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IN LOVE AND WAR: 1961–1969
Although Europe appeared to be the likeliest dirt patch for a major show-
down between communists and capitalists since the close of the Korean War
in 1953, Fidel Castro, a bearded revolutionary in olive green, had changed the
equation in 1959 by overthrowing the military dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista
in Cuba. Though Castro was not originally a communist, he was brutal, and a
series of bumpy incidents with the United States pushed him into Khrushchev’s
Soviet embrace. Plus, Fidel’s younger brother, Raul, was already a communist.
The Castro brothers ran with a good friend and fellow revolutionary, Ernesto
“Che” Guevara, an Argentine doctor who diagnosed the United States with
a case of imperialism and prescribed communist revolution as the antidote.
Guevara had been in Guatemala in 1954 when CIA-funded, -trained, and -led
paramilitary forces had violently overthrown a democratically elected govern-
ment.
He witnessed the start of an American-installed, right-wing, repressive
government that led to civil war and 200,000 Guatemalan deaths by 1996,
“mostly civilian lives, with an estimated 80 percent of those deaths caused
by the U.S.-trained military.”
4
Che Guevara had real reason to see the United
States as an interfering, destructive force in Latin America.
From the outset, Fidel Castro’s relationship with the United States had
been strained. In 1958, the United States had supplied Batista’s forces
with weapons, and in return Castro’s followers had taken U.S. Marines
hostage. The crisis had been resolved peacefully, but it established a shaky
basis for friendship once Fidel Castro took control in January 1959. Also,
during the fighting against Batista’s forces, Castro had obtained weapons
from communist Czechoslovakia with the Kremlin’s okay.
5
Lines were be-
ing drawn. Then, in April 1959, while the American public was enjoying
Castro’s rumpled-bandit look during his hotdog-eating, public-relations
tour of the States, President Eisenhower refused to meet with Castro and
went golfing instead. More problematic for U.S.-Cuban relations than that
diplomatic snub was Castro’s decision to nationalize foreign-owned busi-
n
esses in Cuba, most of which were U.S. corporate property. When Castro
offered to buy the properties at the devalued rates previously claimed by
companies like United Fruit, American enchantment with Castro eroded.
Over a series of months, the United States slowed its purchases of Cuban
sugar, and Castro signed an oil deal with the Soviets. Eisenhower broke
off all relations with Castro in January 1961, just as John Kennedy was
preparing to enter the White House. In this as with so much else, Kennedy
inherited unresolved problems. Fidel Castro was originally a nationalist,
not a communist. He had wanted to empower Cubans, but the schemes and
fears of Soviets, Americans, and his own advisers had convinced him that
in order to nationalize, he would have to communize. What is more, Castro
never showed any reluctance when it came to stifling opposition at home.