
305
sudden attack.
The
construction
of
the
Dreadnought
intensified
the
feeling
of
danger
and
impotence.
"
I was
besieged by
a
demand for
a
large
increase
to meet British
threats,"
writes
Tirpitz
1
. "Even the
Kaiser favoured
propaganda
by
the
Navy
League
and wished
me to
reduce the life
of our
big
ships,
which
was
longer
than
elsewhere. I
resisted this and offered
my
resignation.
My
Bill of
March,
1906,
added
the
six
large
cruisers
which had been
refused
in
1900,
and
obtained
money
to widen
the Kiel
Canal,
through
which
Dreadnoughts
could not
pass."
The naval
rivalry
entered
on a new and
more
dangerous
stage,
and
each
Admiralty
attributed
aggressive
designs
to
the other.
A
speech
by
the
Prime-Minister on
May 4th,
1905,
explaining
the views of
the
newly-founded
Committee
of
Imperial
Defence,
contributed
in
some
degree
to
tranquillise
opinion.
The
Army
and
Navy, explained
Mr
Balfour,
should
be
concentrated
so far as
possible
;
but
experts
had decided
that,
even
if
the
Regular
Army
were
abroad and our
organised
fleets
at
a
distance,
an invasion
would
not
be
attempted
with less than
70,000
men,
and
could
not
reach
London.
In
the
following
month
Lord
Roberts
issued
an
appeal
to
make
rifle-shooting
"a
national
pursuit.
"
Failing Conscription,
he
argued,
the
security
of
the
State
depended
on
the
ability
of
the
nation
thus
to take
up
arms
in
self-defence. He
appealed
for
£100,000
to
promote
rifle clubs
;
but the
slender
response
showed that the
German
danger
was
not
yet
taken
seriously by
the
people
at
large.
II. Great Britain and
France,
1902-1904
While our
relations with
Berlin
were
drifting
from
bad
to
worse,
London
and
Paris made
up
their
quarrel.
Delcasse
had informed
his
first
visitor at
the
Quai
d'Orsay
of
his
intention to
restore
cordial
relations
2
;
and
the decision
to
evacuate
Fashoda cleared the
ground
for
a
new
orientation.
His views were shared
by
M. Paul
Cambon,
whom
he
transferred from
Constantinople
to
London
shortly
after
the
Fashoda
crisis,
and
whose
first task here was
to
delimit
boundaries
in
North Africa.
"The
work,"
he
declared before
leaving
London
in
1921
3
,
"went
quickly
and
smoothly,
for
Lord
Salisbury
knew his
own
mind.
. .
.Then
I
suggested
that there
were several other
matters
which
might
be
settled
in
an
equally
friendly
spirit.
He
shook
his
head
and
smiled.
'
I
have
the
greatest
confidence
in
M.
Delcasse/
he
1
Memoirs,
vol. I.
ch.
15.
2
Stephane
Lauzanne,
The
Fortnightly Review,
February,
191
8.
3
See
the
interview in
The
Times,
December
22nd, 1920.
w.&g.iii
20
306
CONTINENTAL
AGREEMENTS,
1902-1907
said,
'and
also
in
your
present
Government.
But
in a few months'
time
they
will
probably
be
overturned,
and
their
successors will
do
exactly
the
contrary.
No,
we must wait
a
bit.'
"
To the
soreness created
by
Fashoda and
the
Dreyfus
case a
new
irritant
was added
by
the Boer War
;
but
the
advocates
of
reconcilia-
tion
abated neither
hope
nor
effort.
Work
of
enduring
importance
was
accomplished
by
Sir Thomas
Barclay,
who
by
long
residence
had
won
for
himself
a
distinct
place
in
the
life of
the French
capital,
and
to
whom it
occurred
that it
would be of
service to the
good
cause
if
the British Chambers
of
Commerce were invited
to meet
in Paris
in
1900.
The
meeting
was a
great
success,
and
English
visitors
flocked
to the Exhibition.
Though Kruger's
visit took
place shortly
after,
the
seed
had been
sown,
and
the
gross
caricatures
of
Queen
Victoria
in
the
French
illustrated
papers disappeared.
No decisive
advance,
however,
was
possible
while
Lord
Salisbury's
influence was
supreme
and the Boer
War in
progress,
and Delcasse remarked
impatiently
to
Sir Thomas
Barclay
that it was
hopeless
to
try
to conciliate
England.
Salisbury
withdrew into
private
life on
July
12th,
1902,
full of
years
and
honours,
and
Lord
Lansdowne now obtained a free
hand. "I
told
him of
my
talk with
Lord
Salisbury,"
records
M. Paul
Cambon,
"
and
suggested
the
subjects
on
which
I
should have liked to
negotiate
an
agreement.
He asked
me whether
he
might
make a note of
them,
but
I
said he need not
trouble,
as
I
would write
him a
letter.
Next
evening,
at a
dinner-party
at
Buckingham
Palace,
I
was
placed
next
King
Edward,
who
said,
'Lansdowne
has shewn me
your
letter. It
is excellent.
You
must
go
on. I have told the
Prince of Wales
about
it.
You can discuss it also with
him.'
After
dinner,
the
Prince
spoke
to me
eagerly
of the
letter,
and said what
a
good
thing
it
would be
if
we could
have a
general agreement.
He
wanted
to know when it
would be concluded.
I
told
him we could not
go quite
so
fast
as
he
might
wish." The
Ambassador's conversations
with
Chamberlain
and Lord Lansdowne in
1902
indeed
brought
about
no
agreement.
In
the
spring
of
1903 King
Edward
set
forth
in his
yacht
on
the
first
foreign
tour
of
his
reign,
and,
after
visiting
Lisbon and Rome he
reached
Paris
on
May
1st,
for
the first time
for
more than three
years
1
.
"The visit was
his
own
idea,"
testifies
Cambon.
One
day
Lord
Lansdowne
told me that
on
the
way
back
from the
Mediterranean
the
King
wished to
stay
in Paris. I asked whether
it would
be
an official
visit,
and said
that,
however unofficial
it
might
be,
the President
1
The
King's
journeys
are
chronicled
by
J.
A.
Farrer, England
under Edward
VII.
KING EDWARD IN PARIS
307
would
at least have to
ask him to
dinner.
Lord
Lansdowne
thought
it
would be
quite
an
informal
affair,
and
shewed
some
apprehension
as
to
how he
would be
received.
I
informed
my
Government,
and
Lord
Monson
was
not a
little astonished
by
an
enquiry
from the
Quai
d'Orsay
as to
how
the
King
would
wish to
be
received.
He
telegraphed
to
the
King,
who
answered that he desired his
reception
to be as official as
possible,
and
that
the more
honours
that were
paid
to him
the better.
So
I went
to
Paris to
help
in
arranging
matters.
Before Lord
Monson started to meet
the
King,
I
suggested
that he should advise
him to
make
a
little
speech
at the first
opportunity
and to
say
how much he
always
felt
at
home in Paris. When
he
arrived at the Bois de
Boulogne
station,
the
crowd
was enormous
and
respectful,
but
a
trifle
cold;
but after he
had made his
speech
at the British
Chamber
of
Commerce
the
whole
atmosphere changed.
He
won
the hearts
of
the
Parisians
in a
day.
Without
King
Edward
the Entente
might
never
have
been
made
1
.
The
President
of
the
Republic
was
equally
anxious for cordial rela-
tions
and
equally
willing
to
run
risks.
"I
had
misgivings
about
the
expediency
of
a
visit,"
confesses Sir Thomas
Barclay,
"for,
though
the
Entente
had
been
ardently
and
successfully
championed through-
out
provincial
France,
the fierce
passions,
which
in Paris had
developed
into
an
over-sensitive
patriotism,
had
not
calmed
down. When
the
President
sent
for
me,
I
suggested
that
the visit
should
wait until
next
year.
'Impossible/ replied
M.
Loubet;
'the
King
wishes it.
I
know
the
danger
;
but
I
shall
send
for
the leaders
and
tell them
he is
not
responsible
for
the acts
of his
Ministers,
and
that
he has been
always
a friend
of
France
2
.'
"
The
speech,
which won
the
heart
of
France,
struck
a
personal
note
rare
in
royal
utterances.
"It
is
scarcely
necessary
to tell
you
with
what
sincere
pleasure
I
find
myself
once
more in
Paris,
to
which,
as
you
know,
I
have
paid
very
frequent
visits
with
ever-increasing
pleasure,
and for
which
I
feel an
attachment fortified
by
so
many
happy
and
ineffaceable memories.
The
days
of
hostility
between
the
two
countries
are,
I
am
certain,
happily
at
an end.
I
know
of
no
two
countries whose
prosperity
is more
interdependent.
There
may
have
been
misunderstandings
and causes of
dissension
in
the
past;
but
that is all
happily
over
and
forgotten.
The
friendship
of
the two
countries
is
my
constant
preoccupation,
and
I
count
on
you
all,
who
enjoy
French
hospitality
in
their
magnificent
city,
to
aid me to
reach
this
goal."
The
visit
terminated the acute
stage
of
the
estrangement
between
the two
countries.
"A
new
Triple
Alliance
is
in
process
of
1
See
The
Times,
December
22nd,
1920.
2
Barclay,
Anglo-French
Reminiscences,
pp.
219-220.
20—2
3
o8
CONTINENTAL
AGREEMENTS,
1902-1907
formation,"
reported
Eckardstein from
Paris
to the German
Chan-
cellor
1
.
King
Edward's share in
the momentous
transformation
which
followed
has,
no
doubt,
been
exaggerated
by foreign
observers,
ignorant
of
the
working
of
British
institutions.
"The
King,"
writes
Lord
Sanderson,
"did
much
to
promote
an
atmosphere
of
goodwill;
but
he did
not
start
the
notion
nor
take
any
active
part
in
the
details
2
."
"His
visit
gave
a
great impetus
to the
movement,"
records
Lord
Lansdowne in
his official
survey
of
the
influences which were to
produce
the
agreements
of
1904.
But
even
these
guarded
tributes
secure
him
honourable
mention
among
the architects
of
the
entente
cordiale.
Three
months
later,
President Loubet returned
the
King's
visit,
and was
lodged
at St
James's
Palace
—
the first French Chief
of the
State to cross
the
Channel since
Napoleon
III.
"I
hope,"
declared
the
royal
host with
a
warmth
unusual on
such
occasions,
"that
the
welcome
you
have received
today
has convinced
you
of
the true
friendship,
indeed
I
will
say
the
affection,
which
my
country
feels
for France. I
shall
never
forget
the
reception
that
was
recently
given
to
me,
and
the sentiments
which
I
now
express
are
those
which
I
have
always
entertained.
I
hope
our
countries
will
always
retain
the
most intimate relations
and
the
deepest
friendship."
The toast
of
the
Lord
Mayor
at
the
Guildhall was no less cordial.
"
Now we
have
shaken hands
in
the
firm
intention
of
letting
no
cloud
obscure
the
path
we have marked
out,
is
it too
much to
hope
that
our statesmen
will find
means
of
removing
for
ever the
horrible
possibility
of a war
between the
two
peoples
who
have
so
many
common
interests,
and
whose
hopes
and
aspirations
are the same?"
The reference
of
the
Lord
Mayor
to
removing
the
possibility
of war was
inspired
by
an
Arbitration Convention at that moment
in course
of
negotiation.
The
first
documentary symbol
of
the
rapprochement
was due
to
Sir
Thomas
Barclay
and Baron
d'Estournelles
de Constant.
On
July
16th
a
formula
approved
by
the French
Cabinet
was
presented
at
Downing
Street:
"
Differences
of a
juridical
order,
particularly
those
relating
to
difficulties
of
interpretation
of
existing
conventions,
shall
—
provided
they
affect
neither
the vital interests nor the
honour
of the
Contracting
Powers
and
cannot be
solved
through diplomatic
channels
—
be
submitted
to
the
permanent
Court
of
Arbitration
in accordance
with Article
16
of
the
Hague
Convention."
1
Eckardstein, Erinnerungen,
n.
425.
*
Memorandum
on
M.
Cambon's interview
in The
Times,
December
22nd,
1920.
EGYPT
AND MOROCCO
309
The
formula
was
approved
by
the
Cabinet,
and the
Treaty
was
signed
on October
14th.
In
welcoming
M.
Delcasse\
who
had
accompanied
President
Loubet
to
London in
July,
Lord
Lansdowne
observed:
"And
now
we
are
going
to
talk."
A
long
and
fruitful
interview
took
place;
and
the
conversations,
which lasted
eight
months,
were carried
on
by
the
two
Foreign
Ministers
and
M.
Paul
Cambon,
with assistance
from
Sir
Eldon
Gorst,
then
Financial Adviser to
the
Egyptian
Government.
Success
was rendered less
difficult
by
the
very
magnitude
of
the
field
of
controversy.
However
impossible
it
might appear
to
settle
particular
issues
in
isolation,
sacrifices
might
be
tolerable as items in a balanced
settlement.
The
diplomatic
artists
worked
in
large
perspective,
con-
vinced
that the
removal of inflammable material
would be
more than
worth the
renunciation
of
this
or
that ancient
claim
or
glittering
ambition.
"The immediate
origin
of
the
Entente,"
records
Lord
Cromer,
"is
to
be
found
mainly
in
the
local
situation
in
Egypt. Egyptian
finance was then
in a
flourishing
condition;
but,
owing
to
the inter-
national fetters
imposed
in
circumstances
which had
wholly
ceased
to
exist,
the
country
was
unable
to derive
any
real
profit
from
the
surplus
funds. The
position
had,
in
fact,
become
intolerable.
It was
determined to
make an
effort to
improve
it.
A
high Egyptian
official,
Tigrane
Pasha,
was
sent to
Paris
to
feel
the
pulse
of
the
French
Government.
Responsible
Frenchmen had
simultaneously
come to
the conclusion
that it
was
practically
impossible
for
the British
Government to
redeem
the
pledge
to evacuate
Egypt.
The
British
advances were
therefore met
in a
friendly spirit.
The Fashoda
incident
convinced
France that Great Britain
would
remain
in
Egypt
as
long
as she
wished;
but
the
humiliation was
gradually
softened
by
the
discovery
that
the
occupation
was beneficial
to the material
interests
of
France.
It
was
equally
desirable
for
both countries that
the
situation
should
be cleared
up.
France could
not evict
her
rival,
but
she could
still
inconvenience
her
1
."
Not
less
eager
to clear her
path
in
Morocco than
Great
Britain
was
to
secure a
free hand in
the
valley
of
the
Nile,
France,
by
the
conquest
of
Algeria,
came
to take
a
special
interest
in
the
tranquillity
1
"The
actual
determining
cause
of the
Entente,"
adds
Lord
Sanderson,
"was
Lord
Cromer's
anxiety
for
an
arrangement
with
France which
would
let him
place
Egyptian
finances
on a
more
satisfactory footing,
and
pave
the
way
for
abolishing
the
Capitulations.
The
proposals
relating
to
Egyptian
finance
formed
a
sort of
nucleus from
which
the
further
agreements
developed
themselves."
3
io CONTINENTAL
AGREEMENTS,
1902-1907
of
its
neighbour.
The
frontier was
roughly
fixed
by Treaty
in
1845,
and,
in
1877, Muley
Hassan
petitioned
for a
permanent military
mission
to
aid
the
reorganisation
of his
country.
The wall of obstruc-
tion
was
breaking
down,
and
in 1880
the
Powers,
on
the initiative
of
Great
Britain,
met
in
Conference
at Madrid. The
insidious
practice
of
extending
Consular
protection
to
natives,
which
furnished
a
pretext
for
interference,
was
restricted,
and all
the
Signatory
Powers
of
the
October
Treaty
obtained most-favoured-nation
treatment.
The
occu-
pation
of Tunis
on
the east
and
Senegal
on
the south
made
many
Frenchmen
desire
to
round
off
their West
African dominions
by
incorporation
of
the
whole
or
part
of
Morocco
;
and
the
surrender
of
Fashoda
created the
demand for
a
substitute.
Pacific
penetration
began
;
and,
in
1900,
M.
Delcasse secured
the
benevolent
neutrality
of
Italy by
the
recognition
of
her
claims
to
Tripoli.
If
Egypt
and
Morocco
thus
provided
the
elements
of a
bargain
satisfactory
to
both
parties
it
seemed
that
the
principle
of
barter
might prove
equally
acceptable
in
other
parts
of
the
world. Great
Britain
was anxious
to
sweep away
the
grievance
of
"the
French
Shore
"
of Newfoundland
;
and France
entertained
some
minor am-
bitions
in West
Africa which
it was
in our
power
to
satisfy.
While
the
other
differences
presented
less
difficulty,
the
outbreak
of
the
Japanese
War increased
the
necessity
for a
comprehensive
settlement.
The
King's
Speech,
delivered
on
February
2nd,
1904,
registered
the
new
spirit
of
cordiality. "Apart
from
its intrinsic
value,
the
Arbitra-
tion
Agreement
affords
a
happy
illustration
of
the
friendly
feelings
prevailing
between
the two countries." The
note
of confidence and
satisfaction
was
echoed
by
the
Liberal
leaders.
"The
country
feels
deep
gratitude
to the
King,"
declared
Lord
Spencer,
"for
the
impulse
and
support
he has
given
to this
friendly
feeling";
and
Campbell-
Bannerman echoed
the sentiment
in
the
Lower House.
"I
do not
think
you
will
find,
either
here or
in
France,"
rejoined
Lord
Lans-
downe
modestly,
"that too much credit
is
taken
to themselves
by
the
diplomatists
for
this
happy
condition
of
things.
I
believe it to
be
due
mainly
to
a
deep-seated
conviction
on the
part
of
the two
countries
that
there
is
no
real
divergence
between
our
interests,
and that
the
greatest
of our common
interests
is
peace."
Two
months
later,
on
April
8th,
a Convention
relating
to
Newfoundland
and West
Africa,
accompanied
by
four
Declarations,
concerning
respectively
Egypt
and
Morocco,
Siam,
Madagascar
and the
New
Hebrides,
was
signed
1
.
1
See
France,
No.
1
(1904)
and No. 2
(1904).
EGYPT
AND
MOROCCO
311
The most
important
of
the
agreements
which
collectively
form
the
Treaty
of
1904
was
the
following
Declaration
respecting
Egypt
and
Morocco.
I.
His Britannic
Majesty's
Government declare that
they
have
no
inten-
tion
of
altering
the
political
status of
Egypt.
The
Government
of the French
Republic
declare
that
they
will not
obstruct the action of Great
Britain
in
that
country
by asking
that
a limit of
time be fixed for the
British
occupation
or
in
any
other
matter,
and that
they
assent to
the annexed Khedivial
Decree
containing
the
guarantees
considered
necessary
for
the
protection
of the
interests
of the
Egyptian
bond-holders. The
post
of Director
of
Antiquities
shall continue
to be entrusted
to a French
savant,
and
French
schools shall continue
to
enjoy
the same
liberty
as
in
the
past.
II. The Government
of
the
French
Republic
declare
that
they
have
no intention
of
altering
the
political
status
of
Morocco.
His
Britannic
Majesty's
Government
recognises
that it
appertains
to
France,
more
particularly
as a Power whose dominions
are conterminous
for a
great
distance with those
of
Morocco,
to
preserve
order
in that
country,
and to
provide
assistance
for
the
purpose
of all
administrative,
economic,
financial
and
military
reforms
which it
may require. They
declare
that
they
will
not
obstruct the action taken
by
France
for this
purpose, provided
that
such
action shall leave
intact the
rights
which Great
Britain
enjoys
in Morocco
in
virtue
of
treaties,
convention
or
usage.
III. The British Government
will
respect
the
rights
which
France,
in
virtue
of
treaties,
conventions
and
usage,
enjoys
in
Egypt.
IV. The two
Governments,
being equally
attached
to the
principle
of
commercial
liberty
both in
Egypt
and
Morocco,
declare
that
they
will
not
countenance
any inequality
either in the
imposition
of customs
duties
or
other taxes
or of
railway
transport charges.
This
engagement
shall be
binding
for
thirty
years.
Unless this
stipulation
is
expressly
denounced
one
year
in
advance,
the
period
shall be extended
for five
years
at a time.
V. The British
Government
will
use
their influence
in order that the
French officials
in
the
Egyptian
service
may
not be
placed
under less
advantageous
conditions than the British officials
in the same service.
The
French
Government will do
the
same for British officials
in
the
Moorish
service.
VI. In
order to
ensure free
passage
of
the Suez
Canal,
the
British
Government declare that
they
adhere
to
the
stipulations
of the
Treaty
of
1888,
and
agree
to
their
being put
in
force.
VII.
In
order
to
secure the free
passage
of
the
Straits
of
Gibraltar,
the
two
Governments
agree
not to
permit
the erection
of
any
fortifications
or
strategic
works on
the coast of Morocco
between,
but
not
including,
Melilla,
and the
heights
which command the
right
bank
of the
river Sebu.
This
condition
does not
apply
to
the
places
at
present
in
the
occupation
Spain.
3
i2
CONTINENTAL
AGREEMENTS,
1902-1907
VIII.
The
two
Governments,
inspired
by
their
sincere
feeling
of
friendship
for
Spain,
take into
special
consideration
the interests which
that
country
derives
from
her
geographical position
and
her territorial
possessions
on the Moorish
coast.
In
regard
to
these
interests the French
Government
will come to an
understanding
with
the
Spanish
Government,
which shall be communicated
to
the British
Government.
IX.
The
two
Governments
agree
to afford
one
another their
diplomatic
support,
in order to
obtain
the
execution
of
the
present
declaration.
A
Khedivial
Decree,
in
68
Articles,
annexed
to the
Declaration,
laid down
regulations
for
the
administration
and
repayment
of
the
Egyptian
debt.
"If
accepted
by
the
other Powers
concerned,"
wrote
Lord
Lansdowne,
"it
will
give
the
Egyptian
Government
a free hand
in
the
disposal
of
its
own
resources,
so
long
as
the
punctual
payment
of
interest
on
the debt is assured. The
Caisse de la
Dette will
remain;
but its functions
will be
strictly
limited to
receiving
certain
assigned
revenues
on
behalf
of the
bondholders,
and
insuring
the
due
payment
of
the
coupon."
The
surplus
of
5J
millions in
its
possession
was
to
be
transferred to
the Government.
Financial
liberty
for
Egypt
was
balanced
by
the settlement
of
the
juridical
position
of
the
Suez Canal
in
time
of
war
in accordance
with
the
wishes of
France.
Lord
Lansdowne
's
despatch
defines
with
equal
precision
the
manner
in
which
the British Government
regarded
the
aspirations
of
France
in Morocco
:
In
spite
of well-meant
efforts
to
assist the
Sultan,
but little
progress
has been effected. Without
the intervention
of a
strong
and
civilised
Power there
appears
to be no
probability
of a real
improvement.
It
seems
not
unnatural that in
these
circumstances France should
regard
it
as
falling
to her
lot to
assume
the
task of
attempting
the
regeneration
of the
country.
Though
in no
wise
desiring
to annex
the
Sultan's
dominions or to subvert
his
authority,
France seeks to extend her influence
in
Morocco,
and
is
ready
to
submit
to sacrifices
and
to incur
responsibilities
with the
object
of
putting
an
end to
the
condition
of
anarchy
which
prevails upon
the
borders
of
Algeria.
His
Majesty's
Government are
not
prepared
to assume such
responsibilities
or to
make such
sacrifices,
and
they
have therefore
readily
admitted
that,
if
any
European
Power
is
to have
a
predominant
influence
in
Morocco,
that Power
is France.
Next to
Egypt,
no
part
of
the
world
had
given
rise
to
so
much
ill-feeling
between the two
countries
as
Newfoundland;
and
the
settlement
of
the
Fishery dispute
was the
second
outstanding
achieve-
ment
of
1904.
The
controversy
dated
from
the
Treaty
of
Utrecht,
which,
while
recognising
that the
island should thenceforth
belong
to
Great
Britain,
gave
to
the French
"the
right
to
catch
and
dry
fish"
THE
NEWFOUNDLAND FISHERIES
313
on
part
of
the
coast
henceforth
known
as
"the
French Shore."
By
the
Treaty
of
1783,
a new
stretch of
coast
was
substituted,
in
order to
prevent
the
frequent
quarrels
of
the
fishermen,
and
Great
Britain
undertook to
prevent
British
subjects
from
interrupting
the
French
by
their
competition,
and
to
remove
fixed
British
settlements
on
"the
new French
Shore." The
friction
arising
from
divergent interpretations
of
these Treaties
increased with
the
economic
development
of
the
island
and
the
grant
of
self-government.
Frequent
attempts
were
made to settle the
differences,
and in
1857
and
1885
Conventions
were
signed, though, owing
to the
opposition
of
the
colony, they
were never
ratified. The
failure of
the second of
these
efforts was
followed
by
a renewed assertion of
French
rights
in
their
extreme
form;
and Newfoundland
retaliated with a
Bait
Act,
forbidding
the
sale
of
bait to
French
fishing
boats
except
on
"the
French
Shore."
The
French,
thus
restricted,
turned
in
some cases
from
cod
to
lobster
fishing,
which the
British
Government
argued
was
not
included in
the
Treaty rights,
and which
thus
introduced
a new
element
of
discord.
"It
was
obviously
our
duty,"
wrote Lord
Lansdowne,
"to find
some
means of
terminating
this
dispute,
which has
involved
a
constant risk
of
col-
lisions between the two
Governments. Such
collisions
have,
in
fact,
only
been averted
by
the
tact,
moderation
and
good
temper
exhibited
by
the naval
officers of
both Powers. The existence of
these French
rights
over two-
fifths of
the
coast
has meant the obstruction of all
useful
developments."
By
the First Article
of
the Convention
signed
on
April
8th
France
renounced
her
privileges
under
the
Treaty
of
Utrecht
and
its
suc-
cessors.
By
the
Second,
she
retained
the
right
of
catching
all
kinds
of fish in
territorial waters
on
"
the
French
Shore
"
during
the
fishing
season. French
fishermen
might
enter
any
harbour
on
"the
French
Shore" and
obtain
bait
or
shelter
on
the same
conditions
as the
inhabitants,
but
subject
to the
regulations
now
in
force,
or
hereafter
determined
for
the
improvement
of
the fisheries. The
policing
of
the
fishing
on
"
the French
Shore
"
and the
prevention
of
illicit
liquor
traffic
were
to
form
the
subject
of a
separate
agreement.
Article
III
provided
for
compensation
to
the
fishermen
obliged
to abandon
their
establish-
ments
on
"the French
Shore." Thus
the main
cause
of
friction,
the
right
of
landing
on
"the French
Shore,"
was
at
length
removed.
The French
negotiators
contended
that the
surrender
of an
ancient
privilege
required
territorial
compensation;
and the
British
Government,
recognising
the
strength
of
the
argument,
made three
concessions in
West Africa.
The
frontier
fixed
in
1898
between the
314
CONTINENTAL
AGREEMENTS,
1902-1907
British
colony
of
the
Gambia
and
Senegambia
was
slightly
modified,
in order to
give
France access
to the
navigable portion
of
the river.
The Los
Islands,
commanding
Konakry,
the
capital
of French
Guinea,
were
ceded,
with the
stipulation
that the
rights
of
British
fishermen
there should be
maintained for
thirty years.
Of far
greater
importance
was
the
revision of
the
1898
boundary
between British
and
French
Nigeria,
which
compelled
French
convoys
from
the
Niger
to
Lake Chad
to follow a
circuitous
and
waterless
route
or
to
pass
through
British
territory.
France
thus obtained
14,000 square
miles
and
uninterrupted
access
from
her
territories
on
the
Niger
to those
on
Lake Chad.
It
was
further
agreed
that
on
the
Lake itself the
frontier line
should,
if
necessary,
be modified so as to
assure
to
France
communication
through open
water at
all seasons
between
her
possessions
on
the north-west and the
south-east.
A
third
document contained a
Declaration
concerning
Siam,
Madagascar
and
the
New
Hebrides. As to
Siam,
the two
Powers
confirmed
the
Agreement
of
1896,
in
which
they
undertook to
refrain
from
armed
intervention
or
the
acquisition
of
special privileges
in
the
basin
of
the Menam.
France
now
recognised
all
Siamese
possessions
on
the
west
of
this* neutral zone and of
the
Gulf of
Siam,
including
the
Malay
Peninsula
and
the
adjacent
islands,
as henceforth
under
British
influence
;
while
Great Britain
recognised
all Siamese
territory
on
the
east
and
south-east
of
the zone as henceforth
under French
influence. As
regards Madagascar,
the
British
Government
aban-
doned
the
protest
which had been
maintained
against
the
Tariff
introduced
after
the
annexation
of
the
island.
Finally,
the
difficulties
in
the New Hebrides
arising
from
disputes
as to
land-title
and the absence
of
jurisdiction
over
the natives were to be
referred to
a Commission.
At
the
close
of
his
covering
despatch,
Lord Lansdowne
argued
that,
desirable
as were
these
Agreements
on their intrinsic
merits,
they
should be
regarded
not
merely
as
a
series
of
separate
transactions,
but
as
forming
part
of a
comprehensive
scheme
for
the
improvement
of
the relations
between
the two
countries.
The
antipathies
and
suspicions
of
the
past
had
given
place
to
friendship
:
And it
may, perhaps,
be
permitted
to
the Government
to
hope
that,
in
thus
basing
the
composition
of
long-standing
differences
upon
mutual
concessions,
and in the
frank
recognition
of each other's
legitimate
wants
and
aspirations, they
may
have afforded
a
precedent
which
will contribute
something
to
the
maintenance of international
goodwill
and the
preservation
of the
general peace.