Strouthes D.P. Law and Politics: A Cross-Cultural Encyclopedia
Подождите немного. Документ загружается.
households
to
administer within
his
district (ei- times taken
by the
king
to
work
for the
rest
of
ther
more than
100 or
more than 500, accord- their lives
as
royal
retainers,
ing to
different
sources),
did not
have
to
perform
corvee
labor himself.
Men
were also required
to
participate
in the
Inca
military corvee.
In
addi- Murra, John
V.
(1967
[1958])
"On
Inca
Politi-
tion,
from
time
to
time, households were
re-
cal
Structure."
In
Comparative
Political
Sys-
quired
to
provide labor
for
building projects, such
terns,
edited
by
Ronald Cohen
and
John
as
roads
and
fortresses.
People were also some- Middleton,
339-353.
266
TRIBUTE
War is
defined
as
autho-
rized violence between
independent groups
(Pospisil
1974:10).
We say
"authorized" because
it is
approved
by the
appropriate social authori-
ties.
For
example,
if a
group
of men
from
New
York
State went
to
Canada
and
attacked
the
Canadian Parliament,
it
would
not be an act of
war
since
the
president
of the
United States
and
the
U.S.
Congress
had not
approved
the
attack;
rather,
it
might
be a
case
of
external self-redress,
if
the New
Yorkers
felt
themselves wronged
by
the
Canadian government,
or
feud,
if the
vio-
lence
is
part
of a
long-term pattern between sub-
groups
of a
society
or
societies (two
families
on
opposite
sides
of the
Canadian-U.S. border
for
example);
it
would also
be a
violation
of
Cana-
dian
law in any
case.
In
addition,
warfare
can
only
exist between independent groups.
If the
states
of
North Dakota
and
Montana decided
to
engage each other with military violence,
it
would
not be a
case
of war
since
both
states
are
subordinate
to the
federal
government
in
Wash-
ington, D.C., which would undoubtedly
inter-
cede
to end the
violence.
Wars take place
for
many reasons. Some
of
these
are to
exterminate
an
enemy
(as in the
1990s
war in the
former
Yugoslavia between
Serbs
and
Muslims);
to
take wealth
(as in the
war
between Iraq
and
Kuwait);
to
acquire land
(as
in the
nineteenth century wars between
the
whites
and
Indians
in the
United States); over
ideological
differences
(the
war
between Iran
and
Iraq
in the
1980s);
self-defense
(World
War
II);
to
change
the
leadership
of
another group (the
U.S.
war
against Panama
in
1989);
to
take
women
(as
among
the
Yanomamo
people);
for
warriors
to
gather personal glory
in
battle
(as
among
the
Plains Indians
in the
eighteenth
and
nineteenth centuries);
to
take revenge;
and for
other
reasons.
A
number
of
anthropologists have also
looked
at
some
of the
less obvious reasons
why
people
go to
war. Some anthropologists,
for ex-
ample,
believe
that
man is by
nature warlike, that
warfare
is
instinctive.
Other
anthropologists have
pointed
to
societies
in
which
warfare
seems
to
be a
source
of
entertainment; such seems par-
ticularly true
of
some
of the
Indian peoples
of
the
Great
Plains,
who
fought raids against each
other
for
horses, prestige,
and
revenge.
Another
theory
as to why
people
go to war
is
the
sociobiological
theory.
This
theory states
that
men go to war to
increase their reproduc-
tive
success,
that
is,
that they work
to
increase
the
proportional representation
of
their genes
in
the
next generation.
According
to
this
theory,
successful
warriors attract more wives
and
thus
usually
have more children. Also,
successful
war-
riors
kill
off
other
men
whose genes dilute
the
relative proportion
of the
successful
warrior's
genes.
One who has
done much work
on
this
idea
is
Napoleon Chagnon.
Another idea
as to why
there
is war is
that
people
fight
to
gain material resources.
A
cross-
cultural study suggests
that
many nonstate
soci-
ety
peoples
fight to
alleviate short-term
food
shortages.
A
well-known variant
of
this argu-
ment
was
made
by
Marvin Harris.
Harris's
idea
267
WAR
W
WAR
Wars
between nations involve
purposeful
use
of
organized
military
force.
A
state
of
war
exists
between Bosnian
Serbs
and
Croatians
that
causes
death
and
disruption among civilian populations.
Serb
refugees
who
have fled
Croatia
enter
the
Bosnian stronghold
ofBanja
Luka
in
August 1995.
that
it is the
material conditions
of
life
that have
the
greatest
effect
on the
basic culture
is
known
as
cultural materialism.
For
Harris, cultural
ma-
terialism explains
why
some nonstate societies
frequently
engage
in
war. Some
of
these societ-
ies,
it
turns out, have very
little
regular access
to
high-quality protein
in
their diet, protein
of the
kind provided
by
meat. Harris used
the
case
of
the
Yanomamo Indians
of the
rainforests
of
South America
to
illustrate
his
theory.
The
Yanomamo Indians
of
South America
practice female infanticide because they
feel
a
strong
need
to
raise
as
many men,
who can be
warriors,
as
possible.
It is not
possible
to
raise
all of the
children born because there
are
often
food
shortages;
if all of the
children born were
raised, some would die,
and
some
of
these
would
be
male children.
When
the men
become adults,
they search
for
wives; finding that there
are not
enough
to go
around, they decide
to
steal
fe-
males
from
neighboring bands.
Of
course,
the
neighboring bands resist,
and
fighting ensues.
Further,
the
neighboring Yanomamo bands also
steal women
from
their neighbors.
Thus,
the
fighting
requires
a
large number
of
warriors
both
for
defense
and for the
taking
of
women
from
268
WAR
other bands.
The
process
is
therefore circular
and
repetitive.
They
need warriors
to get
women,
but
must
kill
female
infants
to
have more warriors,
who
need more
females
as
mates
and who
have
to go to war to get
them.
The
Yanomamo
them-
selves
believe
that
they
go to war
simply
to ac-
quire
women.
But
according
to
Harris,
the
root
cause
of the
warfare
is a
lack
of
proper protein
in
the
diet.
The
warfare
that
the
relative paucity
of
females
causes
in
turn
forces
the
warring bands
to
move away
from
each other, thus enlarging
the
amount
of
forest
uninhabited
by
people
and
increasing
the
amount
of
game,
and
thus pro-
tein, available
to the
Yanomamo. War, therefore,
indirectly leads
to a
better diet
and
less need
for
war.
But
population increase inevitably causes
a
dearth
of
protein
in the
diet,
and the
whole cycle
starts
all
over again.
Many
anthropologists
are
less concerned
with
the
causes
of
warfare
than
with
the
histori-
cal
effects
of
colonial powers
on
indigenous band
and
tribal societies.
In
tribal
and
band societies
in
many
areas
of the
world, there
are no
political
leaders
or
legal authorities
with
power over
all
of
the
individual small groups.
This
means
that
the
individual groups
are
independent
and no
one
has the
authority
to
stop wars between them.
This
state
of
affairs
almost always changes when
colonial powers take control
of a
region
and
pacify
the
area, ending
all
such hostilities.
The
Cheyenne, Sioux, Arapaho, Crow,
and
other
Plains Indians,
for
example,
no
longer practice
the
raiding
of
each
other's
bands
and
tribes
that
was
common
in the
eighteenth
and
nineteenth
centuries.
Following
is an
example
of
warfare
in a
tribal
society.
One of the
better-described
cases
of
war-
fare
in a
small, non-Western society
is
that
of
the
Jivaro (also called Jibaro) Indians
of
eastern
Ecuador.
The
Jivaro, until being largely
pacified
in
recent years, were
a
fiercely
independent
people
prone
to the use of
violence
with
little
provocation.
So
independent were they
that
each
family
lived alone rather than
with
others
in a
village.
So
prone
to the use of
violence were they
that
boys were raised
to be
warriors
from
a
young
age,
and
deadly
and
prolonged blood
feuds
be-
tween
families
were
a
frequent
occurrence within
the
Jivaro tribe.
The
wars
that
the
Jivaro fought against
neighboring tribes were generally fought
to
avenge
some
act of
aggression against
a
Jivaro
person
or
group.
Once
begun, however,
the ul-
timate
aim of the
Jivaro warriors
was to
com-
pletely erase
the
other tribe
from
the
face
of the
earth.
So
long
as the
other tribe existed,
the
Jivaro were
in
danger
of
retaliation
by its
mem-
bers,
and so it is
logical
that
the
Jivaro should
try to
completely annihilate their enemies.
Those
groups
that
decided
to
wage
war
would combine
and
elect
an
experienced chief
to
lead them.
The
warriors
and
chief drank hal-
lucinogenic drugs
that
allowed them
to see vi-
sions
of
spirits,
who
then gave omens
as to the
success
of the
future
military operations.
Spies
were sent
out to find out how
many
men the
enemy
had, whether they
had
fortified
their
houses,
and
what types
of
weapons they had.
The
chief,
before
the
raid,
told
the men to
have
courage
and
gave them
the
details
of his
battle
plan.
The men
also took part
in a
ceremony
that
used
magic
to
build courage,
the men
repeating
a
memorized dialogue
in
pairs
to
each other.
The
warriors also wore special clothing
for the
raid,
especially
a
monkey-skin
cap and
jaguar-tooth
necklace.
They
painted themselves black, believ-
ing
that
this gave them
the
appearance
and
some
of
the
supernatural powers
of the
"iguanchi"
(de-
mons).
Men
often
brought their sons along
to
observe
a
real
war in
order
to
prepare them
to
become
warriors themselves
in the
future.
The
Jivaro tried
to
surprise their enemies
if
at all
possible.
For
this reason, raids were usu-
ally
made
at
night
or
just
before
dawn.
The
war-
riors
surrounded
a
house
and
killed
the
occupants
as
they tried
to
leave
it. If
they
did not
leave
the
house,
the
Jivaro
set fire to it,
forcing them out.
Then
they moved
on to the
next house.
When
269
WAR
they
couldn't
surprise
the
enemy because
the
enemy's
dogs
or
chickens gave alarm, resistance
was
organized through
the use of a
signal drum.
The
Jivaro warriors killed
all of the
enemy,
with some exceptions. Young women were usu-
ally kept alive
to be
wives
of the
Jivaro men,
and
children were sometimes spared
to be
raised
as
Jivaro.
The
others were killed, their bodies
mu-
tilated,
and the
heads taken
as
trophies.
The
taking
of a
head
as a
trophy
was
cause
for
a
feast
afterward,
and the
head
of a
coura-
geous
warrior
was the
most valued
of
all.
A
head
was
later "shrunk"
by
removing
the
skull,
boil-
ing it,
pouring
hot
sand
in it (to
remove
any re-
maining
flesh), and
then forming
the
skin
so
that
it
remained recognizably human.
Like
the
Jivaro,
the
Crow Indians
of the
nineteenth-century North American Plains
en-
gaged
in
warfare
with great determination. And,
like
the
Jivaro,
the
Crow Indians practiced
a
form
of
warfare
known
as
raiding.
But the
usual rea-
son
given
for
Crow raiding, like
the
raiding
of
other Plains peoples
of the
time,
was to
take
horses
(and sometimes revenge)
from
the en-
emy
(usually other Plains
peoples).
However, this
simple reason hides
an
entire
war
culture com-
plex
with which
the
Crow people were
frequently
preoccupied.
Men
found
that
their position
in
society,
ability
to
achieve political leadership,
and
reputation were based upon their military suc-
cesses.
Ability
as a
storyteller
and
medical
tech-
nique were important,
but of
little significance
in
comparison with military skill.
Men
also
found
in
warfare
activities
a
great source
of ex-
citement
and for
this reason were very interested
in
pursuing them.
Let us
take
the
acquisition
of
horses
as a
rea-
son
for
warfare.
If one
wanted only
to
acquire
horses,
then
why did a
warrior gain
far
more
prestige
by
stealing
an
enemy's
tethered horse
than
for
acquiring several free-roaming horses?
Why
also
did
warriors continue
to
raid
for
horses
even
when
they
had
more than enough?
One
Crow
family
could
not
possibly
use
more than
a
dozen horses,
yet one
man, Gray-Bull,
had be-
tween
70 and 90
head
at one
time. Therefore,
one
must conclude that
the
Crow
men
raided
for
reasons other than simply acquiring horses,
and
that
those were
to
gain individual prestige
and for
excitement.
Crow women
and
children were also
in-
volved with
the war
culture complex.
Chil-
dren,
both
male
and
female, acquired their
names
from
the
famous
battles fought
by
vari-
ous
warriors. Women, when dacing, wore
the
scalps
that
their husbands brought back
from
raids.
They
also displayed their
husbands'
shields
and
weapons
in
public
with
pride.
Further,
the
women, through their cries over
the
deaths
in
battle
of
male members
of
their
families,
acted
as
principal instigators
of
raiding
for
revenge.
The men
sought
and
achieved military glory
in
four
accepted manners,
the
accomplishment
of
any one of
which made
one an
"araxt-si'wice"
(honor-owner).
One
manner
was to be the first
person
in
battle
to
count coup, that
is, to
touch
the
body
of any
enemy individual, usually dur-
ing
battle,
whether
the
enemy
was
wounded,
dead,
or
unharmed (while
it is
obviously dan-
gerous
and
thus indicative
of
courage
for a
sol-
dier
to
touch
an
armed enemy soldier
in
battle,
one
could count coup
on any
enemy person
at
any
time,
as
when
one
Crow
man
crept
up to a
Dakota
[a
Siouan people, enemies
of the
Crow]
camp,
found
a
woman urinating,
and
killed
her).
The
second manner
was to
take
from
an
enemy
soldier
his bow or gun
during
a fight. The
third
was
to cut
loose
and
steal
a
horse tied
up at an
enemy
encampment.
The final
means
to
mili-
tary glory
was to act as
either
the
pipe-owner
or
the
raid-planner
of a
raiding party. Achievement
of any one of
these
feats
made
a man
worthy
of
respect
and
earned
him a
place
as a
herald, next
in
rank
to
chief. Having accomplished each
of
the
four
types
of
deeds made
one a
chief.
And
the
more times
one
accomplished each type
of
deed,
the
more
famous
one
became.
270
WAR
Boys
learned
the
skills
of
warfare
early.
They
counted coup
on
animals, encouraged girls
to
dance
with
the
fur
of
animals
and
pretended
that
the
furs
were scalps,
and
reproduced
the
military
societies
of
adult
men in
their Hammer Society.
In
addition,
the
boys were made physically
fit
through athletics. Finally,
the
boys were prepared
for
the
rigors
of
warfare
by
frequently being told
by
the men
that
to
become
old is a
disgrace
and
that
it is far
better
to die
young
in
battle.
A
horse-raiding party
often
went
as
follows:
The men
would
go on
foot, each carrying,
or
bringing
a dog to
carry,
his
moccasins,
a
small
pail,
and a
rope
to tie the
captured horses.
Most
parties started
out
after
sunset
and
sheltered
themselves with rudimentary windbreaks.
Af-
ter
they camped
for the
night,
the
captain sent
the
scouts forth
to find an
enemy camp.
The
scouts
did not eat
until they
found
the
enemy.
When
they
found
the
enemy, they returned
to
camp holding
up
their guns
as a
signal
of
their
success.
After they came into camp, they kicked
over
a
pile
of
specially collected
buffalo
chips
to
further
signify
their success
and
then they ate.
The
members
of the war
party
attached
magical objects
to
their bodies
and
painted their
faces
so as to
improve their magical "medicine."
The
leader
of the war
party then prayed
to the
Sun, promising
to
build
a
sweatlodge
or
give
some
other
gift
in the
Suns honor
if the Sun
allowed
the
members
of the war
party
to
return
safely
with many horses.
The men
then went
on the
raid
at
night.
They
hoped
to be
able
to
take enough horses
that
they could
all
ride back
to
their
own en-
campment.
This
was not
only
a
matter
of
com-
fort;
the
enemy would
be
chasing them
on
horseback, trying both
to
kill them
and to re-
capture their horses.
Thus,
if not
enough horses
were captured, those
who had to
walk back
of-
ten
were killed.
If the
raid
was
successful,
they rode
at top
speed
all
night, through
the
next day,
and the
next night
as
well. Finally,
on the
second
day
they stopped, killed
a
buffalo,
and ate it.
When
they arrived home, they
fired
their guns
in the
air
and
paraded
the
captured horses around
the
village.
It was at
this time
that
the
spoils were
divided. Under
the
rules,
the
captain could claim
all of the
horses
as his
own,
but he
always gave
most
of
them
to the
other
men in the
party
to
avoid
charges
of
greed.
When
fighting
with
the
specific
intent
of
killing
the
enemy,
the
Crow carried
out
their
raiding
differently.
The
usual reason
for
raiding
to
kill
an
enemy individual
was to
take revenge
for
the
killing
by the
enemy
of a
Crow individual.
Often,
a
revenge raid
was
precipitated
by the
request
of a
woman
to a
famous
warrior
to
avenge
the
death
of her son at the
hands
of the
enemy.
The
woman would bring
gifts
to the
warrior
in
order
to
induce
him to
carry
out the
raid.
Before
the
raid took place,
the
warriors blackened their
faces.
When
they returned victorious, having
killed
one or
more
of the
enemy, they were
treated
to a
celebration, where
the men who had
earned
war
honors
in the
raid were honored.
Before
they entered their home camp,
the first
man
to
count coup
on an
enemy individual
and
the first
person
to
capture
an
enemy weapon were
celebrated
and had
their shirts entirely black-
ened with
a
mixture
of
buffalo
blood
and two
kinds
of
charcoal.
Those
who did
those same
deeds second
and
third
had
their shirts only half
blackened,
and
those
who did
these deeds fourth
had
only
the
sleeves
of
their shirts blackened.
Then
the
group
of
warriors camped just outside
their home camp
one
last night.
In the
morn-
ing, they went
to
their home camp
and fired
their
rifles
into
the
air.
The
women came
out and led
them back into camp
in a
special dance. Later,
there
was
more dancing,
feasting,
and the
sing-
ing of
special praise songs. Celebrations would
last
all of
that
day and
through
the
night.
The
Crow people
had
greatly
different
ideas
about what makes
successful
warfare than
do
the
military leaders
of
modern national armed
forces.
Whereas
modern military leaders
seek
271
WORLD
SYSTEM
some
strategic
or
tactical goal, such
as the
neu-
tralization
of an
opposing
force
or the
capture
of
some geographic area,
the
Crow were
inter-
ested
in
horses, revenge,
and
personal glory.
Further, whereas
the
miliatry leaders
of
modern
nation-states accept
that
they will likely lose
members
of
their
forces
in the
pursuit
of a
stra-
tegic
or
tactical objective,
the
Crow military
objective
was to
carry
out
their
warfare
with
the
goal
of
losing none
of
their members
to the en-
emy.
In
fact,
the
Crow
military leaders
who
lost none
of
their raiding parties
in
military
action were considered superior
to
those
mili-
tary leaders
who got
more horses
or
those
who
killed more
of the
enemy
if
they lost
men in
the
process.
While
it is
true
that
the
Crow
highly esteemed
as
brave
the
individual
who
attacked large numbers
of the
enemy
in a
sui-
cidal rush,
the
normal ideal
was to
kill
the en-
emy
in
such
a way as to
present
the
least danger
to
oneself.
That
the
Crow
sincerely
and
with great
emotion hated their enemies cannot
be
doubted.
The
evidence
for
this
may be
seen
in the way
that
the
Crow
treated
their
captives
and the en-
emy
dead.
Though
it is
true that women cap-
tives
were treated well (they married Crow
men
and
assumed
the
same
life
as a
Crow woman),
captive
men
were
often
tortured.
This
was
espe-
cially
the
case
when
the
enemy
put up a
frus-
trating
defense, thereby inflaming
Crow
emotions.
For
example, there
is the
case
of one
fight
with
a
Blackfoot group,
in
which
the
Blackfoot
built
a
defensive
obstacle
of
logs
and
stones
and
held
off the
Crow
for a
long while.
When
the
Crow finally prevailed, they tortured
their Blackfoot captives
for a
long time
before
they slaughtered them.
The
corpses were then
beaten
and
mangled.
In
another
case,
a
Blackfoot
man
was
caught
by the
Crow, hanged
from
a
tree
by the
neck, shot
at by the
men,
and
perfo-
rated with sharp sticks
by the
women.
And it
was
often
the
case
that
the
bodies
of
enemy dead
were
mutilated
and
dragged along
the
ground
with
a
rope.
Bohannan,
Paul}.,
ed.
(1967)
Law and
Warfare:
Studies
in
the
Anthropology
of
Conflict.
Chagnon, Napoleon. (1989) "Response
to
Fer-
guson."'American
Ethnologist
1989:565-569.
Ember,
Carol,
and
Melvin Ember.
(1992)
"Re-
source
Unpredictability, Mistrust,
and
War."
Journal
of
Conflict
Resolution
36:
242-262.
Haas,].,
ed.
(1990)
The
Anthropology
of
War.
Harris, Marvin. (1995)
Cultural
Anthropology.
4th ed.
Karsten, Rafael. (1967
[1923])
"Blood Revenge
and
War
among
the
Jibaro Indians
of
East-
ern
Ecuador."
In Law and
Warfare:
Studies
in the
Anthropology
of
Conflict,
edited
by
Paul
Bohannan,
303-325.
Lowie, Robert
H.
(1956
[1935])
The
Crow
Indians.
Pospisil, Leopold. (1974
[1971])
Anthropology
of
Law:
A
Comparative
Theory.
The
basic premise
of the
world system
set of
theories
is
that
the
world
has
one
giant economic system
that
involves
nearly
all
people
on
Earth
and
that
is
divided
up
between industrially developed nations (the First
World [the United States, Canada,
the
coun-
tries
of
western
Europe, Australia,
New
Zealand,
and
Japan]
and
Second World [the
former
So-
viet Union
and the
Soviet Bloc countries
of
east-
ern
Europe])
and the
industrially undeveloped
272
WORLD
SYSTKM
WORLD
SYSTEM
nations
(the
Third
World [the rest
of the
world]).
The
ideas behind
the
theory
of the
world sys-
tem
ultimately grew
out of
Marxist thought
and
theories
of
political economy.
The
idea
of
world system theory depends
upon
a
concept
of
development
and
especially
a
concept
of
underdevelopment.
When
the Eu-
ropean
capitalists began their colonization
of the
rest
of the
world,
it was in
large part
to
acquire
wealth.
This
wealth
has
fueled
the
technologi-
cal
and
industrial growth
of
First
World
nations
since
then.
The
colonies,
by and
large, have
re-
mained
technologically
and
industrially behind
in
their development; they have
not
"modern-
ized"
and
therefore remain
"underdeveloped."
In
many
Third
World
countries
that
are
former
colonies
of
European nations, only
the
elite
of
the
countries
has
done well
financially,
while
most
of the
rest
of the
population remains poor.
While
there
was
undoubtedly poverty
and
starvation
in
what
are now
Third
World
nations
prior
to the
coming
of the
Europeans,
the
world
system
theorists
say
that
the
continued poverty
in
those countries
after
the
coming
of the
Euro-
peans
is due to
certain basic
features
of
capital-
ism.
The
world system theorists explain that
the
Third
World
has
continued
in
poverty because
the
capitalist First World
has
kept
the
majority
of
the
world's
technology
and
industry
for
itself
and
relegated
the
Third
World
to
producing
cheap
raw
materials
and
providing cheap labor.
In
other words,
the
Third
World countries con-
tinue
to be
treated
as
colonies, despite
the
fact
that they have
won
political independence.
The
analogy
to
colonies
and the
relationship between
a
country
and its
colonies
is
frequently used
by
world system theorists.
For
example, while
the
urban
centers
of
most
Third
World countries
are
developed,
at
least
for the
elite,
the
rest
of
these
poor
countries remain underdeveloped,
and
these
places
are
often
referred
to as
"internal colonies"
of
a
Third
World
country, thereby making
the
analogy
that
the
Third
World
country's central
elite
is
like
the
country
in a
country-colony
relationship.
The
ideas
of a
"core"
and a
"periphery"
in
the
world economic system were introduced
by
Immanuel Wallerstein.
The
core countries
are
those
in the
First
World,
the
major
capitalist
powers
in the
world economic system.
The pe-
riphery consists
of
those countries that supply
raw
materials
and
cheap labor.
There
is
also
a
"semi-periphery"
of
countries that were under-
developed
but
that
are
presently partially devel-
oped, such
as
South Korea, Taiwan, Argentina,
and
Brazil.
The
core countries
benefit
from
the
world
economic system,
but the
peripheral countries
remain
poor even while supplying
the raw ma-
terials
and
cheap labor that make core nations
wealthy.
The
division
of
labor that
is a
basic fea-
ture
of
capitalism
is
manifested
in an
interna-
tional division, just
as the
entire economy
is
international.
While
countries
can
over time
go
from
being core countries
to
being peripheral coun-
tries,
and
vice
versa,
the
system remains
the
same.
The
major
problem with this theory
is
that
it
does
not
take into account
the
factors
within
any
particular country that keep
it a
peripheral
country
or a
core country,
or
especially
why any
one
country
in
particular, such
as
Japan, goes
from
being
a
peripheral country
to
being
a
core
country,
as
Taiwan
and
South Korea seem likely
to do in the
future.
A
second problem
is
that
the
theory explains
all
poverty
as a
result
of
under-
development.
In
Peru,
for
example,
the
legal
and
political systems
are so
inefficient
that
most
people
prefer
to
work
and
trade
in the
illegal
economy.
This
has the
effect
of
placing
the
country's
tax
burden onto
the
legal businesses,
which cannot produce enough wealth
to
sup-
port
adequate development
efforts
by the
gov-
ernment. Further,
the
illegal economy does
not
operate
efficiently
because their contracts can-
not be
enforced
by the
legal system,
and
because
the
entrepreneurs
can be
arrested
and
their
273
WORLD
SYSTEM
businesses
closed.
So, as a
result
of
these purely
internal
problems, Peru remains
a
poor nation,
regardless
of the
world economic system.
de
Soto, Hernando. (1989)
The
Other
Path:
The
Invisible
Revolution
in the
Third
World.
Lewellen,Ted
C.
(1992)
Political
Anthropology:
An
Introduction.
2d ed.
O'Brien,
Rita Cruise,
ed.
(1979)
The
Political
Economy
of
Underdevelopment:
Dependence
in
Senegal.
Wallerstein, Immanuel. (1974)
The
Modern
World-System
I:
Capitalist
Agriculture
and
the
Origins
of
the
European
World-Economy
in the
Sixteenth
Century.
.
(1980)
The
Modern
World-System
II:
Mercantilism
and
the
Consolidation
of
the
Eu-
ropean
World-Economy
1600-1750.
Wolf,
Eric. (1982)
Europe
and the
People
with-
out
History.
274
Ajisafe,
A. K.
(1946)
The
Laws
and
Customs
of
the
Yoruba
People.
Albuquerque,
C., and D.
Werner. (1985)
"Political Patronage
in
Santa
Catarina."
Current
Anthropology
26(1):
117-120.
The
All
Pakistan
Legal
Decisions.
(1993) Vol.
45.
Edited
by
Malik Muhammad Saeed.
Allen, Martin
G.
(1972)
"A
Cross-Cultural
Study
of
Aggression
and
Crime."
Journal
of
Cross-Cultural
Psychology
3:
259-271.
Alverson,
Hoyt. (1978) Mind
in the
Heart
of
Darkness.
Amsbury,
Clifton. (1979) "Patron-Client Struc-
ture
in
Modern World Organization."
In
Political
Anthropology:
The
State
of
the
Art,
edited
by S. Lee
Seaton
and
Henri
J. M.
Claessen,
79-107.
An-Naim,
Abdullah!
A.,
ed.
(1992) Human
Rights
in
Cross-Cultural
Perspective:
A
Quest
for
Consensus.
Austin,
John. (1954)
The
Province
of
Jurispru-
dence
Determined
and the
Uses
of
the
Study
of
Jurisprudence.
Bacon,
Margaret
K.,
Irvin
L.
Child,
and
Herbert
Barry
III. (1963)
"A
Cross-Cultural Study
of the
Correlates
of
Crime." Journal
of
Abnormal
and
Social
Psychology
66:291-300.
Balandier,
Georges. (1970)
Political
Anthropol-
ogy.
Translated
by A. M.
Sheridan Smith.
Barton,
Roy F.
(1969
[1919])
Ifugao
Law.
.
(1973
[1949])
The
Kalingas:
Their
In-
stitutions
and
Custom
Law.
Beattie,
John.
(1960)
Eunyoro:
An
African
Kingdom.
Bentham, Jeremy. (1876
[1780])
Introduction
to
the
Principles
of
Morals
and
Legislation.
Bishop,
William
W., Jr.
(1971)
International
Law:
Cases
and
Materials.
Bloodworth,
Dennis. (1975)
An Eye for the
Dragon.
Bohannan,
PaulJ.
(1957^
Justice
and
Judgement
among
the
Tiv.
.
(1957b)
Tiv
Farm
and
Settlement.
Bohannan,
Paul
J.,
ed.
(1967)
Law and
War-
fare:
Studies
in the
Anthropology
of
Conflict.
Bohannon,
Laura. (1958) "Political Aspects
of
Tiv
Social Organization."
In
Tribes
without
Rulers,
edited
by
John Middleton
and
David
Tait,
33-66.
Boissevain,
Jeremy. (1966) "Patronage
in
Sic-
ily."
Man,
n.s.
1:18-33.
Brownlie,
Ian. (1992)
Basic
Documents
on Hu-
man
Rights.
Bukurura,
Sufian
Hemed. (1994) "The Main-
tenance
of
Order
in
Rural Tanzania:
The
Case
of the
Sungusungu."
Journal
of
Legal
Pluralism
and
Unofficial
Law 34:
1-29.
Burn,
A. R.
(1974
[1965])
The
Pelican
History
of
Greece.
Buxton,
Jean
Carlile.
(1967
[1957])
"'Clientship'
among
the
Mandari
of the
Southern Sudan."
In
Comparative
Political
Systems,
edited
by
Ronald
Cohen
and
John Middleton,
229-245.
275
BIBLIOGRAPHY