
22. , P , Q
23. , P [.2 .4 .4], Q
24. , P [.2 .4 .4], Q
In Exercises 25–28, find the optimal strategies, P and Q,
for the row player and the column player, respectively.
Also compute the expected payoff E of each matrix game
if the row and column players adopt their optimal strate-
gies and determine which player it favors, if any.
25. 26.
27. 28.
29. P
RICING
P
RODUCTS
Two competing music stores, Disco-
Mart and Stereo World, each have the option of selling a
certain popular compact disc (CD) label at a price of either
c
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$7/CD or $8/CD. If both sell the label at the same price,
they are each expected to get 50% of the business. If Dis-
coMart sells the label at $7/CD and Stereo World sells the
label at $8/CD, DiscoMart is expected to get 70% of the
business; if DiscoMart sells the label at $8/CD and Stereo
World sells the label at $7/CD, DiscoMart is expected to
get 40% of the business.
a. Represent this information in the form of a payoff
matrix.
b. Determine the optimal price that each company should
sell the CD label for to ensure that it captures the largest
possible expected market share.
30. M
AXIMIZING
P
RODUCTION
The management of a division of
National Motor Corporation that produces compact and
subcompact cars has estimated that the quantity demanded
of their compact models is 1500 units/week if the price
of oil increases at a higher than normal rate, whereas
the quantity demanded of their subcompact models is
2500 units/week under similar conditions. However, the
quantity demanded of their compact models and subcom-
pact models is 3000 units and 2000 units/week, respec-
tively, if the price of oil increases at a normal rate. Deter-
mine the percentages of compact and subcompact cars the
division should plan to manufacture to maximize the
expected number of cars demanded each week.
BEFORE MOVING ON . . . 535
Before Moving On . . .
CHAPTER 9
1. The transition matrix for a Markov process is
State
12
and the initial-state distribution vector is
Find X
2
.
2. Find the steady-state vector for the transition matrix
T
3. Compute the steady-state matrix of the absorbing stochas-
tic matrix
4. A two-person, zero-sum game is defined by the matrix
A
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d
c
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State 1
State 2
X
0
c
.3 .4
.7 .6
d
State 1
State 2
T
a. Show that the game is strictly determined and find the
saddle point for the game.
b. What is the optimal strategy for each player?
c. What is the value of the game? Does the game favor one
player over the other?
5. The payoff matrix for a certain game is
A
a. Find the expected payoff to the row player if the row
player R uses her maximin pure strategy and the column
player C uses his minimax pure strategy.
b. Find the expected payoff to the row player if R uses her
maximin strategy 40% of the time and chooses each of
the other two rows 30% of the time, while C chooses the
minimax strategy 60% of the time.
6. The payoff matrix for a certain game is
a. Find the optimal strategies, P and Q, for the row and
column players, respectively.
b. Find the expected payoff E of the game and determine
which player it favors, if any, if the row and column
players use their optimal strategies.
c
31
22
d
£
2 1
32
34
§
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