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John Bonfield, Police Report, 1886

DEPARTMENT OF POLICE

INSPECTOR AND SECRETARY’S OFFICE

CHICAGO, ILLS,

. . . . 1886

Frdrk. Ebersold, Esqr, General Superintendent of Police

Sir:

On Tuesday, May 4th, the attention of our department

was called to a circular headed, “Revenge,” and also to the

fact that an Anarchist meeting was to be held that evening

. . . on the square known in years gone by, as the haymarket,

but owing to reasons known only to the prime movers of the

meeting it was changed to about 90 feet north . . . near the

intersection of an alley, to better serve their purposes.

On the afternoon of the day above mentioned, his

Honor, the Mayor, ordered that the Department of Police

keep watch of the meeting, and if any of the speakers

should advise their hearers to acts of violence, it would be

our duty as conservators of the peace, to go to the place of

meeting in sufficient force and order them to peaceably

disperse, the order to be as directed by law {See Revised

Statutes of Illinois, Chapter 38, Section 253}. To carry out

the instructions of the Mayor, Captain Ward of the 3rd

precinct was ordered to call all his available men to

DesPlaines Street Station. Capt. Ward’s command con-

sisted of one hundred men. . . . In addition . . . there was

present 26 men from the Central Detail and 50 men from

the 4th Precinct. The entire force present consisting of one

Captain, seven Lieutenants and one hundred and seventy-

six men.

At the suggestion of the Mayor, and with your permis-

sion I went to DesPlaines Street Station and took com-

mand of the entire force assembled at that point. By your

orders detectives were sent out to mingle with the crowd

and were ordered to pay strict attention to the speakers,

and if any thing of an incendiary nature was advised, the

officers were to report to me at the DesPlaines Street Sta-

tion.

About 9 o’clock, P.M., I was informed that the meet-

ing had moved to a point about 350 feet from DesPlaines

Street Station. At different times, between 8:00 and 9:30

o’clock, P.M., officers in plain clothes reported the

progress of the meeting and stated that nothing of a very

inflammatory nature was said until a man named Fielden

or Fielding took the stand. He advised his hearers, “To

throttle the law,” “It would be as well for them to die fight-

ing as to starve to death.” He further advised them “To

exterminate the capitalists and to do it that night.” Want-

ing to be clearly within the law, and wishing to leave no

room for doubt as to the propriety of our actions, I did not

act on the first reports, but sent the officers back to make

further observations. A few minutes after 10 o’clock, P.M.,

the officers returned and reported that the crowd were

getting excited and the speaker growing more incendiary

in his language. I then felt to hesitate any longer would be

criminal on my part, and then gave the order to fall in and

our force formed on Waldo Place.

[The report included a diagram showing where the

different companies were placed.]

. . . We marched north on DesPlaines Street, {Captain

Ward and myself in front of the first division,} until within

a few feet of the truck upon which the speakers were

standing and around which a large crowd had congregated.

The command, halt, was given, and Captain Ward stepping

forward to within about three feet of the truck, said, “I

command you, in the name of the People of the State to

immediately and peaceably disperse,” and turning to the

crowd of persons on the right and left, said, “I command

you and you to assist.” Fielden or Fielding turned and got

off the truck and as he reached the sidewalk, said in rather

a loud voice, “We are peaceable.” Almost instantly, I heard

a hissing sound behind me followed by a tremendous

explosion. The explosion was immediately followed by a

volley of pistol shots from the sidewalks and street in front

of us.

The explosion was caused by a dynamite bomb which

was thrown into our ranks from the east sidewalk, and fell

in the second division and near the dividing line between

the companies of Lieuts. Stanton and Bowler. For an

instant the entire command of the above named officers,

with many of the first and third divisions was thrown to the

ground. Alas many never to rise again. The men recovered,

instantly, and returned the fire of the mob. Lieuts. Steele

and Quinn charged the mob on the street, while the com-

pany of Lieut. Hubbard with the few uninjured members

of the second division swept both sidewalks with a hot and

telling fire, and in a few minutes the Anarchists were fly-

ing in every direction. I then gave the order to cease firing,

fearing that some of our men, in the darkness might fire

into each other.

I then ordered the patrol wagons to called, made de-

tails to take care of the dead and wounded, placed guards

around the station and called for physicians to attend to

our wounded men.

The reports of Captain Ward and the Lieutenants

engaged which are attached and form a part of this report

will give all details as to the killed and wounded. It is sur-

prising to many that our men stood and did not get demor-

alized under such trying circumstances.

It has been asserted that regular troops have become

panic stricken from less cause. I see no way to account for

it except this: The soldier acts as part of a machine, rarely,

if ever, when on duty is he allowed to act as an individual

1062 ERA 6: The Development of the Industrial United States

The Rise of the American Labor Movement 1063

or to use his personal judgement. A police officers training

teaches him to be self-reliant. Day after day and night after

night he goes on duty alone, and when in conflict with the

thief and the burglar, he has to depend upon his own indi-

vidual exertions. The soldier being part of a machine it fol-

lows that when a part of it gives out, the rest is useless until

the injury is repaired. The policeman being a machine in

himself, rarely, if ever gives up until he is laid on the

ground and unable to rise again.

In conclusion, I beg leave to report, that the conduct

of the men and officers, with few exceptions, was ad-

mirable. As a military man said to me the next day, “Wor-

thy the heroes of a hundred battles.” Of one officer, I beg

leave to make special mention. Immediately after the ex-

plosion I looked behind me and saw the greater portion of

the second division on the ground. I gave the order to the

men to close up, and in an instant, Sergeant John E. Fitz-

patrick was at my side and repeated the order. To show

our appreciation of the Sergeants gallant conduct, I would

respectfully recommend to his Honor, the Mayor, and

yourself, the promotion of the Sergeant to a Lieutenancy

as soon as a vacancy occurs. I am satisfied that the depart-

ment does not contain a braver or a better officer.

Respectfully Submitted,

John Bonfield Insp & Secty Department of Police

John Altgeld, Reasons for Pardoning Fielden,

Neebe and Schwab, 1893

STATEMENT OF THE CASE On the night of May 4,

1886, a public meeting was held on Haymarket Square in

Chicago; there were from 800 to 1,000 people present,

nearly all being laboring men. There had been trouble,

growing out of the effort to introduce an eight-hour day,

resulting in some collisions with the police, in one of which

several laboring people were killed, and this meeting was

called as a protest against alleged police brutality. The

meeting was orderly and was attended by the mayor, who

remained until the crowd began to disperse and then went

away. As soon as Capt. John Bonfield, of the police depart-

ment, learned that the mayor had gone, he took a detach-

ment of police and hurried to the meeting for the purpose

of dispersing the few that remained, and as the police

approached the place of meeting a bomb was thrown by

some unknown person, which exploded and wounded

many and killed several policemen, among the latter being

one Mathias Degan. A number of people were arrested

and after a time August Spies, Albert R. Parsons, Louis

Lingg, Michael Schwab, Samuel Fielden, George Engle,

Adolph Fischer and Oscar Neebe were indicted for the

murder of Mathias Degan. The prosecution could not dis-

cover who had thrown the bomb and could not bring the

really guilty man to justice, and, as some of the men

indicted were not at the Haymarket meeting and had noth-

ing to do with it, the prosecution was forced to proceed on

the theory that the men indicted were guilty of murder

because it was claimed they had at various times in the past

uttered and printed incendiary and seditious language,

practically advising the killing of policemen, of Pinkerton

men and others acting in that capacity, and that they were

therefore responsible for the murder of Mathias Degan.

The public was greatly excited and after a prolonged trial

all of the defendants were found guilty. . . . The several

thousand merchants, bankers, judges, lawyers and other

prominent citizens of Chicago who have by petition, by let-

ter and in other ways urged executive clemency, mostly

base their appeal on the ground that, assuming the prison-

ers to be guilty, they have been punished enough, but a

number of them who have examined the case more care-

fully . . . and are more familiar with the record. . . assert,

1. FIRST—That the jury which tried the case was a

packed jury selected to convict. SECOND—That accord-

ing to the law as laid down by the supreme court, both

prior to and again since the trial of this case, the jurors,

according to their own answers, were not competent jurors

and the trial was therefore not a legal trial. THIRD—That

the defendants were not proven to be guilty of the crime

charged in the indictment. FOURTH—That as to the

defendant Neebe, the state’s attorney had declared at the

close of the evidence that there was no case against him,

and yet he has been kept in prison all these years. Upon

the question of having been punished enough I will simply

say that if the defendants had a fair trial, and nothing has

developed since to show that they are not guilty of the

crime charged in the indictment, then there ought to be no

executive interference, for no punishment under our laws

could then be too severe. . . . The soil of America is not

adapted for the growth of anarchy. While our institutions

are not free from injustice, they are still the best that have

yet been devised, and therefore must be maintained.

* * *

[The judge concluded that the defendants did not have a

fair trial.]

I am convinced that it is clearly my duty to act in this

case . . . and I, therefore, grant an absolute pardon to

Samuel Fielden, Oscar Neebe and Michael Schwab this

26th day of June, 1893.

JOHN P. ALTGELD,

Governor of Illinois.

Source:

Chicago Historical Society, Haymarket Affair Digital Collection.

Constitution of the

American Federation of Labor, 1886

From the Report of the Sixth Annual Session of the Federation

of Organized Trades and Labor Unions of the United States and

Canada, this is the charter of organization for the American

Federation of Labor (AFL), the association of trade unions

formed in December 1886 at a national labor convention in

Columbus, Ohio. Delegates of the Federation of Organized

Trades and Labor Unions and other labor groups, representing

virtually the whole American trade union movement, assem-

bled at Columbus in hopes of organizing all skilled craft unions

under a single aegis. They founded the AFL as a permanent fed-

eration of trade unions and elected Samuel Gompers its first

president, a post he held every year except one until 1924. The

constitution spelled out the AFL’s structure and principles. It

pledged strict recognition of each trade’s autonomy and estab-

lished the national or international union as the new federa-

tion’s basic organizational unit. A membership tax was to be

levied to raise money to assist striking workers and fund AFL

legislative initiatives. The executive council, responsible for

administering affairs at the national level, was charged with set-

tling jurisdictional disputes, lobbying for legislation, investigat-

ing strikes and lockouts, and influencing public opinion.

________________________

_______________________

Preamble

Whereas, A struggle is going on in all the nations of the civ-

ilized world, between the oppressors and the oppressed of

all countries, a struggle between the capitalist and the

laborer, which grows in intensity from year to year, and will

work disastrous results to the toiling millions, if they are

not combined for mutual protection and benefit.

It therefore behooves the representatives of the

Trades and Labor Unions of America, in Convention,

assembled, to adopt such measures and disseminate such

principles among the mechanics and laborers of our coun-

try as will permanently unite them, to secure the recogni-

tion of the rights to which they are justly entitled.

We therefore declare ourselves in favor of the forma-

tion of a thorough Federation, embracing every Trade and

Labor Organization in America.

Constitution.

Article I.—Name.

Section 1. This association shall be known as “The Ameri-

can Federation of Labor,” and shall consist of such Trades

and Labor Unions as shall conform to its rules and regula-

tions.

Article II.—Objects.

Section 1. The objects of this Federation shall be the

encouragement and formation of local Trades and Labor

Unions, and the closer Federation of such societies

through the organization of Central Trades and Labor

Unions in every city, and the further combination of such

bodies into state, territorial, or provincial organizations, to

secure legislation in the interests of the working masses.

Sec. 2. The establishment of National and Interna-

tional Trades Unions, based upon a strict recognition of

the autonomy of each trade, and the promotion and

advancement of such bodies.

Sec. 3. An American Federation of all National and

International Trades Unions, to aid and assist each other;

and, furthermore, to secure National Legislation in the

interests of the working people, and influence public opin-

ion, by peaceful and legal methods, in favor of Organized

Labor.

Sec. 4. To aid and encourage the labor press of

America.

Article III.—Convention.

Section 1. The convention of the Federation shall be held

annually, on the second Tuesday of December, at such

place as the delegates have selected at the preceding Con-

vention.

Article IV.—Representation.

Section 1. The basis of representation in the convention

shall be: From National or International Unions, for less

than four thousand members, one delegate; four thousand

or more, two delegates; eight thousand or more, three del-

egates; sixteen thousand or more, four delegates; thirty-

two thousand or more, five delegates; and so on; and from

each Local or District Trades Union, not connected with,

or having a National or International head, affiliated with

this Federation, one delegate.

Sec. 2. No organization which has seceded from any

Local, National or International or organization, shall be

allowed a representation or recognition in this Federation.

Article V.—Officers.

Section 1. The officers of the Federation shall consist of a

President, two Vice-Presidents, a Secretary, and a Trea-

surer, to be elected by the Convention.

Sec. 2. At the opening of the Convention the Presi-

dent shall take the chair and call the Convention to order,

and preside until his successor is elected.

Sec. 3. The following Committee, consisting of three

members each, shall be appointed by the President: 1st,

Credentials; 2d, Rules and Order of Business; 3d, Resolu-

tions; 4th, Finance; 5th, Report of Executive Council.

Sec. 4. Should a vacancy in any office occur between

the annual meetings of the Convention, such vacancies

shall be filled by the President of the Federation, by and

with consent of the Executive Council. When a vacancy

1064 ERA 6: The Development of the Industrial United States

The Rise of the American Labor Movement 1065

occurs in the office of President, the Vice-Presidents shall

succeed in their respective order.

Sec. 5. The President and Secretary shall be members

of the succeeding Convention in case they are not dele-

gates, but without vote.

Article VI.—Executive Council.

Section 1. The Officers shall be an Executive Council with

power to watch legislative measures directly affecting the

interests of working people, and to initiate, whenever nec-

essary, such legislative action as the Convention may

direct.

Sec. 2. The Executive Council shall use every possible

means to organize new National or International Trades

Unions, and to organize local Trades Unions and connect

them with the Federation, until such time as there are a

sufficient number to form a National or International

Union, when it shall be the duty of the President of the

Federation to see that such organization is formed.

Sec. 3. While we recognize the right of each trade to

manage its own affairs, it shall be the duty of the Executive

Council to secure the unification of all labor organizations,

so far as to assist each other in any justifiable boycott, and

with voluntary financial help in the event of a strike or

lock-out, when duly approved by the Executive Council.

Sec. 4. When a strike has been approved by the Exec-

utive Council, the particulars of the difficulty, even if it be

a lock-out, shall be explained in a circular issued by the

President of the Federation to the unions affiliated there-

with. It shall then be the duty of all affiliated societies to

urge their Local Unions and members to make liberal

financial donations in aid of the working people involved.

Article VII.—Revenue.

Section 1. The revenue of the Federation shall be derived

from International, National, District and Local organiza-

tions, which shall pay into the treasury of the Federation a

per capita tax of one-half cent per month for each member

in good standing, the same to be payable monthly to the

Treasurer of the Federation.

Sec. 2. Delegates shall not be entitled to a seat in this

Federation, unless the per capita tax of their organization

is paid in full.

Sec. 3. Any organization, affiliated with this Federa-

tion, not paying its per capita tax on or before the 15th of

each month, shall be notified of the fact by the President

of the Federation, and if at the end of three months it is

still in arrears, it shall be suspended from membership in

the Federation, and can only be reinstated by vote of the

Convention.

Sec. 4. Each society affiliated with this Federation,

shall make a monthly report of its standing and progress to

the President of the Federation.

Sec. 5. It shall be the duty of the President to attend

to all correspondence, publish a monthly journal, and

travel, with consent of the Executive Council, wherever

required in the interest of the Federation. His salary shall

be $1,000 per year, payable monthly, with mileage and

expenses.

Sec. 6. Whenever the revenue of the Federation shall

warrant such action, the Executive Council shall authorize

the sending out of Trades Union speakers, from place to

place, in the interests of the Federation.

Sec. 7. The funds of the Federation shall be banked

monthly by three Trustees, who shall be selected by the

Executive Council. The said Trustees shall be residents of

the same city with the Treasurer. No money shall be paid

out only in conformity with the rules laid down by the

Executive Council.

Sec. 8. It shall be the duty of the Secretary to attend

to such business as may be decided by the Executive

Council.

Sec. 9. The accounts of the year shall be closed four-

teen days prior to the assembling of the Convention, and a

balance sheet, duly certified, shall be presented to the

same.

Sec. 10. The remuneration for the loss of time by the

executive council shall be at the rate of $3.000 per diem;

traveling and incidental expenses to be also defrayed.

Article VIII.—Miscellaneous.

Section 1. In all questions not covered by this Constitution,

the Executive Council shall have power to make rules to

govern the same, and shall report accordingly to the Fed-

eration.

Sec. 2. Charters for the Federation shall be granted by

the President of the Federation, by and with the consent

of the Executive Council, to all National and International,

and Local bodies affiliated with this Federation.

Sec. 3. Any seven wage workers of good character, an

favorable to Trades Unions, and not members of any body

affiliated with this Federation, who will subscribe to this

Constitution, shall have the power to form a local body, to

be known as a “Federal Labor Union,” and they shall hold

regular meetings for the purpose of strengthening and

advancing the Trades Union movement, and shall have the

power to make their own rules in conformity with this

Constitution, and shall be granted a local charter by the

President of this Federation, provided the request for a

charter be endorsed by the nearest Local or National

Trades Union officials connected with this Federation.

Sec. 4. The charter fee for affiliated bodies shall be

$5.00, payable to the Treasurer of the Federation.

Sec. 5. Where there are one or more Local Unions in

any city, belonging to a National or International Union,

affiliated with this Federation, it shall be their duty to

organize a Trades Assembly or Central Labor Union, or

join such body, if already in existence.

Article IX.—Amendments.

Section 1. This Constitution can be amended or altered

only at a regular session of the Convention, and to do so, it

shall require a two-thirds vote of the delegates, and must

be ratified within six weeks thereafter, by a majority vote of

the members of the societies composing this Federation.

Sec. 2. This Constitution shall go into effect March

1st, 1887.

Source:

Official Archives of the American Federation of Labor and

Congress of Individual Organizations, Silver Spring, Md.

Sherman Antitrust Act, 1890

First federal U.S. legislation to regulate trusts, enacted on July

2, 1890. Introduced by Republican senator John Sherman, it

declared illegal “every contract, combination in the form of

trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or com-

merce among the several States, or with foreign nations.” The

legislation, based on Congress’s constitutional power to regu-

late interstate commerce, grew out of public dissatisfaction

with the abuses of business trusts and corporations controlling

various commodities. While at first, Supreme Court decisions

condemned labor rather than business practices, the act was

used successfully in President Theodore Roosevelt’s “trust-

busting” campaigns and in later actions. The law was strength-

ened and clarified by the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914.

________________________

_______________________

An Act

To protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints

and monopolies.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-

tives of the United States of America in Congress assem-

bled,

Sec. 1. Every contract, combination in the form of

trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or

commerce among the several States, or with foreign

nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. Every person who

shall make any such contract or engage in any such combi-

nation or conspiracy, shall be deemed guilty of a misde-

meanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by

fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprison-

ment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments,

in the discretion of the court.

Sec. 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt

to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other per-

son or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or

commerce among the several States, or with foreign

nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on

conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding

five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding

one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of

the court.

Sec. 3. Every contract, combination in form of trust or

otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce

in any Territory of the United States or of the District of

Columbia, or in restraint of trade or commerce between

any such Territory and another, or between any such Ter-

ritory or Territories and any State or States or the District

of Columbia, or with foreign nations, or between the Dis-

trict of Columbia and any State or States or foreign

nations, is hereby declared illegal. Every person who shall

make any such contract or engage in any such combination

or conspiracy, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,

and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not

exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not

exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the

discretion of the court.

Sec. 4. The several circuit courts of the United States

are hereby invested with jurisdiction to prevent and

restrain violations of this act; and it shall be the duty of the

several district attorneys of the United States, in their

respective districts, under the direction of the Attorney-

General, to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and

restrain such violations. Such proceedings may be by way

of petition setting forth the case and praying that such vio-

lation shall be enjoined or otherwise prohibited. When the

parties complained of shall have been duly notified of such

petition the court shall proceed, as soon as may be, to the

hearing and determination of the case; and pending such

petition and before final decree, the court may at any time

make such temporary restraining order or prohibition as

shall be deemed just in the premises.

Sec. 5. Whenever it shall appear to the court before

which any proceeding under section four of this act may be

pending, that the ends of justice require that other parties

should be brought before the court, the court may cause

them to be summoned, whether they reside in the district

in which the court is held or not; and subpoenas to that

end may be served in any district by the marshal thereof.

Sec. 6. Any property owned under any contract or by

any combination, or pursuant to any conspiracy (and being

the subject thereof) mentioned in section one of this act,

and being in the course of transportation from one State to

another, or to a foreign country, shall be forfeited to the

United States, and may be seized and condemned by like

proceedings as those provided by law for the forfeiture,

seizure, and condemnation of property imported into the

United States contrary to law.

1066 ERA 6: The Development of the Industrial United States

The Rise of the American Labor Movement 1067

Sec. 7. Any person who shall be injured in his business

or property by any other person or corporation by reason

of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this

act, may sue therefor in any circuit court of the United

States in the district in which the defendant resides or is

found, without respect to the amount in controversy, and

shall recover three fold the damages by him sustained, and

the costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.

Sec. 8. That the word “person,” or “persons,” wher-

ever used in this act shall be deemed to include corpora-

tions and associations existing under or authorized by the

laws of either the United States, the laws of any of the Ter-

ritories, the laws of any State, or the laws of any foreign

country.

Source:

Statutes at Large, Vol. 26, pp. 209–210.

In re Debs, 1895

(In re, a Latin term meaning “in the matter of,” is used to indi-

cate cases that lack formally adversarial parties and refers to

whatever is the subject of the litigation.) U.S. Supreme Court

decision of May 27, 1895, concerning the case of United

States v. Debs et al. Eugene V. Debs, a socialist and major labor

leader, organized railroad workers into the American Railway

Union. Those who worked for the Pullman Company, which

manufactured sleeping cars, lived in a “model town” near

Chicago. During the panic of 1893, Pullman cut wages but left

rents alone. In 1894, workers struck and many engaged in vio-

lence. Using the rationale that the striking workers were pre-

venting the mail from going through, U.S. Attorney General

Richard Olney, who previously represented railroads, sent fed-

eral troops to crush the strike. Debs was imprisoned for vio-

lating an injunction against interfering with the railroads. He

asked for the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus. The

writ was denied, not on the grounds of the Sherman Antitrust

Act (the basis for the injunction), but on the broader grounds

that the federal government’s constitutional authority over

interstate commerce and the transportation of the mails justi-

fied the issuance of such injunctions to prevent forcible

obstructions.

________________________

_______________________

Mr. Justice Brewer, after stating the facts in the foregoing

language, delivered the opinion of the court.

The case presented by the bill is this: The United

States, finding that the interstate transportation of persons

and property, as well as the carriage of the mails, is forcibly

obstructed, and that a combination and conspiracy exists to

subject the control of such transportation to the will of the

conspirators, applied to one of their courts, sitting as a

court of equity, for an injunction to restrain such obstruc-

tion and prevent carrying into effect such conspiracy. Two

questions of importance are presented: First. Are the rela-

tions of the general government to interstate commerce

and the transportation of the mails such as authorize a

direct interference to prevent a forcible obstruction

thereof? Second. If authority exists, as authority in govern-

mental affairs implies both power and duty, has a court of

equity jurisdiction to issue an injunction in aid of the per-

formance of such duty?

1. What are the relations of the general government to

interstate commerce and the transportation of the mails?

They are those of direct supervision, control, and manage-

ment. While, under the dual system which prevails with us,

the powers of government are distributed between the

state and the nation, and while the latter is properly styled

a government of enumerated powers, yet within the limits

of such enumeration it has all the attributes of sovereignty,

and, in the exercise of those enumerated powers, acts

directly upon the citizen, and not through the intermedi-

ate agency of the state.

“The government of the Union, then, is, emphatically

and truly, a government of the people. In form and in sub-

stance it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by

them, and are to be exercised directly on them, and for

their benefit.”

“No trace is to be found in the constitution of an

intention to create a dependence of the government of the

Union on those of the states, for the execution of the great

powers assigned to it. Its means are adequate to its ends,

and on those means alone was it expected to rely for the

accomplishment of its ends. To impose on it the necessity

of resorting to means which it cannot control, which

another government may furnish or withhold, would ren-

der its course precarious, the result of its measures uncer-

tain, and create a dependence on other governments,

which might disappoint its most important designs, and is

incompatible with the language of the constitution.” Chief

Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. State of Maryland, 4

Wheat. 316, 405, 424.

“Both the states and the United States existed before

the constitution. The people, through that instrument,

established a more perfect union by substituting a national

government, acting, with ample power, directly upon the

citizens, instead of the confederate government, which

acted with powers, greatly restricted, only upon the

states.” Chief Justice Chase in Lane Co. v. Oregon, 7 Wall.

71, 76.

“We hold it to be an incontrovertible principle that the

government of the United States may, by means of physi-

cal force, exercised through its official agents, execute on

every foot of American soil the powers and functions that

belong to it. This necessarily involves the power to com-

mand obedience to its laws, and hence the power to keep

the peace to that extent.”

“This power to enforce its laws and to execute its func-

tions in all places does not derogate from the power of the

state to execute its laws at the same time and in the same

places. The one does not exclude the other, except where

both cannot be executed at the same time. In that case the

words of the constitution itself show which is to yield.

“This constitution, and all laws which shall be made in pur-

suance thereof, * * * shall be the supreme law of the land.’”

Mr. Justice Bradley in Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 395.

See, also, The Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch, 116,

136; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 413; Legal Tender

Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 555; Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257;

The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 9 Sup. Ct. 623;

In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 10 Sup. Ct. 658; Logan v. U.S.,

144 U.S. 263, 12 Sup. Ct. 617; Fong Yue Ting v. U.S., 149

U.S. 698, 13 Sup. Ct. 1016; In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, 15

Sup. Ct. 959.

Among the powers expressly given to the national gov-

ernment are the control of interstate commerce and the

creation and management of a post-office system for the

nation. Article 1, Section 8, of the constitution provides

that “the congress shall have power: * * * Third, to regu-

late commerce with foreign nations and among the several

states, and with the Indian tribes. * * * Seventh, to estab-

lish post offices and post roads.”

Congress has exercised the power granted in respect

to interstate commerce in a variety of legislative acts. Pass-

ing by all that legislation in respect to commerce by water,

and considering only that which bears upon railroad inter-

state transportation (for this is the specific matter involved

in this case), these acts may be noticed: First. That of June

15, 1866 (14 Stat. 66), carried into the Revised Statutes as

section 5258, which provides:

“Whereas the constitution of the United States con-

fers upon congress, in express terms, the power to regulate

commerce among the several states, to establish post

roads, and to raise and support armies: Therefore, be it

enacted by the senate and house of representatives of the

United States of America in congress assembled, that

every railroad company in the United States whose road is

operated by steam, its successors and assigns, be, and is

hereby, authorized to carry upon and over its road, boats,

bridges, and ferries all passengers, troops, government

supplies, mails, freight, and property on their way from any

state to another state, and to receive compensation there-

for, and to connect with roads of other states so as to form

continuous lines for the transportation of the same to the

place of destination.”

Second. That of March 3, 1873 (17 Stat. 584; Rev. St.

Sections 4386–4389), which regulates the transportation of

live stock over interstate railroads. Third. That of May 29,

1884 (chapter 60, Section 6, 23 Stat. 32), prohibiting inter-

state transportation by railroads of live stock affected with

any contagious or infectious disease. Fourth. That of

February 4, 1887 (24 Stat. 379), with its amendments of

March 2, 1889 (25 Stat. 855), and February 10, 1891 (26

Stat. 743), known as the “Interstate Commerce Act,” by

which a commission was created with large powers of reg-

ulation and control of interstate commerce by railroads,

and the sixteenth section of which act gives to the courts of

the United States power to enforce the orders of the com-

mission. Fifth. That of October 1, 1888 (25 Stat. 501), pro-

viding for arbitration between railroad interstate companies

and their employes. And, sixth, the act of March 2, 1893 (27

Stat. 531), requiring the use of automatic couplers on inter-

state trains, and empowering the interstate commerce com-

mission to enforce its provisions. . . .

. . . Constitutional provisions do not change, but their

operation extends to new matters, as the modes of business

and the habits of life of the people vary with each suc-

ceeding generation. The law of the common carrier is the

same to-day as when transportation on land was by coach

and wagon, and on water by canal boat and sailing vessel;

yet in its actual operation it touches and regulates trans-

portation by modes then unknown—the railroad train and

the steamship. Just so is it with the grant to the national

government of power over interstate commerce. The con-

stitution has not changed. The power is the same. But it

operates to-day upon modes of interstate commerce un-

known to the fathers, and it will operate with equal force

upon any new modes of such commerce which the future

may develop.

It is said that seldom have the courts assumed juris-

diction to restrain by injunction in suits brought by the

government, either state or national, obstructions to high-

ways either artificial or natural. This is undoubtedly true,

but the reason is that the necessity for such interference

has only been occasional. Ordinarily, the local authorities

have taken full control over the matter, and by indictment

for misdemeanor, or in some kindred way, have secured

the removal of the obstruction and the cessation of the nui-

sance. As said in Attorney General v. Brown, 24 N. J. Eq.

89, 91: “The jurisdiction of courts of equity to redress the

grievance of public nuisances by injunction is undoubted

and clearly established; but it is well settled that, as a gen-

eral rule, equity will not interfere where the object sought

can be as well attained in the ordinary tribunals. Attorney

General v. New Jersey R. & T. Co., 3 N. J. Eq. 136; Water

Com’rs of Jersey City v. City of Hudson, 13 N. J. Eq. 426;

Attorney General v. Heishon, 18 N. J. Eq. 410; Railroad

Co. v. Prudden, 20 N. J. Eq. 532; High, Inj. Section 521.

And, because the remedy by indictment is so efficacious,

courts of equity entertain jurisdiction in such cases with

1068 ERA 6: The Development of the Industrial United States

The Rise of the American Labor Movement 1069

great reluctance, whether their intervention is invoked at

the instance of the attorney general, or of a private indi-

vidual who suffers some injury therefrom distinct from

that of the public, and they will only do so where there

appears to be a necessity for their interference. Rowe v.

Granite Bridge, 21 Pick. 347; Railroad Co. v. Prudden,

supra. The jurisdiction of the court of chancery with

regard to public nuisances is founded on the irreparable

damage to individuals, or the great public injury which is

likely to ensue. 3 Daniell, Ch. Prac. 1740.” Indeed, it may

be affirmed that in no well-considered case has the power

of a court of equity to interfere by injunction in cases of

public nuisance been denied, the only denial ever being

that of a necessity for the exercise of that jurisdiction

under the circumstances of the particular case. Story, Eq.

Jur. Sections 921, 923, 924; Pom. Eq. Jur. Section 1349;

High, Inj. Sections 745, 1554; 2 Daniell, Ch. Pl. & Prac.

(4th Ed.) p. 1636.

That the bill filed in this case alleged special facts call-

ing for the exercise of all the powers of the court is not

open to question. The picture drawn in it of the vast inter-

ests involved, not merely of the city of Chicago and the

state of Illinois, but of all the states, and the general con-

fusions into which the interstate commerce of the country

was thrown; the forcible interference with that commerce;

the attempted exercise by individuals of powers belonging

only to government, and the threatened continuance of

such invasions of public right, presented a condition of

affairs which called for the fullest exercise of all the pow-

ers of the courts. If ever there was a special exigency, one

which demanded that the courts should do all that courts

can do, it was disclosed by this bill, and we need not turn

to the public history of the day, which only reaffirms with

clearest emphasis all its allegations.

The difference between a public nuisance and a pri-

vate nuisance is that the one affects the people at large and

the other simply the individual. The quality of the wrongs

is the same, and the jurisdiction of the courts over them

rests upon the same principles and goes to the same

extent. Of course, circumstances may exist in one case,

which do not in another, to induce the court to interfere or

to refuse to interfere by injunction; but the jurisdiction—

the power to interfere—exists in all cases of nuisance.

True, many more suits are brought by individuals than by

the public to enjoin nuisances, but there are two reasons

for this: First, the instances are more numerous of private

than of public nuisances; and, second, often that which is

in fact a public nuisance is restrained at the suit of a pri-

vate individual, whose right to relief arises because of a

special injury resulting therefrom.

Again, it is objected that it is outside of the jurisdiction

of a court of equity to enjoin the commission of crimes.

This, as a general proposition, is unquestioned. A chancel-

lor has no criminal jurisdiction. Something more than the

threatened commission of an offense against the laws of

the land is necessary to call into exercise the injunctive

powers of the court. There must be some interferences,

actual or threatened, with property or rights of a pecuniary

nature; but when such interferences appear the jurisdic-

tion of a court of equity arises, and is not destroyed by the

fact that they are accompanied by or are themselves viola-

tions of the criminal law. Thus, in Cranford v. Tyrrell, 128

N. Y. 341, 28 N. E. 514, an injunction to restrain the defen-

dant from keeping a house of ill fame was sustained; the

court saying, on page 344, 128 N.Y., and page 514, 28 N.E.:

“That the perpetrator of the nuisance is amenable to the

provisions and penalties of the criminal law is not an

answer to an action against him by a primary person to

recover for injury sustained, and for an injunction against

the continued use of his premises in such a manner.” And

in Port of Mobile v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 84 Ala. 115, 126,

4 South, 106, is a similar declaration in these words: “The

mere fact that an act is criminal does not divest the juris-

diction of equity to prevent it by injunction, if it be also a

violation of property rights, and the party aggrieved has no

other adequate remedy for the prevention of the irrepara-

ble injury which will result from the failure or inability of

a court of law to redress such rights.”

The law is full of instances in which the same act may

give rise to a civil action and a criminal prosecution. An

assault with intent to kill may be punished criminally,

under an indictment therefor, or will support a civil action

for damages; and the same is true of all other offenses

which cause injury to person or property. In such cases the

jurisdiction of the civil court is invoked, not to enforce the

criminal law and punish the wrongdoer, but to compensate

the injured party for the damages which he or his property

has suffered; and it is no defense to the civil action that the

same act by the defendant exposes him also to indictment

and punishment in a court of criminal jurisdiction. So here

the acts of the defendants may or may not have been vio-

lations of the criminal law. If they were, that matter is for

inquiry in other proceedings. The complaint made against

them in this is of disobedience to an order of a civil court,

made for the protection of property and the security of

rights. If any criminal prosecution be brought against them

for the criminal offenses alleged in the bill of complaint, of

derailing and wrecking engines and trains, assaulting and

disabling employes of the railroad companies, it will be no

defense to such prosecution that they disobeyed the orders

of injunction served upon them, and have been punished

for such disobedience.

Nor is there in this any invasion of the constitutional

right of trial by jury. We fully agree with counsel that “it

matters not what form the attempt to deny constitutional

right may take; it is vain and ineffectual, and must be so

declared by the courts.” And we reaffirm the declaration

made for the court by Mr. Justice Bradley in Boyd v. U.S.,

116 U.S. 616, 635, 6 Sup. Ct. 524, that “it is the duty of

courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the cit-

izen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.

Their motto should be obsta principiis.” But the power of

a court to make an order carries with it the equal power to

punish for a disobedience of that order, and the inquiry as

to the question of disobedience has been from time

immemorial, the special function of the court. And this is

no technical rule. In order that a court may compel obedi-

ence to its orders, it must have the right to inquire whether

there has been any disobedience thereof. To submit the

question of disobedience to another tribunal, be it a jury or

another court, would operate to deprive the proceeding of

half its efficiency. In the Case of Yates, 4 Johns. 317, 369,

Chancellor Kent, then chief justice of the supreme court

of the state of New York, said: “In the Case of Earl of

Shaftsbury, 2 State Tr. 615, 1 Mod. 144, who was impris-

oned by the house of lords for ‘high contempts committed

against it,’ and brought into the king’s bench, the court

held that they had no authority to judge of the contempt,

and remanded the prisoner. The court in that case seem to

have laid down a principle from which they never have

departed, and which is essential to the due administration

of justice. This principle that every court, at least of the

superior kind, in which great confidence is placed, must be

the sole judge, in the last resort, of contempts arising

therein, is more explicitly defined and more emphatically

enforced in the two subsequent cases of The Queen v. Paty

[2 Ld. Raym 1105], and of The King v. Grosby [3 Wils.

188].” And again, on page 371: “Mr. Justice Blackstone

pursued the same train of observation, and declared that

all courts, by which he meant to include the two houses of

parliament and the courts of Westminster Hall, could have

no control in matters of contempt; that the sole adjudica-

tion of contempts, and the punishments thereof belonged

exclusively, and without interfering, to each respective

court.” In Watson v. Williams, 36 Miss. 331, 341, it was

said: “The power to fine and imprison for contempt, from

the earliest history of jurisprudence, has been regarded as

a necessary incident and attribute of a court, without

which it could no more exist than without a judge. It is a

power inherent in all courts of record, and coexisting with

them by the wise provisions of the common law. A court

without the power effectually to protect itself against the

assaults of the lawless, or to enforce its orders, judgments,

or decrees against the recusant parties before it, would be

a disgrace to the legislation, and a stigma upon the age

which invented it.” In Cartwright’s Case, 114 Mass. 230,

238, we find this language: “The summary power to com-

mit and punish for contempts tending to obstruct or

degrade the administration of justice is inherent in courts

of chancery and other superior courts, as essential to the

execution of their powers and to the maintenance of their

authority, and is part of the law of the land, within the

meaning of Magna Charta and of the twelfth article of our

Declaration of Rights.” See, also, U.S. v. Hudson, 7

Cranch, 32; Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204; Ex parte

Robinson, 19 Wall. 505; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623-

672, 8 Sup. Ct. 273; Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 9 Sup.

Ct. 77; Eilenbecker v. Plymouth Co., 134 U.S. 31-36, 10

Sup. Ct. 424, in which Mr. Justice Miller observed: “If it

has ever been understood that proceedings according to

the common law for contempt of court have been subject

to the right of trial by jury, we have been unable to find any

instance of it.” Commission v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447-488,

14 Sup. Ct. 1125. In this last case it was said: “Surely it can-

not be supposed that the question of contempt of the

authority of a court of the United States, committed by a

disobedience of its orders, is triable, of right, by a jury.”

In brief, a court enforcing obedience to its orders by

proceedings for contempt is not executing the criminal

laws of the land, but only securing to suitors the rights

which it has adjudged them entitled to.

Further, it is said by counsel in their brief:

“No case can be cited where such a bill in behalf of the

sovereign has been entertained against riot and mob vio-

lence, though occurring on the highway. It is not such fit-

ful and temporary obstruction that constitutes a nuisance.

The strong hand of executive power is required to deal

with such lawless demonstrations.

“The courts should stand aloof from them and not

invade executive prerogative, nor, even at the behest or

request of the executive, travel out of the beaten path of

well-settled judicial authority. A mob cannot be sup-

pressed by injunction; nor can its leaders be tried, con-

victed, and sentenced in equity.

“It is too great a strain upon the judicial branch of the

government to impose this essentially executive and mili-

tary power upon courts of chancery.”

We do not perceive that this argument questions the

jurisdiction of the court, but only the expediency of the

action of the government in applying for its process. It

surely cannot be seriously contended that the court has

jurisdiction to enjoin the obstruction of a highway by one

person, but that its jurisdiction ceases when the obstruc-

tion is by a hundred persons. It may be true, as suggested,

that in the excitement of passion a mob will pay little heed

to processes issued from the courts, and it may be, as said

by counsel in argument, that it would savor somewhat of

the puerile and ridiculous to have read a writ of injunction

to Lee’s army during the late Civil war. It is doubtless true

that inter arma leges silent, and in the throes of rebellion

or revolution the processes of civil courts are of little avail,

for the power of the courts rests on the general support of

1070 ERA 6: The Development of the Industrial United States

The Rise of the American Labor Movement 1071

the people, and their recognition of the fact that peaceful

remedies are the true resort for the correction of wrongs.

But does not counsel’s argument imply too much? Is it to

be assumed that these defendants were conducting a

rebellion or inaugurating a revolution, and that they and

their associates were thus placing themselves beyond the

reach of the civil process of the courts? We find in the

opinion of the circuit court a quotation from the testimony

given by one of the defendants before the United States

strike commission, which is sufficient answer to this sug-

gestion:

“As soon as the employes found that we were arrested,

and taken from the scene of action, they became demoral-

ized, and that ended the strike. It was not the soldiers that

ended the strike. It was not the old brotherhoods that

ended the strike. It was simply the United States courts

that ended the strike. Our men were in a position that

never would have been shaken, under any circumstances,

if we had been permitted to remain upon the field, among

them. Once we were taken from the scene of action, and

restrained from sending telegrams or issuing orders or

answering questions, then the minions of the corporations

would be put to work. * * * Our headquarters were tem-

porarily demoralized and abandoned, and we could not

answer any messages. The men went back to work, and the

ranks were broken, and the strike was broken up, * * * not

by the army, and not by any other power, but simply and

solely by the action of the United States courts in restrain-

ing us from discharging our duties as officers and repre-

sentatives of our employers.”

Whatever any single individual may have thought or

planned, the great body of those who were engaged in

these transactions contemplated neither rebellion nor rev-

olution, and when in the due order of legal proceedings

the question of right and wrong was submitted to the

courts, and by them decided, they unhesitatingly yielded

to their decisions. The outcome, by the very testimony of

the defendants, attests the wisdom of the course pursued

by the government, and that it was well not to oppose force

simply by force, but to invoke the jurisdiction and judg-

ment of those tribunals to whom by the constitution and in

accordance with the settled conviction of all citizens is

committed the determination of questions of right and

wrong between individuals, masses, and states.

It must be borne in mind that this bill was not simply

to enjoin a mob and meb violence. It was not a bill to com-

mand a keeping of the peace; much less was its purport to

restrain the defendants from abandoning whatever

employment they were engaged in. The right of any

laborer, or any number of laborers, to quit work was not

challenged. The scope and purpose of the bill was only to

restrain forcible obstructions of the highways along which

interstate commerce travels and the mails are carried. And

the facts set forth at length are only those facts which

tended to show that the defendants were engaged in such

obstructions.

A most earnest and eloquent appeal was made to us in

eulogy of the heroic spirit of those who threw up their

employment, and gave up their means of earning a liveli-

hood, not in defense of their own rights, but in sympathy

for and to assist others whom they believed to be wronged.

We yield to none in our admiration of any act of heroism

or self-sacrifice, but we may be permitted to add that it is

a lesson which cannot be learned too soon or too thor-

oughly that under this government of and by the people

the means of redress of all wrongs are through the courts

and at the ballot box, and that no wrong, real or fancied,

carries with it legal warrant to invite as a means of redress

the co-operation of a mob, with its accompanying acts of

violence.

We have given to this case the most careful and anx-

ious attention, for we realize that it touches closely ques-

tions of supreme importance to the people of this country.

Summing up our conclusions, we hold that the govern-

ment of the United States is one having jurisdiction over

every foot of soil within its territory, and acting directly

upon each citizen; that, while it is a government of enu-

merated powers, it has within the limits of those powers all

the attributes of sovereignty; that to it is committed power

over interstate commerce and the transmission of the mail;

that the powers thus conferred upon the national govern-

ment are not dormant, but have been assumed and put

into practical exercise by the legislation of congress; that in

the exercise of those powers it is competent for the nation

to remove all obstructions upon highways, natural or arti-

ficial, to the passage of interstate commerce or the carry-

ing of the mail; that, while it may be competent for the

government (through the executive branch and in the use

of the entire executive power of the nation) to forcibly

remove all such obstructions, it is equally within its com-

petency to appeal to the civil courts for an inquiry and

determination as to the existence and character of any

alleged obstructions, and if such are found to exist, or

threaten to occur, to invoke the powers of those courts to

remove or restrain such obstructions; that the jurisdiction

of courts to interfere in such matters by injunction is one

recognized from ancient times and by indubitable author-

ity; that such jurisdiction is not ousted by the fact that the

obstructions are accompanied by or consist of acts in

themselves violations of the criminal law; that the pro-

ceeding by injunction is of a civil character, and may be

enforced by proceedings in contempt; that such proceed-

ings are not in execution of the criminal laws of the land;

that the penalty for a violation of injunction is no substitute

for and no defense to a prosecution for any criminal

offenses committed in the course of such violation; that