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books, pamphlets, and periodicals. The State Supreme

Court construed the finding of the trial court to be that “in

addition to the sale of the books and the distribution of the

pamphlets the defendants were also soliciting contribu-

tions or donations of money for an alleged religious cause,

and thereby came within the purview of the statute.” [126

Conn. 1, 8 A.2d 535.] It overruled the contention that the

Act, as applied to the appellants, offends the due process

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because it abridges

or denies religious freedom and liberty of speech and

press. The court stated that it was the solicitation that

brought the appellants within the sweep of the Act and not

their other activities in the dissemination of literature. It

declared the legislation constitutional as an effort by the

State to protect the public against fraud and imposition in

the solicitation of funds for what purported to be religious,

charitable, or philanthropic causes.

The facts which were held to support the conviction of

Jesse Cantwell on the fifth count were that he stopped two

men in the street, asked, and received, permission to play

a phonograph record, and played the record “Enemies,”

which attacked the religion and church of the two men,

who were Catholics. Both were incensed by the contents

of the record and were tempted to strike Cantwell unless

he went away. On being told to be on his way he left their

presence. There was no evidence that he was personally

offensive or entered into any argument with those he

interviewed.

The court held that the charge was not assault or

breach of the peace or threats on Cantwell’s part, but

invoking or inciting others to breach of the peace, and that

the facts supported the conviction of that offense.

[1-8] First. We hold that the statute, as construed and

applied to the appellants, deprives them of their liberty

without due process of law in contravention of the Four-

teenth Amendment. The fundamental concept of liberty

embodied in that Amendment embraces the liberties guar-

anteed by the First Amendment. The First Amendment

declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an

establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise

thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the

legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to

enact such laws. The constitutional inhibition of legislation

on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the one

hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of

any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom

of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious

organization or form of worship as the individual may

choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it

safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion.

Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts,—freedom

to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in

the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct

remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.

The freedom to act must have appropriate definition to

preserve the enforcement of that protection. In every case

the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in

attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the pro-

tected freedom. No one would contest the proposition that

a state may not, by statute, wholly deny the right to preach

or to disseminate religious views. Plainly such a previous

and absolute restraint would violate the terms of the guar-

antee. It is equally clear that a state may by general and

non-discriminatory legislation regulate the times, the

places, and the manner of soliciting upon its streets, and of

holding meetings thereon; and may in other respects safe-

guard the peace, good order and comfort of the commu-

nity, without unconstitutionally invading the liberties

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The appellants

are right in their insistence that the Act in question is not

such a regulation. If a certificate is procured, solicitation is

permitted without restraint but, in the absence of a certifi-

cate, solicitation is altogether prohibited.

The appellants urge that to require them to obtain a

certificate as a condition of soliciting support for their

views amounts to a prior restraint on the exercise of their

religion within the meaning of the Constitution. The

State insists that the Act, as construed by the Supreme

Court of Connecticut, imposes no previous restraint upon

the dissemination of religious views or teaching but

merely safeguards against the perpetration of frauds

under the cloak of religion. Conceding that this is so, the

question remains whether the method adopted by Con-

necticut to that end transgresses the liberty safeguarded

by the Constitution.

[9] The general regulation, in the public interest, of

solicitation, which does not involve any religious test and

does not unreasonably obstruct or delay the collection of

funds, is not open to any constitutional objection, even

though the collection be for a religious purpose. Such reg-

ulation would not constitute a prohibited previous

restraint on the free exercise of religion or interpose an

inadmissible obstacle to its exercise.

[10] It will be noted, however, that the Act requires an

application to the secretary of the public welfare council of

the State; that he is empowered to determine whether the

cause is a religious one, and that the issue of a certificate

depends upon his affirmative action. If he finds that the

cause is not that of religion, to solicit for it becomes a

crime. He is not to issue a certificate as a matter of course.

His decision to issue or refuse it involves appraisal of facts

the exercise of judgment, and the formation of an opinion.

He is authorized to withhold his approval if he determines

that the cause is not a religious one. Such a censorship of

religion as the means of determining its right to survive is

a denial of liberty protected by the First Amendment and

1402 ERA 8: The Great Depression and World War II

included in the liberty which is within the protection of the

Fourteenth.

[11, 12] The State asserts that if the licensing officer

acts arbitrarily, capriciously, or corruptly, his action is sub-

ject to judicial correction. Counsel refer to the rule pre-

vailing in Connecticut that the decision of a commission or

an administrative official will be reviewed upon a claim

that “it works material damage to individual or corporate

rights, or invades or threatens such rights, or is so unrea-

sonable as to justify judicial intervention, or is not conso-

nant with justice, or that a legal duty has not been

performed.” It is suggested that the statute is to be read as

requiring the officer to issue a certificate unless the cause

in question is clearly not a religious one; and that if he vio-

lates his duty his action will be corrected by a court.

To this suggestion there are several sufficient answers.

The line between a discretionary and a ministerial act is

not always easy to mark and statute has not been construed

by the State court to impose a mere ministerial duty on the

secretary of the welfare council. Upon his decision as to

the nature of the cause, the right to solicit depends. More-

over, the availability of a judicial remedy for abuses in the

system of licensing still leaves that system one of previous

restraint which, in the field of free speech and press, we

have held inadmissible. A statute authorizing previous

restraint upon the exercise of the guaranteed freedom by

judicial decision after trial is as obnoxious to the Constitu-

tion as one providing for like restraint by administrative

action.

[13] Nothing we have said is intended even remotely

to imply that, under the cloak of religion, persons may,

with impunity, commit frauds upon the public. Certainly

penal laws are available to punish such conduct. Even the

exercise of religion may be at some slight inconvenience in

order that the state may protect its citizens from injury.

Without doubt a state may protect its citizens from fraud-

ulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in the community,

before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any pur-

pose, to establish his identity and his authority to act for

the cause which he purports to represent. The state is like-

wise free to regulate the time and manner of solicitation

generally, in the interest of public safety, peace, comfort or

convenience. But to condition the solicitation of aid for the

perpetuation of religious views or systems upon a license,

the grant of which rests in the exercise of a determination

by state authority as to what is a religious cause, is to lay a

forbidden burden upon the exercise of liberty protected by

the Constitution.

[14, 15] Second. We hold that, in the circumstances

disclosed, the conviction of Jesse Cantwell on the fifth

count must be set aside. Decision as to the lawfulness of

the conviction demands the weighing of two conflicting

interests. The fundamental law declares the interest of the

United States that the free exercise of religion be not pro-

hibited and that freedom to communicate information and

opinion be not abridged. The state of Connecticut has an

obvious interest in the preservation and protection of

peace and good order within her borders. We must deter-

mine whether the alleged protection of the State’s interest,

means to which end would, in the absence of limitation by

the federal Constitution, lie wholly within the State’s dis-

cretion, has been pressed, in this instance, to a point where

it has come into fatal collision with the overriding interest

protected by the federal compact.

Conviction on the fifth count was not pursuant to a

statute evincing a legislative judgment that street discus-

sion of religious affairs, because of its tendency to provoke

disorder, should be regulated, or a judgment that the play-

ing of a phonograph on the streets should in the interest of

comfort or privacy be limited or prevented. Violation of an

Act exhibiting such a legislative judgment and narrowly

drawn to prevent the supposed evil, would pose a question

differing from that we must here answer. Such a declara-

tion of the State’s policy would weigh heavily in any chal-

lenge of the law as infringing constitutional limitations.

Here, however, the judgment is based on a common law

concept of the most general and undefined nature. The

court below has held that the petitioner’s conduct consti-

tuted the commission of an offense under the State law,

and we accept its decision as binding upon us to that

extent.

The offense known as breach of the peace embraces a

great variety of conduct destroying or menacing public

order and tranquility. It includes not only violent acts but

acts and words likely to produce violence in others. No one

would have the hardihood to suggest that the principle of

freedom of speech sanctions incitement to riot or that reli-

gious liberty connotes the privilege to exhort others to

physical attack upon those belonging to another sect.

When clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interfer-

ence with traffic upon the public streets, or other immedi-

ate threat to public safety, peace, or order, appears, the

power of the state to prevent or punish is obvious. Equally

obvious is it that a state may not unduly suppress free com-

munication of views, religious or other, under the guise of

conserving desirable conditions. Here we have a situation

analogous to a conviction under a statute sweeping in a

great variety of conduct under a general and indefinite

characterization, and leaving to the executive and judicial

branches too wide a discretion in its application.

Having these considerations in mind, we note that

Jesse Cantwell, on April 26, 1938, was upon a public street,

where he had a right to be, and where he had a right

peacefully to impart his views to others. There is no show-

ing that his deportment was noisy, truculent, overbearing

or offensive. He requested of two pedestrians permission

World War II at Home and Abroad 1403

to play to them a phonograph record. The permission was

granted. It is not claimed that he intended to insult or

affront the hearers by playing the record. It is plain that he

wished only to interest them in his propaganda. The sound

of the phonograph is not shown to have disturbed resi-

dents of the street, to have drawn a crowd, or to have

impeded traffic. Thus far he had invaded no right or inter-

est of the public or of the men accosted.

The record played by Cantwell embodies a general

attack on all organized religious systems as instruments of

Satan and injurious to man; it then singles out the Roman

Catholic Church for strictures couched in terms which nat-

urally would offend not only persons of that persuasion, but

all others who respect the honestly held religious faith of

their fellows. The hearers were in fact highly offended. One

of them said he felt like hitting Cantwell and the other that

he was tempted to throw Cantwell off the street. The one

who testified he felt like hitting Cantwell said, in answer to

the question “Did you do anything else or have any other

reaction?” “No, sir, because he said he would take the vic-

trola and he went.” The other witness testified that he told

Cantwell he had better get off the street before something

happened to him and that was the end of the matter as

Cantwell picked up his books and walked up the street.

[16] Cantwell’s conduct, in the view of the court

below, considered apart from the effect of his communica-

tion upon his hearers, did not amount to a breach of the

peace. One may, however, be guilty of the offense if he

commit acts or make statements likely to provoke violence

and disturbance of good order, even though no such even-

tuality be intended. Decisions to this effect are many, but

examination discloses that, in practically all, the provoca-

tive language which was held to amount to a breach of the

peace consisted of profane, indecent, or abusive remarks

directed to the person of the hearer. Resort to epithets or

personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication

of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution,

and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no ques-

tion under that instrument.

[17] We find in the instant case no assault or threaten-

ing of bodily harm, no truculent bearing, no intentional

discourtesy, no personal abuse. On the contrary, we find

only an effort to persuade a willing listener to buy a book

or to contribute money in the interest of what Cantwell,

however misguided others may think him, conceived to be

true religion.

In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political

belief, sharp differences arise. In both fields the tenets of

one man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor. To

persuade others to his own point of view, the pleader, as we

know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification of

men who have been, or are, prominent in church or state,

and even no false statement. But the people of this nation

have ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the

probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in

the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right

conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy.

The essential characteristic of these liberties is, that

under their shield many types of life, character, opinion

and belief can develop unmolested and unobstructed.

Nowhere is this shield more necessary than in our own

country for a people composed of many races and of many

creeds. There are limits to the exercise of these liberties.

The danger in these times from the coercive activities of

those who in the delusion of racial or religious conceit

would incite violence and breaches of the peace in order to

deprive others of their equal right to the exercise of their

liberties, is emphasized by events familiar to all. These and

other transgressions of those limits the states appropriately

may punish.

Although the contents of the record not unnaturally

aroused animosity, we think that, in the absence of a

statute narrowly drawn to define and punish specific

conduct as constituting a clear and present danger to a

substantial interest of the State, the petitioner’s communi-

cation, considered in the light of the constitutional guaran-

tees, raised no such clear and present menace to public

peace and order as to render him liable to conviction of the

common law offense in question.

The judgment affirming the convictions on the third

and fifth counts is reversed and the cause is remanded for

further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. So

ordered.

Reversed and remanded.

Source:

Supreme Court Reporter, Vol. 60, pp. 900–906.

Franklin Roosevelt,

Address at University of Virginia, 1940

Commencement address delivered at the University of Virginia

in June 1940 by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in which he

pledged U.S. domestic mobilization against the threat of

national security posed by fascist aggression abroad. FDR

spoke against the backdrop of the German and Japanese mili-

tary onslaught in World War II, in which the United States

remained officially neutral. Shortly before, May 26, 1940, the

president had addressed the same subject in a fireside chat.

The isolationist goal of complete U.S. detachment from World

War II—a goal underscored by a belief that a neutral United

States could enjoy unmolested peace within its hemisphere by

minding its own business—was being exposed as folly by the

1404 ERA 8: The Great Depression and World War II

course of the conflict in Europe, FDR argued. He warned that

a defense policy based on a false sense of security would leave

the nation dangerously susceptible. Roosevelt announced the

program his administration had sent to Congress for improving

the nation’s defensive readiness by strengthening its military.

He described a partnership of private industry and the federal

government to carry out the emergency defense buildup most

speedily and efficiently. Common decency, he asserted,

demanded that no arms maker profit unduly from the war. He

urged a continuation of his New Deal policies, contending

that America’s military viability hinged ultimately on the

strength of the nation’s domestic economic and social fabric,

and on public morale.

In the University of Virginia Address, FDR warned that the

war’s widening scope raised fresh and serious perils to U.S.

security. He said that the philosophy of force embodied by

Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan threatened the survival of

free and democratic institutions everywhere. With its heritage

of liberty, he asserted, the United States must not be indiffer-

ent to the global assault on freedom. He assailed the isola-

tionist desire for American insularity as a deluded aspiration in

a world increasingly governed by force. American moral sup-

port in the world war, he said, lay squarely with the nations

opposing Germany and Japan. He declared that the United

States would, within the limits of neutrality, offer material

assistance to nations aligned against fascism and upgrade its

defensive military preparedness.

________________________

_______________________

President Newcomb, my friends of the University of

Virginia:

I notice by the program that I am asked to address the

class of 1940. I avail myself of that privilege. But I also take

this very apt occasion to speak to many other classes that

have graduated through all the years, classes that are still

in the period of study, not alone in the schools of learning

of the Nation, but classes that have come up through the

great schools of experience; in other words a cross section

of the country, just as you who graduate today are a cross

section of the Nation as a whole.

Every generation of young men and women in Amer-

ica has questions to ask the world. Most of the time they

are the simple but nevertheless difficult questions, ques-

tions of work to do, opportunities to find, ambitions to sat-

isfy.

But every now and again in the history of the Repub-

lic a different kind of question presents itself—a question

that asks, not about the future of an individual or even of a

generation, but about the future of the country, the future

of the American people.

There was such a time at the beginning of our history

as a Nation. Young people asked themselves in those days

what lay ahead, not for themselves, but for the new United

States.

There was such a time again in the seemingly endless

years of the War Between the States. Young men and

young women on both sides of the line asked themselves,

not what trades or professions they would enter, what lives

they would make, but what was to become of the country

they had known.

There is such a time again today. Again today the

young men and the young women of America ask them-

selves with earnestness and with deep concern this same

question: “What is to become of the country we know?”

Now they ask it with even greater anxiety than before.

They ask, not only what the future holds for this Republic,

but what the future holds for all peoples and all nations

that have been living under democratic forms of Govern-

ment—under the free institutions of a free people.

It is understandable to all of us that they should ask

this question. They read the words of those who are telling

them that the ideal of individual liberty, the ideal of free

franchise, the ideal of peace through justice, are decadent

ideals. They read the word and hear the boast of those who

say that a belief in force—force directed by self-chosen

leaders—is the new and vigorous system which will over-

run the earth. They have seen the ascendancy of this phi-

losophy of force in nation after nation where free

institutions and individual liberties were once maintained.

It is natural and understandable that the younger gen-

eration should first ask itself what the extension of the phi-

losophy of force to all the world would lead to ultimately.

We see today in stark reality some of the consequences of

what we call the machine age.

Where control of machines has been retained in the

hands of mankind as a whole, untold benefits have accrued

to mankind. For mankind was then the master; and the

machine was the servant.

But in this new system of force the mastery of the

machine is not in the hands of mankind. It is in the control

of infinitely small groups of individuals who rule without a

single one of the democratic sanctions that we have

known. The machine in hands of irresponsible conquerors

becomes the master; mankind is not only the servant; it is

the victim, too. Such mastery abandons with deliberate

contempt all the moral values to which even this young

country for more than three hundred years has been

accustomed and dedicated.

Surely the new philosophy proves from month to

month that it could have no possible conception of the way

of life or the way of thought of a nation whose origins go

back to Jamestown and Plymouth Rock.

Conversely, neither those who spring from that

ancient stock nor those who have come hither in later years

World War II at Home and Abroad 1405

can be indifferent to the destruction of freedom in their

ancestral lands across the sea.

Perception of danger to our institutions may come

slowly or it may come with a rush and a shock as it has to

the people of the United States in the past few months.

This perception of danger has come to us clearly and over-

whelmingly; and we perceive the peril in a world-wide

arena—an arena that may become so narrowed that only

the Americas will retain the ancient faiths.

Some indeed still hold to the now somewhat obvious

delusion that we of the United States can safely permit the

United States to become a lone island, a lone island in a

world dominated by the philosophy of force.

Such an island may be the dream of those who still talk

and vote as isolationists. Such an island represents to me

and to the overwhelming majority of Americans today a

helpless nightmare of a people without freedom—the

nightmare of a people lodged in prison, handcuffed, hun-

gry, and fed through the bars from day to day by the con-

temptuous, unpitying masters of other continents.

It is natural also that we should ask ourselves how now

we can prevent the building of that prison and the placing

of ourselves in the midst of it.

Let us not hesitate—all of us—to proclaim certain

truths. Overwhelmingly we, as a nation—and this applies

to all the other American nations—are convinced that mil-

itary and naval victory for the gods of force and hate would

endanger the institutions of democracy in the western

world, and that equally, therefore, the whole of our sym-

pathies lies with those nations that are giving their life

blood in combat against these forces.

The people and the Government of the United States

have seen with the utmost regret and with grave disquiet

the decision of the Italian Government to engage in the

hostilities now raging in Europe.

More than three months ago the Chief of the Italian

Government sent me word that because of the determi-

nation of Italy to limit, so far as might be possible, the

spread of the European conflict, more than two hundred

millions of people in the region of the Mediterranean had

been enabled to escape the suffering and the devastation

of war.

I informed the Chief of the Italian Government that

this desire on the part of Italy to prevent the war from

spreading met with full sympathy and response on the part

of the Government and the people of the United States,

and I expressed the earnest hope of this Government and

of this people that this policy on the part of Italy might be

continued. I made it clear that in the opinion of the Gov-

ernment of the United States any extension of hostilities in

the region of the Mediterranean might result in a still

greater enlargement of the scene of the conflict, the con-

flict in the Near East and in Africa and that if this came to

pass no one could foretell how much greater the theater of

the war eventually might become.

Again on a subsequent occasion, not so long ago, rec-

ognizing that certain aspirations of Italy might form the

basis of discussions among the powers most specifically

concerned, I offered, in a message addressed to the Chief

of the Italian Government, to send to the Governments of

France and of Great Britain such specific indications of the

desires of Italy to obtain readjustments with regard to her

position as the Chief of the Italian Government might

desire to transmit through me. While making it clear that

the Government of the United States in such an event

could not and would not assume responsibility for the

nature of the proposals submitted nor for agreements

which might thereafter be reached, I proposed that if Italy

would refrain from entering the war I would be willing to

ask assurances from the other powers concerned that they

would faithfully execute any agreement so reached and

that Italy’s voice in any future peace conference would

have the same authority as if Italy had actually taken part

in the war, as a belligerent.

Unfortunately to the regret of all of us and the regret

of humanity, the Chief of the Italian Government was

unwilling to accept the procedure suggested and he has

made no counter proposal.

This Government directed its efforts to doing what it

could to work for the preservation of peace in the Mediter-

ranean area, and it likewise expressed its willingness to

endeavor to cooperate with the Government of Italy when

the appropriate occasion arose for the creation of a more

stable world order, through the reduction of armaments,

and through the construction of a more liberal interna-

tional economic system which would assure to all powers

equality of opportunity in the world’s markets and in the

securing of raw materials on equal terms.

I have likewise, of course, felt it necessary in my com-

munications to Signor Mussolini to express the concern of

the Government of the United States because of the fact

that any extension of the war in the region of the Mediter-

ranean would inevitably result in great prejudice to the

ways of life and Government and to the trade and com-

merce of all the American Republics.

The Government of Italy has now chosen to preserve

what it terms its “freedom of action” and to fulfill what it

states are its promises to Germany. In so doing it has man-

ifested disregard for the rights and security of other

nations, disregard for the lives of the peoples of those

nations which are directly threatened by this spread of the

war; and has evidenced its unwillingness to find the means

through pacific negotiations for the satisfaction of what it

believes are its legitimate aspirations.

On this tenth day of June, 1940, the hand that held the

dagger has struck it into the back of its neighbor.

1406 ERA 8: The Great Depression and World War II

On this tenth day of June 1940, in this University

founded by the first great American teacher of democracy,

we send forth our prayers and our hopes to those beyond

the seas who are maintaining with magnificent valor their

battle for freedom.

In our American unity, we will pursue two obvious and

simultaneous courses; we will extend to the opponents of

force the material resources of this nation; and, at the same

time, we will harness and speed up the use of those

resources in order that we ourselves in the Americas may

have equipment and training equal to the task of any emer-

gency and every defense.

All roads leading to the accomplishment of these

objectives must be kept clear of obstructions. We will not

slow down or detour. Signs and signals call for speed—full

speed ahead.

It is right that each new generation should ask ques-

tions. But in recent months the principal question has

been somewhat simplified. Once more the future of the

nation and of the American people is at stake.

We need not and we will not, in any way, abandon our

continuing effort to make democracy work within our bor-

ders. We still insist on the need for vast improvements in

our own social and economic life.

But that is a component part of national defense itself.

The program unfolds swiftly and into that program

will fit the responsibility and the opportunity of every man

and woman in the land to preserve his and her heritage in

days of peril.

I call for effort, courage, sacrifice, devotion. Granting

the love of freedom, all of these are possible.

And the love of freedom is still fierce and steady in the

nation today.

Source:

Franklin F. Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses

of Franklin D. Roosevelt. New York: Random House,

1938–1950.

Alien Registration Act

(Smith Act), 1940

U.S. legislation, best known as the Smith Act after its primary

sponsor, Representative Howard W. Smith of Virginia, was

enacted June 28, 1940. It strengthened existing laws concern-

ing the admission and deportation of aliens and required the

registration and fingerprinting of all aliens living in the United

States. Its primary purpose, however, as the United States was

being drawn into World War II, was to reduce subversive

activities, particularly communist-led strikes that might injure

the American defense industry. The act declared it illegal to

advocate or teach the forceful overthrow of the U.S. govern-

ment or knowingly to join a group that did so. In 1951 the

Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the act in

Den-

nis et al. v. United States

(341 U.S. 494).

________________________

_______________________

An Act

To prohibit certain subversive activities; to amend certain

provisions of law with respect to the admission and depor-

tation of aliens; to require the fingerprinting and registra-

tion of aliens; and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-

tives of the United States of America in Congress assem-

bled,

Title I

Section 1. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person, with

intent to interfere with, impair, or influence the loyalty,

morale, or discipline of the military or naval forces of the

United States—

(1) to advise, counsel, urge, or in any manner cause

insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty by

any member of the military or naval forces of the United

States; or

(2) to distribute any written or printed matter which

advises, counsels, or urges insubordination, disloyalty,

mutiny, or refusal of duty by any member of the military or

naval forces of the United States.

(b) For the purposes of this section, the term “military

or naval forces of the United States” includes the Army of

the United States, as defined in section 1 of the National

Defense Act of June 3, 1916, as amended (48 Stat. 153;

U.S.C., title 10, sec. 2), the Navy, Marine Corps, Coast

Guard, Naval Reserve, and Marine Corps Reserve of the

United States; and, when any merchant vessel is commis-

sioned in the Navy or is in the service of the Army or

the Navy, includes the master, officers, and crew of such

vessel.

Sec. 2. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person—

(1) to knowingly or willfully advocate, abet, advise, or

teach the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of over-

throwing or destroying any government in the United

States by force or violence, or by the assassination of any

officer of any such government;

(2) with the intent to cause the overthrow or destruc-

tion of any government in the United States, to print, pub-

lish, edit, issue, circulate, sell, distribute, or publicly

display any written or printed matter advocating, advising,

or teaching the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of

overthrowing or destroying any government in the United

States by force or violence.

(3) to organize or help to organize any society, group,

or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage

the overthrow or destruction of any government in the

World War II at Home and Abroad 1407

United States by force or violence; or to be or become a

member of, or affiliate with, any such society, group, or

assembly of persons, knowing the purposes thereof.

(b) For the purposes of this section, the term “govern-

ment in the United States” means the Government of the

United States, the government of any State, Territory, or

possession of the United States, the government of the

District of Columbia, or the government of any political

subdivision of any of them.

Sec. 3. It shall be unlawful for any person to attempt

to commit, or to conspire to commit, any of the acts pro-

hibited by the provisions of this title.

Sec. 4. Any written or printed matter of the character

described in section 1 or section 2 of this Act, which is

intended for use in violation of this Act, may be taken from

any house or other place in which it may be found, or from

any person in whose possession it may be, under a search

warrant issued pursuant to the provisions of title XI of the

Act entitled “An Act to punish acts of interference with the

foreign relations, the neutrality and the foreign commerce

of the United States, to punish espionage, and better to

enforce the criminal laws of the United States, and for

other purposes”, approved June 15, 1917 (40 Stat. 228;

U.S.C., title 18, ch. 18).

Sec. 5. (a) Any person who violates any of the provi-

sions of this title shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined

not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than

ten years, or both.

(b) No person convicted of violating any of the provi-

sions of this title shall, during the five years next following

his conviction, be eligible for employment by the United

States, or by any department or agency thereof (including

any corporation the Stock of which is wholly owned by the

United States).

Title II

Sec. 20. Section 19 of the Immigration Act of February 5,

1917 (39 Stat. 889; U.S.C., title 8, sec. 155), as amended,

is amended by inserting, after “Sec. 19.,” the letter “(a),”

and by adding at the end of such section the following new

subsections:

“(b) Any alien of any of the classes specified in this

subsection, in addition to aliens who are deportable under

other provisions of law, shall, upon warrant of the Attorney

General, be taken into custody and deported:

“(1) Any alien who, at any time within five years after

entry, shall have, knowingly and for gain, encouraged,

induced, assisted, abetted, or aided any other alien to

enter or to try to enter the United States in violation of

law.

“(2) Any alien who, at any time after entry, shall have

on more than one occasion, knowingly and for gain,

encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided any other

alien or aliens to enter or to try to enter the United States

in violation of law.

“(3) Any alien who, at any time after entry, shall have

been convicted of possessing or carrying in violation of any

law any weapon which shoots or is designed to shoot auto-

matically or semi-automatically more than one shot with-

out manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger, or

a weapon commonly called a sawed-off shotgun.

“(4) Any alien who, at any time within five years after

entry, shall have been convicted of violating the provisions

of title I of the Alien Registration Act, 1940.

“(5) Any alien who, at any time after entry, shall have

been convicted more than once of violating the provisions

of title I of the Alien Registration Act, 1940.

“No alien who is deportable under the provisions of

paragraph (3), (4), or (5) of this subsection shall be

deported until the termination of his imprisonment or the

entry of an order releasing him on probation or parole.

“(c) In the same of any alien (other than one to whom

subsection (d) is applicable) who is deportable under any

law of the United States and who has proved good moral

character for the preceding five years, the Attorney Gen-

eral may (1) permit such alien to depart the United States

to any country of his choice at his own expense, in lieu of

deportation, or (2) suspend deportation of such alien if not

racially inadmissible or ineligible to naturalization in the

United States if he finds that such deportation would

result in serious economic detriment to a citizen or legally

resident alien who is the spouse, parent, or minor child of

such deportable alien. If the deportation of any alien is sus-

pended under the provisions of this subsection for more

than six months, all of the facts and pertinent provisions of

law in the case shall be reported to the Congress within ten

days after the beginning of its next regular session, with the

reasons for such suspension. The Clerk of the House shall

have such report printed as a public document. If during

that session the two Houses pass a concurrent resolution

stating in substance that the Congress does not favor the

suspension of such deportation, the Attorney General shall

thereupon deport such alien in the manner provided by

law. If during the session the two Houses do not pass such

a resolution, the Attorney General shall cancel deportation

proceedings upon the termination of such session, except

that such proceedings shall not be canceled in the case of

any alien who was not legally admitted for permanent res-

idence at the time of his last entry into the United States,

unless such alien pays to the Commissioner of Immigra-

tion and Naturalization a fee of $18 (which fee shall be

deposited in the Treasury of the United States as miscella-

neous receipts). Upon the cancelation of such proceedings

in any case in which such fee has been paid, the Commis-

sioner shall record the alien’s admission for permanent res-

idence as of the date of his last entry into the United States

1408 ERA 8: The Great Depression and World War II

and the Secretary of State shall, if the alien was a quota

immigrant at the time of entry and was not charged to the

appropriate quota, reduce by one the immigration quota of

the country of the alien’s nationality as defined in section

12 of the Act of May 26, 1924 (U. S. C., title 8, sec. 212),

for the fiscal year then current or next following.

“(d) The provisions of subsection (c) shall not be appli-

cable in the case of any alien who is deportable under (1)

the Act of October 16, 1918 (40 Stat. 1008; U. S. C., title

8, sec. 137), entitled ‘An Act to exclude and expel from the

United States aliens who are members of the anarchist and

similar classes’, as amended; (2) the Act of May 26, 1922,

entitled ‘An Act to amend the Act entitled “An Act to pro-

hibit the importation and use of opium for other than

medicinal purposes”, approved February 9, 1909, as

amended’ (42 Stat. 596; U. S. C., title 21, sec. 175); (3) the

Act of February 18, 1931, entitled ‘An Act to provide for

the deportation of aliens convicted and sentenced for vio-

lation of any law regulating traffic in narcotics’, as

amended (46 Stat. 1171; U. S. C., title 8, sec. 156a); (4) any

of the provisions of so much of subsection (a) of this sec-

tion as relates to criminals, prostitutes, procurers, or other

immoral persons, the mentally and physically deficient,

anarchists, and similar classes; or (5) subsection (b) of this

section.”

Sec. 21. The Act entitled “An Act to provide for the

deportation of aliens convicted and sentenced for violation

of any law regulating traffic in narcotics,” approved Febru-

ary 18, 1931, is amended—

(1) By striking out the words “and sentenced”;

(2) By inserting after the words “any statute of the

United States” the following: “or of any State, Territory,

possession, or of the District of Columbia,”; and

(3) By inserting after the word “heroin” a comma and

the word “marihuana.”

Sec. 22. No alien shall be deportable by reason of the

amendments made by section 20 or 21 on account of any

act committed prior to the date of enactment of this Act.

Sec. 23. (a) The first paragraph of section 1 of the Act

entitled “An Act to exclude and expel from the United

States aliens who are members of the anarchistic and sim-

ilar classes,” approved October 16, 1918, as amended, is

amended to read as follows:

“That any alien who, at any time, shall be or shall have

been a member of any one of the following classes shall be

excluded from admission into the United States:”.

(b) Section 2 of such Act of October 16, 1918, as

amended, is amended to read as follows:

“Sec. 2. Any alien who was at the time of entering the

United States, or has been at any time thereafter, a mem-

ber of any one of the classes of aliens enumerated in sec-

tion 1 of this Act, shall, upon the warrant of the Attorney

General, be taken into custody and deported in the man-

ner provided in the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917.

The provisions of this section shall be applicable to the

classes of aliens mentioned in this Act, irrespective of the

time of their entry into the United States.”

Title III

Sec. 30. No visa shall hereafter be issued to any alien seek-

ing to enter the United States unless said alien has been

registered and fingerprinted in duplicate. One copy of the

registration and fingerprint record shall be retained by the

consul. The second copy shall be attached to the alien’s

visa and shall be taken up by the examining immigrant

inspector at the port of arrival of the alien in the United

States and forwarded to the Department of Justice, at

Washington, District of Columbia.

Any alien seeking to enter the United States who does

not present a visa (except in emergency cases defined by

the Secretary of State), a reentry permit, or a border-cross-

ing identification card shall be excluded from admission to

the United States.

Sec. 31. (a) It shall be the duty of every alien now or

hereafter in the United States, who (1) is fourteen years of

age or older, (2) has not been registered and fingerprinted

under section 30, and (3) remains in the United States for

thirty days or longer, to apply for registration and to be fin-

gerprinted before the expiration of such thirty days.

(b) It shall be the duty of every parent or legal

guardian of any alien now or hereafter in the United

States, who (1) is less than fourteen years of age, (2) has

not been registered under section 30, and (3) remains in

the United States for thirty days or longer, to apply for the

registration of such alien before the expiration of such

thirty days. Whenever any alien attains his fourteenth

birthday in the United States he shall, within thirty days

thereafter, apply in person for registration and to be fin-

gerprinted.

Sec. 32. Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 30

and 31—

(a) The application for the registration and finger-

printing, or for the registration, of any alien who is in the

United States on the effective date of such sections may be

made at any time within four months after such date.

(b) No foreign government official, or member of his

family, shall be required to be registered or fingerprinted

under this title.

the approval of the Attorney General, special regulations

for the registration and fingerprinting of (1) alien seamen,

(2) holders of border-crossing identification cards, (3)

aliens confined in institutions within the United States, (4)

aliens under order or deportation, and (5) aliens of any

other class not lawfully admitted to the United States for

permanent residence.

World War II at Home and Abroad 1409

Sec. 33. (a) All applications for registration and fin-

gerprinting under section 31 shall be made at post offices

or such other places as may be designated by the Com-

missioner.

(b) It shall be the duty of every postmaster, with such

assistance as shall be provided by the Commissioner, to

fingerprinting under such section, and for such purposes

to designate appropriate space in the local post office for

such registration and fingerprinting. Every postmaster

shall forward promptly to the Department of Justice, at

Washington, District of Columbia, the registration and fin-

gerprint record of every alien registered and fingerprinted

by him. The Commissioner may designate such other

places for registration and fingerprinting as may be neces-

sary for carrying out the provisions of this Act, and provide

for registration and fingerprinting of aliens at such places

by officers or employees of the Immigration and Natural-

ization Service designated by the Commissioner. The

duties imposed upon any postmaster under this Act shall

also be performed by any employees at the post office of

such postmaster who are designated by the postmaster for

such purpose.

Sec. 34. (a) The Commissioner is authorized and

directed to prepare forms for the registration and finger-

printing of aliens under this title. Such forms shall contain

inquiries with respect to (1) the date and place of entry of

the alien into the United States; (2) activities in which he

has been and intends to be engaged; (3) the length of time

he expects to remain in the United States; (4) the criminal

record, if any, of such alien; and (5) such additional matters

as may be prescribed by the Commissioner, with the

approval of the Attorney General.

(b) All registration and fingerprint records made

under the provisions of this title shall be secret and confi-

dential, and shall be made available only to such persons or

agencies as may be designated by the Commissioner, with

the approval of the Attorney General.

of himself or another under this title shall submit under

oath the information required for such registration. Any

person authorized to register aliens under this title shall be

authorized to administer oaths for such purpose.

Sec. 35. Any alien required to be registered under this

title who is a resident of the United States shall notify the

Commissioner in writing of each change of residence and

new address within five days from the date of such change.

Any other alien required to be registered under this title

shall notify the Commissioner in writing of his address at

the expiration of each three months’ period of residence in

the United States. In the case of an alien for whom a par-

ent or legal guardian is required to apply for registration,

the notices required by this section shall be given by such

parent or legal guardian.

Sec. 36. (a) Any alien required to apply for registration

and to be fingerprinted who willfully fails to refuses to

make such application or to be fingerprinted, and any par-

ent or legal guardian required to apply for the registration

of any alien who willfully fails or refuses to file application

for the registration of such alien shall, upon conviction

thereof be fined not to exceed $1,000 or be imprisoned not

more than six months, or both.

(b) Any alien, or any parent or legal guardian of any

alien, who fails to give written notice to the Commissioner

of change of address as required by section 35 of this Act

shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not to exceed

$100, or be imprisoned not more than thirty days, or both.

alien, who files an application for registration containing

statements known by him to be false, or who procures or

attempts to procure registration of himself or another per-

son through fraud, shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined

not to exceed $1,000, or be imprisoned not more than six

months, or both; and any alien so convicted within five

years after entry into the United States shall, upon the war-

rant of the Attorney General, be taken into custody and be

deported in the manner provided in sections 19 and 20 of

the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, as amended.

Sec. 37. (a) The Commissioner, with the approval of

the Attorney General, is authorized and empowered to

make the prescribe, and from time to time to change and

amend, such rules and regulations not in conflict with this

Act as he may deem necessary and proper in aid of the

administration and enforcement of this title (including

provisions for the identification of aliens registered under

this title); except that all such rules and regulations, inso-

far as they relate to the performance of functions by con-

sular officers or officers or employees in the Postal Service,

shall be prescribed by the Secretary of State and the Post-

master General, respectively, upon recommendation of

the Attorney General. The powers conferred upon the

Attorney General by this Act and all other powers of the

Attorney General relating to the administration of the

Immigration and Naturalization Service may be exercised

by the Attorney General through such officers of the

Department of Justice, including officers of the Immigra-

tion and Naturalization Service, attorneys, special attor-

neys, and special assistants to the Attorney General, as he

may designate specifically for such purposes.

(b) The Commissioner is authorized to make such

expenditures, to employ such additional temporary and

permanent employees, and to rent such quarters outside

the District of Columbia as may be necessary for carrying

out the provisions of this title.

1410 ERA 8: The Great Depression and World War II

Sec. 38. (a) For the purposes of this title—

(1) the term “United States”, when used in a geo-

graphical sense, means the States, the Territories of Alaska

and Hawaii, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the

Virgin Islands;

(2) the term “Commissioner” means the Commis-

sioner of Immigration and Naturalization.

(b) The provisions of this title shall take effect upon

the date of enactment of this Act; except that sections 30

and 31 shall take effect sixty days after the date of its enact-

ment.

Sec. 39. The President is authorized to provide, by

Executive order, for the registration and fingerprinting, in

a manner as nearly similar to that provided in this title as

he deems practicable, of aliens in the Panama Canal

Zone.

Title IV

Sec. 40. If any provision of this Act, or the application

thereof to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the

remainder of the Act, and the application of such provision

to other persons or circumstances, shall not be affected

thereby.

Sec. 41. This Act may be cited as the “Alien Registra-

tion Act, 1940”.

Source:

Statutes at Large, Vol. 54, pp. 670–676.

Ogdensburg Declaration, 1940

Statement issued by U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt and

Canadian prime minister W. L. Mackenzie King at Ogdens-

burg, New York, on August 18, 1940, announcing the estab-

lishment of the Permanent Joint Board of Defense, to plan for

the cooperative defense of North America in case of any for-

eign attack. The board, with members from both Canada and

the United States, was to investigate mutual personnel and

material sea, land, and air defense problems. Soon after

the declaration, Canada served as a mediator between the

United States and Great Britain for the Destroyers-for-Bases

Agreement.

Continuing the pattern of friendship and cooperative

defense established by the Ogdensburg Declaration, on April

20, 1941, Roosevelt and King met at Roosevelt’s estate at

Hyde Park, New York, and signed an agreement that provided

for shared defense production and for greater U.S. purchases

of war materials from Canada, thus creating closer economic

ties between the two nations.

________________________

_______________________

August 24, 1940

The Prime Minister and the President have discussed the

mutual problems of defense in relation to the safety of

Canada and the United States.

It has been agreed that a Permanent Joint Board on

Defense shall be set up at once by the two countries.

This Permanent Joint Board on Defense shall com-

mence immediate studies relating to sea, land, and air

problems including personnel and materiel.

It will consider in the broad sense the defense of the

north half of the Western Hemisphere.

The Permanent Joint Board on Defense will consist of

four or five members from each country, most of them

from the services. It will meet shortly.

Source:

Charles I. Bevans, comp. Treaties and Other Agreements of the

United States of America, 1776–1949, Washington, D.C.:

Government Printing Office, 1968–76.

Destroyers-for-Bases Agreement, 1940

Although the United States, until December 8, 1941, was

technically neutral in World War II, which began in 1939,

President Franklin D. Roosevelt considered an Allied victory

to be an American interest. He therefore found various ways

to help Great Britain and the Soviet Union against the Axis

powers. The destroyer deal was one of them. In this mutual

defense agreement announced by Roosevelt on September 2,

1940, the United States transferred 50 “overage” World War

I destroyers to Great Britain (then engaged in the aerial

Battle of Britain) in exchange for 99-year leases on British

naval and air bases in the Western Hemisphere. The destroy-

ers, used to escort convoys, helped Britain protect its sea

lanes. Linking British survival with American security, Roo-

sevelt called the exchange the “most important action in the

reinforcement of our national defense . . . since the Louisiana

Purchase.”

The technique used in the destroyer deal was strength-

ened March 11, 1941, by the Lend-Lease legislation. It autho-

rized the president to sell, transfer, exchange, lease, or lend

arms or other war supplies to any country whose defense he

deemed vital to U.S. security. Opposed by those who feared

direct U.S. involvement in World War II, the controversial leg-

islation enabled the United States to aid the hard-pressed

Allies despite U.S. neutrality laws. Congress promptly appro-

priated $7 billion for the first installment of the program. By

the time the program was terminated, on August 21, 1945,

total Lend-Lease aid had exceeded $50 billion.

________________________

_______________________

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