identified as members of the th Rajput rifles. Three separate inquiries
concluded that the evidence of the women was inconsistent and, on the
basis of these inquiries, the Indian government asserted that the episode
was ‘a massive hoax orchestrated by terrorist groups, their mentors and
sympathisers in Kashmir and abroad.’
71
The mission of the International
Commission of Jurists which visited Kashmir in , however, concluded
that ‘while mass rape at Kunan Poshpura may not have been proved beyond
doubt, there are very substantial grounds for believing that it took place.’
72
‘Indian security forces tied up and shot seven men and boys, all members
of the same Kashmiri Muslim family in this remote village at the weekend,
in what seems to have been a calculated act of brutality to deter villagers
from helping Kashmiri separatists,’ wrote David Housego from Malangam in
the Kashmir valley in April . ‘The apparently cold-blooded reprisals by
the BSF against villagers they believed to be shielding militants or weapons
is further evidence of breakdown in discipline among Indian forces in
Kashmir.’
73
In June , Tony Allen-Mills reported how the inhabitants of Kulgam
were subjected to indiscriminate firing in the streets in reprisal for a rocket
attack on BSF barracks, when two soldiers were slightly injured:
Abdul Hamid Wazi, a baker’s assistant, saw soldiers pouring gunpowder on the
outside walls of his house. They fired a shot and set the place alight. The thatched
roof collapsed on him. Wazi jumped through the flames, badly burning his leg
and face. By the time the soldiers’ wrath was spent, twenty-eight shops and two
houses had been torched, there were bullet holes in the mosque and several
women claimed to have been raped.
74
In Tim McGirk of The Independent generously assessed the combined
strength of the main militant groups at , armed and trained fighters.
Indian army and paramilitary were initially estimated to be ,.
75
Over
time, these figures fluctuated both in reality and perception. The belief that
‘half a million Indian troops’ were stationed in Kashmir became an established
fact in the opinion of all opposition groups. The Indian government
maintained there were less militants and definitely less military.
After the JKLFs early successes, its leaders found that the Hizb-ul
Mujaheddin was finding more support in Pakistan at their expense. Amanullah
Khan complained that his recruits were being coerced to join the Hizb and
other groups. In December at a press conference in Islamabad, Khan
regretted that the pro-Pakistani Hizb was killing JKLF workers. The JKLF
also accused pro-Pakistani supporters of providing clues to the Indian security
forces regarding the JKLF hideouts, which made them easier to catch. In
Amanullah Khan made such a publicised attempt to cross the line of control;
in order to demonstrate that the JKLF did not recognise the line dividing
‘the motherland of Kashmir.’
76
His first attempt, on February – the
eighth anniversary of Maqbool Butt’s execution – was stopped by the