Schofield Victoria. Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War
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HQ at Rawalpindi and the seat of the government at Karachi, there was
hardly any politico-military cohesion in the war . . . war direction was ding-
dong at the least and many opportunities were missed.’
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In an effort to circumvent Indian defences in the valley, the Azad irregulars
and Gilgit Scouts had moved towards Baltistan and Ladakh. Skardu was
besieged and fell to their forces. Dras and Kargil, strategically located on the
zoo mile track across the Zoji la pass between Srinagar and Leh were also
captured in May. Central Ladakh was therefore cut off from the most easily
accessible land route. The Ladakhis, who were not anxious to be ‘liberated’
by the Azad forces, sent an urgent appeal for help to the Indian General
Thimmayya’s headquarters in Srinagar. The Indian air force flew in Gurkha
reinforcements and hastily constructed an airstrip at Leh which, at ,
feet, remains the world’s highest civil landing strip. ‘You follow the Indus
river to the landing strip,’ explained an Indian Airlines pilot in . ‘If you
can’t see the river, you can’t land.’
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As the Azad forces converged on Leh, Nehru was writing to Patel: ‘This
is of no great military significance and we can recapture all the lost ground.
But it is irritating that on the map, a huge province may be shown as under
the enemy.’ He also admitted that the maharaja’s state forces in Ladakh and
Skardu in Baltistan had behaved ‘in a most cowardly and disgraceful manner.
They had not only run away at the slightest provocation but have handed
over our weapons and ammunition to the enemy.’
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Throughout the summer,
the Indian leaders were frustrated at their lack of progress in the war, despite
pouring in men and money. ‘Like Oliver Twist, the military commanders
always ask for more and their estimates of requirements are constantly
changing,’ observed Sardar Patel. The extent of Indian military assistance
also raised the question of what was to become of the maharaja’s state
forces. Patel was reluctant to merge them with the Indian army because ‘if
and when any question of withdrawal of these Indian forces comes about,
this autonomous existence would enable us to maintain friendly forces on
the spot.’ If, however, they were merged with the Indian army, the Indian
government risked being asked to withdraw them, when the time came for
holding the plebiscite.
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‘The prolonged fighting was also taking a more
serious toll on the Indian resources than they had at first anticipated:
‘The military position is none too good,’ Patel confided, on June, to the
former prime minister of Jammu and Kashmir state, Gopalaswami Ayyangar,
who was India’s representative at the UN. ‘I am afraid our military resources
are strained to the uttermost. How long we are to carry on this unfortunate
affair, it is difficult to foresee.’
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At the same time, however, the Indian
leaders were also focusing their attention on the state of Hyderabad in central
India which, like Junagadh, with a Muslim ruler and a Hindu majority
population, was Kashmir in reverse. On September Indian troops
invaded Hyderabad; the Muslim nizam was deposed and this large state
became part of India. It was also the day Mohammad Ali Jinnah died.
Britain’s ‘truth’
From Britain’s perspective, they had done what was necessary to give the Indian
sub-continent its independence. Future Pakistanis, however, believed that their
country had not been favoured in the same way as India because of
Mountbatten’s presence as Governor-General of India and the grudge they
believed he bore for not being asked to be Governor-General of Pakistan. But
what they did not know were the misgivings Mountbatten felt about accepting the
position of Governor-General of one dominion and not the other. As General
Ismay, his chief of staff, recorded, Mountbatten had seriously considered telling
Congress that he could not now be Governor-General of the new India ‘on the
grounds that he might be accused of having deliberately favoured India in his
partition plan’ and that he should therefore ‘fade out’. But the British government
believed that there were ‘strong arguments’ for him to take up the position.
Firstly, because Congress would be bitterly hurt by having its ‘Crown’ spurned
and, since Congress would obviously not offer it to another Englishman, the
improvement in their relations would be nullified. Secondly, Congress would be
furious with Jinnah for having ‘once more cooked their goose’. Any chance of
good relations between the two new dominions or of a fair divison of assets
would disappear. Thirdly, the British officers remaining in India could possibly
have refused to stay if Mountbatten and his staff left. Fourthly, the Indian states
would also be likely to feel that their only chance of getting ‘a square deal’ from
Congress would have disappeared. As Ismay related, when he went to England to
discuss the matter with Attlee and the opposition leaders, they had many ‘anxious
and prolonged’ discussions, before finally deciding that Mountbatten should serve
as Governor-General of India. Mountbatten agreed provided the King, HMG
and the opposition ‘strongly desired him to do so’. *
Another key area of British influence which provided the seeds for criticism
in later years was their role in the armed forces. Because of Pakistan and
India’s dependence on British officers in their respective armies, both countries
believed that they had been disadvantaged during the Kashmir war: Pakistan,
because General Gracey had refused to send in troops when Jinnah requested
him to do so; India because, rather than encouraging the Indians to counter-
attack and recapture the area around Mirpur and Muzaffarabad, while they
were militarily in the ascendancy, General Bucher pressed for a ceasefire. But,
from the British perspective, Bucher’s objective, mirrored by that of Gracey,
was preventing an inter-dominion war, which would have required men, who
had so recently been comrades-in-arms, to fight each other. **
* W.H.J.Christie Collection, OIOC, MSS Eur D718
** see Dasgupta, C. War & Diplomacy, New Delhi, 2002 for an interesting, if somewhat
biased, discussion of British actions in the UN and the Kashmir war.
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