Suny R.G. (ed.) The Cambridge History of Russia, Volume 3: The Twentieth Century

Подождите немного. Документ загружается.

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

jonathan haslam

In an extraordinary outburst that echoed the unreal hopes of 1932–3, which

had also led to disaster, Stalin commented thus on Germany and the Allies:

‘We would not mind if they got into a good ﬁght and weakened one another,’

he said. ‘It would be no bad thing if the position of the richest capitalist Powers

(particularly England) was shattered at the hands of Germany. Hitler, without

understanding or wishing for this, is shattering and blowing up the capitalist

system.’ The implications for Comintern policy were clear. Before the war, a

contradistinction between Fascist and democratic regimes was correct. But, ‘At

a time of war between the imperialist Powers [it] would no longer be correct.

Distinguishing between Fascist and democratic capitalist countries has lost its

former signiﬁcance.’

Thus the role now ascribed to the Communist parties

in Europe and the United States was to oppose the war.

Nothing could have undermined their strenuous efforts to identify more

closely with the nation than this. From the time the instructions went out,

fraternal parties conducted a policy of defeatism that undermined the national

war effort and made it that much easier for Hitler to conquer the greater part

of the subcontinent. Anxious at the speed of the Wehrmacht progress, on

17 September Stalin invaded Poland in haste to meet the incoming German

troops. Large numbers of senior Polish ofﬁcers and other members of the

elite were captured; a substantial number were then ordered to be shot by

the Politburo on 5 March 1940.

Poland out of the way, Stalin moved to force

the Baltic states to heel and, with the signature of the Friendship Pact with

Berlin at the end of September he included Lithuania in with Latvia and Estonia

as new Soviet protectorates. The blunt refusal of Social Democratic Finland

to submit then resulted in war on 30 November, a conﬂict brought to an end

after great cost only in March 1940. And by then Hitler was on the way to the

total domination of Western Europe.

Stalin believed the Nazi–Soviet agreements had bought the Soviet govern-

ment time both to expand and to prepare against the eventuality of a German

attack. ‘A German attack is also possible’, he told the Letts. ‘For six years

German fascists and the communists cursed each other. Now an unexpected

turn took place; that happens in the course of history. But one cannot rely

upon it. We must be prepared in time. Others who were not ready paid the

price’.

But Stalin badly miscalculated the speed of the German advance and

43 Firsov, Komintern: opyt,p.21.

44 Excerpt from the minutes of the Politburo, 5 Mar. 1940: S. Stepashin et al. (ed.), Organy

Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti SSSR v Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voine – Sbornik dokumentov, vol.

i (Moscow: Kniga i biznes, 1995), doc. 71.

45 Report from Munters, 2 Oct. 1939: A Bilmanis (ed.), Latvian–Russian Relations: Documents

(Washington, D.C.: Latvian Delegation, 1944), p. 196.

656

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

Comintern and Soviet foreign policy, 1919–1941

failed to anticipate, as did most others, the rapid collapse of France. The key to

sustaining a balance against Germany was French survival. Stalin was caught

off guard because his own evaluation of both Britain and France seriously over-

estimated their power as against that of Germany. The reigning assessment

of the balance of forces suggested stalemate rather than the victory of the

Blitzkrieg.

On 9 April 1940 the Germans invaded Denmark and Norway. The Soviet

leadership were evidently bafﬂed by this unexpected turn of events. Voroshilov

spoke of the international situation being ‘extremely muddled’ and called for

vigilance.

Three days later, on 7 May the Soviet government re-established

the ranks of General and Admiral. On 10 May the Germans attacked Belgium

and the Netherlands. The only good news for the Russians was the resignation

of the hated Neville Chamberlain and the reassuring reappearance of Winston

Churchill, bent on defeating Hitler. On 14 May Holland surrendered and three

days later German troops were taking possession of Brussels. Soon British and

French forcesevacuated Norway, giving wayto German occupation on 10 June.

Now the French capital itself lay in imminent danger. Initially, in September

1939, the PCF was strongly instructed to oppose the war for fear that Britain

and France would win. Now it was instructed to sustain its opposition for fear

of offending the Germans. At the very last minute, on 10 June, Comintern

leaders Dimitrov and Manuil’skii sent a text drafted by the leaders of the PCF

to Stalin with a request for advice. The draft declaration, though loaded with

vituperative denunciation for the leaders of France, the capitalist system, the

leaders of the French Socialists and avoiding anymention of Germany (!), ended

with what effectively amounted to a call to arms to forestall ‘capitulation’.

For

good measure it was also sent to Molotov. Finally, on 13 June, permission came

through for acting upon it and the Comintern secretariat formally approved

the dispatch of appropriate instructions.

But on the following day German

troops entered Paris and on 15 June the secretariat reported that it would not

be appropriate to publish the declaration.

Reﬂecting the abysmal level of defeatism signalled after the surrender was

taken on 22 June, the egregious Jacques Duclos, leading the PCF on the ground

in Paris, then made moves parallel to the capitulationism of P

etain by attempt-

ing to secure Nazi co-operation for party publications and activities. Finally

Moscow took fright and issued orders to desist. But it does indicate just how

46 Izvestiia, 4 May 1940.

47 From the Comintern archives: N. Lebedeva and M. Narinskii (eds.), Komintern i vtoraia

mirovaia voina, vol. i (Moscow: Nauka, 1994), doc. 98.

48 Ibid., doc. 99. 49 Ibid., n. 1.p.358.

657

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

jonathan haslam

disoriented the entire international Communist movement had become in

the face of Moscow’s irresolution that the most important party in Western

Europe should have descended to such depths.

Stalin’s mind was, of course, elsewhere and in some degree of panic. In mid-

Junehe wastalked into offeringan olive branchto Britain, much againsthis own

inclination. Andrew Rothstein, a leading Stalinist in the British Communist

Party, informed the Foreign Ofﬁce that the Russians wanted Prime Minister

Churchill to meet Ambassador Ivan Maiskii for a ‘frank discussion’. In passing

on this request, Rothstein confessed that the fall of France came as ‘something

of a surprise, even to the Moscow realists’. He also noted that the takeover

of the Baltic and the mobilisation of Soviet troops along the Polish frontier

would not please Berlin. The time was ripe, he concluded, for an improvement

in relations between London and Moscow.

But since Sir Stafford Cripps had

already been sent to Moscow to improve relations but had yet to see Stalin,

none of this really seemed at all convincing. Clearly something of a vacuum

had opened up in Moscow, and Stalin was procrastinating, as he often did

when faced with key decisions, allowing others to propose alternatives, until

events ﬁnally forced a decision upon him.

Meanwhile, as a precautionary measure Russian troops speedily occupied

the Baltic states from 17 to 21 June and on 26 June the Supreme Soviet prohib-

ited citizens from leaving their jobs, and imposed a seven-day working week

with an eight-hour working day. Then on 28–30 June Stalin took Bessarabia and

Northern Bukovina from Romania by force, eventually setting up the bastard

republic of Moldavia on 2 August. The Soviet Union now held the Baltic

and had a toe-hold in the Balkans, much to Hitler’s personal irritation (in

reaction on 5 August he issued the ﬁrst draft plan for the invasion of the Soviet

Union).

The key issue, however, was whether Britain would hold out when Opera-

tion Sea Lion was launched by Hitler for the invasion of the home islands on

16 July. An article by Eugene Varga, head of the Institute of Global Economics

and International Relations (IMEMO) caught the prevalent mood in Moscow:

We will not be so bold as to give a ﬁnal prognosis; but it seems to us that from

the point of view of purely military possibilities – with aid in only supplies

from the USA – England could still continue the war. However, the political

side to the question is decisive: is the English ruling class in actual fact deter-

mined to conduct the struggle to the end to win or perish?

50 G. Gorodetsky, Stafford Cripps’ Mission to Moscow, 1940–42 (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-

versity Press, 1984), p. 49.

658

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

Comintern and Soviet foreign policy, 1919–1941

Varga noted there were two camps in London – one for peace; the other for

war: ‘The scant information available to us now about what is going on in

England does not enable us to judge which of these two tendencies is the

stronger.’

Events answered that question when Churchill rebuffed Hitler’s

offer of negotiations. A further article that went to press on 24 October argued

that the United States would enter the war.

The Kremlin was thus deluded,

despite a raft of intelligence warnings, that it was safe while Britain remained

undefeated. Hitler had in Mein Kampf criticised his predecessors for ﬁghting

simultaneously on two fronts and gave every indication that he would not

repeat that fatal error. Furthermore, on returning from Moscow at the begin-

ning of January 1941 the Soviet military attach

e in Paris indicated that ‘it was

no longer believed in Moscow that the Axis Powers could deliver a deﬁnitive

victory against Great Britain. There is also scepticism of the possibility of a dev-

astating victory by Great Britain . . . The opinion most widespread in Moscow

is that the war must end in a compromise peace acceptable to the British

empire and limiting the advantages and the preponderance in Europe that the

Reich has conquered.’ The notion therefore was that the Soviet Union would

not intervene until peace negotiations opened and then it would do so with

military power to back up its position.

German disinformation conveyed to

agents in Berlin trusted by the Russians also played its part. One instance was

the dispatch from Berlin on 24 April indicating that the Germans had dropped

the idea of going against Russia and were going to focus on pushing the British

out of the Middle East.

German troops entered Romania on 12 October 1940 and on 28 October the

Italians invaded Greece. The Balkans were nowengulfed in war. Molotov’svisit

to Berlin on 12 November to sort out the state of relations with Hitler personally

gave the Russians the impression that the Germans were still committed to

the defeat of Britain. Yet little more than a month later, on 18 December,

Hitler signed Directive 21, Barbarossa, for the invasion of the Soviet Union.

But Moscow continued ﬁrmly in the belief that any talk of Germany aiming

to attack Russia was merely a smokescreen or an attempt to bluff the Kremlin

into conceding some of its territorial gains. And the more the British attempted

51 Mirovoe khoziaistvo i mirovaia politika 6 (1940).

52 Mirovoe khoziaistvo i mirovaia politika 9 (1940).

53 Report dated 3 June 1941: France, Minist

ere des Affaires Etrang

eres, Archives.S

erie Guerre

1939–1945, Vichy Europe. 834.URSS.

54 A. P. Belozerov et al. (eds.), Sekrety Gitlera na stole u Stalina – Razvedka i kontrrazvedka

o podgotovke germanskoi agressii protiv SSSR, mart–iiun 1941g: Dokumenty iz Tsentral’nogo

arkhiva FSB Rossii (Moscow: Mosgorarkhiv, 1995), pp. 35–7.

659

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

jonathan haslam

to persuade the Russians otherwise, the more ﬁrmly Stalin and Molotov clung

to that conclusion. The signing of a Neutrality Pact with Japan on 13 April also

indicated Soviet conﬁdence, because the Russians had turned down a non-

aggression pact that the Japanese had been seeking for over a year, evidently

believing that no such agreement (which would foreshorten the option of war

with Japan) was necessary.

The ﬂight to Britain of Hitler’s deputy Rudolf Hess made matters worse.

Prior to his arrival and in some desperation, British Ambassador Sir Stafford

Cripps recommended a strategy to London that ultimately proved disastrous,

because the Russians were reading his mail. His attempts to persuade Stalin

that a German invasion was inevitable had come to nothing. The only ‘counter-

weight’, he noted, ‘is the fear that we may conclude a separate peace on the

basis of a German withdrawal from occupied territories of Western Europe

and a free hand for Hitler in the East . . .’ ‘I realise of course’, he continued, ‘that

this is a most delicate matter to be handled through round about channels.

Nevertheless I consider it our most valuable card in a very difﬁcult hand and

I trust some means may be found of playing it. Soviet talent for acquiring

information through illicit channels might surely for once be turned to our

account.’

Hess arrived by plane in Scotland on 10 May. When news of his arrival

reached Moscow via Kim Philby, then spying for the Russians within the heart

of Whitehall, Stalin demanded to know what peace terms had accompanied

him. At the Foreign Ofﬁce Deputy Secretary Orme Sargent expressed the

‘wish we could get out of the Hess incident some material which Sir Stafford

Cripps could use on the Soviet Government’.

Philby, after some anxious

investigation, concluded that ‘now the time for peace negotiations has not yet

arrived, but in the process of the future development of the war Hess will

possibly become the centre of intrigues for the conclusion of a compromise

peace and will be useful for the peace party in England and for Hitler’.

Sargent

did not immediately recommend adoption of the Cripps proposal, but before

the end of Mayhe did recommend a variation of it, to be delivered as a ‘whisper’.

The line was ‘to give some assurance to the Soviet Government that they need

not buy off Germany with a new and unfavourable agreement because there

55 Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Threat,ch.6.

56 Cripps (Moscow) to London, 23 Apr. 1941: Foreign Ofﬁce Archives (Public Record Ofﬁce,

Kew): FO 371/29480.

57 Comment by Sargent dated 14 May 1941 on Cripps (Moscow) to London, 13 May 1941:

ibid., FO 371/29481.

58 From KGB archives: O. Tsarev, ‘Iz arkhivov KGB SSSR: Poslednii polet “chernoi

berty” ’, Trud, 13 May 1990.

660

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

Comintern and Soviet foreign policy, 1919–1941

is clear evidence that Germany does not intend to embark on a war with

the Soviet Union in present circumstances’.

Cripps’s proposal and Sargent’s

comments were precisely the conﬁrmation that Stalin needed to demonstrate

that all talk of a German invasion had been merely a British plot and that,

having found out that it no longer served its purpose, London had reversed its

line. Thus it was that on 22 June the Soviet government was caught unawares

when Hitler attacked. The full consequences of Stalin’s misjudgement were to

be felt for a long time to come. The tragedy went further than the massive loss

of life entailed. The very suspicions that had given rise to the mistake were

to multiply as the war proceeded and would lead to the very situation Neville

Chamberlain once feared and Churchill hoped would never come to pass:

the emergence of Soviet Russia as a mighty power determined to hold the

balance of Europe in its own hands. This was not the ﬁrst time and certainly not

the last when Western ignorance of the Soviet Union inadvertently combined

with deep-seated Russian suspicions to wreak havoc with a relationship that

had never been good.

59 Sargent’s comment of 30 May 1941 on Cripps (Moscow) to London, 27 May 1941: Public

Record Ofﬁce, FO 371/29481. The fact that these documents were not declassiﬁed under

the thirty-year rule but ﬁfty years later indicates that the usual excuse of ‘security’

is utter nonsense. These materials were retained evidently to save the Foreign Ofﬁce

embarrassment at such monumental incompetence.

661

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

Moscow’s foreign policy, 1945–2000:

identities, institutions and interests

ted hopf

‘A great power has no permanent friends, just permanent interests’, an oft-

heard aphorism about international politics, assumes these interests are obvi-

ous. In Britain’s case it was to prevent the domination of continental Europe.

For Great Powers in general, it has been to maintain a balance against emerg-

ing hegemonic threats, such as Napoleonic France, Hitler’s Germany or the

post-war Soviet Union.

Advising states to balance against power, the aphorism also warns against

treating other states as natural allies, as an enemy today might be a friend

tomorrow, as Britain found with the Soviet Union in June 1941. But aphorisms

are rarely more than half-truths. States’ interests are no more permanent than

their allies or enemies. Threats and interests are not obvious or objective.

There is nothing about French and British nuclear weapons that make them

objectively less threatening to the United States than Chinese warheads.

How, then, does a state become a threat? Realism tells us that power threat-

ens. No Great Power feels threatened by Togo. But power is only necessary,

not sufﬁcient, to threaten. Britain, the Soviet Union, the United States and

France did not balance against Hitler’s Germany before the Second World

War. Britain and France did not balance against the United States after the Sec-

ond World War. Britain, France, China and Russia have not balanced against

the United States since the end of the Cold War.

The meaning of power is not given; it is interpreted. Threats are the social

constructions of states. States construct threats both by interacting with other

states and their own societies.

For example, France could have learned that

Soviet power was more dangerous than Nazi Germany’s through its interac-

tions with Moscow. But France may have felt more threatened by the Soviet

Union than Germany because French understanding of itself as a bourgeois

1 For systemic constructivism, see Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

662

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

Moscow’s foreign policy, 1945–2000: identities, institutions and interests

liberal capitalist state made the Communist Soviet Union more dangerous

than Fascist Germany.

I explore Moscow’s relations with Eastern Europe, China, Western Europe,

the decolonising world and the United States (US) since 1945 from the perspec-

tive of Soviet and Russian identity relations with these states. Six different

identities have predominated in Moscow since the Second World War:

1945–7, Soviet Union as part of a Great Power condominium

1947–53, Soviet Union within capitalist encirclement

1953–6, Soviet Union as natural ally

1956–85, Soviet Union as the other superpower

1985–91, Soviet Union as normal Great Power in international society

1992–2000 Russia as European Great Power

Each of these identities has its roots in the relationship between the state and

society.

Post-war ambiguity, 1945–7

The re-establishment of an orthodox Stalinist identity for the Soviet Union

took only eighteen months. From September 1945 to June 1947 uncertainty

about Soviet identity was replaced by a strict binary: the New Soviet Man

(NSM) and its dangerous deviant Other. The NSM was an ultra-modern,

supranational, secular carrier of working-class consciousness. The formal dec-

laration of the triumph of orthodoxy over difference was Andrei Zhdanov’s

August 1946 speech declaiming authors who offered a ‘false, distorted depic-

tion of the Soviet people’, that is, who did not write as if the NSM was

reality.

Zhdanovshchina began with the closure of the literary journals Zvezda and

Leningrad and the expulsion of Anna Akhmatova and Mikhail Zoshchenko

from the Writers’ Union.

A connection was drawn between these deviations

and the imperialist threat to the existence of socialism. This was not a wholly

imagined danger. Reports from local Ministry of State Security (MGB) and

oblast committee (obkom) secretaries to their superiors in Moscow told of

widespread rumours among the peasantry that Britain and the United States

were threatening to use military force to coerce Stalin to disband collective

2 Leonid Mlechin, MID: Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del (Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2001),

p. 316. See also Aleksandr A. Danilov and Aleksandr V. Pyzhikov, Rozhdenie sverkhderzhavy:

SSSR v pervye poslevoennye gody (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2001).

663

ted hopf

farms.

Meanwhile, the US and Britain were providing military aid to anti-

Soviet guerrillas in Poland, Western Ukraine and the Baltic republics, and this

was known to Stalin.

The level of danger was tied to parlous economic conditions. As early as

September 1945, workers demonstrated at defence plants in the Urals and

Siberia. Crime, especially the theft of food, soared. Best estimates are that

100 million Soviets suffered from malnutrition in 1946–7, and 2 million died

of starvation from 1946 to 1948. There was no soap or winter clothing. Local

party committees cancelled the 7 November 1946 celebration of the Bolshevik

revolution, realising people would freeze to death without adequate clothing.

Stalinism itself was the primary institutional carrier of the NSM. All instru-

ments of the party and state both policed Soviet society for deviance and

saturated the public space with the dominant discourse. But a peculiar foreign

policy institution operated, too. Many post-war East European Communist

Party elites had spent the warin the Soviet Union and had formed close ties with

Soviet party elites. The latter had their favourites among these allies, and the

former curried favour in the Kremlin by energetically fulﬁlling Soviet wishes in

their own countries. Indeed, foreign Communists competed to demonstrate

their obedience. This relationship was an institutional route for Moscow’s

inﬂuence in Eastern Europe. East European Communist leaders, identiﬁed

with Moscow, were often hostage to Soviet elite politics; leadership manoeu-

vrings in the Kremlin reverberated throughout the alliance in Eastern Europe.

There was a certain ‘Frankenstein effect’ at work. Eastern European Com-

munists who had remained in Moscow had become more ‘orthodox than the

Patriarch’. Soviet leaders faced demands from their allies to support more

radical Stalinisation than Moscow itself was imagining. In May 1945 Finnish

Communists petitioned Moscow to make Finland a Soviet Republic! Zhdanov

replied by advising them to become a parliamentary party in coalition with

3 E. Iu. Zubkova, ‘Stalin i obshchestvennoe mnenie v SSSR, 1945–1953’, in I. V. Gaiduk, N. I.

Egorova and A. O. Chubar’ian (eds.), Stalinskoe desiatiletie kholodnoi voiny: Fakty i gipotezy

(Moscow: Nauka, 1999), pp. 152–62.

4 William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and his Era (New York: Norton, 2003), p. 197.

5 Elena Zubkova, Russia after the War (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), pp. 36–49. See

also Danilov and Pyzhikov, Rozhdenie sverkhderzhavy,pp.120–32.

6 For Poland, see I. S. Iazhborovskaia, ‘Vovlechenie Pol’shi v Stalinskuiu blokovuiu politiku:

problemy i metody davleniia na pol’skoe rukovodstvo, 1940-e gody’, in A. O. Chubar’ian

(ed.), Stalin i kholodnaia voina (Moscow: In-t vseobshchei istorii RAN, 1997), pp. 84–101.

On Germany, see Norman N. Naimark, The Russians in Germany (Cambridge, Mass.:

Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1995). See also G. P. Murashko and A. F.

Noskova, ‘Institut Sovetskikh sovetnikov v stranakh regiona: tseli, zadachi, rezul’taty’,

in T. V. Volokitina et al., Moskva i vostochnaia Evropa. Stanovlenie politicheskikh rezhimov

sovetskogo tipa (1949–1953). Ocherki istorii (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2002), pp. 645–9.

664

Moscow’s foreign policy, 1945–2000: identities, institutions and interests

others in Finland.

Soviet leaders reined in their allies. As Stalin told the Czech

leader Klement Gottwald in the summer of 1946, ‘the Red Army has already

paid the price for you. You can avoid establishing a dictatorship of the prole-

tariat of the Soviet type.’

Soviet foreign policy correlates with the evolution of Soviet identity at

home. An initial expectation of Great Power condominium rapidly gave way

to a binarised conﬂict with former allies. On 10 January 1944 Maksim Litvinov

and Ivan Maiskii gave Molotov a memorandum about the post-war world,

in which the world was divided largely between the United States and the

Soviet Union, the latter having indirect control over much of Europe.

Even

as late as November 1946, and from the Soviet leader most closely associated

with the division of the world into ‘two camps’, Zhdanov, there were calls for

maintenance of this coalition.

The partially pluralist domestic scene was reﬂected in Soviet views of the

imperialist world as differentiated.In Lenin’scontributionto international rela-

tions theory, ‘Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism’, wars among impe-

rialist powers are inevitable, since they will compete over global resources.

The Second World War apparently havingvalidatedthis theory, Stalin expected

differences between Britain and the US after the war, but he was disappointed

by British agreement to US policies on Turkey and Iran, and the Truman Doc-

trine, which assumed British obligations ‘east of Suez’. The Marshall Plan,

announced only three months after the Truman Doctrine was promulgated,

struck Stalin as an effective effort by the US to establish its hegemony over

all of Europe, hence muting any differences between Europe and the US, and

threatening Stalin’s more coercive forms of control. Just as Stalinist society

was becoming binarised, so too was international society.

Regimes which had been discouraged from Stalinising were now deemed

insufﬁciently ‘friendly’ to the Soviet Union. East European publics were turn-

ing against their Soviet occupiers and those they perceived as Moscow’s local

7 G. P. Murashko and A. F. Noskova, ‘Sovetskii faktor v poslevoennoi vostochnoi evrope

(1945–1948)’, in L. N. Nezhinskii (ed.), Sovetskaia vneshnaia politika v gody ‘Kholodnoi

Voiny’ (1945–1985) (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1995), p. 90.OnHungary,see

Volokitina, ‘Istochniki formirovaniia partiino-gosudarstvennoi nomenklatury – novogo

praviashchego sloia’, in Volokitina et al., Moskva i vostochnaia evropa,pp.103–38.

8 Ibid., p. 90. On Poland, see Volokitina, ‘Stalin i smena strategicheskogo kursa kremlia v

kontse 40-x godov’, in Gaiduk, Egorova and Chubar’ian, Stalinskoe desiatiletie,p.14. See

also Grant M. Adibekov, Kominform i poslevoennaia evropa (Moscow: Rossiia molodaia,

1994), p. 93 and Volokitina, ‘Nakanune: novye realii v mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniakh

na kontinente v kontse 40-x godovi otvet Moskvy’, in Volokitina et al., Moskvai vostochnaia

evropa,pp.36–8.

9 Volokitina, ‘Nakanune: novye realii’, p. 29.

10 Robert Tucker (ed.), The Lenin Anthology (New York: Norton, 1975).

665