Telo M. European Union and New Regionalism. Regional Actors and Global Governance in a Post-Hegemonic Era
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value. This difference is one important dimension of the emerging transatlantic rift,
which could prevented by a less unilateral/bilateral approach on the part of the US,
and by a more consistent and responsible attitude on the part of the EU. For the US
this means less unilateralism in terms of decision making – and less bilateralism
in terms of diplomatic relations. What the ‘lame duck’ period after the November
2006 election implies will be discussed later. The EU in contrast is committed to
multilateralism in terms of decision making and plurilateralism/regionalism in terms
of diplomatic relations: the group-to-group approach.
2
The chapter is structured as follows. Firstly, the historical relationship between
Europe and the US is briefly reviewed with the focus on more recent EU-US
relations. These relations are sometimes referred to in regional terms as European
– North American, but the actual counterpart to the EU is the US not North America
(NAFTA). This is a significant fact which deserves to be carefully analysed. Secondly
the qualitative difference between the two actors – a nation state with superpower
status and a regional institutionalized polity – is analyzed in terms of actorship. The
complex relationship between the two actors is explained by differences in actorship.
In order for a region to be an actor, to achieve actorship, particular preconditions
are needed. Thirdly the concept of world order is elaborated in some detail in order
to analyze the principal differences between the two models: Pax Americana and
Pax Europaea. Fourthly, the preferred world order model from the EU perspective
is outlined, followed by, fifthly, the US preferences as far as global governance is
concerned. Sixthly we look into the encounters between the policies and practices
inherent in the two models as they take shape in different regional contexts. Finally,
we conclude by some thoughts on the future world order.
1 The uncertain Atlantic Alliance
Where to start an account of European – US relations? Perhaps from the very
start, since the relationship between Europe and America has gone through a
number of fundamental transformations all of them having created an important
legacy. The US was born in an anti colonial revolt against European imperialism,
it grew economically by means of protectionism and industrial policy, it grew
bigger as provider of goods during the European civil war, it established itself as a
superpower in divided Europe, it became the champion of multilateralism and free
trade after the war, and encouraged European integration as a geopolitical strategy
against the rival superpower. In spite of so much shared history as well as shared
enemies and threats, the differences in terms of values are substantial. The alliance
has therefore always been ‘uncertain’ (Smith, 1984) but the current uncertainties
are inherent in the new context created by the end of the Cold War. Between the
US and Europe the close relationship, historically manifested in NATO has grown
increasingly strenuous. Joint operations are difficult to agree on and when they
are implemented they leave bitterness behind. NATO itself has therefore been
marginalized, as shown in particular after 9/11, when the NATO declaration of
support was completely disregarded by the US.
After the Cold War the relations thus became more complicated and tense as
Europe in the form of the EU asserted itself as a world power. There was divergence
Interregionalism and World Order: The Diverging EU and US models 109
and a conspicuous lack of interregionalism as here defined (Aggarwal and Fogarty,
2006). Attempts were nevertheless made to institutionalize relations. The rather
symbolic Transatlantic Declaration (1990) was replaced by the New Transatlantic
Agenda – TNA (1995) and later complemented by the Transatlantic Economic
Partnership – TEP (1998).
The two powers meet in various regional arenas, but whereas the EU tries to
form or consolidate regional groups, the US tries to break them up through bilateral
agreements (Mexico, Chile, Paraguay), and the ‘disaggregation policy’ (dealing
directly with the nation states) in Europe. This aspect of the decline of Atlanticism
will be discussed in section 6.
Transatlantic links between Europe and North America include EU-US, EU-
Mexico, and EU-Canada links which here are termed transregional (or hybrid
interregionalism being between a regional organization and a state), whereas EU
– MERCOSUR and EU - ASEAN relations exemplify authentic interregional
relations.
In the EU – Canada relationship it is Canada rather than the EU that has tried
to focus on the interregional possibilities (EU – NAFTA). The obvious reason is
that Canada wants to reduce its dependence on the US. Apart from this there seems
to be a stronger cultural affinity between Europe and Canada than between Europe
and the US. The Framework Agreement of 1976 is the oldest formal relationship
of the EU with any industrialized country. It is noteworthy that both parties in
the 2004 (Ottawa) Partnership Agenda spell out their commitment to ‘an effective
multilateral system’ and ‘international rule of law’.
The EU ‘global agreement’ (1999) with Mexico was based on a wish from the
EU to maintain a role in this large Latin American market and for Mexico (as for
Canada) to reduce its extreme dependence on its Northern neighbour.
Does the EU–NAFTA relationship have any future? There are many problems
among which are the extremely asymmetrical structure of NAFTA which places
‘the fate of NAFTA essentially in the relationship between the US administration
and the Congress’ (Aggarwal and Fogarty, 2006). Aggarwal and Fogarty provides
a detailed analysis in explaining why the EU has neglected this link by employing
different theories: functionalism, interest group preferences (pluralism), great power
politics (realism), and EU identity-building processes (constructivism). They find
that no theory predicts a strong transatlantic interregionalism. There are thus reasons
to believe that the Atlantic Alliance will fall apart, and that Nato will become
marginalized (Hodge, 2005). It is remarkable that both the EU and NATO are building
up rapid response forces (Economist, Nov 24, 2006:26). Thus both the EU and the
US are distancing themselves from NATO. The Atlantic Alliance seems doomed.
For reasons to be discussed further on this does not preclude bilateral cooperation in
crisis situations where the interests of both are threatened and when they can agree
upon the adequate response. The latter condition seems most problematic.
2 Regionalism and agency
When comparing the external actions of the EU and the US one problem to address
is that while the US operates as a large nation state, the EU is a different kind of
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political animal: a regional institutionalized polity. The question is how such a
polity can be an actor in world politics. Regions are not simply geographical or
administrative objects, but should be conceived of as subjects in the making (or
un-making); their internal cohesion as well as their boundaries are shifting, and so
is their capacity as actors (actorhood). When different processes of regionalization
in various fields of action and at various levels intensify and converge within
the same geographical area, the cohesiveness and thereby the distinctiveness of
the region in the making increases. This will make its presence felt in the outer
world and it will also have an impact on this world. Thus agency in the context of
regionalism (or regional actorship) can be understood as an outcome of regional
cohesiveness/identity (regionness), presence and actorness (Bretherton and Vogler,
2006). Building on Bretherton and Vogler my analytical framework for the study
of regional agency is built around what is seen as three interacting dimensions
of actorhood: regionness, international presence and purposive actorness. By
actorhood (or actorship) I refer to the general phenomenon of being able to act
towards the outside world more or less effectively. This capacity to act can increase
or decrease over time, depending on changes in the underlying variables which
may go in different directions. An actor can thus also lose its actor capacity due to
changes in any of the underlying variables.
Internal integration, cohesion and identity is summarized in the concept of
regionness. Presence is an expression of the impact of the region on the external
world due to size, demography, economic strength, that is, factors which do not
depend on a purposive policy to influence, whereas actorness is a variable based
on conscious organized efforts to shape the external world in accordance with the
values, interests and identity of the actor.
The process of regionalization shaping cohesiveness and regional identity can
in general terms be described in terms of levels of ‘regionnes’– that is, successive
orders of regional social space, system, society, community and institutionalized
polity. Increasing regionness implies that a geographical area is transformed from a
passive object to an active subject – an actor – increasingly capable of articulating
the transnational interests of the emerging region (Hettne, 1993, 2003; Hettne and
Söderbaum, 2000).
The concept of regionness defines the position of a particular region in terms
of its cohesion; this can be seen as a long-term endogenous historical process,
changing over time from coercion, the building of empires and nations in history, to
voluntary cooperation: the current logic of regionalization. The political ambition
of establishing regional cohesion and identity has been of primary importance in the
ideology of the regionalist project. The approach of seeing region as process implies
an evolution of deepening regionalism, not necessarily following the idealized stage
model presented here, that mainly serves a heuristic purpose. Since regionalism is
a political project, created by human actors, it may fail. In this perspective decline
would mean decreasing regionness. From this perspective Europe now seems to
have reached an impasse, facing decline in terms of regionness with an impact on
actorhood.
Actorness, usually referring to external behaviour, implies a larger scope of
action and room for manoeuvre, in some cases even a legal personality. The concept
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of actorness (with respect to the EU’s external policies) has been developed by
Bretherton and Vogler (2006).
3
Capacity to act is of course relevant internally as
well, for instance in relation to what I have referred to as security regionalism,
development regionalism and environmental regionalism, three areas where
increased regional cooperation may make a difference (Hettne, 2001). Actorness
is closely related to regioness, the latter implying an endogenous process of
increasing cohesiveness, the former a growing capacity to act that follows from
the strengthened presence of the regional unit in different contexts, as well as
the actions that follow from the interaction between the actor and its external
environment. Actorness is thus not only a function of regionness but an outcome of
a dialectic process between endogenous and exogenous forces.
Europe as external actor is more than the EU foreign policy, and more than even
EU’s policies in different areas taken together. Simply by existing, the union due
to its relative weight – demographically, economically and so on – has an impact
on the rest of the world, its footprints are seen everywhere. Bretherton and Vogler
use the concept ‘presence’ to signify this phenomenon. Furthermore, they usefully
relate presence to ‘actorness’, or capacity to act. A stronger presence implies more
capacity to act, unless we are dealing with a sleeping giant (which anyhow must
wake up sooner or later). Actorness implies consciousness. In the near abroad
presence is particularly strong, and can develop into outright absorption of new
territory (enlargement). Bretherton and Vogler identify five requirements for
actorness: (1) commitment to shared values and principles; (2) ability to formulate
coherent policies; (3) capacity to undertake international negociation; (4) access to
policy instruments; and (5) legitimacy of decision processes.
This is for a regional actor. A strong, functioning state like the US, of course,
possesses these requirements and can use them to rule by either hegemonic power,
or by dominance based on the use of force. This makes the third requirement less
important (‘we do not negotiate about our lifestyle’).
4
The unique feature of regional (as compared to great power) actorness is that
this has to be created by voluntary processes and therefore depends more on
dialogue and consensus-building than on coercion. This way of operating is the
model Europe holds out as the preferred world order, since this is the way the New
Europe (as it was organized by the EU) developed.
4 Conceptualizing world order
This chapter tries to clarify the impact of global regionalization on world order.
What is then meant by world order? The concept is rarely defined. In recent books
on international relations the concept often occurs in the text (sometimes even in
the title), but is absent in the index, which means that it is given a common sense
meaning in no need of being defined, or used merely as an attractive slogan, but
not really meant to be thought of as an analytical concept. Hedley Bull focused
on international order, which meant the system of states, and saw world order as
both a more general and a more normative concept, but he left it at that (Bull,
1997). According to Robert Cox, who is one of the few who has used the concept
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in a conscious way for analytical purposes, it is genuinely trans historical (there is
always a world order of some sort, but not necessarily an orderly one). However,
this order is seen as an outcome of underlying factors – social forces and political
units – which then gain more analytical importance for understanding world order
(Cox, 1996). The concept is, furthermore, commonly used normatively in a more
political sense, which is to say it describes not primarily the actually existing order
(or historical orders) but models and/or utopian projects. It has even been used as
a political slogan.
In order to be able to compare alternative models, I propose a non-normative
and mainly political definition of world order as constituted by three dimensions:
structure, mode of governance and form of legitimization. Structure is the way
the units of the system are related, that is, different forms of polarity determined
by the distribution of power and resources; mode of governance refers to avenues
of influence on decision making and policy making; legitimization is the basis on
which the system is made acceptable to the constituent units. On the structural
dimension, I make a further distinction between the unipolar, the bipolar and the
multipolar. Polarity can define relations between regions as well as great powers
and these relations are not necessarily hostile (as postulated in realist theory).
In the area of governance, the distinction I draw is between the unilateral,
the plurilateral and the multilateral. The difference between plurilateral and
multilateral is especially important. A plurilateral grouping of actors is exclusive,
whereas multilateral by definition implies inclusion, provided the rules of the game
are accepted by all parties. Multilateralism is therefore often seen as preferable,
but, for many purposes, regionalism, as a form of plurilateralism defined by
geographical proximity, is just as useful. By contrast, unilateralism undermines
collective arrangements and may even be a path towards imperialism. By relying
on unilateral decision making, which means prioritizing the ‘national interest’ over
collective security, structural anarchy is promoted for as long as no single power
is able to impose its will on the whole of international society. In that eventuality
the structural result, to the extent that such a policy ultimately succeeds, will be
unipolarity (or imperialism). Finally, in terms of legitimization, I discern a declining
scale from the universally accepted rule of international law, through hegemony
exercised by one great power (which normally means ‘acceptable dominance’), to
pure dominance, legitimized only by the national interest of the dominant power
and relying on coercion, prevention and pre-emption. The dividing line between
hegemony and dominance is not a very sharp one, but trends in one direction or the
other can easily be established within the general diplomatic/political international
debate. For example, the preparedness to accept dominance increases in dramatic
crises such as 9/11.
With the help of this framework a comparative analysis can be made between
alternative models, as well as of changes in and of world orders over time. The
concepts of international order and world order are often used as pseudonyms.
Here international order connotes a more state-centric conception, whereas world
order connotes a more complex multidimensional and post-sovereign order. An
international system can furthermore be less than globally encompassing, for
instance Europe as a regional international system in the nineteenth century.
Interregionalism and World Order: The Diverging EU and US models 113
World order of course implies a system including the whole world and all human
beings. The degree of order within a region or in the international system can vary;
thus different security theories speak of regional security complexes, anarchies,
anarchic societies, regional security communities, and so on. The security agenda
is broadened, which makes regional approaches to security more relevant.
A well functioning multilateral world order will require a certain degree of
institutionalization which counters unilateral action, limited bilateral solutions, or
ill-considered political or military reactions which aggravate a sensitive security
situation. The degree of order within a particular region or in the international system
can vary; different security theories speak of regional security complexes, anarchies,
anarchic societies, regional security communities, and so on. Regional approaches
to security are fully compatible with, and even necessitating multilateralism. After
9/11 there existed, to an even greater degree than in connection with the first
Gulf war, the possibility of an institutionalized multilateralism, an international
regime based on the premises of international law and extensive participation by
states and other transnational actors. But this multilateralism was false. By ‘false
multilateralism’ is meant political and military actions that take place in the guise
of multilateralism but which in reality are an expression of more limited interests:
plurilateralism if it is a matter of a group of major powers; regionalism if it is
a geographically united bloc; or unilateralism if a superpower or regional major
power is in reality acting alone. A certain kind of regionalism (interregionalism)
may, however, be supportive to multilateral principles (regional multilateralism,
or multiregionalism). But this is a long-term perspective and will depend on the
strength of the political project of taking regionalism as the crucial element in
reorganizing world order. This is the European approach to world order.
5 Interregionalism as world order: Pax Europaea?
What impact will or could Europe – or rather the EU – have on the future world
order? One possible form of world order could be a ‘neo-Westphalian order’,
governed either by a reconstituted UN system, in which the major regions of
the world have a strong influence; another alternative would be a more loosely
organized global ‘concert’ of great powers and the consequent marginalization
of the UN. The relevant powers in both models will be the regional powers of
the world. In the former case, supported by the EU, the UN will make use of the
old idea of complementary ‘regional arrangements’ (Henrikson, 1995; Hettne and
Söderbaum, 2006). In the latter case, supported by the US, regionalism will suffer
from imposed or hegemonic regionalism, and the regions as such will be far from
the ideal of security communities. It will thus be a multipolar and plurilateral world,
but the concert model will be lacking in legitimacy.
Regionalism would, however, put its mark on a future post-Westphalian
governance pattern, which would be more in line with EU preferences. In such a
world order, the locus of power would move irreversibly to the transnational level.
The state system would be replaced or complemented by a regionalized world order
and a strengthened global civil society, supported by a ‘normative architecture’ of
world order values, such as multiculturalism and multilateralism.
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The EU emphasis on interregionalism may in the longer run prove to be
important in the reconstruction of a multilateral world order in a regionalized form,
here called multiregionalism, meaning a horizontalized, institutionalized structure
formed by organized regions, linked to each other through multidimensional
partnership agreements. The EU’s ambition is to formalize these as relations
between regional bodies rather than as bilateral contacts between countries; but,
for pragmatic reasons, the forms of agreement show a bewildering variety. The
EU’s relations with the various geographical areas are furthermore influenced
by the ‘pillared approach’ in its own internal decision making, creating artificial
divisions between, for instance, foreign and development policy (Holland, 2002).
The development of the pattern has also been influenced over time by shifting
bilateral concerns among additional members: for example, the United Kingdom
and South Asia, Iberia and Latin America.
Even so, a multipolar system in which the EU constitutes the hub and driving
actor does already exist in an embryonic form. The partnership between the EU and
ASEAN is a prominent example of a formal interregional relationship. Relations
between the EU and Mercosur and between the EU and the grouping of African,
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries further extend the global web that has the
EU at its centre.
There is thus a clear pattern in the EU’s external policy, namely, to shape the world
order in accordance with Europe’s (more recent) experience of solving conflicts
through respect for ‘the other’, dialogue, multilateralism based on international
law, and institutionalized relations. Thus Europe is referred to as a ‘civilian power’
(Telò, 2006). This can also, more critically, be called ‘soft imperialism’ since,
despite fine diplomacy, it is often felt as an imposition in other parts of the world
(Hettne and Söderbaum, 2005). The policy varies along widening circles from
integration (making certain neighbours EU members), to stabilization (by entering
privileged partnerships with the ‘near abroad’), bilateral agreements with important
great or middle powers and partnership agreements with other regions. These four
foreign policy relations lead to four types of counterparts: prospective members,
neighbors, great powers, and more far away regions.
Enlargement policy covers acceding countries (Bulgaria and Romania),
candidate countries (Turkey and Croatia) and potential candidate countries in
the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro).
5
The enlargements have either
concerned well integrated European countries, whose entry for various reasons
were delayed, or ‘southern’ less developed countries to be integrated into the
European mainstream, mainly for security reasons.
The European neighbourhood policy (ENP) offers a privileged relationship
with the EU’s neighbours (distinct from integration/enlargement).
6
A crucial
component of the ENP is the commitment to promote democratization and human
rights in combination with the principles of good governance, rule of law, market
economy and sustainable development. The ‘near abroad’ of the EU and Russia
coincides to a large degree. The neighbourhood plays a most important role in the
EU’s more coherent and comprehensive security strategy (Charillon, 2004). The
Barcelona process is a strategy of cooperation between the EU and its Mediterranean
Interregionalism and World Order: The Diverging EU and US models 115
neighbours (Euro–Med), where peace is the first priority, in accordance with the
basic concern for stability. Thus the general method involved in the foreign policy
towards Near Abroad is a soft form of imperialism (asymmetric partnership)
based on conditional ties; the prize ranging from assistance to full membership.
The success story is the transformation and integration of Central and Eastern
Europe, which in fact implied a large number of resolved and prevented conflicts.
For countries not supposed to become a member the policy is a rather weak way
of influencing the external world. Thus, actorness shifts from one context to
another.
The EU has also developed a series of bilateral relationships with the United
States, Russia, Canada, Mexico, China, Japan, India and South Africa. In some
cases this completes and in other cases it replaces genuine region-to-region links.
Among the bilateral partners the USA is the most powerful, in fact the challenges
and problems posed by its military superiority cannot be balanced and its imperial
policy influenced according to the old realist recipe: balance of power politics.
What remains is what has been called ‘soft balancing’, which can be seen as a
form of civil power, implying different kinds of non-violent resistance. This policy
was practiced by both small and big powers in connection with the Iraq war and
may increase in importance if the ‘imperial’ policies of the USA continue. During
the last decade interregional cooperation has become an increasingly important
component of the EU’s foreign policy relations, which is realized through a large
number of interregional arrangements especially with more far away counterparts
in Africa, Asia and Latin America, where the EU interests often clash with those
of the US, particularly in Latin America. In spite of massive contacts on the level
of civil society, the formal interregional transatlantic links (EU–NAFTA) are
institutionally weak or nonexistent, as was discussed in section 1.
In the Middle East, where the US is predominant there has been an opening for
the EU in the Gulf area ( with The Gulf Cooperation Council – GCC) in the last
couple of years. The Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle
East was adopted in 2004 bringing all relationships with Middle Eastern states
under one umbrella.
7
The EU relations to ACP (Countries of Africa, Caribbean and the Pacific)
are rooted in colonial and neocolonial relations, which now, as for instance in
the Cotonou agreement (June 2000), are described in more symmetric terms, as
‘partnerships’. The background to this is the gradual abandoning of the ‘pyramid
of privilege’ implied in the Yaoundé-Lomé-framework that since the mid-1960s
defined the relationship between the EU and peripheral regions, originally
selectively favoured in accordance with former colonial interests. ACP is not a
regional organization. The EU is therefore trying to encourage cooperation within
the three constituent regions, stressing as an article of faith that regional integration
is the best development strategy (see the contribution by Fredrik Söderbaum).
In its cooperation policy with Africa, the EU has always paid special attention to
regional integration and cooperation. The main reason for this is its own character
as a regional body with a relatively long and successful experience. This implies
that it has a unique expertise as regards the technical and practical aspects of
regional integration.
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6 Unilateralism as world order: Pax Americana?
Before 9/11 one could still discuss several alternative world orders (Hettne and
Odén, 2002). After the terrorist action there seemed to be fewer alternatives;
there was a clear trend towards one distinct world order model: Pax Americana.
This order, now in retreat, was unilateral rather than multilateral or regional, and
unipolar rather than multipolar. However, we do not know how stable and durable a
new order will be. Unilateralism is particularly provocative and, arguably, therefore
inherently unstable.
Regionalism, implying a multipolar world order structure, as preferred by the
EU, is unacceptable to the United States, which, furthermore, has made it very
clear that multilateralism, although desirable, has its limitations set by the USA’s
own security interests. This is wholly in line with the traditional realist security
doctrine and therefore not new. The US has always applied multilateralist policies
and solutions only to the extent that they coincided with ‘the national interest’ and
this interest must first of all, according to the doctrine, be backed up with hard
power. According to Chalmers Johnson ‘a vast network of military bases on every
continent except Antarctica actually constitutes a new form of empire (Johnson,
2004: 1). However, the foreign policy of the Bush administration went beyond
classical realism (type Kissinger or Brzezinski) towards reinforcing what the
neoconservative think-tank, the Project for the New American Century, described
as ‘a policy of military strength and moral clarity’ (inspired by Ronald Reagan).
This formulation captures the essence of neo-conservatism: military strength and
willingness to use it, and a moral mission to change the world in accordance with
American values, first of all liberty. The opportunity, ‘the unipolar moment’, came
after the end of the Cold War and this thinking is thus older than 9/11. The concept
was coined by American publicist Charles Krauthammer (1991–92) and stood for
the US policy of taking advantage of its military superiority by shaping the world
order in accordance with the US national interest. Later the concept became ‘the
unipolar era’, expressing the confidence of the neoconservatives.
The ‘war’ against terrorism came in a number of cases to mean a strengthening
of the state and the military. The violent polarization between regimes that, from a
democratic viewpoint, are dubious, and their more or less fundamentalist opponents,
created the premises for a further proliferation of terrorism. The multilateralist
world order, as distinct from what might be expected of a loose and temporary
alliance (ad hoc multilateralism), must grapple with these structural conditions in
a more systematic way. It must also be built on political pluralism, a co-existence
between civilizations instead of ‘the clash of civilizations’. To achieve this will
require much time, patience and resources. The alternative is a repressive world
order which breeds terrorism with different faces in different regions. This will also
impact on the role of regional institutions.
To my mind, it is wrong to call the present world order ‘unipolar’, since the
remaining superpower has to fill the power vacuum created by the collapse of the
other. As shown in Iraq, there is no automatism involved. Furthermore, to dub
this ideological structure ‘neo-conservatism’ is hardly an appropriate description of
what seems rather to be a militant revolutionary doctrine, rejecting the multilateral
Interregionalism and World Order: The Diverging EU and US models 117
world order model and the role of the UN as the protector of this order. Neo-
conservatism, or ‘militant libertarianism’, and isolationism, however different
these typically American doctrines may seem, are both sceptical to subsuming
national interests to international cooperation and collective security and constitute
different expressions of the specificity (the ‘exceptionalism’) of the USA as the
home of a ‘chosen people’.
The foreign policy of President Bush has been discussed in terms of ‘imperialism’
based on domination, whereas the Clinton administration is seen as less overtly
imperialist, more hegemonic (Lieven, 2004). The concept of imperialism has been
used academically, pejoratively and positively by different people. Some are also
warning against reviving the concept (Telò, 2006). A minimum academic definition
of imperialism should to my mind contain a unilateralist, exploitative, coercive
and systematic (the sustainability problem) relationship with the external world,
seen as an object for political and military action by a great power (designed by
its political class). Yet most analysts in the new literature on imperialism question
the dimension of sustainability and point to the problem of overstretch (Kennedy,
1987; Burbach and Tarbell, 2004; Falk, 2005).
Before 9/11 the unipolar moment was just one ideological current within the
USA. From the US point of view, the question of multilateralism revolved around
a realistic balancing between legality and effectiveness, and priority was always
given to the latter. Unilateralism maintained the upper hand. This has also marked
the US approach to regionalism, which has always been subordinated to the
national interest. This is clear, for instance in the cases of NAFTA and APEC and
the latter’s support for regional cooperation in Southeast Asia. All can be explained
by specific, perceived national interests: NAFTA was a globalist policy, APEC
an instrument for hegemonic control in Asia-Pacific, and support for regional
cooperation in Southeast Asia a part of the anti-terrorist struggle. Thus, the US has
‘resigned itself to regionalism’ (Telò, 2006:129) in spite of its scepticism in order to
promote national interests such as an open trading system or geopolitical control.
The interregionalism of the EU is certainly also interest-driven. But in this
case there is no unitary national interest, but rather a collective, negotiated interest
based on the European integration experience. In what follows we shall look into
the competitive relationship in various regional contexts.
7 US and EU regional encounters
As we have seen the EU and the US approaches to regionalism differ a lot, something
which also explains the bewildering status of global regionalism. Looking at the
existing patchwork of trans-and interregional agreements there is so far, in terms
of structural outcome, no clear picture on the horizon. Transregional arrangements
are in principal voluntary and cooperative. They are also very diverse and difficult
to categorize. Few are interregional in the proper sense of the word, some relations
are transregional, some bilateral (hybrid relations between a regional organization
and a great power). That the EU constitutes the hub of interregional arrangements
is in full accordance with its regionalist ideology, encompassing not only trade and