Rosenfeld Susan. Encyclopedia of American Historical Documents

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Source:

Statutes at Large, Vol. 57, pp. 163–169.

Teheran Conference Communiqué, 1943

Communiqué that was issued at the conclusion of the first war

conference held by the leaders of the three major Allied

forces in the capital of Iran from November 28 to December

1, 1943. The conference was attended by President Franklin

D. Roosevelt of the United States, Prime Minister Winston

Churchill of Great Britain, and Premier Joseph Stalin of the

Soviet Union. The Teheran Declaration stated that the Allies

reached “complete agreement as to the scope and timing of

operations” that would defeat Nazi Germany. The three lead-

ers promised to “express our determination that our nations

shall work together in war and in the peace that will follow.”

Their common goal was to make a peace, which would “ban-

ish the scourge and terror of war for many generations.” How-

ever, the grand words of the final communiqué told almost

nothing about the actual agreements that were made by the

Big Three at Teheran (Tehran). The second front would finally

be opened by an Anglo-American invasion of western France

(Operation Overlord) in the late spring of 1944. The USSR

agreed to enter the war against Japan once Germany was

defeated.

________________________

_______________________

Declaration of the Three Powers:

We, the President of the United States, the Prime Minis-

ter of Great Britain, and the Premier of the Soviet Union,

have met these four days past, in this, the Capital of our

ally, Iran, and have shaped and confirmed our common

policy.

We express our determination that our Nations shall

work together in war and in the peace that will follow.

As to war—our military staffs have joined in our

round-table discussions, and we have concerted our plans

for the destruction of the German forces. We have reached

complete agreement as to the scope and timing of the

operations to be undertaken from the east, west, and

south.

The common understanding which we have here

reached guarantees that victory will be ours.

And as to peace—we are sure that our concord

will win an enduring peace. We recognize fully the

supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the United

Nations to make a peace which will command the good

will of the overwhelming mass of the peoples of the world

and banish the scourge and terror of war for many gen-

erations.

With our diplomatic advisers we have surveyed the

problems of the future. We shall seek the cooperation and

active participation of all Nations, large and small, whose

peoples in heart and mind are dedicated, as are our own

peoples, to the elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppres-

sion and intolerance. We will welcome them, as they may

choose to come, into a world family of democratic Nations.

No power on earth can prevent our destroying the

German armies by land, their U-boats by sea, and their war

plants from the air.

Our attack will be relentless and increasing.

Emerging from these cordial conferences we look

with confidence to the day when all peoples of the world

may live free lives, untouched by tyranny, and according to

their varying desires and their own consciences.

We came here with hope and determination. We leave

here, friends in fact, in spirit, and in purpose.

Signed: Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin.

Source:

Franklin D. Roosevelt. The Public Papers and Addresses of

Franklin D. Roosevelt. New York: Random House, 1938–50.

Smith v. Allwright, 1944

U.S. Supreme Court decision issued on April 3, 1944, over-

turning a Texas Democratic Party policy that excluded black

citizens from membership in the party and therefore prevented

them from voting in the primary elections.

Previously, in

Guinn and Beal v. United States

(238 U.S.

347, [1915]) issued June 21, 1915, the U.S. Supreme Court

declared the “grandfather clause” unconstitutional. The grand-

father clause, a legal device used extensively in the South,

exempted from various financial and educational voting

requirements those whose fathers or grandfathers had voted

before 1867; it effectively disenfranchised most blacks, whose

ancestors had then been slaves. The test case arose from an

attempt to include such a clause in the Oklahoma Constitution

and was brought before the Supreme Court by the National

Association for the Advancement of Colored People. The

Court ruled that the clause violated the purpose and intent of

the Fifteenth Amendment, which was to assure equal voting

rights regardless of race, color, or previous condition of servi-

tude. However, other laws, standards imposed by registrars,

and economic and terrorist coercion continued to keep south-

ern blacks from voting in significant numbers until the late

1960s.

The “white primary” was one such device. In Texas, as in

all the former Confederate states, the Democratic primary was

tantamount to election. Lonnie E. Smith, a black, challenged

the policy, suing election judge S. E. Allwright on the grounds

that Smith was excluded from voting in the primaries because

1432 ERA 8: The Great Depression and World War II

of his race. Reversing its 1935 decision in

Grovey v. Townsend

(295 U.S. 45), the Supreme Court ruled that party primaries

could not be considered private matters and that the party was

acting as an agency of the state. The use of white primaries

was therefore prohibited by the Fifteenth Amendment. The

broader significance of the case comes from the Court’s plac-

ing substance over form in determining voting rights, a con-

cept that led directly to overturning other discriminatory

legislation.

Future Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall argued

the case for the NAACP Legal and Education Fund. Although

he is better known for arguing the landmark

Brown v. Board of

Education

(347 U.S. 483 [1954]), Marshall considered

Smith

Allwright

the most important case he argued. After

Allwright

legal actions to deny blacks the franchise had to be directed

against individuals such as poll taxes (outlawed by the Twenty-

fourth Amendment) and literacy tests (outlawed by the Voting

Rights Act of 1965). By bringing primaries under federal aegis,

it enabled the Department of Justice through the FBI to inves-

tigate primary voting rights violations.

________________________

_______________________

Mr. Justice Reed delivered the opinion of the Court.

This writ of certiorari brings here for review a claim

for damages in the sum of $5,000 on the part of petitioner,

a Negro citizen of the 48th precinct of Harris County,

Texas, for the refusal of respondents, election and associ-

ate election judges respectively of that precinct, to give

petitioner a ballot or to permit him to cast a ballot in the

primary election of July 27, 1940, for the nomination of

Democratic candidates for the United States Senate and

House of Representatives, and Governor and other state

officers. The refusal is alleged to have been solely because

of the race and color of the proposed voter.

The actions of respondents are said to violate Sec-

tions 31 and 43 of Title 8 of the United States Code, 8

U.S.C.A. Section 31 and 43, in that petitioner was de-

prived of rights secured by Sections 2 and 4 of Article I

and the Fourteenth, Fifteenth and Seventeenth Amend-

ments to the United States Constitution. The suit was

filed in the District Court of the United States for the

Southern District of Texas, which had jurisdiction under

Judicial Code Section 24, subsection 14, 28 U.S.C.A. Sec-

tion 41 (14).

The District Court denied the relief sought and the

Circuit Court of Appeals quite properly affirmed its action

on the authority of Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45. . . .

We granted the petition for certiorari to resolve a claimed

inconsistency between the decision in the Grovey case and

that of United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299. . . .

The State of Texas by its Constitution and statutes

provides that every person, if certain other requirements

are met which are not here in issue, qualified by residence

in the district or county “shall be deemed a qualified

elector.” . . . Primary elections for United States Senators,

Congressmen and state officers are provided for by Chap-

ters Twelve and Thirteen of the statutes. Under these

chapters, the Democratic Party was required to hold the

primary which was the occasion of the alleged wrong to

petitioner. . . .

The Democratic Party of Texas is held by the Supreme

Court of that state to be a “voluntary association” . . .

* * *

The Democratic party on May 24, 1932, in a State Con-

vention adopted the following resolution, which has not

since been “amended, abrogated, annulled or avoided”:

“Be it resolved that all white citizens of the State of

Texas who are qualified to vote under the Constitution and

laws of the State shall be eligible to membership in the

Democratic party and, as such, entitled to participate in its

deliberations.” It was by virtue of this resolution that the

respondents refused to permit the petitioner to vote.

[1] Texas is free to conduct her elections and limit her

electorate as she may deem wise, save only as her action

may be affected by the prohibitions of the United States

Constitution or in conflict with powers delegated to and

exercised by the National Government. The Fourteenth

Amendment forbids a state from making or enforcing any

law which abridges the privileges or immunities of citizens

of the United States and the Fifteenth Amendment specif-

ically interdicts any denial or abridgment by a state of the

right of citizens to vote on account of color. Respondents

appeared in the District Court and the Circuit Court of

Appeals and defended on the ground that the Democratic

party of Texas is a voluntary organization with members

banded together for the purpose of selecting individuals of

the group representing the common political beliefs as

candidates in the general election. As such a voluntary

organization, it was claimed, the Democratic party is free

to select its own membership and limit to whites participa-

tion in the party primary. Such action, the answer asserted,

does not violate the Fourteenth, Fifteenth or Seventeenth

Amendment as officers of government cannot be chosen at

primaries and the Amendments are applicable only to gen-

eral elections where governmental officers are actually

elected. Primaries, it is said, are political party affairs, han-

dled by party not governmental officers. . . .

The right of a Negro to vote in the Texas primary has

been considered heretofore by this Court. The first case

was Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, . . . declared “in no

event shall a Negro be eligible to participate in a Demo-

cratic party primary election . . . in the State of Texas.”

Nixon was refused the right to vote in a Democratic pri-

mary and brought a sought for damages against the elec-

tion officers. . . . Without consideration of the Fifteenth

World War II at Home and Abroad 1433

[Amendment], this Court held that the action of Texas in

denying the ballot to Negroes by statute was in violation of

the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

and reversed the dismissal of the suit.

The legislature of Texas reenacted the article but gave

the State Executive Committee of a party the power to

prescribe the qualifications of its members for voting or

other participation. This article remains in the statues. The

State Executive Committee of the Democratic party

adopted a resolution that white Democrats and none other

might participate in the primaries of that party. Nixon was

refused again the privilege of voting in a primary and again

brought suit for damages. . . . This Court again reversed

the dismissal of the suit for the reason that the Committee

action was deemed to be State and invalid as discrimina-

tory under the Fourteenth Amendment. The test was said

to be whether the Committee operated as representative

of the State in the discharge of the State’s authority. . . .

The question of the inherent power of a political party in

Texas “without restraint by any law to determine its own

membership” was left open.

In Grovey v. Townsend . . . this Court had before it

another suit for damages for the refusal in a primary of a

county clerk, a Texas officer with only public functions to

perform, to furnish petitioner, a Negro, an absentee ballot.

The refusal was solely on the ground of race.

This case differed from Nixon v. Condon, supra, in that

a state convention of the Democratic party had passed the

resolution of May 24, 1932, hereinbefore quoted. . . . The

managers of the primary election were therefore declare

not to be state officials in such sense that their action was

state action. A state convention of a party was said not to be

an organ of the state. This Court went on to announce that

to deny a vote in a primary was a mere refusal of party

membership with which “the state need have no concern”

. . . Consequently, there was found no ground for holding

that the county clerk’s refusal of a ballot because of racial

ineligibility for party membership denied the petitioner any

right under the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments.

Since Grovey v. Townsend and prior to the present

suit, no case from Texas involving primary elections has

been before this Court. We did decide, however, United

States v. Classic. . . . We there held that Section 4 of Arti-

cle I of the Constitution authorized Congress to regulate

primary as well as general elections. . . . Consequently, in

the Classic case, we upheld the applicability to frauds in a

Louisiana primary of . . . the Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C.A.

Sections 51, 52. Thereby corrupt acts of election officers

were subjected to Congressional sanctions because that

body had power to protect rights to Federal suffrage by the

Constitution in primary as in general elections. . . . This

decision depended, too, on the determination that under

the Louisiana statutes the primary was a part of the proce-

dure for choice of Federal officials. By this decision the

doubt as to whether or not such primaries were a part of

“elections” subject to Federal control . . . was erased. The

Nixon cases were decided under the equal protection

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment without a determi-

nation of the status of the primary as a part of the electoral

process. The exclusion of Negroes from the primaries by

action of the State was held invalid under that Amendment.

The fusing by the Classic case of the primary and general

elections, into a single instrumentality for choice of officers

has a definite bearing on the permissibility under the Con-

stitution of excluding Negroes from primaries. This is not to

say that the Classic case cuts directly into the rationale of

Grovey v. Townsend. This latter case was not mentioned in

the opinion. Classic bears upon Grovey v. Townsend not

because exclusion of Negroes from primaries is any more or

less state action by reason of the unitary character of the

electoral process but because the recognition of the place

of the primary in the electoral scheme makes clear that

state delegation to party of the power to fix the qualifica-

tions of primary elections is delegation of a state function

that may make the party’s action the action of the state. . . .

As the Louisiana statutes for holding primaries are similar

to those of Texas, our ruling in Classic as to the unitary

character of the electoral process calls for a reexamination

as to whether or not the exclusion of Negroes from a Texas

party primary was state action.

The statutes of Texas relating to primaries and the res-

olution of the Democratic party of Texas extending the

privileges of membership to white citizens only are the

same in substance and effect today as they were when

Grovey v. Townsend was decided by a unanimous Court.

The question as to whether the exclusionary action of the

party was the action of the State persists as the determina-

tive factor. . . .

[2] It may now be taken as a postulate that the right to

vote in such a primary for the nomination of candidates

without discrimination by the State, like the right to vote

in a general election, is a right secured by the Constitution

. . . By the terms of the Fifteenth Amendment that right

may not be abridged by any state on account of race.

Under our Constitution the great privilege of the ballot

may not be denied a man by the State because of his color.

[3] We are thus brought to an examination of the qual-

ifications for Democratic primary electors in Texas, to

determine whether state action or private action has

excluded Negroes from participation. Despite Texas’ deci-

sion that the exclusion is produced by private or party

action. . . Federal courts must for themselves appraise

the facts leading to that conclusion. It is only by the per-

formance of this obligation that a final and uniform inter-

pretation can be given to the Constitution, the “supreme

Law of the Land.” . . . Texas requires electors in a primary

1434 ERA 8: The Great Depression and World War II

to pay a poll tax. Every person who does so pay and who

has the qualifications of age and residence is an acceptable

voter for the primary. . . . No convention may place in

platform or resolution any demand for specific legislation

without endorsement of such legislation by the voters in

a primary. Texas thus directs the selection of all party

officers.

Primary elections are conducted by the party under

state statutory authority. . . . These party committees or the

state convention certify the party’s candidates to the appro-

priate officers for inclusion on the official ballot for the

general election. No name which has not been so certified

may appear upon the ballot for the general election as a

candidate of a political party. No other name may be

printed on the ballot which has not been placed in nomi-

nation by qualified voters who must take oath that they did

not participate in a primary for the selection of a candidate

for the office for which the nomination is made.

The state courts are given exclusive original jurisdic-

tion of contested elections and of mandamus proceedings

to compel party officers to perform their statutory duties.

[4, 5] We think that this statutory system for the selec-

tion of party nominees for inclusion on the general elec-

tion ballot makes the party which is required to follow

these legislative directions an agency of the state in so far

as it determines the participants in a primary election. The

party takes its character as a state agency from the duties

imposed upon it by state statutes; the duties do not be-

come matters of private law because they are performed

by a political party. The plan of the Texas primary follows

substantially that of Louisiana, with the exception that in

Louisiana the state pays the cost of the primary while

Texas assesses the cost against candidates. In numerous

instances, the Texas statutes fix or limit the fees to be

charged. Whether paid directly by the state or through

state requirements, it is state action which compels. When

primaries become a part of the machinery for choosing

officials, state and national, as they have here, the same

tests to determine the character of discrimination or

abridgement should be applied to the primary as are

applied to the general election. If the state requires a cer-

tain electoral procedure, prescribes a general election bal-

lot made up of party nominees so chosen and limits the

choice of the electorate in general elections for state

offices, practically speaking, to those whose names appear

on such a ballot, it endorses, adopts and enforces the dis-

crimination against Negroes, practiced by a party

entrusted by Texas law with the determination of the qual-

ifications of participants in the primary. This is state action

within the meaning of the Fifteenth Amendment. . . .

[6] The United States is a constitutional democracy.

Its organic law grants to all citizens a right to participate in

the choice of elected officials without restriction by any

state because of race. This grant to the people of the

opportunity for choice is not to be nullified by a state

through casting its electoral process in a form which per-

mits a private organization to practice racial discrimination

in the election. Constitutional rights would be of little

value if they could be thus indirectly denied. . . . .

[7, 8] The privilege of membership in a party may be,

as this Court said in Grovey v. Townsend, . . . no concern

of a state. But when, as here, that privilege is also the

essential qualification for voting in a primary to select

nominees for a general election, the state makes the action

of the party the action of the state. In reaching this con-

clusion we are not unmindful of the desirability of conti-

nuity of decision in constitutional questions. However,

when convinced of former error, this Court has never felt

constrained to follow precedent. In constitutional ques-

tions, where correction depends upon amendment and not

upon legislative action this Court throughout its history has

freely exercised its power to reexamine the basis of its con-

stitutional decisions. This has long been accepted practice,

and this practice has continued to this day. This is particu-

larly true when the decision believed erroneous is the

application of a constitutional principle rather than an

interpretation of the Constitution to extract the principle

itself. Here we are applying, contrary to the recent deci-

sion in Grovey v. Townsend, the well established principle

of the Fifteenth Amendment, forbidding the abridgement

by a state of a citizen’s right to vote. Grovey v. Townsend is

overruled.

Judgment reversed.

Source:

Supreme Court Reporter, Vol. 64, pp. 757–768.

General Dwight D. Eisenhower,

If D Day Fails, 1944

One of the most dramatic events of World War II was Opera-

tion Overlord, the invasion of western Europe by more than

14,000 Allied troops (mostly Americans) on the beaches near

Cherbourg in Normandy beginning June 6, 1944, D Day. The

invasion involved more than 5,000 vessels, 11,000 airplanes,

and 175,000 men, who left from England the night before. To

keep plans for this gigantic invasion from the Germans, who

had occupied France, the Allies set up a parallel but totally fic-

tional invasion force that was to land in Calais under the sup-

posed direction of a real general, George Patton. The ruse

worked, and the Germans sent their best divisions to Calais.

However, they also had a formidable force in Normandy.

British and American paratroopers along with several thou-

sand dummy paratroopers preceded the seaborne force, which

also served to confuse the Germans. Nevertheless, the Ger-

World War II at Home and Abroad 1435

mans met the landing parties with heavy gunfire and artillery.

By the end of the first day, the Allies controlled five beaches

but casualties included more than 6,000 Americans, 3,000

British, and almost 1,000 Canadians.

Considering the possibility that the invasion would fail,

General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was in charge of Over-

lord, penned this note a few hours after giving the order to

begin the operation. In his haste or trepidation he misdated the

document July 5 instead of June 5. Fortunately, the note was

not needed. But the European war would continue for another

11 months before the Germans surrendered.

________________________

_______________________

Our landings in the Cherbourg-Havre area have failed to

gain a satisfactory foothold and I have withdrawn the

troops. My decision to attack at this time and place was

based upon the best information available. The troops, the

air and the Navy did all that Bravery [sic] and devotion to

duty could do. If any blame or fault attaches to the attempt

it is mine alone. July 5

Source:

National Archives and Records Administration, Dwight D. Ei-

senhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. Available on-line. URL:

http://www.archives.gov/exhibit_hall/american_originals_iv/

images/d_day/eisenhower_note.html. Accessed January

2004.

GI Bill of Rights, 1944

U.S. legislation enacted on June 22, 1944, authorizing eco-

nomic and educational assistance for veterans of World War II.

(A veteran or member of the U.S. armed forces is called a GI,

an abbreviation of “government issue.”) The law provided

low-interest, federally guaranteed mortgages for the purchase

of new homes, farms, and businesses; allowed substantial

unemployment benefits for up to one year; provided assis-

tance to returning veterans in finding jobs; and gave educa-

tional and vocational subsidies for up to four years of college,

allowing up to $500 a year for tuition and books and $50 a

month as a stipend. It also authorized aid for veterans’ hospi-

tals and vocational rehabilitation.

This was possibly the most influential economic and social

act of the century. Some 12 million veterans were able to attain

college and graduate degrees qualifying them for higher paying

jobs and/or to purchase homes giving them a capital base for

their future and spurring the move to suburbia. Without detract-

ing from deserving veterans it should be noted that the GI Bill

not only helped produce the general prosperity of the 1950s

and 1960s, it helped increase the disparity between those who

benefited and those who did not. The armed services had racial

and gender quotas, and some positions filled primarily or

exclusively by women or racial minorities did not qualify for

the GI Bill or other veterans’ benefits.

________________________

_______________________

An Act

To provide Federal Government aid for the readjustment

in civilian life of returning World War II veterans.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Represen-

tatives of the United States of America in Congress assem-

bled, That this Act may be cited as the “Servicemen’s

Readjustment Act of 1944.”

Title I

HAPTER

I—H

OSPITALIZATION

LAIMS

AND

ROCEDURES

Sec. 100. The Veterans’ Administration is hereby declared

to be an essential war agency and entitled, second only to

the War and Navy Departments, to priorities in personnel,

equipment, supplies, and material under any laws, Execu-

tive orders, and regulations pertaining to priorities, and in

appointments of personnel from civil-service registers the

Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs is hereby granted the

same authority and discretion as the War and Navy

Departments and the United States Public Health Service:

Provided, That the provisions of this section as to priorities

for materials shall apply to any State institution to be built

for the care or hospitalization of veterans.

Sec. 101. The Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs and

the Federal Board of Hospitalization are hereby authorized

and directed to expedite and complete the construction of

additional hospital facilities for war veterans, and to enter

into agreements and contracts for the use by or transfer to

the Veterans’ Administration of suitable Army and Navy

hospitals after termination of hostilities in the present war

or after such institutions are no longer needed by the

armed services; and the Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs

is hereby authorized and directed to establish necessary

. . . subordinate offices in centers of population where there

is no Veterans’ Administration facility, or where such a

facility is not readily available or accessible. . .

* * *

HAPTER

III—R

EVIEWING

UTHORITY

* * *

Sec. 301. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the

Navy, after conference with the Administrator of Veterans’

Affairs, are authorized and directed to establish in the War

and Navy Departments, respectively, boards of review

composed of five members each, whose duties shall be to

review, the type and nature of [a former officer or enlisted

man or woman’s] discharge or dismissal, except a discharge

or dismissal by reason of the sentence of a general court

1436 ERA 8: The Great Depression and World War II

martial. Such review shall be based upon all available

records of the service department relating to the person

requesting such review, and such other evidence as may be

presented by such person. Witnesses shall be permitted to

present testimony either in person or by affidavit and the

person requesting review shall be allowed to appear before

such board in person or by counsel. . . . Such board shall

have authority, except in the case of a discharge or dis-

missal by reason of the sentence of a general court martial,

to change, correct, or modify any discharge or dismissal,

and to issue a new discharge in accord with the facts pre-

sented to the board . . . . the findings thereof to be final

subject only to review by the Secretary of War or the Sec-

retary of the Navy, respectively. . . .

Sec. 302. (a) The Secretary of War, the Secretary of

the Navy, and the Secretary of the Treasury are authorized

and directed to establish, from time to time, boards of

review composed of five commissioned officers, two of

whom shall be selected from the Medical Corps of the

Army or Navy, or from the Public Health Service, as the

case may be. It shall be the duty of any such board to

review, at the request of any officer retired or released to

inactive service, without pay, for physical disability pur-

suant to the decision of a retiring board, the findings and

decision of such retiring board. Such review shall be based

upon all available service records relating to the officer

requesting such review, and such other evidence as may be

presented by such officer. Witnesses shall be permitted to

present testimony. . . . The proceedings and decision of

each such board of review . . . shall be transmitted to the

Secretary of War, the Secretary of Navy, or the Secretary of

the Treasury, as the case may be, and shall be laid by him

before the President for his approval or disapproval and

orders in the case.

* * *

Title II

HAPTER

IV—E

DUCATION OF

ETERANS

* * *

“Part VIII

“1. Any person who served in the active military or

naval service on or after September 16, 1940, and prior to

the termination of the present war, and who shall have

been discharged or released therefrom under conditions

other than dishonorable, and whose education or training

was impeded, delayed, interrupted, or interfered with by

reason of his entrance into the service, or who desires a

refresher or retraining course, and who either shall have

served ninety days or more, exclusive of any period he was

assigned for a course of education or training under the

Army specialized training program or the Navy college

training program, which course was a continuation of his

civilian course and was pursued to completion, or as a

cadet or midshipman at one of the service academies, or

shall have been discharged or released from active service

by reason of an actual service-incurred injury or disability,

shall be eligible for and entitled to receive education or

training under this part. . . . And provided further, That any

such person who was not over 25 years of age at the time

he entered the service shall be deemed to have had his

education or training impeded, delayed, interrupted, or

interfered with.

“2. Any such eligible person shall be entitled to edu-

cation or training, or a refresher or retraining course, at

an approved educational or training institution, for a

period of one year (or the equivalent thereof in continu-

ous part-time study), or for such lesser time as may be

required for the course of instruction chosen by him.

Upon satisfactory completion of such course of education

or training, according to the regularly prescribed stan-

dards and practices of the institutions, except a refresher

or retraining course, such person shall be entitled to an

additional period or periods of education or training, not

to exceed the time such person was in the active service

or on after September 16, 1940, and before the termina-

tion of the war, exclusive of any period he was assigned for

a course of education or training under the Army special-

ized training program or the Navy college training pro-

gram, which course was a continuation of his civilian

course and was pursued to completion, or as a cadet or

midshipman at one of the service academies, but in no

event shall the total period of education or training

exceed four years: Provided, That his work continues to

be satisfactory throughout the period, according to the

regularly prescribed standards and practices of the insti-

tution. . . .

“3. Such person shall be eligible for and entitled to

such course of education or training as the may elect, and

at any approved educational or training institution at which

he chooses to enroll, whether or not located in the State in

which he resides, which will accept or retain him as a stu-

dent or trainee in any field or branch of knowledge which

such institution finds him qualified to undertake or pursue:

Provided, That, for reasons satisfactory to the Administra-

tor, he may change a course of instruction: And provided

further, That any such course of education or training may

be discontinued at any time, if it is found by the Adminis-

trator that, according to the regularly prescribed standards

and practices of the institution, the conduct or progress of

such person is unsatisfactory.

* * *

5. The Administrator shall pay to the educational or

training institution, for each person enrolled in full time or

part time course of education or training, the customary

World War II at Home and Abroad 1437

cost of tuition, and such laboratory, library, health, infir-

mary, and other similar fees as are customarily charged,

and may pay for books, supplies, equipment, and other

necessary expenses, exclusive of board, lodging, other liv-

ing expenses, and travel, as are generally required for the

successful pursuit and completion of the course by other

students in the institution: Provided, That in no event shall

such payments, with respect to any person, exceed $500

for an ordinary school year: Provided further, That no pay-

ments shall be made to institutions, business or other

establishments furnishing apprentice training on the job:

And provided further, That if any such institution has no

established tuition fee, or if its established tuition fee shall

be found by the Administrator to be inadequate compen-

sation to such institution for furnishing such education or

training, he is authorized to provide for the payment, with

respect to any such person, of such fair and reasonable

compensation as will not exceed $500 for an ordinary

school year.

“6. While enrolled in and pursuing a course under

this part, such person, upon application to the Adminis-

trator, shall be paid a subsistence allowance of $50 per

month, if without a dependent or dependents, or $75 per

month, if he has a dependent or dependents, including

regular holidays and leave not exceeding thirty days in a

calendar year. Such person attending a course on a part-

time basis, and such person receiving compensation for

productive labor performed as part of their apprentice or

other training on the job at institutions, business or other

establishments, shall be entitled to receive such lesser

sums, if any, as subsistence or dependency allowances, as

may be determined by the Administrator: Provided, That

any such person eligible under this part, and within the

limitations thereof, may pursue such full time or part-time

course or courses as he may elect, without subsistence

allowance.

* * *

“8. No department, agency, or officer of the United

States, in carrying out the provisions of this part, shall exer-

cise any supervision or control, whatsoever, over any State

educational agency, or State apprenticeship agency, or any

educational or training institutions: Provided, That nothing

in this section shall be deemed to prevent any department,

agency, or officer of the United States from exercising any

supervision or control which such department, agency, or

officer is authorized, by existing provisions of law, to exer-

cise over any Federal educational or training institution, or

to prevent the furnishing of education or training under

this part in any institution over which supervision or con-

trol is exercised by such other department, agency, or offi-

cer under authority of existing provisions of law.

* * *

“11. As used in this part, the term ‘educational or

training institutions’ shall include all public or private ele-

mentary, secondary, and other schools furnishing educa-

tion for adults, business schools and colleges, scientific and

technical institutions, colleges, vocational schools, junior

colleges, teachers colleges, normal schools, professional

schools, universities, and other educational institutions,

and shall also include business or other establishments

providing apprentice or other training on the job, includ-

ing those under the supervision of an approved college or

university or any State department of education, or any

State apprenticeship agency or State board of vocational

education, or any State apprenticeship council or the Fed-

eral Apprentice Training Service established in accordance

with Public, Numbered 308, Seventy-fifth Congress, or

any agency in the executive branch of the Federal Gov-

ernment authorized under other laws to supervise such

training.”

* * *

Title III—Loans for the Purchase or Construction

of Homes, Farms, and Business Property

HAPTER

V—G

ENERAL

ROVISIONS FOR

OANS

Sec. 500. (a) Any person who shall have served in the

active military or naval service of the United States at any

time on or after September 16, 1940, and prior to the ter-

mination of the present war and who shall have been dis-

charged or released therefrom under conditions other

than dishonorable after active service of ninety days or

more, or by reason of an injury or disability incurred in

service in line of duty, shall be eligible for the benefits of

this title. Any such veteran may apply within two years

after separation from the military or naval forces, or two

years after termination of the war, whichever is the later

date, but in no event more than five years after the termi-

nation of the war, to the Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs

for the guaranty by the Administrator of not to exceed 50

per centum of a loan or loans for any of the purposes spec-

ified . . . That the aggregate amount guaranteed shall not

exceed $2,000. If the Administrator finds that the veteran

is eligible for the benefits of this title and that the loan

applied for appears practicable, the Administrator shall

guarantee the payment of the part thereof as set forth in

this title.

* * *

title shall be payable under such terms and conditions as

may be approved by the Administrator: Provided, That the

liability under the guaranty, within the limitations of this

title, shall decrease or increase pro rata with any decrease

1438 ERA 8: The Great Depression and World War II

or increase of the amount of the unpaid portion of the obli-

gation: Provided further, That loans guaranteed by the

Administrator shall bear interest at a rate not exceeding 4

per centum per annum and shall be payable in full in not

more than twenty years. The Administrator is authorized

and directed to guarantee loans to veterans subject to

the provisions of this title on approved applications made

to persons, firms, associations, and corporations and to

governmental agencies and corporations, either State or

Federal.

Purchase or Construction of Homes

Sec. 501. (a) Any application made by a veteran under

this title for the guaranty of a loan to be used in purchas-

ing residential property or in constructing a dwelling on

unimproved property owned by him to be occupied as his

home may be approved by the Administrator of Veterans’

Affairs if he finds—

(1) that the proceeds of such loans will be used for

payment for such property to be purchased or constructed

by the veteran;

(2) that the contemplated terms of payment required

in any mortgage to be given in part payment of the pur-

chase price or the construction cost bear a proper relation

to the veteran’s present and anticipated income and

expenses; and that the nature and condition of the prop-

erty is such as to be suitable for dwelling purposes; and

(3) that the purchase price paid or to be paid by the

veteran for such property or the construction cost, includ-

ing the value of the unimproved lot, does not exceed the

reasonable normal value thereof as determined by proper

appraisal.

(b) Any application for the guaranty of a loan under

this section for the purpose of making repairs, alterations,

or improvements in, or paying delinquent indebtedness,

taxes, or special assessments on, residential property

owned by the veteran and used by him as his home, may

be approved by the Administrator if he finds that the pro-

ceeds of such loan will be used for such purpose or pur-

poses.

* * *

Purchase of Farms and Farm Equipment

Sec. 502. Any application made under this title for the

guaranty of a loan to be used in purchasing any land, build-

ings, livestock, equipment, machinery, or implements, or

in repairing, altering, or improving any buildings or equip-

ment, to be used in farming operations conducted by the

applicant, may be approved by the Administrator of Veter-

ans’ Affairs if he finds—

(1) that the proceeds for such loan will be used in pay-

ment for real or personal property purchased or to be pur-

chased by the veteran, or for repairing, altering, or

improving any buildings or equipment, to be used in bona

fide farming operations conducted by him;

(2) that such property will be useful in and reasonably

necessary for efficiently conducting such operations;

(3) that the ability and experience of the veteran, and

the nature of the proposed farming operations to be con-

ducted by him, are such that there is a reasonable likeli-

hood that such operations will be successful; and

(4) that the purchase price paid or to be paid by the

veteran for such property does not exceed the reasonable

normal value thereof as determined by proper appraisal.

Purchase of Business Property

Sec. 503. Any application made under this title for the

guaranty of a loan to be used in purchasing any business,

land, buildings, supplies, equipment, machinery, or tools,

to be used by the applicant in pursuing a gainful occupa-

tion (other than farming) may be approved by the Admin-

istrator of Veterans’ Affairs if he finds—

(1) that the proceeds of such loan will be used for pay-

ment for real or personal property purchased or to be pur-

chased by the veteran and used by him in the bona fide

pursuit of such gainful occupation;

(2) that such property will be useful in and reasonably

necessary for the efficient and successful pursuit of such

occupation;

(3) that the ability and experience of the veteran, and

the conditions under which he proposes to pursue such

occupation, are such that there is a reasonable likelihood

that he will be successful in the pursuit of such occupation;

and

(4) that the purchase price paid or to be paid by the

veteran for such property does not exceed the reasonable

normal value thereof as determined by proper appraisal.

* * *

Title IV

HAPTER

IV—E

MPLOYMENT OF

ETERANS

Sec. 600. (a) In the enactment of the provisions of

this title Congress declares as its intent and purpose that

there shall be an effective job counseling and employ-

ment placement service for veterans, and that, to this

end, policies shall be promulgated and administered, so

as to provide for them the maximum of job opportunity in

the field of gainful employment. For the purpose there is

hereby created to cooperate with and assist the United

States Employment Service. . . . a Veterans’ Placement

Service Board. . . . The Board shall determine all matters

of policy relating to the administration of the Veterans’

Employment Service of the United States Employment

Service.

* * *

World War II at Home and Abroad 1439

Sec. 601. The United States Employment Service

shall assign to each of the States a veterans’ employment

representative, who shall be a veteran of the wars of the

United States separated from active service under honor-

able conditions, who at the time of appointment shall have

been a bona fide resident of the State for at least two years,

and who shall be appointed, subject to the approval of the

Board, in accordance with the civil-service laws. . . . He

shall be administratively responsible to the Board, through

its executive secretary, for the execution of the Board’s vet-

erans’ placement policies through the public employment

service in the State.

In cooperation with the public employment service

staff in the state, he shall—

(a) be functionally responsible for the supervision of

the registration of veterans in local employment offices for

suitable types of employment and for placement of veter-

ans in employment;

(b) assist in securing and maintaining current infor-

mation as to the various types of available employment in

public works and private industry or business;

veterans;

(d) maintain regular contact with employers and vet-

erans’ organizations with a view of keeping employers

advised of veterans available for employment and veter-

ans advised of opportunities for employment; and

(e) assist in every possible way in improving working

conditions and the advancement of employment of veter-

ans.

* * *

Title V

HAPTER

VII—R

EADJUSTMENT

LLOWANCES FOR

ORMER

EMBERS OF THE

RMED

ORCES

NEMPLOYED

Sec. 700. (a) Any person who shall have served in the

active military or naval service of the United States at any

time after September 16, 1940, and prior to the termina-

tion of the present war, and who shall have been dis-

charged or released from active service under conditions

other than dishonorable, after active service of ninety days

or more, or by reason of an injury or disability incurred in

service in line of duty, shall be entitled, in accordance with

the provisions of this title and regulations issued by the

Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs pursuant thereto, to

receive a readjustment allowance as provided herein for

each week of unemployment, not to exceed a total of fifty-

two weeks. . . .

(b) Such person shall be deemed eligible to receive an

allowance for any week of unemployment if claim is made

for such allowance and the Administrator finds with

respect to such week that—

(1) the person is residing in the United States at the

time of such claim;

(2) the person is completely unemployed, having per-

formed no service and received no wages, or is partially

unemployed in that services have been performed for less

than a full work-week and the wages for the week are less

than the allowance under this title plus $3;

(3) the person is registered with and continues to

report to a public employment office, in accordance with

its regulations;

(4) the person is able to work and available for suitable

work

HAPTER

VIII—D

ISQUALIFICATIONS

* * *

(2) In determining under subsection (a) of this section

the suitability of work, no work shall be deemed suitable

for an individual if—

(A) the position offered is vacant due directly to a

strike, lock-out, or other labor dispute; or

(B) the wages, hours, or other conditions of the work

offered are substantially less favorable to him than those

prevailing for similar work in the locality.

* * *

HAPTER

XI—A

DMINISTRATION

Sec. 1100. (a) The Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs is

authorized to administer this title and shall, insofar as pos-

sible, utilize existing facilities and services of Federal and

State departments or agencies on the basis of mutual

agreements with such departments or agencies. Such ag-

reements shall provide for the filing of claims for readjust-

ment allowances with the Administrator through

established public employment offices and State unem-

ployment-compensation agencies. Such agencies, through

agreement, shall also be utilized in the processing, adjust-

ment, and determination of such claims and the payment

of such allowances. To facilitate the carrying out of agree-

ments with State departments or agencies and to assist in

the discharge of the Administrator’s duties under this title,

a representative of the Administrator, who shall be a war

veteran separated from active service under honorable

conditions and who at the time of appointment shall have

been a bona fide resident of the State for at least two years,

shall be located in each participating State department

or agency.

(b) The Administrator, consistent with the provisions

of this title, shall prescribe such rules and regulations

and require such records and reports as he may find

necessary to carry out its purposes: Provided, however,

That cooperative rules and regulations relating to the

performance by Federal or State departments, or agen-

1440 ERA 8: The Great Depression and World War II

cies, of functions under agreements made therewith may

be made by the Administrator after consultation and

advisement with representatives of such departments or

agencies.

* * *

HAPTER

XIII—P

ENALTIES

Sec. 1300. Any claimant who knowingly accepts an

allowance to which he is not entitled shall be ineligible to

receive any further allowance under this title.

Sec. 1301. (a) Whoever, for the purpose of causing an

increase in any allowance authorized under this title, or

for the purpose of causing any allowance to be paid

where none is authorized under this title, shall made

or cause to be made any false statement or representation

as to any wages paid or received, or whoever makes or

causes to be made any false statement of a material

fact in any claim for any allowance under this title, or

whoever makes or causes to be made any false statement,

representation, affidavit, or document in connection

with such claim, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and

upon conviction thereof shall be fined not more

than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or

both.

(b) Whoever shall obtain or receive any money,

check, or allowance under this title, without being enti-

tled thereto and with intent to defraud the United States,

shall be punished by a fine of not more than $1,000 or by

imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.

* * *

Title VI

* * *

Sec. 1503. A discharge or release from active service under

conditions other than dishonorable shall be a prerequisite

to entitlement to veterans’ benefits provided by this Act or

Public Law Numbered 2, Seventy-third Congress, as

amended.

Sec. 1504. The Administrator shall transmit to the

Congress annually a report of operations under this Act. If

the Senate or the House of Representatives is not in ses-

sion, such reports shall be transmitted to the Secretary of

the Senate or the Clerk of the House of Representatives,

as the case may be.

* * *

Approved June 22, 1944.

Source:

Statutes at Large, Vol. 58, pp. 284–301.

Korematsu v. United States, 1944

U.S. Supreme Court decision, issued on December 18, 1944,

that upheld the constitutionality of the Japanese evacuation

program established under Executive Order 9066 after Pearl

Harbor. Fred Korematsu, an American-born citizen of Japanese

ancestry, refused to obey the evacuation order on the grounds

that it violated his Fifth Amendment rights to due process. In its

6-3 decision, the Court ruled that military authorities were jus-

tified in relocating people of Japanese descent without individ-

ual hearings because of national security needs. In dissent,

Justice Frank Murphy criticized the evacuation program as

“legalization of racism.” In 1983, when Korematsu sued for

vindication on a charge of “prosecutorial misconduct,” a fed-

eral court vacated his conviction and erased his criminal

record. The original decision, which has never been over-

turned, has resonated within the Arab-American community

prior to and during the 1991 Gulf War and after the September

2001 terrorist attacks.

Previously, the U.S. Supreme Court had in

Hirabayashi

United States

(320 U.S. 81) upheld a military curfew estab-

lished on the West Coast after the Japanese attack on Pearl

Harbor. Gordon Hirabayashi, an American-born citizen of

Japanese ancestry, refused to obey the 8:00

. to 6:00

curfew and the evacuation order imposed on Japanese Amer-

icans on the grounds that they constituted racial discrimina-

tion in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to due process.

In its unanimous decision, the Court refused to consider the

evacuation issue but justified the curfew as a temporary, emer-

gency war measure. In 1983 Hirabayashi sued for vindication,

charging “prosecutorial misconduct.” In 1986 a federal district

court struck down his conviction for refusing to obey the evac-

uation order but declined to reverse the curfew violation. The

decision also discusses

Hirabayashi

The same month as

Korematsu

, the U.S. Supreme Court

declared in

Ex Parte Endo

(323 U.S. 283) that the government

could not detain in a relocation camp a Japanese American

whose loyalty had been established. Misuye Endo, an Ameri-

can citizen of Japanese descent, had reported for internment,

then challenged her detention by the War Relocation Author-

ity. In a unanimous opinion, the Court granted her liberty, rul-

ing that Congress had not authorized an indefinite detention

program for Japanese Americans declared “loyal”; the Court

did not rule on the constitutionality of the program in general.

In both

Hirabayashi

and

Korematsu

the Court noted that

“we cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the military

authorities and of Congress that there were disloyal members

of that population, whose number and strength could not be

precisely and quickly ascertained.” Unknown outside of the

Department of Justice was a memorandum from FBI director J.

Edgar Hoover to the attorney general regarding Executive

Order 9066 stating that from its pre–Pearl Harbor investi-

gations, the FBI had identified all those persons of Japanese,

World War II at Home and Abroad 1441