Perrie M. (ed.) The Cambridge History of Russia, Volume 1: From Early Rus’ to 1689
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michael khodarkovsky
The newly risen Orthodox Muscovy stood alone against Roman Catholic
Swedenin the north-west and Lithuania in the west, the Islamic Golden Horde
and its successor khanates of the Crimea and Astrakhan’ in the south and
Kazan’ in the east. Except for the western borderlands which were overwhelm-
ingly populated by the Christian communities, Moscow was surrounded by a
vastnon-Christian world.It is here, on its non-Christian frontiers, that Moscow
enjoyed its major military successes, acquired new confidence, crystallised its
own identity, and built its first empire.
Before the ultimate collapse of the Golden Horde in the early sixteenth
century allowed for Moscow’s expansion south and east, the natural direction
of Muscovite expansion was the north-east. Moscow’s increasing appetite for
furs,salt and metals ledto Muscovite penetrationofthe distant lands populated
by various animist peoples.
In contrast to Novgorod, which was solely interested in exacting tribute
from the native population of the north, the Muscovites undertook a full-scale
colonisation of the region. The traditional landscape of the northern region,
previously dominated by primordial wilderness and the hunting and fishing
societies of the aboriginal population, was undergoing a thorough transfor-
mation. New villages, forts, towns and monasteries emerged with the arrival
of Russian peasants, soldiers, townsmen, traders and bureaucrats who were
to settle and colonise the lands, and clergy seeking to convert the pagan popu-
lation. North of the Urals, the construction of Pustozersk allowed Moscow to
set foot in the arctic tundra populated by the Nenets (Samoed), while the Mus-
covite towns of Ust’-Vym, Cherdyn’ and Solikamsk had firmly put the Great
Perm’ region populated by Komi (Zyrians) under Moscow’s control. Previ-
ously sporadic missionary activity of the Russian Orthodox Church received
a new impetus with the foundation in 1462 of the first large monastery in the
Urals, the Ioanna-Bogoslovskii monastery in Cherdyn’.
2
In the 1550s, the title of the recently crowned tsar of all Russia, Ivan IV, began
to include the territories east of the Urals, ‘Obdor, Konda and all Siberian
lands’. More often than not, such claims over new lands and peoples were
premature, and Moscow’s limited influence in the region continued to rely on
exchange treaties with the natives. The Muscovites would have to wait until
the 1590s, when the construction of the forts and towns of Berezov, Obdorsk
and Verkhotur’e did indeed give Moscow greater control over lands east of the
Urals mostly populated by the Khanty (Ostiaks) and Mansi (Voguls).
3
2 Istoriia Urala s drevneishikh vremen do 1861 g. (Moscow: Nauka, 1989), p. 146.
3 James Forsyth, A History of the Peoples of Siberia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1992), p. 10.
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The non-Christian peoples on the Muscovite frontiers
Bythemiddleofthesixteenthcenturythe Muscoviteexpansion in the north-
eastwasencroaching on the various peoples in the Volga–Kama Mesopotamia.
These were the northern boundaries of the magnificent Muslim khanate of
Kazan’. At the same time Moscow’s expansion brought it directly to the gates
of the city of Kazan’, which remained the main barrier preventing Moscow’s
expansion east into Siberia and south towards the Caucasus.
The conquest of Kazan’ and Astrakhan’
The conquest and annexation of the Kazan’ khanate was one of the critical
watersheds in Russianhistory. It set the stage for Moscow’s relentless territorial
aggrandisement throughout the following centuries. The upstart Muscovite
state was rapidly turning into an empire, whose ruler claimed to be a Universal
Emperor destined to rule over the diverse multitudes of pagan and Muslim
peoples.
The long-term strategic and economic importance of the conquest of
Kazan’ was obvious: to control the riches of the mid-Volga area, to gain access
to the wealth of Siberia and to dominate the commercial routes to Central
Asia and China as well as Iran and the Caucasus. In other words, Kazan’ was
Moscow’s window on the East.
But even greater was its immediate symbolic significance. Kazan’ was one
of the successor states of the Golden Horde and its rulers were the Chingisids,
the direct descendants of Chingis khan. Given the centuries of humiliation and
the grand princes’ subservience to the khans of the Golden Horde, Moscow
undoubtedly saw the conquest of Kazan’ as an ultimate testimony to its newly
won sovereignty, the superiority of its arms and, most importantly, a Divine
Indication that Moscow had become the centre of Christendom.
Of course, Ivan IV was not the only one claiming to be a Universal Christian
ruler, and his Habsburg contemporaries, the Holy Roman Emperor, Charles
V, and his son Philip II, king of Spain, had laid similar claims prior to Ivan
IV. Is it possible that Ivan IV was, in fact, inspired by the Spanish feats which
followed in short succession: the Reconquista of the Iberian peninsula from
the Muslims, the swift conquest of America and its animist population and
finally Charles V’s conquest of Tunis in 1535, celebrated as a crusading triumph
against the World of Islam?
Immediately after Kazan”s conquest, Moscow showed a zeal similar to its
Spanish counterpart: the mosques were destroyed and the Muslim population
faced slaughter, expulsion, forced resettlement and conversion to Orthodox
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Christianity.
4
Those who were converted at the initial stage of conquest
become known as the old converts (starokreshchennye). Yet Moscow’s rule
over the conquered Muslim domains proved to be very different from that of
Spain. Shortly after the annexation of Kazan’, Moscow changed its policy to a
mixture of carrots and sticks, choosing to rely more on accommodation and
co-optation than on concerted violence. The Muscovite rulers never resorted
to the sort of violent campaign which characterised the Spanish Reconquista:
wholesale conversion to Christianity and massive expulsion.
Belatedly and unconvincingly Moscow also tried to make Kazan’ into its
own Reconquista, claiming that Kazan’ had always been a patrimony of the
Russian princes. Such a claim could justify the conquest to Muscovite and
Western audiences, but it certainly found little appeal among the population
of the Kazan’ khanate and Muslims outside it. Unlike Spain, which was a part
of a larger Roman Catholic Europe, Moscow was surrounded by powerful
Islamic states and numerous non-Christian peoples whom it simply could not
afford to antagonise, even less to dispense with. To legitimise its conquest
among the population of the former Golden Horde, Moscow had to take
the mantle of the khans and to claim to be an heir to their glory. It would
not be the last time that Moscow’s political theology of a crusading state
destined to rule and convert the pagans and the Muslims was moderated by
the reality mandating a more accommodating approach. For a long time to
come, Moscow’s pragmatic political concerns continued to coexist uneasily
with its theological visions.
Annexation of the Kazan’ khanate added numerous non-Christians to the
Muscovite realm. These were the Mordva, Chuvash, Mari (Cheremis) and
Udmurts(Votiaks)whocomprisedprosperous agriculturalcommunitiesalong
the banks of the Volga, Viatka and Kama rivers and remained predominantly
pagan. But most significantly,forthe firsttimeMoscow acquired largenumbers
of Muslims who were to become the subjects of the Christian tsar. These were
Tatars mostly residing in and around Kazan’ and Bashkirs in the territory east
of the Volga.
Theconquest and annexationof Kazan’ in 1552 was the culmination of a long
process: Moscow’s incremental but determined territorial aggrandisement,
driven above all by its growing economic and military might on the one hand
and the increasing rivalry and debilitation among the successor khanates of the
Golden Horde on the other. Moscow’s expansion was also based on a complex
4 Prodolzhenie drevnei rossiiskoi vivliofiki, 11 vols. (St Petersburg: Imperatorskaia Akademiia
Nauk, 1786–1801; reprinted in Slavic printings and reprintings, 251, ed. C. H. van
Schooneveld, The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1970), vol. ix (1793), pp. 60–5.
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The non-Christian peoples on the Muscovite frontiers
set of its ever-changing relationships with the various constituent parts of the
former Golden Horde.
Thus, it was no secret that Moscow’s measured military successes between
1480 and 1509 were due to its alliance with the Crimea. Of course, what was
de facto an alliance was seen in the world of steppe politics as a relationship of
two unequals. The Crimean khans claimed to be the heirs to the heritage of
the Golden Horde and referred to themselves as the Great Khans of the Great
Horde (Ulug Ordugunun Ulug Khan), while continuing to regard the grand
princes as the rulers of a subservient tributary state. Such indeed was the status
of the Russian princes since the mid-thirteenth century, when they had been
pressed into submission by the khans of the Golden Horde. The Muscovite
grand princes tacitly agreed with such assumptions and never challenged them
openly as long as the Crimea and Moscow had common enemies: Poland-
Lithuania and the Great Horde.
In the middle of the fifteenth century several branches of the Chingisids
seceded from the Golden Horde. They used traditional commercial hubs
to establish new political centres on the fringes of the Golden Horde: thus
emerged the khanates of the Crimea, Kazan’, Astrakhan’ and Siberia. What
was left of the Golden Horde was the Great Horde, a nomadic confederation
deprived of its vital economic centres, whose khans could claim to be the
heirs of the Golden Horde with greater legitimacy than any other members
of the Chingis dynasty and were therefore the main rivals of the Crimean
khans. In 1502, having suffered the last devastating blow by the Crimeans, the
Great Horde ceased to exist, its people and herds captured and brought to
the Crimea. With their common antagonist gone, the interests of Moscow
and Crimea began to diverge. In their effort to establish Crimean authority
over the parts of the former Golden Horde, the Crimean khans sought to
control Kazan’, Kasimov and Astrakhan’ and continued to demand tribute
and military assistance from Muscovy.
In the meantime, Moscow had its own agenda. With its hard-won
sovereignty, Moscow was in no mood to have the Crimea replace Sarai, the
former residence of the khans of the Golden Horde. It slashed the payments of
customary tribute, procrastinated in helping the Crimeans against Astrakhan’
and, most importantly, zealously guarded its influence over Kazan’ where,
however intermittently and indirectly, Moscow had exercised control since
1487. When in 1519 Moscow installed in Kazan’ Shah Ali, a member of the rival
branch of the Chingisid dynasty and a nephew of Ahmed, the deceased khan
of the Great Horde, the Crimean khan Muhammed Girey had had enough. In
1521, Muhammed Girey approached his arch-rival, the khan of Astrakhan’, and
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offered peace and alliance against Moscow. At the same time, pro-Crimean
forcesin Kazan’ organised a coup and successfully installed on the throne Sahip
Girey, the sonofthe deceased Crimean khan,Mengli Girey. Thedeferred hostil-
ity which had characterised the relationship between Moscow and the Crimea
since 1509 now turned into an open war. The military campaign launched
against Muscovy from both the Crimea and Kazan’ was one of the most dev-
astating in the history of the Muscovite state.
5
With the final dissipation of the Golden Horde, the steppe lost any sem-
blance of central authority, which led to further turmoil and the emergence of
new actors and new alliances. From the mid-1520s Moscow’s military success
was, in no small degree, based on its alliance with the Nogais, a powerful
nomadic confederation of Turko-Mongol tribes. Throughout the sixteenth
century, the Nogais found themselves under increasing pressure from other
nomadic peoples, the Kazakhs and Kalmyks, and were forced to move further
west, approaching the Muscovite zone of influence. De facto crucial players
in the turbulent politics of the steppe, the Nogais had no claims to the throne
of the Great Khan of the Horde because their rulers were not descendants
of Chingis khan. The Nogais played a critical role in annihilating the Great
Horde and assisting Moscow in the conquests of Kazan’ and Astrakhan’.
6
Moscow’s annexation of Kazan’ represented more than a military victory;
it was also an ultimate challenge to the Crimean pretensions to rule and
control the territories of the former Golden Horde in the name of the horde’s
khans. Vocabulary of images spoke louder than words. To celebrate his victory
over Kazan’, Ivan IV ordered the construction of the most unusual cathedral.
Erected in the Red Square near the Kremlin, St Basil’s cathedral, with its
eclectic architecture, stood as the ultimate symbol of Moscow’s place in its
self-construed theological and political universe. Moscow was to be the New
Jerusalem and the New Sarai, both at the same time.
The deluge of foreign embassies and envoys in the wake of Moscow’s mil-
itary victory was a further confirmation of Moscow’s rise to international
prominence. The author of the Kazan’ Chronicle did not doubt the biblical
importance of Moscow’s victory over Kazan’, when he included the Baby-
lonians among many foreign envoys arriving to honour the Muscovite tsar.
7
5 M. Khudiakov, Ocherki po istorii Kazanskogo khanstva (Kazan’: Gosudarstvennoe izda-
tel’stvo, 1923; reprinted Kazan’: Fond TIAK, 1990), pp. 49–80; Michael Khodarkovsky,
Russia’s Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500–1800 (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2002), pp. 91–100.
6 Ibid., pp. 81, 100–7.
7 L. A. Iuzefovich, ‘Kak v posol’skikh obychaiakh vedetsia...’(Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye
otnosheniia, 1988), p. 5.
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The non-Christian peoples on the Muscovite frontiers
The first ones to recognise the new status of the tsar as a successor to the
khans of the Golden Horde were those most interested in seeking Moscow’s
economic and military assistance. After the conquest of Kazan’, recognising
the sovereignty and supremacy of the Muscovite ruler, the Nogais began to
refer to Ivan IV as the ‘White Tsar’ more frequently, while one Nogai mirza,
Belek-Bulat, decided to surpass others in his flattery and called Ivan IV ‘the
son of Chingis’.
The Nogais of Ismail and Belek-Bulat mirzas, whose pastures were located
along the banks of the Volga, remained Moscow’s crucial allies. The fact that
Moscow’s ambitions did not end with the annexation of Kazan’ was made
clear in Ivan’s letters to Ismail mirza in early 1553. Ivan asked Ismail to let him
know of an opportune moment to begin their campaign against Astrakhan’
and to advise him how best to conquer the Crimea.
8
In the spring of 1554, following Ismail’s advice, Ivan sent an army of 30,000
men down the Volga to rendezvous with Ismail’s Nogais and to install on
the Astrakhan’ throne a Muscovite and Nogai prot
´
eg
´
e, Dervish Ali from the
Astrakhan’ dynasty. Unlike the conquest of Kazan’, the conquest of Astrakhan’
took place without much struggle or drama.The Astrakhan’ khan, Yamgurchi,
fled to Azov with no attempt to resist the Muscovite siege of the city, and
Moscow declared Dervish to be the new khan of Astrakhan’. Ismail was given
thirty Muscovite musketeers and expected to guard the land approaches to
Astrakhan’, while Ivan was to secure the water routes.
Ismail’s delivery of Astrakhan’ into Muscovite hands set off anew the dor-
mant hostilities between the Nogai chiefs. As in the past, the internal wars
among the Nogais were waged along the factional lines of a pro-Russian
versus an anti-Russian coalition. In early 1555 the members of the victorious
pro-Russian coalition assumed the leadership positions among the Nogais
and Ismail became their beg (a supreme chief). When in the following year
the recalcitrant Nogai nobles rebelled against Ismail beg and Dervish khan
chose to forge close ties with the Crimea, Ivan IV dispatched his army against
Astrakhan’ once again. Dervish khan fled and Astrakhan’ fell without any
resistance. This time, however, as in his experience with Kazan’, Ivan decided
to rely on the puppet Chingisids no longer. Astrakhan’ was now annexed
and was henceforward ruled by the appointed Muscovite voevodas (military
governors).
9
8 Prodolzhenie drevnei rossiiskoi vivliofiki, vol. ix,pp.64–6, 80, 81.
9 Ibid., pp. 122–6, 152–6, 163–8;V.V.Trepavlov,Istoriia Nogaiskoi Ordy (Moscow: Vostochnaia
literatura, 2001), pp. 263–4, 297–9.
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A foothold in the North Caucasus
The Muscovite annexation of Astrakhan’ transformed Moscow overnight into
a significant player in the Caucasus region. Throughout the early 1550s, the
envoys of various Kabardinian princes from the Piatigorsk region in the North
Caucasus arrived in Astrakhan’ and Moscow. They came to explore the possi-
bility of a military alliance against their adversaries: the Crimeans in the west
and the Kumyks in the east. The Crimean khan continued to demand a levy of
Kabardinian boys and girls, who were in high demand at the Ottoman court.
Any refusal to supply the youths invited punitive raids from the Crimea. On
the other side, to the east, the Kabardinian villages suffered from the debili-
tating raids of the Kumyks. Ruled by the shamkhal (a title of a Kumyk ruler)
from his residence in Tarki in northern Daghestan and closely allied with the
Crimeans and Ottomans, the Kumyks were one of the most significant mili-
tary and economic powers in the North Caucasus. The slave trade in captured
Kabardinians, Georgians, and other peoples of the Caucasus was a vital source
of revenue for the Kumyks, who sold their human booty to the merchants
from Persia and Central Asia at the thriving slave markets in the Kumyk town
of Enderi (Andreevskaia in Russian). Enderi together with Kaffa, the Ottoman
port in the Crimea where the human cargo from the Slavic lands had been
sold and shipped to distant lands, were the two most important slave-trading
centres in the region.
One group of the Kabardinian nobles led by their grand prince Tem-
riuk Idarov was particularly enthusiastic about the newly founded alliance
with Moscow. In exchange for serving Moscow’s interests, Temriuk expected
Moscow’s help in protecting his people from the Kumyk raids and in suppress-
ing the rival Kabardinian princes. Perceived in terms of traditional political
culture, Temriuk was to be Ivan IV’s kunak, that is, a valued guest, friend
or ally. From Moscow’s point of view, however, Temriuk’s relationship with
the tsar could only be that of a subject with his ruler. The notion that the
Kabardinians became Muscovite subjects as early as the 1550s was construed
by the Muscovite chroniclers of the latter day and uncritically accepted into the
historiographical tradition. More than two centuries later, after the Ottoman
Porte was compelled to concede that the Kabardinians were now in Russia’s
sphere of influence, the Kabardinian nobles refused to swear allegiance to
Russia insisting that they had always been Russia’s kunaks, but not subjects.
10
10 Akty, sobrannye Kavkazskoi Arkheograficheskoi kommissiei, 12 vols. (Tiflis, 1866–83), vol. i
(1866), p. 91.
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The non-Christian peoples on the Muscovite frontiers
Whatever the differencesin the interpretation of their relationship, both the
Kabardinians and Muscovites were keenly interested in establishing close ties
betweenthem. Probablyfew expectedat the time that theseties wouldbecome
so close. In 1561, shortly after the death of his first wife, Ivan IV married the
daughter of Temriuk Idarov. She was brought to Moscow, baptised, named
Mariia and remained Ivan IV’s wife until her death in 1569.
11
The marriage
was the most eloquent testimony to Moscow’s ambitions in the Caucasus and
its first attempt to establish a foothold there through the loyal Kabardinian
princes.
The royal marriage with the Kabardinian princess may have been prompted
by more than geopolitical goals. The Muscovite officials believed that Kabar-
dinians were Orthodox Christians before they became Muslims, and because
the influence of Islam on the Kabardinians was barely discernible, Moscow
hoped to have them converted or reconverted without much difficulty. In
1560, when dispatching Muscovite troops to assist the Kabardinians against
the Kumyks, Ivan also included several priests, who were instructed to bap-
tise the Kabardinians. But if any major conversion of the Kabardinians was
indeed envisioned, it did not happen. Achieving Moscow’s missionary goals as
well as military objectives proved to be a more formidable task than Moscow
expected.
12
Moscow’s increasing activity in the North Caucasus had finally attracted
the attention of the Ottoman sultan, S
¨
uleyman the Magnificent. Despite initial
concern over Moscow’s conquests of Kazan’ and Astrakhan’, the issue of
containing Muscovite ambitions did not become a priority while the Porte
was engaged in a protracted struggle with the Habsburgs in the West and
Safavid Persia in the East. By the early 1560s, however, it became apparent
that Moscow’s rapid expansion southward along the Volga and Don rivers
was threatening Ottoman strategic interests in the area and could no longer
be ignored. The Don cossacks’ raids disrupted land communications with the
Ottoman fortof Azov (Azak), and the Russianmilitary governors in Astrakhan’
did not allow safe passage of Muslim pilgrims from the Central Asian khanates
to Mecca.
In 1567, the sultan and khan discovered that the Muscovites were construct-
ing Fort Tersk on the Terek River in the eastern corner of the North Caucasus.
Moscow’s expansion further south now suddenly endangered the Porte’s vital
11 Kabardino-russkie otnosheniia v XVI–XVIII v. Dokumenty i materialy, 2 vols. (Moscow: AN
SSSR, 1957), vol. i,p.9.
12 Ibid., p. 8: Michael Khodarkovsky, ‘Of Christianity, Enlightenment, and Colonialism:
Russia in the North Caucasus, 1500–1800’, Journal of Modern History 71 (1999): 412–13.
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communications with its newly acquired possessions on the western shore of
the Caspian Sea and threatened the Crimea’s control of parts of the North
Caucasus and its Kabardinian subjects. The Porte revived the plan to send an
expeditionary force in order to construct a canal connecting the Don and the
Volga rivers. Ottoman success in building such a canal would have allowed
Istanbul to conquer Astrakhan’, to dominate the entire North Caucasus region
and to control the trade routes connecting Bukhara, Khiva, Urgench and
Tashkent with the Ottoman markets.
In 1567 news reached Moscow that the new Ottoman sultan, Selim II, was
preparingan armada of 7,000 ships to sail to Azov under his personalcommand,
and then he and the Crimean khan would set out against Astrakhan’. The
Crimean khan, Devlet Girey, expressed his concern over Moscow’s expansion
to the Muscovite envoy in the Crimea: ‘Before Ivan used to send tribute (shuby,
literally fur coats) to Kazan’, and then he seized Kazan’ and Astrakhan’, and
now he founded Tersk.’ With the support of an Ottoman army behind him,
the Crimean khan wrote to Ivan raising the price of peace with Moscow.
Devlet Girey demanded that Ivan return Kazan’ and Astrakhan’ to the Crimea
(‘because from the old days Astrakhan’ and Kazan’ were part of the Muslim
world and the iurt [apanage] of the khans of our dynasty’), send valuable and
numerous presents and give up building a fort on the Terek River. Otherwise,
the khan warned, there would be no peace.
13
In the spring of 1569 a large Ottoman–Crimean force set out on the cam-
paign. Digging a canal between the Don and the Volga at their nearest point
proved to be too difficult an undertaking, and the work was soon aban-
doned. The Ottoman–Crimean expeditionary force approached Astrakhan’
in September 1569. Instead of continuing the campaign so late in the season,
the decision was made not to storm the city but to build a fort nearby and
winter there in anticipation of reinforcements in the following year. In the end,
rumours of a large Russian army sailing down the Volga and a Persian army
dispatched to assist Astrakhan’ forced the Ottoman retreat.
Although a military fiasco, the Astrakhan’ campaign of 1569 convinced
Moscow that the Porte’s concerns had to be taken more seriously. Ivan IV’s
assurances that he meant no harm to Muslims and the Islamic faith, and that
he had conquered the Volga khanates merely to ensure their loyalty, did not
13 Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv drevnikh aktov, Moscow, Krymskie dela, f. 123,kn.13,
ll. 57, 66ob., 67, 71ob., 82, 83; E. I. Kusheva, ‘Politika russkogo gosudarstva na Severnom
Kavkaze v 1552–1572 gg.’, IZ 34 (1950): 279–80; A. A. Novosel’skii, Bor’ba Moskovskogo
gosudarstva s tatarami v pervoi polovine 17 veka (Moscow and Leningrad: AN SSSR, 1948),
pp. 23–7; P. A. Sadikov, ‘Pokhod tatar i turok na Astrakhan’ v 1569 g.’, IZ 22 (1947): 143–50.
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The non-Christian peoples on the Muscovite frontiers
satisfy Selim II. The sultan insisted that the regions of Astrakhan’ and Kabarda
in the Caucasus were traditional Ottoman domains with Muslim residents.
He demanded that the pilgrims and merchants from Bukhara and elsewhere
be allowed to proceed through Astrakhan’ en route to Mecca. In 1571, eager to
prevent another campaign against Astrakhan’, which Moscow could ill afford
to defend at the time, Ivan IV informed the sultan that Fort Tersk was being
demolished and the Astrakhan’ route reopened.
14
Propelled almost instantly
into the forefront of a struggle with Islam, Moscow was not yet prepared
for such a confrontation. For the time being, the government refrained from
missionary or any other activity that could provoke the Ottomans.
The conquest of Siberia
While Moscow’s ambitions in the Caucasus collided with the interests of its
powerful regional contenders, the Islamic states of the Crimea, the Ottomans
and the Persians, no such major power stood in Moscow’s way in Siberia.
Here no other state insisted on its sovereignty over the indigenous peoples or
claimed religious affinity with the predominantly animist population. It was
not until the Russians reached the distant frontiers on the Amur River in the
second half of the seventeenth century that they were confronted with the
competing interests of another powerful state, Ming China.
This absence of a rival sovereign state extending its claims to the Siberian
lands and the commercial nature of the Siberian frontier may explain why the
conquest and colonisation of Siberia were put into private hands, the powerful
family of the Novgorod merchants and entrepreneurs, the Stroganovs. After
all, the royal charters to the Stroganovs to colonise Siberia in the sixteenth
century and a charter to the Russian-American Company to exploit Alaska
in the nineteenth century are the only two known instances, short-lived as
they were, when the colonisation of the new frontiers was entrusted to large
commercial companies similar to the better-known cases in the history of the
Western European expansion.
The Stroganovs’ success in colonising the Kama River region, which Ivan
IV had entrusted to them in a charter of 1558, encouraged Ivan IV to issue
a series of similar charters granting the Stroganovs a twenty-year exemption
from customs and taxes and the right to construct the forts and recruit its own
military in order to colonise the region east of the Urals.
14 Kabardino-russkie otnosheniia v XVI–XVIII vv., vol. i,no.10,p.20;no.13,p.26;no.16,pp.27–
9; Puteshestviia russkikh poslov XVI–XVII vv. Stateinye spiski (Moscow and Leningrad: AN
SSSR, 1954), p. 76.
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