Perkins John. The Secret History of the American Empire: Economic Hit Men, Jackals, and the Truth about Global Corruption
Подождите немного. Документ загружается.
120BOLIVIA: BECHTEL AND THE WATER WARS
plans advocated for helping impoverished regions since the
1930s, including those adopted by the Rural Electrification
Administration (REA) in the United States: that providing
services such as electricity, water, and sewer to everyone was
essential to general economic growth, even if such services had to
be subsidized. Following the REA example, implementing this
theory had proven highly effective in numerous countries. Despite
the successes, the World Bank decided to experiment with
something radically different.
As chief economist of one of the firms hired to promote Bank
policies in the 1970s, I was pressured to develop econometric
models that would prove the validity of EPPs. Econometrics
makes it easy to justify just about anything and I had a brilliant
staff of economists, mathematicians, and financial experts; so
technically it was not a problem. However, there were two issues
that tore at me. The first was the obvious moral one. The second
was pragmatic, a recognition that the old theory had demonstrated
its efficacy time and again. So, I asked myself, why tinker with
success, why risk increased poverty and social unrest, why
advocate EPPs?
The answer was evident: the EPP approach would transform
government-subsidized bureaucracies into profitable "cash cows"
ripe for privatization (as I would later discover in Bolivia at
COBEE). EPPs evolved out of the same mentality as
infrastructure loans that benefited foreign construction companies
and the local rich while leaving the poor with nothing, other than
huge debts. On a trip to Argentina, I learned of another reason.
"These countries are our future security," Gen. Charles Noble
told me as we rode together in a chauffeur-driven car through the
streets of Buenos Aires in 1977. "Chuck" was a vice president at
MAIN (who would later be promoted to president). A West Point
graduate with a master's degree in engineering from MIT, he had
a distinguished military career, having served as commanding
general of the U.S. Army Engineer Command in Vietnam and
president of the Mississippi River Commission. Now he was in
charge of MAIN'S water resource studies for Argentina, including
121THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
EMPIRE
those relating to the massive Salto Grande hydroelectric
project the country was building in partnership with Uruguay,
which would produce nearly two thousand megawatts, create a
vast lake, and flood a town of twenty-two thousand inhabitants.
"We lost Vietnam because we didn't understand the
communist mind. We gotta do a whole lot better here in Latin
America." Chuck gave me his best smile, one that was shockingly
gentle for a man with his reputation for toughness. "Don't ever let
the socialists talk you into believing that offering a free lunch
buys anything but disrespect. People have to pay for what they
get. Only way they appreciate it. Besides, it teaches them
capitalism, not communism. Look at that." He pointed at a pond
in a park we were passing. "Water's the future gold and oil
combined. We need to own as much of it as possible. That'll give
us leverage, power."
More than two decades later, I thought about Chuck Noble
when the announcement was made that a single company had
been granted the exclusive right to purchase Cochabamba's water
system, known as SEMAPA. A forty-year privatization lease was
granted to Aguas del Tunari, a partnership led by a subsidiary of
the infamous Bechtel Corporation. Awarding such a license-to-
exploit to a U.S. company had to make the general very happy.
But people in Latin America felt differently. The San Francisco-
based firm had earned a reputation as an organization that
managed to win favors from just about everyone in high places. It
had a long history of securing lucrative contracts from the World
Bank and the U.S. government. Because it was a private
corporation, controlled by a single family, it did not have to open
its books to the SEC or other watchdog organizations and
adamantly refused to do so.
"If Bechtel wants the job, don't even bother to bid," I had been
told during my EHM days on different occasions by government
officials in Indonesia, Egypt, and Colombia. Not long after my
trip to Argentina with Chuck Noble, an Ecuadorian contracting
officer, a personal friend from my Peace Corps days, allowed me
to take him out to dinner at the most expensive restaurant in Quito
and
122BOLIVIA: BECHTEL AND THE WATER WARS
then confided that he would save me thousands of times the
price of that meal by advising me not to spend the next several
months preparing proposals for a project he knew Bechtel was
slated to get. He rubbed his thumb and forefinger together.
"Everyone will grow rich," he said. "Me, the mayor, the president,
the boys from San Francisco." He grimaced. "Except you—and
the other poor suckers who think this is a competitive bidding
process."
Bechtel's ex-officers and executives include such luminaries as
George Shultz (Bechtel president and board member, Secretary of
the Treasury under Nixon, and Secretary of State under Reagan),
Caspar Weinberger (Bechtel vice president and general council,
and Secretary of Defense under Reagan), Daniel Chao (executive
vice president and managing director of Bechtel Enterprises
Holdings, Inc. and member of the advisory committee for the
Export-Import Bank of the United States), and Riley Bechtel
(Bechtel CEO and member of George W. Bush's President's
Export Council). Bechtel's management also included my father-
in-law, who, before he retired, had been the company's chief
architect and then was brought out of retirement to serve as
project manager of a huge Bechtel job to build cities in Saudi
Arabia. My wife had started her career at Bechtel. I knew the
company well—from many angles.
Almost immediately after the lease for SEMAPA was granted
to Bechtel, water rates skyrocketed. Some Cochabambans
experienced an escalation in their bills of more than 300 percent.
This was catastrophic for the city's inhabitants, who ranked
among the continent's most impoverished people.
"They're faced with the choice between food and water," a
Quechua organizer told me. "The gringos want more profits.
Bolivians are dying of thirst. They're told they can't even collect
rain water, that their contract with SEMAPA requires them to pay
Bechtel for any and all water they consume."
The citizens of Cochabamba rebelled. Boycotts shut down the
city for four straight days in January 2000. Mobs threatened to
storm SEMAPA’s offices. Bechtel demanded protection. Bolivian
123THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
EMPIRE
President Hugo Banzer acquiesced and mobilized the army. In
the violence that followed, dozens of Aymara and Quechua were
wounded and a seventeen-year-old boy was shot to death.
Fearing a full-blown revolution, President Banzer finally
imposed martial law. Then, after reportedly meeting with U.S.
embassy officials, he announced that he would nullify the Bechtel
contract. In April 2000 Bechtel abandoned its operations at
SEMAPA.
The people of Cochabamba celebrated their victory. They
shared cups of water in the streets. They offered toasts to their
new Aymara and Quechua heroes and wrote songs proclaiming
this triumph as the beginning of a new era. However, soon it was
apparent that they also faced a dilemma. They found that there
was no one left with adequate experience to run SEMAPA. Many
of the former managers had retired, relocated, or accepted other
jobs.
The community elected a new board of directors and
established a set of governing principles that identified social
justice as SEMA-PA's guiding commitment. The water company's
most important objectives would be to supply water to the poor,
including those who had not previously been connected to the
system; provide adequate compensation to its workers; and
operate efficiently and without corruption.
24
Meanwhile, Bolivia's government still had to deal with the
corporatocracy. Bechtel was not about to give up its cash cow—
and set a precedent that might encourage other countries to follow
Bolivia's example—without a fight. In a classic case that
demonstrates the corporatocracy's willingness to manipulate
international law in order to achieve its goals, Bechtel enlisted
one of its Dutch holding companies. Drawing on a 1992 Bilateral
Investment Treaty (BIT) between the Netherlands and Bolivia
(since none existed between the United States and Bolivia), the
Dutch subsidiary filed a $50 million lawsuit against the Bolivian
people, half for profits it claimed would be lost from its
"expropriated investment" and half for damages.
This incredible story of corporate intrigue, greed, and
insensitivity
124BOLIVIA: BECHTEL AND THE WATER WARS
was largely ignored by the U.S. media. However, the Latin
press covered it extensively. As I followed reports posted on their
Web sites, I kept thinking about the people at COBEE. I recalled
that most of the key executives and engineers at Bolivia's most
powerful electric utility—the one that supplied power to both the
presidential palace and military headquarters—were citizens of
other countries (the United States, the United Kingdom,
Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Paraguay). This dependency on
foreign nationals was, I realized, a calculated strategy, virtually
ensuring that the utility would never be nationalized.
I also discovered that Leucadia no longer owned COBEE. The
electric company had been bought and sold several times since
the early 1990s, always by foreign corporations. Leucadia and the
others had reputations for merchandising companies at a profit.
Cash cows were a good thing; but the quick, high-return sale was
even better, especially since it kept local populations off balance.
From all the turmoil, a new leader emerged. Following a
pattern that seemed to be turning into a trend, Evo Morales rose
out of the indigenous community. An Aymara activist, he joined
the Mov-imiento al Socialismo (MAS) party. His was a strong
voice that opposed privatization and what euphemistically was
referred to by corporatocracy supporters as "liberal" or "free
market" economic reforms—policies that would prevent Bolivia
from protecting its farmers and businesses while at the same time
forcing it to accept protectionist barriers from the United States.
He denounced the Washington-driven Free Trade Area of the
Americas as a plan "to legalize the colonization of the Americas."
His popularity grew and he was elected to Congress.
Almost immediately, the corporatocracy labeled him a
terrorist. The U.S. State Department described him as an "illegal
coca agitator."
25
Although Morales had been part of the cocalero
movement—a coalition of coca leaf-growing campesinos who
resisted U.S. efforts to eradicate coca farms—he pointed out that
the plant was used by Andean people as a dietary supplement and
medicine long before
125THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
EMPIRE
it was made into cocaine. A remedy for altitude sickness,
muscle aches, hunger pangs, and other digestive disorders, coca
tea had been drunk by many dignitaries, including Pope John Paul
II and Britain's Princess Anne. Nevertheless, Morales was forced
out of his congressional seat in 2002 on charges of terrorism. The
Que-chua and Aymara accused the CIA of masterminding his
removal. Within months, his eviction was declared
unconstitutional.
U.S. Ambassador Manuel Rocha warned, "I want to remind
the Bolivian electorate that if you elect those who want Bolivia to
become a major cocaine exporter again, this will endanger the
future of U.S. assistance to Bolivia." Rather than deterring
Bolivians, Rocha inflamed them. Morales declared that the
ambassador's words had helped to "awaken the conscience of the
people." MAS plastered posters onto walls around the country;
above an enormous photo of Morales, huge letters asked:
"Bolivians: You Decide: Whose in Charge? Rocha or the Voice of
the People?"
26
In the 2002 presidential elections, MAS finished only a couple
points behind the leading party. Morales refused to endorse the
new president, a millionaire raised in the United States, Gonzalo
Sanchez de Lozada. Instead MAS opted to play the role of
opposition. Like Chavez after his failed coup attempt, Morales's
reputation was bolstered by what on the surface appeared to be a
defeat.
President Sanchez buckled to IMF and World Bank demands.
In 2002 he decreed a huge tax increase. As so often happens in
such circumstances, those who could least afford to pay taxes
ended up hardest hit. Amid ensuing riots, thirty people were
killed. Road blocks and demonstrations brought the country to a
standstill. Sanchez's plans to export natural gas at low prices to
the United States and other countries instead of distributing it to
needy Bolivians further inflamed indigenous communities.
Bloody fighting resulted in another twenty deaths. Finally,
Sanchez was forced to flee the country. He now lives outside
Washington, D.C.; the United States has refused Bolivia's
requests to have him returned for trial.
Bolivians had defied the World Bank and they had defeated
126
Bechtel, one of the most powerful organizations on the planet.
Now one of their "original people," one of those who had been so
brutally subjugated for generations, had risen phoenixlike from
the ashes of his culture's ruins.
In a way, it seemed to me that the real message here was not
just for Bolivians and Latins; it was also intended for Bechtel and
the rest of the corporatocracy. It was a pro-democracy, pro-justice
message that served to inspire the younger generations in Bolivia,
the United States, and the world.
I often found myself thinking about Jessica's comment as we
wound through the Zongo River gorge. "I'm glad they didn't build
a big dam and flood this whole valley," she had said. "It's so
beautiful."
There was nothing beautiful about any aspect of U.S. foreign
policy and CIA skullduggery I encountered during a trip to
Brazil— Washington's attempt to counter the message sent by the
new wave of Latin leaders.
23
Brazil: Skeletons in the Closet
By the time I arrived at the World Social Forum (WSF) in
Brazil in January 2005, the continent was caught up in what
amounted to a revolution against the corporatocracy. In addition
to Chavez, Lula, and Gutierrez, Nestor Kirchner and Tabare
Ramon Vazquez had won elections in Argentina and Uruguay
respectively. Regardless of whether some might be bending under
pressure, all had run populist campaigns that denounced U.S.
intervention and exploitation by foreign corporations. The North
American press could denounce them as "leftists," "friends of
Castro," and even "communists," but in Africa, Asia, and Europe,
as well as Central and South America, people knew that these
adjectives were irrelevant; each of the new presidents had
campaigned as a nationalist determined to see his country's
resources used to help its citizens rise out of poverty.
Something extraordinary was also happening in Chile.
Published reports and recently declassified U.S. government
documents confirmed rumors long held that the Nixon
administration and the CIA had coordinated efforts with U.S.
companies and the Chilean military to overthrow and assassinate
democratically elected president Salvador Allende in 1973.
Allende's "crime" had been to honor his campaign promises that
Chilean resources should belong to Chileans, and, after election,
to nationalize the foreign-owned copper, coal, and steel industries,
and 60 percent of the private banks. As in Iran, Iraq, Guatemala,
Indonesia, and so many other places before, the United States
backed a man to replace him whose personality matched the
profile of a bloodthirsty despot: Gen. Augusto Pinochet Now, two
decades later, the WSF was abuzz with the news that U.S.
congressional investigators and a Chilean judge had uncovered
secret
128BRAZIL: SKELETONS IN THE CLOSET
Pinochet bank accounts at Riggs Bank in Washington and
other foreign banks totaling at least $16 million and that Pinochet
himself would finally be brought to justice for the estimated two
thousand people killed by police and army units under his
command.
Rumors also abounded at the WSF that a Chilean woman
whose air force general father had died in prison for opposing
Pinochet was a strong possibility for the 2005 presidential
elections. Michelle Bachelet had already established herself as a
very competent head of Chile's health and defense ministries; she
had demonstrated that she was a nationalist with the courage to
stand up to the corporato-cracy. If she won, it would mean that
more than 80 percent of South America had voted for
anticorporatocracy presidents, that 300 million people (roughly
the population of the United States) had chosen the candidate who
opposed the empire to the north.
The WSF is a symbol of the changes sweeping our planet. It
was established at the beginning of the third millennium as a
response to the World Economic Forum, where government and
business leaders collaborate, strike deals, hammer out trade
policies, and coordinate other corporatocracy strategies. More
than 150,000 participants from more than 130 countries flocked to
the WSF in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in January 2005 to discuss
economic, social, environmental, and political issues and to
formulate alternatives to failing systems. Presidents Lula of Brazil
and Chavez of Venezuela, among other luminaries, attended the
WSF.
I had been asked by a Swedish nonprofit organization, the Dag
Hammarskjold Foundation, to give a keynote address entitled
"Confessions of an Economic Hit Man—What Next for the
World?" A huge tent was provided for my talk. Rights to the book
had been sold in many languages, but most had not been
published yet. It did not seem to matter; the English version
circulated widely. The crowd that showed up filled the hundreds
of chairs and expanded out through the tent's doorway. Following
my talk, dozens lined up .it the microphone to ask questions and
make their own comments. I personally was particularly moved