to be a genuine dialogue between Nehru and Mohammad Ali Bogra, prime
minister of Pakistan. In June they discussed Kashmir informally with
Nehru in London, where they were both present for the coronation of
Queen Elizabeth II. Nehru held talks with Bogra in Karachi. Soon afterwards
Bogra visited Delhi and together they discussed the naming of a plebiscite
administrator with the view to holding a plebiscite in the whole state. ‘We
have to choose a path which not only promises the greatest advantage but
is dignified and in keeping with our general policy,’ Nehru wrote to Bakshi
Ghulam Muhammad on August .
53
But Pakistan’s reluctance to
consider a different nominee, other than the American Admiral Nimitz, whom
India did not accept, stalled the whole proceedings. Such an opportunity
never arose again. ‘It is one of those ironies of history that just when India
appeared to be willing to settle the Kashmir dispute, the prime minister of
Pakistan allowed the opportunity to be frittered away,’ writes Gowher Rizvi.
54
The Western powers, most significantly the United States, were also
reappraising their policy towards India and Pakistan. Initially, American liberals
saw India ‘in a romantic haze’, writes Sam Burke. But the United States’
failure, most demonstrably over Korea, to enlist India’s support in the fight
against communism and Nehru’s commitment to a policy of ‘non-alignment’
finally alienated the US from India and brought them closer to Pakistan. ‘To
the Americans the main problem of the day was communism, to Nehru it
was colonialism,’ writes Burke. ‘Americans viewed socialism as the road to
communism; Nehru looked upon capitalism as the parent of imperialism
and fascism.’ Pakistan, however, took a different view of communism from
that of India, which meant that the United States was prepared to look more
favourably on Pakistan’s position on Kashmir. This support was demonstrated
in the UN, when both Britain and the United States voted for resolutions
which were acceptable to Pakistan.
Pakistan’s signature of a Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement with the
United States in May and acceptance of American aid was regarded by
India, as upsetting the sub-continental balance of power. Before the agree-
ment was signed, Nehru had written to Mohammad Ali Bogra:
If such an alliance takes place, Pakistan enters definitely into the region of the
cold war. That means to us that the cold war has come to the very frontiers of
India . . . It must also be a matter of grave consequence to us, you will appreciate,
if vast armies are built up in Pakistan with the aid of American money . . . All
our problems will have to be seen in a new light.
55
As an Indian journalist was to observe, however, Pakistan’s acceptance of
Western support ensured its survival. ‘India held the pistol at the head of
Pakistan, until, in , the American alliance delivered the country from the
nightmare.’
56
In September Pakistan joined SEATO and the following year
the Baghdad Pact (later called CENTO), whose other members were Turkey,
Iran and the United Kingdom.