RAND Corporation. Social Science for Counterterrorism
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Representing Social-Science Knowledge Analytically 425
Figure 11.10
Factor Tree for Root Causes
RAND MG849-11.10
Low government capacity (e.g., few institutions, no rule of law);
population movements, demographic shifts
Increased root-cause
likelihood of terrorism
and
ors
ors
ors
ors
ors
and
Facilitative norms
about use of violence
Mobilizing structuresPerceived grievances
(hatred, humiliation, desire for revenge)
Cultural
propensity
for
violence
Source of recruits
Foreign
occupation or
dispossession
Ideology
(e.g., religion)
Social
instability
Alienation
Perceived
illegitimacy
of regime
Cultural
imperialism
Population
growth
and increasing
number of
youth
Social and
family
Political discontent
t 'FXQPMJUJDBM
opportunities
t $POTUSBJOFEDJWJM
liberties
t &MJUFEJTFOGSBO-
chisement and
competitions
Human insecurity
t -BDLPGFEVDBUJPO
t -BDLPGIFBMUIDBSF
t $SJNF
Technological
change and
modernization
t 6SCBOJ[BUJPO
t $MBTTTUSVHHMF
t 8FBMUIJOFRVBMJUZ
t 1PQVMBUJPOEFOTJUZ
t %JTMPDBUJPOT
&DPOPNJDQSPCMFNT
t 6OFNQMPZNFOU
t 1PWFSUZ
t 4UBHOBUJPO
t *OBEFRVBUFSFTPVSDFT
Repression
Globalization Loss of identity
426 Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together
level factors are determined by a myriad of complex and subtle factors
indicated lower in the tree.
In comparing this with Helmus’s tree (Figure 11.11) on individual-
level radicalization, we see considerable overlap despite the differences
in the perspectives. Helmus sees radicalizing groups as necessary but
also perceived rewards in one form or another (not included in Noricks’s
discussion of root causes), grievances, and a desire for change. Once
again, the richness of discussion depends on factors farther down the
tree, but we are interested in the high-level abstractions.
Paul’s tree (Figure 11.12) relates to public support. Despite having
begun by thinking about the group level of analysis, Paul found himself
recasting issues in terms of individuals’ propensity to support terrorism—
but with individuals affected by social pressures and incentives. His
factor tree again has much in common with the earlier ones. How-
ever, he puts more emphasis on “identity” and social pressures. He also
highlights the “negative” kind of social pressure caused by intimida-
tion. If the terrorist organization is able to credibly threaten a popula-
tion or individuals within it, then that will increase social pressures to
support the terrorist activity—perhaps only in a passive manner, per-
haps by providing materiel support, or perhaps by becoming a terrorist
(more the subject of Helmus’s paper). Paul also includes future-benefit
considerations (which, implicitly could be negative, reducing public
support). Individuals trade off “benefits” and “costs,” but how they do
so varies a great deal. ey may value such intangibles as prestige; they
may merely be swept along in a fervor. e result may be less rational-
analytic than emotional behavior.
Figure 11.13 is my adaptation from Jackson (2009), which exam-
ines how terrorist organizations decide whether to take particular
actions. I have translated that into a factor tree analogous to the ones
above. Here, again, we see factors for benefits and risks but also refer-
ence to costs and risks; we also see the importance of resources and
information. Is the potential action going to provide benefits in terms
of advancing group interests or strategy? If so, is it presumably consis-
tent with interests and ideology and also (an “and” condition) in align-
ment with constraints of external influences, such as the interests of
state sponsors, cooperating groups, or supportive social movements?
Representing Social-Science Knowledge Analytically 427
Figure 11.11
Radicalization Factor Tree
Individual willingness
to engage in terrorism
Radicalizing
social groups
Real and perceived
rewards
Felt need to respond to
grievances
Passion for change
Collective grievance
and duty to defend
Personal grievance
and desire for revenge
t
t
Personal attacks on
self or loved ones
Effects of post-traumatic
stress disorder
...
Religious
change
tCaliphate
t.JMMFOJBMJTN
Political change
tIndependence
of state
tAnarchy...
Single-issue
change
tEnvironment
tAbortion
tAnimal rights...
Alienation
Recruitment
Bottom-up
peer groups
tPrisons
t3BEJDBMGBNJMJFT
t3FMJHJPVTTFUUJOHT
advocating violence
t*OUFSOFUTJUFT
ands
ors
or
ors
Financial
Excitement
Social
Religious
or ideological
ors
Sense of identity
tied to collective
Attack
on collective
and
SOURCE: Adapted from Helmus (2009).
or
RAND MG849-11.11
Social, economic, and political discrimination;
other broad contextual factors
Charismatic, entrepreneurial leadership
428 Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together
Figure 11.12
Public Support Tree
RAND MG849-11.12
Propensity to support terrorism
Cultural
obligations
Kinship,
fictive kinship,
other ties
Group provision
of social
services
Regime
illegitimacy
Occupation
Group
intimacy
Ideology and
social-movement
considerations
Desire
to defend
Grievances
Desire for
revenge
Shared goals
Intimidation
Future benefit
t1SFTUJHF
t#BOEXBHPOJOH
t%JTDPVOUQBSBNFUFS
Unacceptable
group behavior
t&YDFTTJWFDJWJMJBODBTVBMUJFT
t*NQPTJUJPOPGSFMJHJPVTSVMFTy
Felt need for resistance or
BDUJPOCZQSPYZGPSQVCMJDHPPE
*EFOUJmDBUJPOXJUI
terrorist group
Social pressures and
incentives
and
and
Misperceptions
or self-deception
favoring group
Humiliation,
frustration,
alienation,
hatred
Charged negative
emotions
Normative
acceptability
of violence
Lack of opportunity for
QPMJUJDBMFYQSFTTJPOBOE
freedom, repression
ors
ors
ors
or
ors
ors
Charismatic, entrepreneurial leadership;
group propaganda
4063$&"EBQUFEGSPN1BVM
Representing Social-Science Knowledge Analytically 429
Figure 11.13
Decisionmaking
SOURCE: Adapted and simplified from Jackson (2009).
RAND MG849-11.13
Propensity to act
Perceived benefits
Acceptability of
perceived risks
Acceptability of
resources required
Sufficiency of
information
Positive
relevant-
population
reaction
Advance
of group
interests
or strategy
Positive
reactions
within group
Legiti-
macy
Pressures
to act
tCompetitional
t&WFOUESJWFO
and?
ands
ors
Consistency
with interests
and ideology
Alignment
with external
influences
tState sponsors
t$PPQFSBUJOHHSPVQT
t.PWFNFOUTBOE
networks...
Legitimacy
Need of
group to act
tFor cohesion
t#JBTUPBDUJPO
Action-specific
preferences
and?
Permissiveness
of group criteria
Weakness
of defenses
Effectiveness vs. counter-
terrormsm measures
Group
capability
Group
risk
tolerance
Resources
available
t.POFZ
tTechnology
t1FPQMF
tT ime
Situational
awareness
Technical
knowledge
Communi-
ications
Threshold
needs
or
and?
430 Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together
Claude Berrebi’s paper (Berrebi, 2009), written from an econo-
mist’s perspective, also emphasizes the rational-choice model and its
explanatory power. As one would expect in an economist’s discussion,
it considers benefits, costs, and risks.
Considering the observed overlap, it is natural to consider whether
a high-level synthesis exists for these various “views of the elephant.”
Such a synthesis is not straightforward because the appropriate abstrac-
tion depends on what insights one is looking to highlight or which
of several stories one wants to tell. I will merely illustrate one synthe-
sis. e story is expressed in terms of influence on individuals and
groups.
For this, it is useful to begin with a system-level influence diagram
(Figure 11.14, adapted from Gvineria [2009] and Davis [2006]). In this
diagram, the terrorist organization already exists, but its operational
capabilities (central oval) may increase or decrease as a function of the
resources and organizational structures available to it, which in turn
depend on support obtained from states (for example, Iranian support
Figure 11.14
A System Diagram Relating to Terrorism
Target
vulnerabilities
Attacks’
effectiveness
Context, developments, motivations, ideologies, perceptions,...
Counterterrorism efforts
±
±
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Support for
terrorism
Organizations
and resources
for terrorism
operational
capabilities
At-time “demand”
for attacks; decisions
Terrorist attacks
Terrorist
Representing Social-Science Knowledge Analytically 431
for Hizballah), general populations (for example, broad popular senti-
ment support for al-Qaeda), or more specific popular support (sup-
port of expatriate communities in western Europe for al-Qaeda or local
affiliates).
24
Given a degree of operational capability, the terrorist organization
has the potential to conduct attacks, but the potential effects depend
also on the targets’ vulnerabilities. If support for action is strong enough,
and if operational capability is adequate, then attacks will ensue. ose
will have effects, which in turn will affect subsequent support. Another
spectacular event akin to the attacks on the U.S. World Trade Center
and the Pentagon might increase support for what would be seen as a
revitalized al-Qaeda. Or it might spark back-reaction because of the loss
of human life and retaliation. Or both. e consequences, then, might
have positive or negative feedback effects (hence the ± symbology).
e primary function of Figure 11.14 is to illustrate how sup-
port for terrorism matters. Support, however, comes in many differ-
ent forms. Suppose that we put aside state support, which is a subject
unto itself, and consider only public support. at also varies markedly.
Support may be so great that individuals will actually become terror-
ists (see Helmus’s discussion); or it may come in the form of active or
passive public support without direct participation in terrorism attacks
(see Paul’s discussion). Such public support is widely regarded in social
science as a key to the success or decline of terrorism (see the classic,
Galula [1963], for example; and discussions in Paul [2009], Gvineria
[2009], and Stout, Huckabey, and Schindler [2008, p. 52], which is
based on perspectives from within al-Qaeda).
On reflection and on comparing the discussions, it seems that the
high-level factors contributing to either radicalization or active public
support are very similar, although sometimes with different names
depending on the author.
is suggests a composite view as shown in Figure 11.15, which
shows the propensity for participating in terrorism or public support
of the terrorist effort (an aggregation for simplicity) to be a function of
four primary factors:
432 Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together
Figure 11.15
A High-Level Factor Tree Relating to a Population’s Support for Terrorism
RAND MG849-11.15
Attractiveness of
and identification with
cause or activity
Strength of
ideology
(e.g., religion)
or cause
Group,
glory
Perceived
regime
illegitimacy,
dissatisfaction,
anger...
Religious,
ideological,
and ethical
basis
Threat to homeland
or people
Cultural
propensity
for violence
Personal
grievances
Perceived legitimacy
of terrorism
Acceptability of
costs and risks
Personal
risks and
opportunity
costs
Counter-
vailing
social
pressures
Societal
costs
Necessity,
effectiveness
Absence of
alternatives
History of
success
ands
ors
and
ors
or
or
–
Charismatic, entrepreneurial leadership
Active support-raising efforts by terrorist organizations and counterterrorist efforts by states and others
Other factors of environment and context:
t International political and political-military factors (including state support of terrorism, occupations, ...)
t Economic issues, social instability, human insecurity (within context of demographics, globalization, ...)
t Cultural issues (within contexts of globalization, modernization, ...)
t History and cultural history, ...
Propensity to participate in or
actively support terrorism
Radicalizing,
mobilizing
groups
–
–
Intimi-
dation
Emo-
tional
factors
±
Representing Social-Science Knowledge Analytically 433
attractiveness of and identification with a cause or other action•
perceived legitimacy of terrorism•
acceptability of costs and risks•
presence of radicalizing or mobilizing groups.•
e first of these is my renaming in “positive terms” the factor related
to motivation. As has been repeatedly noted by terrorism scholars (for
example, Sageman, 2008; Jenkins, 2006), terrorists do not see them-
selves as “terrorists.” ey often see themselves as warrior heroes sup-
porting either a cause (religious or otherwise) or, at least, an activity
that they find exciting. e second factor uses the term “legitimacy.”
As we know from accounts of terrorists’ internal debates, such mat-
ters are important—even if they conveniently discover rationale for
doing what they are motivated to do anyway (Sageman, 2008; Stout,
Huckabey, and Schindler, 2008, pp. 232 ff.). e third factor, accept-
ability of costs and risks, is implicit in some of the companion papers
and explicit in others (for example, Jackson’s, as well as Berrebi’s). e
fourth factor appears explicitly in Noricks’s and Helmus’s work and
implicitly in the others. Note also, at the bottom, that charismatic,
entrepreneurial leaders can be very important (Gupta, 2008).
At the second and third levels of detail, Figure 11.15 shows more
than a dozen constituent factors. All of these are discussed in one form
or another in the papers by Noricks, Helmus, Paul, Jackson, and Ber-
rebi. e papers offer different perspectives as to how they come into
play, but the differences are arguably not of first-order importance.
As discussed above, “ands” and “ors” are important in Figure
11.15. To first order, the research base suggests that all of the top-level
factors must surpass some threshold or terrorism will decline. However,
there are different ways that a cause may be seen as attractive and that
terrorism can be seen to be legitimate. Similarly, there are a number
of factors affecting the “negatives,” that is, determining the percep-
tion of costs and risks. Although only one of several possible high-
434 Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together
level perspectives,* the figure highlights overarching factors that appear
repeatedly in the research literature in one form or another. Further, it
does so holistically rather than asserting, for example, that participa-
tion in or support of terrorism is just a consequence of a cost-benefit
calculation or that the current wave of terrorism is supported by popu-
lar sympathy driven only by Salifism or only by political grievances. To
put matters otherwise, the intent of the diagram is to cover all of the
available respectable explanations, not just the one deemed currently
by some particular experts to be dominant in a particular time and
place.
At first glance, it may appear that the factors of Figure 11.15 are
assumed to combine via rational choice: Is there value to the terrorism,
is it legitimate, are the costs and risks acceptable, and is there a mecha-
nism? at might, in the instance of some individuals and groups, be
correct and, as discussed in a companion paper (Berrebi, 2009), much
can be understood with the rational-choice model. Social science tells
us, however, that that model is often not descriptive. Even if we con-
sider an individual or group contemplating terrorism, so that the con-
cept of “decision” is perhaps apt, the more general concept is arguably
limited rationality. People attempt to be rational, that is, to take actions
consistent with their objectives, but they are affected by many influ-
ences, which include
†
the constraints of • bounded rationality, which include erroneous
perceptions, inadequate information, and the inability to make
the complex calculations under uncertainty demanded by strict
“rational choice”; the result is often heuristic decisionmaking,
which employs simplified reasoning and may even accept the first
solution that appears satisfactory
*
For example, if one wises to emphasize the differences between root-cause factors and fac-
tors affecting public support or causing the decline of terrorism (see Cragin, 2009), then the
“super aggregation” represented by Figure 11.16 is inappropriate.
†
See the Nobel Prize lectures Simon (1978) and Kahneman (2002) for discussions of
bounded rationality and cognitive biases. Davis, Kulick, and Egner (2005) review modern
decision science with extensive citations to the rational-analytic and “naturalistic” decision-
making literatures.