(six volumes published between 1948 and 1954), negotiated in 1947, was
worth £555,000 or over $2.2 million – the value in today’s money estimated
by David Reynolds as anything between $18 and $50 million. New deals
were still being arranged after he finally retired, including £20,000 for a
10,000-word epilogue for a one-volume abridgement of the war memoirs in
1957, the sale of the film and TV rights to The Second World War for $75,000
in 1959, and £100,000 for the film rights (in 1960) for My Early Life. At death
Churchill left £304,000 (equivalent to over £3 million today).
23
The government thought it was important to keep Churchill informed
and supported. Uniquely a Foreign Office official, Anthony Montague
Browne, was seconded to be his private secretary (he became a close com-
panion, staying with Churchill until the end of his life), though Churchill
reimbursed the government for the cost of his salary. Foreign Office tele-
grams were sent to the former prime minister, though Montague Browne
says he only ‘skimmed through them like a newspaper holiday-reader on
the beach’. He was regularly briefed and updated on developments during
the Suez crisis. The government wanted to keep him on board and, as
Jenkins says, while he still had for a while ‘a semi-diplomatic world role’,
meeting foreign leaders and world statesmen, such as Adenauer, de Gaulle
and Eisenhower, ‘help to steer him through such delicate waters’.
24
Although he had a massive domestic and international reputation and an
iconic and legendary status, it is difficult to point to much direct political
impact after he left Number 10. Eden wanted to be his own man and, while
he was friendly and kept in touch with his old chief, made sure he did not
play a part in the national campaign or make a party political broadcast in
the 1955 general election, though Churchill would have been happy to
have had a role. Six months later, at Eden’s request, he had a long talk with
a wavering R.A. Butler, to try to persuade him to move from the Treasury to
become Leader of the Commons and a non-departmental minister. He had
had doubts about Eden as his successor – ‘I don’t believe Anthony can do
it’ – and shared the growing anxieties about Eden’s moods and weaknesses
even before the new prime minister was tested to destruction by the Suez
crisis.
25
As prime minister Churchill had fought all the way against British with-
drawal from the Suez Canal zone and it was to be expected he would
support strong action against Nasser when he nationalised the canal – ‘we
can’t have that malicious swine sitting across our communications’. When
Macmillan saw him and talked about the need to bring in Israel, destroy
the Egyptian forces and bring down Nasser, he noted in his diary ‘Churchill
got out some maps and got quite excited’. The next day, in ‘Action This
Day’ mode, Churchill spent August Bank Holiday Monday driving from
Chartwell to Chequers, dictating in the car a note setting out his views on
the military issues and options, which was typed up by his secretary in a
lay-by, and then discussed the military planning with Eden. At the height
Attlee to Douglas-Home 157