Strouthes D.P. Law and Politics: A Cross-Cultural Encyclopedia

CONSTITUTION

37. The

President with

a

majority

of the Ex-

ecutive Council shall exercise

the

right

of

mercy

in all

criminal sentences.

38.

The

President

with

the

consent

of the

Volksraad

declares

war and

makes peace.

39.

The

President shall

be

able

to

make con-

ventions, subject

to the

consent

of the

Volksraad.

40. The

President shall

not be

able

to

make

any

treaty without consent

of the

Volksraad.

41.

The

President,

or any

member

of the Ex-

ecutive

Council, shall have

the

right

at all

times

to

inspect

the

state

of the

finances,

as

also,

the

books

of the

officials.

CHAPTER

VI.—EXECUTIVE

COUNCIL.

42.

There

shall

be an

Executive Council, con-

sisting

of the

Landrost

of the

capital,

the

Sec-

retary

of the

Government,

and

three

unofficial

members,

chosen

by the

Volksraad,

to

assist

the

President with advice

and

assistance.

The

President shall

be the

Chairman,

and

have

a

decisive vote.

43. The

Executive Council shall hold

session

on

the

second Monday

of

each second month,

and

at

such other times

as the

President

may

desire.

44.

The

Executive Council shall

be

bound

to

make

a

yearly report

of its

transactions

to the

Volksraad.

45.

A

maj

oriry

of the

Executive Council shall

have

the

right

to

summon

an

extraordinary

meeting

of the

Volksraad.

46. The

President

and the

Executive Council

shall

have

the

power

of

declaring martial law.

CHAPTER

VII.—THE

JUDICIAL

POWER.

47. The

Landrost holds

the

power

of

civil

commissioner

and

resident magistrate.

48.

The

judicial power

is

exclusively exercised

by

the

courts

of

law, which

are

established

by

the

law.

49.

Legislation also regulates

the

administra-

tion

of

criminal justice,

as

also

that

in

police

cases,

always understanding, however,

that

criminal cases brought

in the

first

instance

before

the

Higher

Courts

are

judged

by a

jury.

CHAPTER

VIIL—THE

MILITARY

SYSTEM.

50. The

Field-cornets shall

be

chosen

by and

out of the

burghers

of

their wards.

51.

A

Field-commandant shall

be

chosen

for

each

district,

by and out of the

burghers

of

the

same.

52. The

assembled Field-commandants

and

Field-cornets

who are

united

on a

commando

shall choose

from

amongst themselves,

in

case

of

war, their

own

Commandant-general,

which General must then receive

his

instruc-

tions

from

the

President.

53. The

assembled Field-commandants

and

Field-cornets have

the

right, during

the

course

of the

war, when they have just

cause

for so

doing,

to

discharge

the

Commandant-general

who had

been chosen

by

them,

and to

appoint

another, they being bound

in

that

case

to

give

notice

to the

President thereof,

who on

receipt

of

such announcement,

and on

finding

the as-

signment reasons well founded,

fixes

the day

on

which

a new

election shall take place.

54.

After

the war

there exists

no

longer

any

Commandant-general

as

such.

55. The

Field-cornets

must

be

resident

in

their

own

wards

and

possess

property therein.

5

6.

The

Field-commandants must

be

resident

of

their

own

districts, possess

fixed

property

to the

amount

of

£200,

and

have lived

one

year

in

the

country.

CHAPTER

IX.—MISCELLANEOUS

SUBJECTS.

57. The

Roman-Dutch

law

shall

be the

57

CONTRACT

principal

law of

this State, where

no

other

law

has

been made

by the

Volksraad.

5

8.

The

law

is for all

alike, always understand-

ing

that

the

judge shall exercise

all

laws with

impartiality

and

without respect

of

persons.

59.

Every inhabitant owes obedience

to the

law

and the

authorities.

60.

Right

of

property

is

guaranteed.

61.

Personal

freedom,

provisional

on

remain-

ing

within

the

limitations

of the

law,

is

guaranteed.

62. The

freedom

of

press

is

guaranteed

pro-

visionally

on

remaining within

the

law.

Morgan, Lewis Henry.

(1851)

League

oftheHo-

De'-No-Sau-Nee,

or

Iroquois.

Parker,

Arthur

Caswell.

(1968)

Parker

on the

Iroquois:

Iroquois

Uses

of

Maize

and

Other

Food

Plants,

the

Code

of

Handsome

Lake

y

the

Seneca

Prophet,

the

Constitution

of

the

Five

Nations.

Edited

by

William

N.

Fenton.

The

Political

Laws

of

the

South

African

Republic.

(1896) Translated

by W. A.

Macfadyen.

Rattray,

R. S.

(1969

[1911])

Ashanti

Law and

Constitution.

Tooker, Elisabeth.

(1978)

"The

League

of the

Iroquois:

Its

History, Politics,

and

Ritual."

In

Handbook

of

North

American

Indians.

Vol.

15,

Northeast,

edited

by

Bruce

G.

Trigger

and

William

Sturtevant,

418-441.

CONTRACT

A

contract

is a

legally

recognized promise,

the

terms

of

which

are

pro-

tected

by the

possibility

of

legal remedy

if

they

are

not

fulfilled.

In

order

for a

contract

to be

valid,

it

must

be

mutually agreed upon

by the

contracting parties; that

is, one

person cannot

force

another person

to

abide

by the

terms

of a

contract

if

that

second person does

not

wish

to

enter into

the

contract. Further,

the

contracting

parties

must

be

legally able

to

enter into

a

con-

tract; thus,

in

most societies,

a

child

is not

able

to

enter into

a

legally binding contract because

he or she is not

considered mature enough

to be

able

to

distinguish contracts

that

are to his or

her

advantage

and

those that

are

not.

Traditionally,

the

Tswana people

of

South

Africa

had five

main types

of

contracts.

These

were

(1)

contracts pertaining

to

betrothal,

(2)

those

pertaining

to

marriage,

(3)

those pertain-

ing to the

alienation

of

property,

(4)

those

per-

taining

to

permission

to use

property,

and (5)

those pertaining

to

service. Women

and

chil-

dren

were

not

allowed

to

make contracts unless

specifically

authorized,

in the

case

of

women,

by

their husbands

or, in the

case

of

children,

by

their

fathers.

The

betrothal contract

was

preceded

by ne-

gotiations between

the

families

of the

future

bride

and

groom.

It was

concluded

by a

pay-

ment

from

the

future

groom

s

family

to the fu-

ture bride

s

family

of an

animal

to

slaughter

or,

instead,

items

for the

future

bride, such

as

cloth

or

blankets.

Either

the

future

bride

s

family

or

the

future

groom's

family

could break

the be-

trothal contract

at any

time prior

to

marriage.

If

only

either

the

future

bride

or the

future

groom

wished

to

break

the

engagement, then

the

mar-

riage

was

still likely

to

take place,

and

could

be

so

ordered

by the

applicable legal authority (chief

or

headman).

If the

future

grooms

family

wished

to end the

betrothal because

the

future

bride

had

acted

badly (failing

to

take adequate notice

of

their

son

when

he

visited

or by

keeping

com-

pany

with

or

becoming pregnant

by

another

man),

then

the

betrothal contract could

be

bro-

ken

and the

future

bride

and her

family

had to

return

all

that

had

been given them

by the fu-

ture

groom's

family.

If the

future

bride

s

family

58

CONTRACT

wished

to end the

betrothal contract because

of

the

future

groom's

behavior

(failing

to

visit

the

future

bride's

family frequently

or

keeping com-

pany

with

another woman),

then

the

betrothal

contract could

be

broken,

but the

future

bride's

family

could keep

all

that

the

future

groom's fam-

ily

had

given them.

In

such

a

case,

the

future

bride's

family

could also

be

awarded

by the

legal

authority

a

further

compensation

to be

paid

by

the

future

groom's

family

for

having wasted

the

time

that

the

woman

had to

arrange

a

good

marriage

for

herself.

If a

future

bride died

be-

fore

marrying,

the

future

groom

was

entitled

to

continue

his

engagement

with

the

dead woman's

younger sister. Likewise,

if an

affianced

man

died

before

marrying,

his

fiancee

had the

right

to

marry

his

younger brother,

but her

children

would

be

considered

the

children

of the

dead

man

and

would inherit

from

his

estate.

A

marriage similarly involved

a

contract

between

the

groom's

family

and the

bride's fam-

ily.

The

essential

feature

of a

fully

completed

marriage

was the

payment

of the

bride-price,

called

bogadi.

The

bogadi

payment, consisting

of

a

variable number

of

cattle

given

by the

groom's

family

to the

bride's

family,

purchased

the

bride's

reproductive

powers.

Until

the

bogadi

was

paid,

and

this could

be

years

after

the

couple began

to

cohabit,

the

couple's children were considered

illegitimate

and

could

not be the

legal heirs

of

the

father.

The

bogadi

was

returned

to the

groom's family

if the

wife

died

without

having

borne children

or if the

couple divorced

on the

grounds

of the

wife's

inability

to

bear children.

If the

couple divorced

after

the

bogadi

had

been

paid

and

children born,

the

children remained

with

the

father

and his

family.

Trading

activities also make

use of

contracts.

When

a

Tswana

man

needed

a

manufactured

article

that

he

himself could

not

make,

he

would

have

to go to a

craftsman

and

usually would have

to

place

an

order

for it to be

made

in the

future.

If

there

is a

credit transaction,

and the

buyer does

not pay the

creditor

at the

agreed upon time (usu-

ally

in one

year's

time),

then

the

creditor reminds

the

debtor that

the

payment

is

due.

If he is not

paid,

he

then

waits

for

another period

of

time

before

reminding

the

debtor again.

If the

debt

remains unpaid, then

the

creditor appeals

to the

kin

of the

debtor.

If

this does

no

good, then

the

creditor takes

his

case

to the

chief.

If the

debtor

refuses

the

chief's

order

to pay the

creditor, then

the

chief will order that

the

creditor

may go to

the

debtor's house

and

take whatever

is of

equal

value

to the

debt;

any

effort

by the

debtor

to

stop

the

creditor

is

punished

by the

chief.

The

goods

that

the

creditor

has

seized

are not to be

used

or

sold

by

him, since they

are

merely secu-

rity

for the

payment

of the

debt. Should

a

debtor

still

refuse

to

pay,

or be

unable

to

pay,

his

debt,

his kin are

expected

to pay the

debt.

If

they

refuse

or

cannot

do so,

then

the

debtor

will

have

to

perform

labor

for the

creditor

to

satisfy

his

debt.

Debts

are

inherited

by the

heirs

to an

estate.

If the

debt

is to be

paid

at a

later date with

an

article

of

livestock—for

example,

a

cow—it

some-

times

happens

that

the

recipient

may

reject

the

offered

cow as

being

unsuitable.

This

would usu-

ally lead directly

to a

lawsuit,

with

the

headman

or

chief

as the

legal authority.

If the

recipient

of

the cow had not

initially

specified

the

condition

of

the cow

that

was to be

delivered

to

him, then

the

legal authority would rule

that

he

must take

whatever kind

of a cow was

offered

to

him.

Contracts

were also used

in

several types

of

agreements regarding permission

to use

prop-

erty.

If

someone borrows

an

item

and the

item

is

broken while

it is

being borrowed,

the

bor-

rower

must

inform

the

owner immediately; oth-

erwise,

the

borrower will

be

liable

for the

repair

or

replacement

of the

broken item, even

if the

damage

was

accidental.

With

the

exception

of

wagons

and

teams

of

oxen,

the

Tswana

do not

expect

payment

of

interest

on a

loan; wagons

and

teams

are

rented

out at a

rate

of two

baskets

of

corn

per

load.

Cattle

owners

often

lend their cattle

to

other

herdsmen; cattle

so

borrowed

are

called

mafisa

59

CONTRACT

cattle.

The

borrower

had to ask the

permission

of all

members

of his

family

before

entering into

a

contract

to

borrow

the

cattle, since

if the

cattle

were

lost

it was

possible

for the

entire

family

to

be

held liable

for the

value

of the

lost cattle.

The

one

borrowing

the

cattle

benefits

because

he can

use

their milk

for

himself

or, if the

cattle

are

oxen,

use

them

for

plowing

his own

fields.

The one

lending

the

cattle benefits because

his

workload

is

reduced

and

because,

in the

event

a

disease

attacks

the

cattle

of his own

herd,

he may be

able

to

escape

total

financial ruin

by

losing only

those cattle

and not the

ones

he has

lent.

The

borrower

of the

mafisa

cattle must agree

as

part

of the

contract

to

take very good care

of

them,

to

keep them separate

from

his own

cattle,

and

to

never slaughter

or

alienate them

or

allow them

to be

seized

as

payment

of a

debt.

The

owner

of

the

cattle also

has the

right

of

ownership over

any

offspring

of the

cattle,

but the

owner usu-

ally gives

the

borrower

the

offspring

as a

reward

if

the

borrower

has

taken good

care

of the

cattle.

If

cattle

are

lost

to

theft, death,

or

straying,

this

must immediately

be

communicated

to the

owner;

if a cow or ox

dies,

the

skin must

be

brought

to the

owner

as

proof. Failure

to

make

an

immediate report

or to

bring

the

skin

of a

dead animal leaves

the

borrower liable

for the

value

of the

lost

animal.

The

Tswana also contract

for

labor.

One

important kind

of

contract

is

between servant

and

master. Servants

are

bound

by a

contract

to

their masters

for

life

and

receive

all the

necessi-

ties

of

life,

the

protection

of

their

masters

from

lawsuits,

and the

payment

of

their

hut

taxes.

In

exchange, they provide services such

as

herding,

domestic work,

and

plowing. Servants could

not

leave

the

service

of

their masters without per-

mission

and

could take

no

legal action against

them even

if

mistreated

by

them. Finally,

the

children

of

servants were required

to

serve

the

family

of

their

parents

7

masters, also

for

life.

Another kind

of

labor contract involves

cattle herding.

If a man

wishes,

he may

allow

his

cattle

to be

herded

by

another

man as if

they

belonged

to

this other man.

The one

taking

up

the

task

of

herding

another's

cattle

may not

sell

or

slaughter them,

but

bears

no

liability

for the

loss

of

cattle

due to

death, straying,

or

theft.

The

owner also

has

ownership

of the

offspring

of his

cattle.

In

this type

of

contract,

the one

herding

another

man

s

cattle receives

no

payment

for his

services.

Cattle

owners also sometimes hire another

man

to

work solely

as a

herdsman

of his

cattle.

The

herdsman

in

this type

of

contract

is

liable

for

the

accidental loss

of the

cattle under

his

care.

The

owner pays

the

herdsman

a fee for his

ser-

vices,

usually

a

heifer,

and may

also supply

him

with

food

and

blankets.

Tswana manual laborers sometimes sell their

labor

for

such temporary jobs

as

roofing

a hut or

clearing

a field.

Payment

and the

specifications

for

the job to be

done

are

decided

at the

time

of

the

making

of the

contract.

If the

work

is

done

and not

paid for,

the

worker

can sue the em-

ployer.

If the

work

is not

completed,

the

worker

has no

legal claim

to any

compensation, even

partial compensation.

Work party contracts

are

also used

by the

Tswana.

If a

large

job

needs

to be

done quickly,

such

as

clearing

a field or

weeding

it, the

owner

may

ask his

friends

and kin to

help

him for a

day;

the

owner pays

the

workers

in

beer, milk,

tobacco, meat, porridge,

and/or

salt.

If a

man

s

ox

dies,

he may

give

the

meat away (and quickly,

before

it

spoils)

to all who

wish

to

have

a

por-

tion

of it in

return

for a day s

labor

at an un-

specified

later date.

If a

recipient

of the

meat

repeatedly

refuses

to

work,

a

legal authority will

order

him to

work

or to

repay

the

meat.

Finally,

the

Tswana make contractual agree-

ments with magicians

for

their services.

The

employer will

pay a

magician

for

divination,

treatment

of

illnesses,

and for

good luck magic

for

their huts,

fields, and

cattle.

The

payment

for

divinations

and for the

treatment

of

minor

illnesses

is

small,

but for the

treatment

of

major

60

CORPORATION

illnesses

and for the

making

of

good luck magic,

the

magician

is

paid

with

an ox. The

employer

only

pays

the

magician

for

treating

an

illness

if

the

treatment

is

successful.

If the

employer

fails

to pay for

successful

medical treatment,

the ma-

gician

can sue him in

court. However, people

rarely

fail

to pay

magicians

for

legitimate bills,

because

of the

fear

that

the

magicians will

use

sorcery

against them

if

they

do not

pay. Finally,

if

an

employer

has

paid

a

magician

the

substan-

tial

payment

of an ox, he and his

family

have

the

right

to the

magician's

services without

further

payment

at any

future

time.

The

importance

of

contractual relations

among

the

Tswana

may be

compared

with

the

importance

of

contracts among

the

Naskapi

In-

dians

of

Labrador, Canada. Among

the

Naskapi,

contracts

are of no

importance

to

individuals

or

the

economy

as a

whole.

The first

reason

is

that

promises

are not

protected

by the

law,

and

thus

there

can be no

true contracts.

The

second rea-

son

is

because everybody does

the

same kind

of

work, although there

is

division

of

labor

by

gen-

der. Therefore, nobody typically works

for an-

other

or

trades

with

another.

The

exceptions

are

in

the

case

of

older people

who

cannot

any

longer

do

all the

things they need

to do to

live prop-

erly,

and

even these cases

are

rare.

When

such

promises

are

made, however,

the

older people

might hire

a

young unmarried woman

to

help

them and,

in the

1940s,

would

pay her as

much

as

$5 or $10 and the

material

to

make some

clothing.

If

they hire

a

boy,

he is

usually expected

to

help

with

the

trapping,

and

receives

in

com-

pensation half

of the

furs

he

takes.

In

Naskapi society, then, although there

are

economic promises, they

are few and of

little

importance

and

hence

the

provisions

of

such

promises

are

little

protected,

and not

protected

at all

under

the

law.

All

promises

are

oral

and

require

no

witnesses.

There

is

nothing whatso-

ever

to

corroborate

the

fact

that

a

promise

was

made.

There

is no

remedy available

for a

breach

of

promise,

and

there

is no

legal penalty

for a

breach

of

promise.

The

creditor

has no

right,

for

instance,

to

take

any

property

of the

debtor

if

there

is a

breach,

nor can he ask

that

a

legal

authority punish

the

debtor

for

failing

to

fulfill

the

obligations

of the

promise.

In

short,

the

Naskapi

have

no

true contracts

as the

idea

of

contract

is

defined.

For

this reason,

it may be

supposed

that

many kinds

of

commercial activi-

ties

are not

easy

to

carry

out

there.

In the

former

Soviet Union,

it was

almost

impossible

for

average citizens

to

make contracts

with each other.

This

was

because

the

Soviet

Union wished

to

stamp

out

capitalism.

So, it was

forbidden

to

make virtually

any

kind

of a

com-

mercial

agreement with another citizen.

The

only

kinds

of

contracts allowed were ones

in

which

one let

one's

own

apartment

or

dacha,

or in

which

one

sold agricultural produce grown

on

one's

own

plot

at the

collective

farm

markets.

loffe,

Olympiad

S., and

Peter

B.

Maggs. (1983)

Soviet

Law in

Theory

and

Practice.

Lips, Julius

E.

(1947)

"Naskapi

Law."

Transac-

tions

of the

American

Philosophical

Society

37(4):

378-492.

Schapera,

Isaac. (1970

[1938])

A

Handbook

of

Tswana

Law and

Custom.

CORPORATION

The

corporation

is an

artificial

person under

the

law,

a

legal entity

that

is

recognized

by the law as a

person.

As

such,

the

corporation

can be a

party

to

legal action,

either

as a

plaintiff

or as a

defendant.

The

cor-

poration

is a

legal

fiction,

meaning

that

it

exists

only

in the

eyes

of the

law.

A

corporation

may be

owned

by one

person

or

several persons

or, in

many parts

of the

world,

it may be

unowned,

as is the

case when groups

61

CORPORATION

of

people have

a

corporate identity.

A

corpora-

tions

has the

capability

to

exist

in

perpetuity;

that

is, it may

continue

to

exist long

after

any of

the

people associated with

it at any one

time

are

dead.

The

main function

of a

corporation

in the

modern Western world

is to

limit individual

le-

gal

liability.

For

example,

if a man

decides

to

manufacture

airplanes,

he

would probably want

to

have

the

airplane company incorporated.

If

he

does

so, and one of his

airplane designs turns

out to be

faulty

and

causes crashes, only

the

corporation

can be

sued

by

those

injured

by the

crashes.

The man

himself cannot

be

sued,

and

his own

personal wealth cannot

be

used

to pay

damages

awarded

by a

court

to the

injured.

Only

the

assets

of the

corporation

are

legally liable.

The

obvious benefit

to

incorporation

is

that

it

encourages people

to

start

and to run

businesses,

because

the

fear

of

personal

financial

ruin

is

greatly reduced.

In

many parts

of the

world,

but

particularly

in

the

Middle

East

and in

Africa,

lineal societ-

ies

are

found,

and it is

usually true

that

the

lin-

eages

that

make

up one of

these societies

are

corporate.

In

some other societies, tribes

as a

whole

can be

corporate.

The

lineage

and

tribal corporations typically

own

the

land used

by the

members

of the

lin-

eage

or

tribe.

For

example, among

the

Yoruba

people

of

Nigeria,

the

corporate tribe owns

all

of the

land

the

Yoruba

people

use and

claim

as

their own. Under traditional

Yoruba

law, usu-

fructuary

rights

to

Yoruba

land were apportioned

to the

members

of the

Yoruba

tribe. Since

the

land

was

owned

by the

Yoruba tribal corpora-

tion, ownership rights

in

land could

not be

alien-

ated. Even

a

Yoruba king

or

chief could

not

alienate

any of the

real property under

Yoruba

control;

a

king

or

chief

was

no

more

an

owner

of

the

land

as a

whole,

or of any

piece

of it,

than

any

other person

on the

face

of the

earth;

he

thus

had no

right

to

sell

or

give away land.

An

individuals

usufructuary

rights could

not be

sold,

and

it was

required

that

the

holder

of

such rights

bequeath them

to his

offspring.

The

corporate nature

of

some societies

manifests

itself

in the

idea

of

social

substitut-

ability,

as

Meyer Fortes

has

called

it. In

corpo-

rate lineal societies, such

as the

Nuer

of the

Sudan,

Tallensi

of

Northern Ghana,

and the

Bedouin

of the

Middle

East, individuals

are to

a

greater degree than

in

other societies substi-

tutable

for

each other.

There

and in

similar

so-

cieties,

the

social group

is

conceived

of as

less

of

an

actual group

of

living people than

as a

system

of

legal

and

political statuses.

When

a

person

holding

one of

these statuses dies,

the

society

does

not

face

the

danger

of

disintegration,

be-

cause

someone else will inherit

that

status.

In

matters

of law and

revenge

as

well,

indi-

viduals

within

the

corporation

are

equal

and

sub-

stitutable

for

each other

in

corporate societies.

If a

member

of a

corporate group commits

a

murder,

and his

victim

is a

member

of

another

group,

the

relatives

of the

victim may,

if it is ap-

propriate

in

those societies, seek

to

kill

in re-

venge. However,

it is the

corporation

as a

whole

that

is

responsible

for the

actions

of any one of

the

members

of the

corporation.

Thus,

the

people seeking revenge

may

kill

or

beat

any

suit-

able

member (usually

an

adult male)

of the

cor-

poration

to

which

the

killer belongs;

it is not

necessary

to

kill

or

hurt

the

killer himself.

This

principle

of

corporate political

or

legal

responsibility

for the

actions

of one

member

of

the

corporation

can be

seen

in

modern Western

business

practices

as

well.

If a

worker

at a

fac-

tory owned

by a

corporation makes

a bad

prod-

uct,

and

that

product

injures

someone,

then

the

corporation

that

owns

the

factory

and

employs

the

worker

is

legally responsible

for

causing

the

injuries,

not the

worker himself

or

herself.

Ajisafe,

A. K.

(1946)

The

Laws

and

Customs

of

the

Yoruba

People.

62

COUP

Fortes,

Meyer.

(1953)

"The Structure

of

Unilineal Descent Groups." American

An-

thropologist

55:17-41.

Pollock, Frederick,

and

Frederic

W.

Maitland.

(1966

[1899])

"Corporation

and

Person."

In

Anthropology

and

Early Law, edited

by

Lawrence

Krader,

300-336.

The

term

coup

is

short

for

the

French term

coup

d'etat,

which translates

literally

as "a

blow

to the

state."

A

coup

is a

quick

change

of

government through

the

actual

or

threatened

use of

violence directed specifically

at

the

leadership

in

power, rather than

at the

group

as a

whole. Coups come about when

one

segment

of

society seeks

to

gain

from

another

segment

of the

society control over

the

society

as

a

whole; coups

do not

directly involve

forces

external

to the

society, though coup leaders

may

have

ties

to

external

forces

and

interested parties.

Coups usually take place

in

societies

that

already have unstable governments, such

as

states

that

recently gained independence

from

colonial powers. Usually, too, coups

are

military

in

origin,

since

it is the

military

that

usually

has the

force

necessary

to

bring about

a

coup

and

to

defeat whatever other

forces

may

wish

to

defend

the

leaders whom

the

coup wishes

to

replace.

The

reasons

why

coups take place

are

almost

as

numerous

as the

number

of

coups themselves.

There

is no one

reason

for why

coups occur.

Some

coups take place

to

restore

the old

ways

of

doing things

in the

face

of a

reform-minded

government.

Other

coups take place because

there

is

insufficient reform

of the

central

government's

corruption

and

inefficiency.

Other

coups

are

based

in

ideological movements, while

still

further

coups come about

from

a

percep-

tion that

the

central government

has not

been

sufficiently

nationalistic

in its

policies.

The

coups

in

Nigeria

in the

1960s, which

eventually

led to

civil

war and the

temporary

creation

of the

separate state

of

Biafra,

resulted

from

tribalist allegiances

and

politics.

The

main

dispute centered

on the

position

of the

Ibo

(also

known

as

Igbo)

people

of

southern Nigeria.

The

Ibo

were,

at the

time, hard-working,

trade-

minded people

who

spread

out

over

the

land

in

Nigeria because

their

own

homelands were

densely populated.

Wherever

they moved,

they

engaged

in

commerce

and

wage labor,

and in-

vested their earnings

in

real property

and

their

children's

education.

They

frequently displayed

an

arrogant attitude toward others whom they

considered

backward, lazy,

and

uneducated,

and

this aroused resentment

in the

others, particu-

larly

in the

Moslem northern part

of

Nigeria.

In

1956,

the

northern part

of

Nigeria acquired

self-

rule,

and the

largely Hausa population prevented

Ibos

from

holding civil service positions.

The

Ibos

responded

by

turning their

efforts

to

mak-

ing

money

in the

private sector.

In

January 1966,

Ibo

army

officers

staged

a

successful

coup against

the

central government,

killing Prime

Minister

Balewa

and

many

politi-

cal

leaders

in the

northern part

of the

country.

The

leaders

of the

coup enjoyed

a

great deal

of

popular support, including

that

of

many Hausas.

The

leaders

of the Ibo

faction

of the

army

in-

stalled General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi

as the

head

of the

government. Aguiyi-Ironsi estab-

lished

a

strong

Ibo-dominated

central govern-

ment.

This

in

turn

led to

anti-Ibo

riots

in the

north,

as the

northern Hausas believed that

the

Ibos intended

to

have total control

of the

coun-

try.

Hausas

in the

north waited until

May

1966,

and

then attacked

and

killed several thousand

Ibos

who

lived

in the

north.

As the

Ibos

left

to

escape

to the

southern part

of

Nigeria, their tra-

ditional homeland, they were persuaded

by the

government

to

remain

in the

north

so as to

help

build

a

strong

and

united Nigeria.

But in

July

of

63

COUP

Kwame

Nkrumah,

right,

the

first prime minister

of

Ghana

following

independence

from

Great

Britain,

visits

with Indian Prime Minister

Indira

Gandhi,

left,

on 22

February

1966.

In his

absence,

members

of

the

Ghanian

army

overthrew

Nkrumah's

government

in a

coup

d'etat.

Mrs.

Gandhi,

a

Hindu,

was

assassinated

eight

years

later

by two

Sikhs

who

were

her

guards.

1966,

the

northerners staged

a

countercoup,

and

put

into power Army Chief

of

Staff

Yakubu

Gowon. Coup leaders killed

Aguiyi-Ironsi,

and

this

was

followed

by a

second massacre

of

Ibos

in

the

northern part

of

Nigeria.

The

Ibos con-

tinued

to

stay

in the

north

to

help establish

a

united Nigeria.

In

September

of

1966, there

was

a

third

and

very large massacre

of

Ibos

in

north-

ern

Nigeria,

and it was

this action

that

convinced

the

Ibos that

a

united Nigeria

was

impossible.

Most

of

those

who

survived

left

for

eastern

Ni-

geria, thus accomplishing

the

aims

of the

north-

ern

Nigerians,

who

wanted

a

northern Nigeria

free

of

Ibo

people.

In

1967, Gowon redrew district lines

in Ni-

geria, creating twelve separate units.

The

east-

ern

Nigerians

rejected

this division

and

seceded

from

Nigeria, establishing

a

state known

as

Biafra.

The

resulting civil

war

lasted until 1970,

when

a

defeated

Biafra

consented

to

reunify

with

Nigeria.

The

civil

war

cost

1

million

Biafran

(mostly Ibo) lives through fighting, starvation,

and

disease.

Gowon attempted

to

rebuild eastern

Nige-

ria

and

create

a

multitribal

Nigeria,

but his ef-

forts

were

cut

short

by

another coup

in

1975.

The man put in

charge

by

that coup

was

himself

the

victim

of a

coup

the

following year.

Demo-

64

CRIME

cratically elected

officials

came into power

in

Nigeria

in

1979,

but

there

was

another success-

ful

military coup

in

1983.

The

reasons

for the

successful

February 1966

coup against

the

leader

of

Ghana,

Kwame

Nkrumah,

were

different

still

from

those given

above. Ghana became independent

from

Great

Britain

in

1957,

and

Nkrumah became

its first

prime

minister.

As

time went

on,

Nkrumah

be-

came

increasingly intolerant

of

political opposi-

tion, going

so far in

1964

as to

make

the

existence

of

all

opposition political parties

illegal.

He

also

established increasingly close ties

with

the

U.S.S.R.

and

other Communist bloc nations.

He

made

extensive

use of

preventive detention

of

people

who

opposed him,

fired

judges

who

pro-

duced

decisions with which

he

disagreed,

and

had

legal cases retried when

the

verdicts were

not to his

liking. Further,

he

made

an

error

that

cost

him the

support

of the

military.

He

asked

that

two

foreign

powers,

the

U.S.S.R.

and the

former

colonial masters,

the

British, train

and

equip

the

army.

The

army rebelled against these

measures

and in

February 1966,

it

overthrew

Nkrumah.

In

short, Nkrumah

was

deposed

be-

cause

he

allowed

little

political

freedom

and be-

cause

he was

insufficiently

nationalistic

in his

leadership.

Greene, Fred. (1970

[1966])

"Toward Under-

standing Military

Coups."

In

African

Poli-

tics

and

Society\

edited

by

Irving Markovitz,

242-247.

Legum,

Colin.

(1970

[1966])

"The

Tragedy

in

Nigeria"

In

African

Politics

and

Society,

ed-

ited

by

Irving Markovitz,

248-251.

Markovitz, Irving. (1970

[1966])

"Ghana

with-

out

Nkrumah:

The

Winter

of

Discontent."

In

African

Politics

and

Society,

edited

by

Irv-

ing

Markovitz,

252-265.

Cm

MI;

Crime

is a

legal

offense

against

a

society.

The

society,

then,

is the

sub-

ject

of

legal rights

and the

object

of

legal duties

to it. It

thus

differs

from

an

offense

against civil

law,

or

tort,

in

that

it

involves

a

public

offense

rather than

a

private one.

All

societies reserve

for

themselves

the

right

to

regulate

the

behavior

of

their members

so

that

threats

to it do not de-

stroy

it.

Unregulated behavior

can

very quickly

lead

to

schisms within

a

society

and to the

even-

tual

end of the

society.

A

very broad range

of

behaviors

are

classi-

fied

as

crimes

or

offenses

in

cultures around

the

world.

The

following

is a

list

of

only some

be-

haviors

that

are

considered

to be

crimes

in

some

cultures, organized into

the

major

Strouthes D.P. Law and Politics: A Cross-Cultural Encyclopedia

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