Mises, Ludwig von. Theory and History: An Interpretation of Social and Economic Evolution

Подождите немного. Документ загружается.

252 EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF HISTORY

uals or is it more than this and thereby an entity en-

dowed with independent reality? The question is non-

sensical. Society is neither the sum of individuals nor

more nor less. Arithmetical concepts cannot be applied

to the matter.

Another confusion arises from the no less empty ques-

tion whether society is—in logic and in time—anterior

to individuals or not. The evolution of society and that

of civilization were not two distinct processes but one

and the same process. The biological passing of a spe-

cies of primates beyond the level of a mere animal

existence and their transformation into primitive men

implied already the development of the first rudiments

of social cooperation. Homo sapiens appeared on the

stage of earthly events neither as a solitary food-seeker

nor as a member of a gregarious flock, but as a being

consciously cooperating with other beings of his own

kind. Only in cooperation with his fellows could he de-

velop language, the indispensable tool of thinking. We

cannot even imagine a reasonable being living in per-

fect isolation and not cooperating at least with members

of his family, clan, or tribe. Man as man is necessarily a

social animal. Some sort of cooperation is an essential

characteristic of his nature. But awareness of this fact

does not justify dealing with social relations as if they

were something else than relations or with society as

if it were an independent entity outside or above the

actions of individual men.

Finally there are the misconstructions caused by the

organismic metaphor. We may compare society to a bi-

ological organism. The tertium comparationis is the fact

THE CHALLENGE OF SCIENTISM 253

that division

labor

and

cooperation exist among

the

various parts

of a

biological body

among

the

various

members

society.

But the

biological evolution that

resulted

in the

emergence

of the

structure-function

systems

plant and animal bodies was

purely physio-

logical process

which no trace

of a

conscious activity

on the part

the cells can

discovered. On the other

hand, human society is an intellectual and spiritual phe-

nomenon.

cooperating with their fellows, individuals

not

divest themselves

their individuality. They

retain the power

to act

antisocially,

and

often make

use

of it.

Its

place

the structure

the body

invariably

assigned

each cell.

But

individuals spontaneously

choose the way

which they integrate themselves into

social cooperation.

Men

have ideas

and

seek chosen

ends,

while

the

cells

and

organs

of the

body lack such

autonomy.

Gestalt psychology passionately rejects

the

psycho-

logical doctrine

associationism.

ridicules

the con-

ception

of "a

sensory mosaic which nobody

has

ever

observed"

and

teaches that "analysis

if it

wants

to re-

veal

the

universe

in its

completeness has

stop

at the

wholes, whatever their size, which possess functional

reality."

Whatever

one may

think about Gestalt

psy-

chology,

it is

obvious that

it has no

reference

at all to

the problems

society.

It is

manifest that nobody

has

ever observed society as

whole. What can be observed

is always actions

individuals.

interpreting the var-

ious aspects

of the

individual's actions,

the

theorists

Koffka, "Gestalt/' Encyclopaedia

of the

Social Sciences,

644.

254 EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF HISTORY

develop the concept of society. There cannot be any

question of understanding "the properties of parts from

the properties of wholes."

There are no properties of

society that cannot be discovered in the conduct of its

members.

In contrasting society and the individual and in deny-

ing to the latter any "true" reality, the collectivist doc-

trines look upon the individual merely as a refractory

rebel. This sinful wretch has the impudence to give

preference to his petty selfish interests as against the

sublime interests of the great god society. Of course,

the collectivist ascribes this eminence only to the right-

ful social idol, not to one of the pretenders.

But who pretender is, and who is king,

God bless us all—that's quite another thing.

When the collectivist extols the state, what he means

is not every state but only that regime of which he ap-

proves, no matter whether this legitimate state exists

already or has to be created. For the Czech irredentists

in the old Austria and the Irish irredentists in the

United Kingdom the states whose governments resided

in Vienna and in London were usurpers; their rightful

state did not yet exist. Especially remarkable is the

terminology of the Marxians. Marx was bitterly hostile

to the Prussian state of the Hohenzollern. To make it

clear that the state which he wanted to see omnipotent

and totalitarian was not that state whose rulers resided

in Berlin, he called the future state of his program not

state but society. The innovation was merely verbal.

Ibid., p. 645.

THE CHALLENGE OF SCIENTISM 255

For what Marx aimed at was to abolish any sphere of

the individual's initiative action by transferring the con-

trol of all economic activities to the social apparatus of

compulsion and repression which is commonly called

state or government. The hoax did not fail to beguile

lots of people. Even today there are still dupes who

think that there is a difference between state socialism

and other types of socialism.

The confusion of the concepts of society and of state

originated with Hegel and Schelling. It is customary to

distinguish two schools of Hegelians: the left wing and

the right wing. The distinction refers only to the atti-

tude of these authors toward the Kingdom of Prussia

and the doctrines of the Prussian Union Church. The

political creed of both wings was essentially the same.

Both advocated government omnipotence. It was a left-

wing Hegelian, Ferdinand Lassalle, who most clearly

expressed the fundamental thesis of Hegelianism: "The

State is God/'

Hegel himself had been a little more

cautious. He only declared that it is "the course of

God through the world that constitutes the State" and

that in dealing with the State one must contemplate

"the Idea, God as actual on

earth."

The collectivist philosophers fail to realize that what

constitutes the state is the actions of individuals. The

legislators, those enforcing the laws by force of arms,

and those yielding to the dictates of the laws and the

police constitute the state by their behavior. In this

Gustav Mayer, Lassalleana, Archie fur Geschichte der Sozialis-

mus, 1, 196.

Hegel, Philosophy of Right, sec. 258.

256 EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF HISTORY

sense alone is the state real. There is no state apart from

such actions of individual men.

The Concept of the Social Sciences

The collectivist philosophy denies that there are such

things as individuals and actions of individuals. The

individual is merely a phantom without reality, an il-

lusory image invented by the pseudo philosophy of the

apologists of capitalism. Consequently collectivism re-

jects the concept of a science of human action. As it

sees it, the only legitimate treatment of those problems

that are not dealt with by the traditional natural sci-

ences is provided by what they call the social sciences.

The social sciences are supposed to deal with group

activities. In their context the individual counts only

as a member of a group.

But this definition implies

that there are actions in which the individual does not

act as a member of a group and which therefore do not

interest the social sciences. If this is so, it is obvious

that the social sciences deal only with an arbitrarily

selected fraction of the whole field of human action.

In acting, man must necessarily choose between var-

ious possible modes of acting. Limiting their analysis

to one class of actions only, the social sciences renounce

in advance any attempt to investigate the ideas that de-

termine the individual's choice of a definite mode of

conduct. They cannot deal with judgments of value

which in any actual situation make a man prefer act-

E. R. A. Seligman, "What Are the Social Sciences?" Encyclo-

paedia of the Social Sciences, 1, 3.

THE CHALLENGE OF SCIENTISM 257

ing as a group member to acting in a different manner.

Neither can they deal with the judgments of value that

prompt a man to act as a member of group A rather

than as a member of any of the non-A groups.

Man is not the member of one group only and does

not appear on the scene of human affairs solely in the

role of a member of one definite group. In speaking of

social groups it must be remembered that the members

of one group are at the same time members of other

groups. The conflict of groups is not a conflict between

neatly integrated herds of men. It is a conflict between

various concerns in the minds of individuals.

What constitutes group membership is the way a

man acts in a concrete situation. Hence group member-

ship is not something rigid and unchangeable. It may

change from case to case. The same man may in the

course of a single day perform actions each of which

qualifies him as a member of a different group. He may

contribute to the funds of his denomination and cast his

ballot for a candidate who antagonizes that denomina-

tion in essential problems. He may act at one instant

as a member of a labor union, at another as a member

of a religious community, at another as a member of a

political party, at another as a member of a linguistic or

racial group, and so on. Or he may act as an individual

working to earn more income, to get his son into col-

lege,

to purchase a home, a car, or a refrigerator. In fact

he always acts as an individual, always seeks ends of

his own. In joining a group and acting as a member

of it, he aims no less at the fulfillment of his own wishes

than in acting without any reference to a group. He

258 EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF HISTORY

may join a religious community in order to seek the sal-

vation of his soul or to attain peace of mind. He may

join a labor union because he believes that this is the

best means to get higher pay or to avoid being bodily

injured by the members of the union. He may join a

political party because he expects that the realization

of its program will render conditions more satisfactory

for himself and his family.

It is vain to deal with "the activities of the individual

as a member of a

group"

while omitting other activ-

ities of the individual. Group activities are essentially

and necessarily activities of individuals who form

groups in order to attain their ends. There are no social

phenomena which would not originate from the activ-

ities of various individuals. What creates a group ac-

tivity is a definite end sought by individuals and the

belief of these individuals that cooperating in this

group is a suitable means to attain the end sought. A

group is a product of human wishes and the ideas about

the means to realize these wishes. Its roots are in the

value judgments of individuals and in the opinions held

by individuals about the effects to be expected from

definite means.

To deal with social groups adequately and com-

pletely, one must start from the actions of the individ-

uals.

No group activity can be understood without

analyzing the ideology that forms the group and makes

it live and work. The idea of dealing with group activ-

ities without dealing with all aspects of human action

is preposterous. There is no field distinct from the field

Seligman, loc. cit.

THE CHALLENGE OF SCIENTISM 259

of the sciences of human action that could be investi-

gated by something called the social sciences.

What prompted those who suggested the substitu-

tion of the social sciences for the sciences of human ac-

tion was, of course, a definite political program. In

their eyes the social sciences were designed to oblit-

erate the social philosophy of individualism. The cham-

pions of the social sciences invented and popularized

the terminology that characterizes the market economy,

in which every individual is intent upon the realiza-

tion of his own plan, as a planless and therefore chaotic

system and reserves the term "plan" for the designs of

an agency which, supported by or identical with the

government's police power, prevents all citizens from

realizing their own plans and designs. One can hardly

overrate the role which the association of ideas gen-

erated by this terminology plays in shaping the politi-

cal tenets of our contemporaries.

The Nature of Mass Phenomena

Some people believe that the object of the social

sciences is the study of mass phenomena. While the

study of individual traits is of no special interest to

them, they hope study of the behavior of social aggre-

gates will reveal information of a really scientific char-

acter. For these people the chief defect of the tradi-

tional methods of historical research is that they deal

with individuals. They esteem statistics precisely be-

cause, as they think, it observes and records the be-

havior of social groups.

260 EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF HISTORY

In fact statistics records individual traits of the mem-

bers of arbitrarily selected groups. Whatever the prin-

ciple may be that determined the scientist to set up a

group,

the traits recorded refer primarily to the individ-

uals that form the group and only indirectly to the

group.

The individual members of the group are the

units of observation. What statistics provides is infor-

mation about the behavior of individuals forming a

group.

Modern statistics aims at discovering invariable con-

nections between statistically established magnitudes

by measuring their correlation. In the field of the sci-

ences of human action this method is absurd. This has

been clearly demonstrated by the fact that many coeffi-

cients of correlation of a high numerical value have

been calculated which undoubtedly do not indicate any

connection between the two groups of facts.

Social phenomena and mass phenomena are not

things outside and above individual phenomena. They

are not the cause of individual phenomena. They are

produced either by the cooperation of individuals or

by parallel action. The latter may be either independent

or imitative. This is valid also with regard to antisocial

actions. The intentional killing of a man by another

man is as such merely a human action and would have

no other significance in a hypothetical (and irrealiza-

ble) state in which there was no cooperation between

men.

It becomes a crime, murder, in a state where social

M. R. Cohen and E. Nagel, An Introduction to Logic and Scien-

tific Method (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1934), p. 317.

THE CHALLENGE OF SCIENTISM 261

cooperation precludes homicide except in cases strictly

determined by the laws of this society.

What is commonly called a mass phenomenon is the

frequent repetition and recurrence of a definite individ-

ual phenomenon. The proposition: In the West bread

is an article of mass consumption, means: In the West

the immense majority of men eat bread daily. They do

not eat bread because it is an article of mass consump-

tion.

Bread is an article of mass consumption because

practically everybody eats a piece of bread each day.

From this point of view one may appreciate the endeav-

ors of Gabriel Tarde to describe imitation and repeti-

tion as fundamental factors of social evolution.

The champions of the social sciences criticize the his-

torians for concentrating their attention upon the ac-

tions of individuals and neglecting the conduct of the

many, the immense majority, the masses. The critique is

spurious. A historian who deals with the spread of the

Christian creed and of the various churches and denom-

inations, with the events that resulted in the emergence

of integrated linguistic groups, with the European colo-

nization of the Western hemisphere, with the rise of

modern capitalism certainly does not overlook the be-

havior of the many. However, the main task of history

is to indicate the relation of the individuals* actions to

the course of affairs. Different individuals influence his-

torical change in different ways. There are pioneers who

conceive new ideas and design new modes of thinking

and acting; there are leaders who guide people along

G. Tarde, Les lois de limitation, 3d ed. Paris, 1900.