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PROBLEMS JN
EUROPEAN
CIVILIZATION
THE
NAZI
Germany's
Guttt
or
Germany's
52-19060
Snell
Ti:e
Eazi
Revolution
PROBLEMS
IN
EUROPEAN
CIVILIZATION
THE NAZI
REVOLUTION
Germany's
Guilt
or
Germany's
Fate?
EDITED AND
WITH AN
INTRODUCTION
BY
John
L.
Snelly
TULANE
UNIVERSITY
B.C.
HEATH
AND
COMPANY
BOSTON
In
the
case
of
sale outside
the United
States,
special
acknowledgment
is made to
Odhams
Press Ltd.
for
permission
to
reprint
the
selection
from
Alan
Bullock's
HITLER: A
STUDY
IN
TYRANNY;
to
Hamish
Hamilton Ltd.
for
the
selection
from,
A.
J.
P.
Taylor's
THE
COURSE OF
GERMAN
HISTORY;
and
to
Routledge
&
Kegan
Paul
Ltd.
for
Zevedei
Earbus
DEMOCRACY
AND
DICTATORSHIP:
THEIR
PSYCHOLOGY
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1959
BY D.
C. HEATH
AND
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THE
UNITED
STATES
OF
AMERICA
Table
of
Contents
HITLER
MADE
THE
MOVEMENT
ALAN
BULLOCK
The Talents of
Tyranny
i
A
PRODUCT
OF
EUROPEAN
POWER
POLITICS
L U
D W I
G
BE H
I O
Germany
and the
Epoch
of
World
Wars
9
MAURICE BAUMONT
The
Role
of
Foreign Policy
in the Success
of
the
National
Socialist
Party
12
AN OUTGROWTH
OF
GERMAN
HISTORY?
EDMOND
VERMEIL
Pre-19
14
Roots
15
A.
J. P. TAYLOR
History
Unfolds,
1918-1933
19
EUGENE
N. ANDERSON
German
History
Did
Not
Make
Nazism
Inevitable
27
A NATIONAL
UPRISING
AGAINST
UN-GERMAN
POSTWAR
FORCES
LEON
POLIAKOV
Anti-Semitism:
Cause
or
Result
of
Nazism?
30
MILTON
MAYER
Communism
as
a
Cause
of
Nazi
Popularity
33
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vu
viii
Table
of
Contents
A
TOOL OF
CRISIS
CAPITALISM
FRANZ
NEUMANN
The Crisis
of
German
Capitalism
35
GEORGE
W.
F. II
A
L
L G A
R
T
E
N
German
Industrialists Paid
Hitler
38
A
PRODUCT
OF THE
PROMISE AND
FAILURE
OF
SOCIALISM
FR
IED RI
CH
M Ei N
ECICE
Product of
the
Promise of
Socialism
46
GERARD
BRAUNTHAL
The
Failure
of
Socialist
Labor
50
A RESULT
OF
MILITARISM,
NOT
ECONOMICS?
J.J.SCHOKKING
Militarism
in
German
Society
58
ROBERT
G.
L.
WAITE
The
Free
Corps:
Vanguard
of
Nazism
,
63
GORDON
A.
CRAIG
The
Guilt
of
the
Old
Army
67
THE
NEMESIS
OF
WESTERN
MASS
DEMOCRACY
GERHARD
RITTER
The
Army
Not
Guilty
73
GERHARD
R1TTER
The
Fault
of
Mass
Democracy
76
SECURITY
FOR A
SICK
PSYCHE?
ZEVED
El
BARB U
The
Uniqueness
of the
German
Psyche,
1918-1933
85
ROBERT
H.
LOW IE
Germans
Are
Like
Other
Europeans
89
Suggestions
for
Additional
Reading
94
Introduction
HISTORY
is not
an exact
science.
Even
when it
tries most to attain ulti
mate
truth,
it
remains
an
"art
of the
possi
ble."
Each
historian's
truth
about
the
past
is
in
some
part
a
personal
truth;
it
is "sub
jective."
The earlier the student o
history
acknowledges
this limitation of
history
as
a
discipline
the
better,
for indeed the
greatest
of
all
faults
is
to
be
conscious
of
none.
But
the
warning
of
a
wise
Dutch
his
torian,
J.
Huizinga,
is
appropriate
here:
"A
gentle
slope
leads
from
an
unavoidably
subjective approach
to
problems
down
to
crass
prejudice
and
partisanship/'
Like
all
knowledge,
an awareness of
the
relativity
of historical
truth
can
be
a
dangerous thing.
One
reader
might
conclude
that
any
man's
interpretation
of the
past
is
as
good
as the
next.
Another
student
of
history
might
de
cide
that
he
should
not
be a
student
of
his
tory
at
all,
since
it
will
give
him
few abso
lute answers
to
important questions.
These
conclusions
are
not
the
ones
this
collection
of
historical
interpretations
of
Nazism is
de
signed
to
suggest.
Scientific
ideals,
"myths/'
are
as
essential
in
the life of mankind
as
are
"social
myths."
Realization
that the
ideal
of
absolutely
"objective"
truth
cannot
be
achieved
should
lead
neither
to
oppor
tunism
nor to
despair,
but
to
a more
critical,
wiser,
and
therefore
more
realistic
striving
to
achieve
it.
It
should
lead to
the
study
of
as
many
different serious
approaches
to
truth
as
can be found
in
varying
historical
interpretations
of
important
events.
The
readings
in
this booklet
are extracts
from
varying
and
important
interpretations
of
a
major
historical
event.
They
are
organ
ized
around
a
central
question.
The
event:
One
of
the
most
important
developments
in
the
history
of
the
modern
world,
the
crea
tion of
a
twelve-year reign
of
terror
by
National
Socialism
under the
ruthless
lead
ership
of
Adolf
Hitler.
The central
ques
tion is the
question
of
causation:
How
was
it
possible
for
the
Nazis to come
to
power
in one of
the most civilized
countries
of
Europe
in
the
twentieth
century,
just
four
teen
years
after that
country
had thrown its
monarchical armor
on the
slag
heap
of his
tory
and
wrapped
itself
in
the
clothing
of
democratic
republicanism?
Did it
happen
because of
unique
conditions in
Germany?
Were other
nations
chiefly
or
partly
re
sponsible?
These
are the
questions
Ger
many's
famed
historian,
the late
Friedrich
Meinecke,
had
in mind
in
1948
when
he
told
his
German
colleagues
:
", .
. we
must
rediscover
ourselves
by throwing
light upon
the
historical
transformations
of
our
own
character
and the
interweaving
of
our
guilt
and our
fate," Will
Nazism
happen again?
If
so,
is it
likely
to
happen
in
Germany
only,
or
might
it
happen
elsewhere?
The
answers
depend upon
how
we
answer
the
central
questions
which
these
readings
pose:
What
brought
Hitler to
$Qt&-pawex^JM,xe$-
wMny^n"Jk93&2
Was
his
success
and the
German-European
tragedy
Germany's
guilt
or
Germany's
fate?
Historians have
given
diverse
answers
to
these
questions.
Some
writers
have
even
denied that there was
a
Nazi
"revolution,"
insisting
that the Nazi
movement
was re
actionary
and
could
have been at
most
a
"counter-revolution/*
Others
agree
that
there
was
a
Nazi
revolution but insist
that
it
did not
precede,
but
followed
Hitlers
appointment
as Chancellor
on
January
30,
1933.
Probably only
the
most
narrowly
loyal
Communist historians would
argue
today
that
all
that followed
1933 was
counter-revolution,
not
revolution.
It was
revolutionary,
let
us
say,
in
somewhat the
IX
Introduction
way
the rule
of Cromwell
was revolution
ary
in
mid-seventeenth
century
England,
or
the
way
in which
Napoleon
was revolu
tionary
in France
after
1799.
The
readings
in
this
booklet
suggest
both
revolutionary
and
reactionary
forces
that
helped
prepare
the
way
for
"die
Nazi
Revolution"
by
en
abling
Hitler to become
Chancellor of
the
German Reich. One
of
your
tasks
is
to de
cide
which were
the
more
fundamental,
which were
immediately
decisive^
Each of
the
units of
readings presented
in
this
booklet
emphasizes
the
significance
of
a
different factor in
the
rise
of the
Nazis
to
power.
The
first
unit
will
appeal
to
scholars who
believe that
history
is
power
fully
shaped by
leading
personalities
in
history,
for it
poinHTolfeln^
of
Hitler
in the
rise
of
Nazism.
Even those
like
Friedrich
Meinecke
who
emphasize
other
factors
have
acknowledged
"the mon
strous
effect of
Hitler's
personality"
as
a
cause of Nazi
success.
Advocates of "the
great
man"
theory
of
historical
causation
will
find much
to
support
their
convictions
in the
brilliant
interpretation
of
Adolf
Hitler
by
Alan
Bullock
which
opens
these
readings.
Others
look elsewhere
for
the
causes of
the
Nazi
revolution.
"Hitler's
wickedness
is
one
thing/'
an
English
historian
has writ
ten,
but
"how he
came
to
be
in
a
position
to
exercise
his
wickedness
in
the
way
he
did,
.
.
.
by
whose
derelictions
of
duty,
on
the
part
not
only
of
Germans
but
also
of
English
and
French
and
Americans and
others,
is
another
thing;
and
it
is
with the
latter
that,
first
and
foremost,
the
historian
has to
do."
In
a
spirit
akin
to
this,
Ludwig
Dehio
has
found
very
impersonal
reasons
of
a
European,
not
a
specifically
German
character,
for
the
Nazi
revolution.
Ger
many
was
bound
by
some
unkind
histori
cal
destiny
to
gamble
for
domination
"hegemony"
in
Europe,
Dehio
writes
in
the
second unit
in
this
book.
Germany's
gamble
was
only
the
last
in
a
long
line
of
similar
efforts
by
Spain,
Austria,
and
France
to
put
an
end to
"balance
of
power"
rivalries
in
Europe
by
imposing
their
own
rule. In
his
basic
thesis,
Dehio,
a
noted
German
historian,
seems
to
make
excuses
for
Germany.
But
it
is
well
to
remember
that Dehio has
also
demanded
that
his
fellow
Germans
recognize
"the
frightful
role which
we have
played,
as
the
last
and
therefore
the most
demoniacal
hegemonic
power
of
old
Europe
in decline."
The second
essay
in
unit
two
is
by
a
leading
French
historian,
Maurice
Bau-
mont.
He
also
illustrates
how
Germany's
international
political
situation
helped
Hit
ler
climb
to
power.
Not some cosmic
or
historical
destiny,
but the
peacemakers
who
wrote the
Versailles
Treaty
of
1919
are
brought
to
our attention
by
the
Baumont
statement. Most Germans
today
will
still
contend
that the
Treaty
of
Versailles
was
primarily
responsible
for
the
rise
of
Nazism.
Certainly
it
provided
Hitler with
an
ex
cellent
propaganda
weapon,
for
it
was re
garded
as anathema
by virtually
all
Ger
mans. When the terms
first
became
known
they
were
denounced in
the
German
Na
tional
Assembly
at Weimar
by
all
party
spokesmen.
The
words
of
Ludwig
Quidde,
a
leading
German
pacifist,
were
harsh and
prophetic:
"What
a
tragedy
it
would
be
for
the
human
race,
if these
conditions
should
really
be
imposed!" Though
he
had
many political
enemies,
Quidde
was
cheered
from
left to
right
as
he
shouted
that
Ger
many's
motto must
be: "No!
And
again
No!
-
and for
a
third
time,
No!"
Today,
some
forty
years
later,
'Versailles"
is still
not
forgotten
in
Germany.
In
January,
1958,
Germans
soberly
took
note
of the
twenty-fifth
anniversary
of
Hitler's
appoint
ment as
Chancellor.
One of
their
most in
fluential
newspapers,
the
Kolnische
Runds
chau
(January
30,
1958),
cautioned
that
the
failure
to
revise
the
Versailles
Treaty
was
being
repeated by
the
maintenance
of
the
Yalta
and
Potsdam
terms of
1945.
An
old
and
typical
German
trick
to
"shake
down"
the
West?
So
say
those
who
believe
that
German
"national
character"
was
responsible
for the
Nazi
revolution.
Even a
few
German
writers,
and a
good
many
German
emigrants,
have
emphasized