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jonathan haslam
overheated and unrest manifest within the ranks of the Red Army, itself back-
ward technologically compared to the Great Powers, the last thing Stalin
wanted was a Communist attempt to seize power and, in so doing, unite the
wrath of the capitalist world in a furious, further and possibly final assault on
the debilitated Soviet Union.
14
Thus an extraordinary credibility gap emerged by the spring of 1930 between
bellicose Comintern propaganda about the imminence of war and revolution
and the flagrant timidity and conservatism of Stalin’s instructions to foreign
Communist parties. In both Germany and China word went out to desist
from grandiose and risky revolutionary adventures.
15
On the diplomatic front
this cautious approach was matched by Commissar Maksim Litvinov, who
had de facto control over the Narkomindel since 1928 before supplanting
his ailing and querulous boss, Georgii Chicherin, in the summer of 1930.
The Litvinov line met Stalin’s needs to a tee. It meant following the line
Lenin had chosen in the spring of 1922 for the Soviet delegation to the Genoa
conference, designed to win over the pacifist bourgeoisie of the West with
high-flown talk of increased trade, world peace and general and complete
disarmament; a charade, perhaps, but a proven and effective smokescreen
which required a continued Soviet presence at international conferences –
mostly boring Geneva, where Litvinov indulged himself spinning out the
empty hours in the evenings watching Westerns at the cinema.
16
Fear of France eclipses the real danger
France was, of course, the power most set against disarmament, haunted by
fear of a German revival. But it was also an imperial power overseas of some
magnitude, and lines of communication were stretched to the limit. Since
the 1920s, when it led in the losses from nationalisation by the Bolsheviks
of all private property in Russia, France had chafed at irksome but contain-
able Comintern support for troublesome tribes in North Africa. It had been
obliged to follow Britain and Germany in recognising the Soviet regime. Sen-
timent hardened, however, when, in the spring of 1930, a nationalist revolt of
major proportions took hold in Indochina, in which the young Ho Chi Minh’s
Communist group came to play a role disproportionate to its minuscule size.
Paris, on very little evidence but the principle of cui bono, immediately blamed
14 Carr, Twilight, ch. 1. 15 Ibid., ch. 1.
16 See Jonathan Haslam, Soviet Foreign Policy 1930–33: The Impact of the Depression (London:
Macmillan, 1983).
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Moscow and launched a European-wide campaign to renew the economic
blockade of Russia ended by the British in March 1921.
17
In the bleak circumstances of the Great Depression, with industrialised pow-
ers now looking anxiously to capture the few lucrative markets that remained
and with the Russians favouringGermany, Sweden,Italy, Britain and the United
States with sizeable orders for capital goods, the French stood alone (except for
its powerless little allies along the Danube who competed with Moscow on the
falling world grain market). Yet, because the Russians still lacked an efficient
foreign intelligence service, French hostility came to be magnified out of all
proportion to its true effectiveness. And a further factor intervened to com-
pound Soviet anxieties when, on 18 September 1931, Imperial Japan launched
its occupation of Manchuria, overran Soviet-owned railroads and raced to the
Soviet border with a view to another excursion at Russian expense. Word soon
leaked to the press that the French expressed the wish to the Japanese that
they now go north (to Russia) rather than south (to Indochina). The Japanese
also reinforced existing military and intelligence links with Finland, Poland
and Afghanistan, in an attempt at encirclement of the USSR. Soviet efforts
to counteract this met stiff resistance in Washington, where the Republican
administration under Hoover stubbornly sought recompense for property
appropriated by Lenin in 1918 and had no incentive to appease the Russians
while they bought US manufactures anyway. And the British, economically
holed beneath the waterline and with a navy of doubtful morale, shied away
from confrontation with warlike Japan. Worse still, the Red Army in the Far
East deterred no one, a fleet had yet to be put together and the single-tracked
Trans-Siberian Railway gave little promise of rapid reinforcement in time of
war. The need to rearm speedily in the East placed a new burden on a strained
economy and the need to stockpile food for war in Siberia further exacerbated
the acute shortage of grain that had opened up with famine in the summer of
1932.
18
Rather than risk allowing the KPD to launch an abortive revolution in
Germany, which was sure to fail if merely for the fact that the stooges Stalin
had emplaced were better known for unthinking obedience than strategic
initiative, Stalin instead chose to encourage German nationalism as the best
means of distracting the French. Hitler was seen here, as elsewhere in Europe,
to be just another German nationalist. No attempt was therefore made to
curb the natural antipathy of the KPD towards long resented ‘social Fascists’
(the socialists of the SPD), whereas any attempt to open a channel towards
17 Ibid., chs. 4 and 5. 18 Ibid., ch. 8.
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them in the name of a still greater threat (the Nazis) was sat upon firmly.
19
The
Comintern thus resumed its role as a passive conveyor belt for the furthering
of Soviet state interests – as interpreted by Stalin and, in this instance and every
other with respect to German matters, by his closest colleague, chairman of
the Council of People’s Commissars and overseer of the Comintern, the dour
and taciturn Viacheslav Molotov.
Throughout, Stalin did receive contrary advice. It was at the time reported
that Litvinov, who regarded Molotov as a fool, warned of Hitler as a serious and
hostile forceto be reckoned with; but he was undermined byhis deputy, Nikolai
Krestinskii, who had behind him nearly a decade of success as ambassador
in Berlin.
20
Krestinskii confirmed Stalin and Molotov in their complacency.
From the unthinking Left in the Comintern, the head of the sector dealing
with Germany, Knorin, took a position akin to ‘the worse the better’, since
revolution needed to break the fetters of constitutionalism, to which the work-
ing class had apparently become wedded. Hitler was in this deluded image a
bulldozer with the KPD at the wheel. Were not most Nazi Party members
former members of the KPD? The thinking Left, represented by Trotsky in
exile, argued very differently and essentially took Litvinov’s position. The fact
that both Trotsky and Litvinov were Jewish undoubtedly heightened their
powers of perception of an anti-Semite like Hitler. But Trotsky’s advocacy –
which was closely monitored at great distance in the Kremlin – doubtless also
confirmed Stalin in his stubborn resistance to such views.
Salvation too late
From Moscow’s vantage point, backing German nationalism was a low-cost
policy. Hitler’s arrival in power at the end of January 1933 did not occasion
an abrupt change of line. Instead the Russians assumed a policy of watchful
waiting. At the Comintern the prevailing view was ably expressed by Osip
Piatnitskii in a letter to Stalin, Molotov and Kaganovich on 20 March. Piatnit-
skii carried some weight as head of the international communications section
of the Comintern – basically the intelligence section which worked hand in
glove with the OGPU – and as a member of the presidium of the Com-
intern executive committee (IKKI). He reasserted the current myth that in
Germany ‘the revolutionary crisis is fast developing’ and that it would, under
Hitler, gather speed and that therefore the resistance of the masses could not
but develop. ‘The establishment of an open Fascist dictatorship,’ he wrote,
19 Carr, Twilight,chs.3–4. 20 Haslam, Soviet Foreign Policy,pp.67–8.
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‘dispelling all democratic illusions among the masses and freeing the masses
from the influence of Social Democracy, will speed up the pace of develop-
ment of Germany towards a proletarian revolution.’
21
This bizarre misreading
was commonplace in Moscow at the time and was sustained even after the
successful persecution of the KPD and simultaneous harassment of the mass
of Soviet trade and diplomatic employees in Germany took on alarming pro-
portions. By summer the KPD had been suppressed with extraordinary ease
and rapidity. Meanwhile in Moscow uneasy inertia began to give way to a
more resolute position, though not all illusions – including those of Molotov –
were extinguished as late as 1941.
22
Pressure was building, however, from within Comintern ranks for a change
of line. At the head of the British party, Harry Pollitt called for the Comintern
presidium to discuss the situation in Germany and the united front strategy
(then non-existent). Piatnitskii carefully separated the two, even though they
were indissolubly linked in Pollitt’s mind and in the minds of others unhappy at
the recent course of events.
23
A straw in the wind was the failure of Piatnitskii –
then effectively running the Comintern – to prompt what remained of Com-
munist supporters in Germany to have Moscow agree to boycotting the
referendum forthcoming in Germany that autumn.
24
At the level of interstate relations Litvinov fought for a policy based on the
assumption that Hitler posed a fundamental threat to the peace of Europe,
since, on this view, a war begun anywhere on the subcontinent was destined
to spread. Therefore the new Germany had to be contained by a system of
alliances – what, in effect, had heretofore been the policy of the French that the
Russians had always condemned. France was by now courting the Russians for
an alliance premissed on the USSR’s entry into the League of Nations in order
to appease French allies in Eastern Europe, the so-called Little Entente: Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania. Within the Comintern calls for a
united riposte to German Fascism had begun to have some impact in Moscow,
but dogma as well as the refusal to believe the German revolution was well
and truly dead held up progress. And if France had turned to Russia for help,
was not reliance on German nationalism paying off? The Leninist policy of
21 N. Komolova et al. (eds.), Komintern protiv fashizma: dokumenty (Moscow: Nauka, 1999),
doc. 77.
22 Jonathan Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Collective Security in Europe, 1933–39
(London: Macmillan, 1984).
23 Letter from Piatnitskii to Stalin and Molotov, 26 July 1933, in Anderson and Chubar’ian,
Komintern i ideia, doc. 82.
24 Observe the exchange of letters between Piatnitskii and Soviet leaders in late October:
ibid., docs. 83–6.
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exploiting contradictions between imperialist powers precluded alliances with
them since by definition imperialism meant war. Within the rank and file of the
Bolshevik Party opposition to accepting French entreaties was pressed on this
basis. The issue came to turn on whether ideological principle or pragmatism
should predominate in determining the future course of policy. Domestically
ideology had triumphed, duly celebrated at the Seventeenth Party Congress
in January 1934, though at a bloody price. Stalin could therefore now afford to
accept a degree of ideological heresy abroad as well as at home, provided he
could be assured that the Left would not reassert itself and once more accuse
him of counter-revolution.
The Popular Front against Fascism
Whereas the united front of working-class parties against a common enemy
was well within Leninist doctrine, what came into being as the Popular Front
bore no relationship at all to Leninist doctrine. This was partly as a result
of accident. After his trial in Leipzig for setting fire to the Reichstag, which
Dimitrov successfully exposed as a charade, the Bulgarian militant was evac-
uated to Moscow at Soviet behest. Here he used immediate access to Stalin to
make the case for dropping the suicidal policy of opposing Social Democracy
and for returning to the united front policy dropped in 1928, on the grounds
that Fascism was a real danger to one and all. Having agreed to adopt the Litvi-
nov line on collective security, it made little sense for the Kremlin to sustain
a Comintern policy so at odds with common sense. Stalin moved cautiously,
however, and only gave Dimitrov, now general secretary of the Comintern,
freedom to experiment before any policy was finalised by a full Congress. In
the teeth of resolute opposition from others within the Comintern apparat –
head of the German section Knorin was still prattling on about ‘The beginning
of the crisis of German Fascism’
25
– and most probably also fundamentalists
such as Molotov, who tended to a dogmatic vision on foreign affairs, Dimitrov
began to loosen the reins and finally, in the summer of 1934, allowed member
parties to open contacts with socialist parties along the lines of an anti-Fascist
united front.
26
25 Speech, 9 July 1934: ibid., doc. 90.
26 See Jonathan Haslam, ‘The Comintern and the Origins of the Popular Front, 1934–
1935’, Historical Journal 22, 3 (1979): 673–91. For the core document on this new strategy,
see Anderson and Chubar’ian Komintern i ideia, doc. 89. This can now also be read
in English, with Stalin’s comments inserted: A. Dallin and F. Firsov (eds.), Dimitrov &
Stalin 1934–1943: Letters from the Soviet Archives (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000),
doc. 1.
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France was on the front line against Fascism in 1934. The Great Depression
hit France late but with as much force as elsewhere. Thus the French political
system began to destabilise just as German power was effectively resurrected
under Hitler. The initial testing ground for the united front was thus effectively
France. Here, however, revolutionary tradition reached back much further
than 1917; echoes of 1789, 1830, 1848 and, not least, 1871 still resounded through
the capital. Complications lay in the fact that France was also the natural ally
of Russia against any German plans for European conquest. How could the
governing classes of France be expected to ally with a revolutionary power
when they themselves so feared revolution at home from the very people in
receipt of continual advice and subsidy from Moscow? The only hope lay in
persuading Stalin that it was in Soviet interests not only to ally with France
against Germany but also to nullify the effectiveness of the PCF in the domestic
arena. The trouble was that Stalin trusted no one, and the PCF was so anti-
military, because the French military was so anti-revolutionary, that this circle
could not easily be squared.
It wassurelybecause of the potential of France as an allythat Stalin permitted
the PCF to go far beyond Comintern orthodoxy in declaring not merely for
a united front of workers’ parties against Fascism, but also a united front of
all parties against Fascism: the so-called Front Populaire, declared by Maurice
Thorez on 24 October 1934 at Nantes. Acting for the Comintern the Italian
party leader Palmiro Togliatti and other comrades had tried to dissuade Thorez
from delivering the speech, but to no avail.
27
In Moscow Thorez’s call for
unity with not only peasant parties but also, implicitly, the Roman Catholic
Church and bourgeois parties against the common enemy created uproar
within the Comintern. One of the most vigorous of several severe critics of
the Comintern’s new line was the Hungarian revolutionary, B
´
ela Kun: once
subject to Trotsky’s caustic wit after a particularly nasty ad hominem outburst in
the late 1920s – ‘la maniera di Bela, non
´
e una bella maniera’, quipped the leader
of the opposition. On 14 November 1934 Kun wrote a letter to members of the
Comintern political secretariat condemning Thorez’s position. He objected
to the absence from Thorez’s statements of any reference to the dictatorship
of the proletariat and all power to the soviets in France. ‘I once again point out
the danger that the PCF is misrepresenting united front tactics. Turning them
into a vulgar [coalition] policy, and I propose that such misrepresentation of
the tactics of the united front be immediately refuted by a detailed rebuttal.’
28
27 Haslam, ‘The Comintern and the Origins’, pp. 688–9.
28 Letter to the political secretariat of the Comintern executive committee, 14 Nov. 1934:
Anderson and Chubar’ian Komintern i ideia, doc. 211.
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The fact that no such rebuttal was issued meant that Thorez read the runes
in Moscow better than Kun. And in late July 1935 the Seventh Congress of the
Comintern placed a firm seal of approval on the entire venture by generalising
it across the world movement.
The anti-Japanese front
The Popular Front against Fascism, as we have seen, had indigenous roots
and did not result merely from instructions issued in Moscow. The Anti-
Imperialist Front in the East, however, fits more closely the preconceived
pattern of Moscow dictating policy. Yet its implementation, at the hands of
Mao Zedung, actually meant that while the letter of policy was observed, the
spirit was broken with such consistency that the results Stalin desired – a solid
anti-Japanesefront–were never forthcoming. This mattered, because although
France had reluctantly agreed a mutual assistance pact, it precluded – at French
insistence – any undertaking with respect to the Far East. Moscow’s concern
was quite clearly lest the threat from the East joined the threat from the West.
And Stalin well knew that Poland and Finland both had military contacts with
Japan. The prospect of creating a firm united front on the ground in China
against the Japanese was therefore high priority as compensation for the lack
of alliances in the region to secure Siberia from Japanese attack. The most
Litvinov had been able to secure from the United States had been diplomatic
recognition (1933); any talk of an anti-Japanese alliance was firmly quashed
by President Roosevelt. The underlying contradiction in outlook between
Moscow and China remained, however: Stalin saw the best hope in a bourgeois
anti-imperialist China led by a coalition including a minority of Communists,
who had no immediate hope of a workers’ revolution in a peasant country;
Mao, undeterred by Moscow preferences and prejudices, and too distant for
any sustained exertion of Comintern discipline, was looking for a fully-fledged
Communist revolution via the peasantry.
The Japanese invasion of Manchuria from 18 September 1931 had long neces-
sitated the unification of resistance in victim China. But the CCP and the
Guomindang had long resisted any attempt to draw them back into alliance,
not least because of the disastrous experience of the 1920s. Moscow had one
major instrument at its disposal – the supply of munitions. The problem was
to ensure that these, sent to the Guomindang as the recognised government
of China, were used against Japan and not against the CCP. Only an opti-
mist could take a generous view of Chiang Kai-shek. From 1934 to 1935 the
Chinese Communists sought escape from encirclement and destruction by
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the Guomindang through a long march to the north-west of China, an area
distant from Chiang’s deadly reach and much closer to potential Soviet support
from Outer Mongolia. Not surprisingly, therefore, even Stalin’s pet Chinese
Communist Wang Ming (Chen Shaoyu) had held common cause with Dim-
itrov’s opponents and spoke at the Comintern Congress of Chiang as one of
the ‘traitors of the nation’ – not an encouraging indicator for the prospects of a
united front against Japanese imperialism.
29
Mao was still out of reach. Radio
contact was not re-established with Moscow until the onset of winter and
even then the CCP still lacked reliable codes for transmission. With the party
at Wayaobao in northern Shaanxi province, emissaries flew in from Moscow
with news of the Comintern Congress and its decisions.
30
When Chiang came shopping for arms from Moscow, the Russians insisted
that agreement must be reached with the Communists for an anti-Japanese
front.
31
The Comintern simultaneously now emphasised the need to include
Chiang in any united front.
32
But Mao held out against implementing the spirit
of the new line and this state of affairs continued even as the Soviet ambas-
sador to the Chiang regime pressed for what amounted to total subjugation of
the Chinese Communists to the Guomindang.
33
The signing of the German–
Japanese anti-Comintern pact on 25 November 1936, effectively an anti-Soviet
alliance, represented precisely the danger Moscow had long feared. Yet CCP
policy was to ‘force the Guomindang Nanzhing Government and its army
to take part in a war of resistance against Japan’.
34
The effective result that
December was Chiang’s kidnapping in Xian by warlord of Manchuria Zhang
Xueliang – then under the influence of pro-Communist advice. ‘Some com-
rades’, former CCP Politburo member Zhang Guotao later reported, ‘were
opposed to a peaceful settlement of the Incident.’
35
The urge on the part of the
Communists to do away with their hated enemy had to be restrained. ‘When
Chou En-lai first came to Sian’, Chang’s main adviser is quoted as having said,
‘he wanted a people’s assembly to try Chiang Kai-shek, but a wire came from
the Comintern and Chou changed his mind’.
36
At Moscow’s insistence Chiang was permitted to negotiate his freedom,
having made some concession to the need for a united front. These conces-
sions remained mere verbiage, however, until 7 July 1937 when the Japanese
finally embarked on all-out war across the face of China. Chiang Kai-shek
29 Jonathan Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Threat from the East, 1933–41 (London: Macmil-
lan, 1992), p. 59.
30 Ibid., p. 65. 31 Ibid., pp. 63–4. 32 Ibid., pp. 64–5.
33 Ibid., pp. 68–9. 34 Ibid., p. 78. 35 Ibid., p. 83.
36 This was heard by Nym Wales, wife of intrepid American journalist Edgar Snow.
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immediately pressed the Russians to come to his aid. Stalin was not in any
haste to oblige. The month before, in an act of supreme folly borne of deep-
seated insecurity, Stalin had the cream of his most senior officers shot, though
it is interesting that he avoided decapitating the Far Eastern army until later.
By the end of August, however, he was persuaded into conceding the Chinese
200 planes and 200 tanks on the basis of $500 million in credit. But getting
the equipment into China was no easy task. Planes came in via Xinjiang and
Outer Mongolia. Otherwise armaments had to come by sea until the French
closed the routes through Indochina, or via a perilous 3,000-mile journey to
Lanzhou by road from the end of the Turksib railway.
37
Thus between 1937 and
1941 Chiang received a total of 904 planes, nearly half of which were bombers,
but only 82 tanks and a mass of automobiles, heavy and light arms, plus thou-
sands of bombs and some 2 million shells.
38
In May 1938 Deputy Commissar
Vladimir Potemkin told the French ambassador that the Soviet government
was ‘counting on resistance by this country for several years, after which Japan
will be too enfeebled to be capable of attacking the USSR’.
39
In fact more was needed. Collisions between the Red Army and Japanese
forces in the summer of that year showed worrying weaknesses in Soviet
military capabilities. And not until September 1939 did the Russians, in this case
under the command of the ruthless and efficient Georgii Zhukov, overwhelm
the Japanese and teach them a lesson they would not soon forget – at the Battle
of Khalkhin-Gol on the frontiers of Mongolia. But more important still was
the fact that the Russians had retreated from the emerging war in Europe. The
Nazi–Soviet pact, to which Hitler had agreed without consulting Japan, came
as a grievous blow to Japanese aspirations of forcing the Russians to fight a
two-front war. This failure of co-ordination between East and West was vital
to Soviet survival, not only between 1939 and 1941, but even more after Hitler
decided on war with Russia.
The Popular Front collapses, 1939
The Popular Front strategy, along with its siamese twin Collective Security,
could last only as long as it served Stalin’s purpose. The failure to form an
effective ring around Nazi Germany highlighted the need to come to terms
and drop the distinction hard won by Litvinov between democratic and non-
democratic capitalist states. The brutal manner in which the Soviet Union was
deliberately kept out of the solution to the crisis over Czechoslovakia by Prime
37 Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Threat,pp.92–3. 38 Ibid., p. 94. 39 Ibid., p. 94.
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Minister Neville Chamberlain in September 1938 marked the low point of trust
between Moscow and the democracies. Similarly the collapse of Soviet efforts
to sustain the Popular Front government in Spain, which received substantial
military aid in both men and munitions despite adverse logistical difficulties,
spelt the collapse of a policy intended to contain Fascism by other means.
No longer would Moscow act to preserve the territorial status quo in Europe
created by the Versailles Treaty system. As late as 9 July 1939 Stalin told Chiang
Kai-shek that a ‘satisfactory result’ was not impossible in the negotiations with
Britain and France.
40
But Stalin’s price was the de facto reabsorption of the
Baltic states as protectorates, with a fate not much different for Poland, and
that meant the expansion of Soviet power to the West, something Chamberlain
feared even more than the Germans. Impatient at the lack of seriousness with
which the British approached alliance negotiations with the Soviet Union and
ever suspicious that these negotiations were merely there to enhance London’s
bargaining power vis-
`
a-vis Germany, Stalin cut his losses and signed up with
Hitler.
The Nazi–Soviet Non-Aggression Pact signed on 23–4 August 1939 con-
tained within it a secret protocol allowing for the partition of Poland and the
Baltic states. This was a tragedy for the victim states. More important for
the fate of the world, however, were the assumptions underlying the agree-
ment, which Litvinov, for one – forced into premature retirement in May –
considered entirely misconceived. Overestimating British and French power
and underestimating that of the Germans, Stalin saw the pact as a means of
throwing the entire capitalist world into confusion, from which the Soviet
Union would draw unilateral long-term advantage, extending its territory and
expanding the reach of socialism at one stroke. ‘The extinction of this state
[Poland]’, Stalin said, ‘in current conditions would mean one bourgeois Fascist
state less! What would be so bad about extending the socialist system to new
territories and populations as a result of the defeat of Poland.’
41
Indeed, Stalin’s
acts attracted unwanted and backhanded congratulations from Leon Trotsky
in his place of exile. He unflatteringly compared the role of Stalin to that of
Napoleon: though exterminating the revolution at home, he was obliged to
spread it abroad.
42
40 Chiang Kai-shek, A Summing-up at Seventy: Soviet Russia in China (London: Harrap, 1957),
p. 89.
41 F. Firsov, ‘Komintern: opyt, traditsii, uroki – nereshennye zadachi issledovaniia’, in
Komintern: opyt, traditsii, uroki. Materialy nauchnoi konferentsii, posviashchennoi 70-letiiu
Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala (Moscow: Nauka, 1989), pp. 21–2.
42 ‘SSSR v Voine’, Biulleten’ Oppozitsii (25 Sept. 1939): 79–80.
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