DIPLOMATS 163
gains that might accrue to the lucky concessionaires. One instructive
example is the insistence of the United States that she participate in the
projected Hukuang railway loan in 1909. Chang Chih-tung had just
about wrapped up a loan agreement with German, British and French
banking groups in June 1909 when (at the instigation of J. P. Morgan
and Company, Kuhn, Loeb and Company, the First National Bank of
New York and the National City Bank of New York) a personal telegram
arrived from President Taft to Prince Ch'un, the regent, demanding a
piece of the loan for the American banking group. The American case
rested upon alleged promises by the Chinese government in 1903 and 1904
to Edwin Conger, the American minister, that if Chinese capital were
unable to finance the railway from Hankow to Szechwan (now part of
the proposed Hukuang system), United States and British capital would
be given the first opportunity to bid for any foreign loan. On this basis,
the Chinese were pressed relentlessly, and strong representations were
made to Paris and London. But the pledges to Conger, which the Depart-
ment of State described as 'solemn obligations', did not exist. In fact,
in both 1903 and 1904 the Chinese Foreign Ministry had bluntly rejected
requests by Conger on behalf of American firms. Its reply of 1903, for
example, concluded with this statement: 'In short, when companies of
various nationalities apply to China for railway concessions, it must
always remain with China to decide the matter. It is not possible to regard
an application not granted as conferring any rights or as being proof
that thereafter application must first be made to the persons concerned.'
Even the texts of the 1903 exchanges were not available in Washington.
The Department of State asked Peking in July 1909 to transmit them
forthwith to bolster negotiations in London. But, given their content,
when they arrived, the texts were not shown to the British.'
4
China, in the end, acceded to the Taft telegram because of pressure, not
because of the alleged 'pledges'. And the European banking group
ultimately admitted the Americans to the loan consortium because they
feared that it might be difficult to enforce their own quite shadowy loan
guarantees in China if they denied similar American claims. No loan for
the Hukuang railway system was ever made, but in the pursuit of eco-
nomic advantage, however insubstantial, China was treated as an object
and not as an equal partner in commerce.
One significant source of diplomatic arrogance was the language bar-
rier. The principal foreign representatives in Peking seldom knew
Chinese, nor did the leading foreign merchants in the treaty ports, with
34 John A. Moore, Jr. 'The Chinese consortiums and American-China policy, 1909-1917'
(Claremont Graduate School, Ph.D. dissertation, 1972),
18-31.
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