Tsebelis G. Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work
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models are not able to assess the powers of the parliament, as a result, claimed that a parliament
that was making thousands of amendments and had one of every two amendments approved was
considered by some of the literature as a weak parliament. Both the theories and the tests in this
chapter were significantly more adnvanced than in the rest of this book because the institutions
were more complicated and the theory had to be further developed to address questions like
conditional agenda setting and the tests could be more precise because of the existence of sharper
theoretical predictions in the literature.
In conclusion, this book contains a series of theoretical arguments and specific
expectations. These expectations are frequently different from most of the literature: for example
on how well regime types explain differences among countries, whether party systems or
government characteristics are more important explanatory variables for the study of different
phenomena, on the role and the significance of referendums, on the importance and
consequences of bicameralism, federalism, and qualified majorities. The policy predictions were
corroborated both with respect to legislation (policy instruments), and macroeconomic policies
(policy outcomes). The structural predictions were corroborated whether they were on
bureaucracies, the judiciary, government composition and duration, or overall assessments about
a variable institutional structure like the EU. On the basis of the arguments produced in this book
and the diversity of the supporting evidence, veto players’ theory can become the basis of an
institutional approach to comparative politics.
422
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