Mises, Ludwig von. Theory and History: An Interpretation of Social and Economic Evolution

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222 EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF HISTORY

and finally dies. All civilizations, however different

they may appear to the superficial observer, have the

same structure. They must necessarily pass through the

same sequence of successive stages. There is no history.

What is mistakenly called history is in fact the repe-

tition of events belonging to the same class; is, as

Nietzsche put it, eternal recurrence.

The idea is very old and can be traced back to an-

cient philosophy. It was adumbrated by Giovanni Bat-

tista Vico. It played some role in the attempts of several

economists to develop schemes of parallelisms of the

economic history of various nations. It owes its present

popularity to Oswald Spengler's Decline of the West

Softened to some extent and thereby rendered incon-

sistent, it is the main idea of the voluminous Study of

History on which Arnold J. Toynbee is still working.

There is no doubt that both Spengler and Toynbee were

prompted by the widespread disparagement of capital-

ism.

Spengler's motive clearly was to prognosticate the

inevitable breakdown of our civilization. Although un-

affected by the chiliastic prophecies of the Marxians, he

was himself a socialist and entirely under the sway of

the socialists' vilification of the market economy. He

was judicious enough to see the disastrous implications

of the policies of the German Marxians. But, lacking

any economic knowledge and even full of contempt for

economics, he came to the conclusion that our civiliza-

tion has to choose between two evils each of which is

bound to destroy it. The doctrines of both Spengler and

Toynbee show clearly the poor results engendered by

neglect of economics in any treatment of human con-

HISTORICISM 223

cerns.

True, Western civilization is decadent. But its de-

cadence consists precisely in the endorsement of the

anticapitalistic creed.

What we may call the Spengler doctrine dissolves

history into the record of the life span of individual

entities, the various civilizations. We are not told in

precise terms what marks characterize an individual

civilization as such and distinguish it from another civ-

ilization. All that we learn about this essential matter

is metaphorical. A civilization is like a biological being;

it is born, grows, matures, decays, and dies. Such anal-

ogies are no substitute for unambiguous clarification

and definition.

Historical research cannot deal with all things to-

gether; it must divide and subdivide the totality of

events. Out of the whole body of history it carves sep-

arate chapters. The principles applied in so doing are

determined by the way the historian understands things

and events, value judgments and the actions prompted

by them and the relation of actions to the further course

of affairs. Almost all historians agree in dealing sepa-

rately with the history of various more or less isolated

peoples and civilizations. Differences of opinion about

the application of this procedure to definite problems

must be decided by careful examination of each indi-

vidual case. No epistemological objection can be raised

to the idea of distinguishing various civilizations within

the totality of history.

But what the Spengler doctrine means is something

entirely different. In its context a civilization is a Gestalt,

a whole, an individuality of a distinct nature. What de-

224 EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF HISTORY

termines its origin, changes, and extinction stems from

its own nature. It is not the ideas and actions of the

individuals that constitute the historical process. There

is in fact no historical process. On the earth civilizations

come into being, live for some time, and then die just

as various specimens of every plant species are born,

live,

and wither away. Whatever men may do is irrele-

vant to the final outcome. Every civilization must decay

and die.

There is no harm in comparing different historical

events and different events that occurred in the history

of various civilizations. But there is no justification

whatever for the assertion that every civilization must

pass through a sequence of inevitable stages.

Mr. Toynbee is inconsistent enough not to deprive us

entirely of any hope for the survival of our civilization.

While the whole and only content of his study is to

point out that the process of civilization consists of pe-

riodic repetitive movements, he adds that this "does not

imply that the process itself is of the same cyclical order

as they are." Having taken pains to show that sixteen

civilizations have perished already and nine others are

at the point of death, he expresses a vague optimism

concerning the future of the twenty-sixth civilization.

History is the record of human action. Human action

is the conscious effort of man to substitute more satis-

factory conditions for less satisfactory ones. Ideas de-

determine what are to be considered more and less

satisfactory conditions and what means are to be re-

A. J. Toynbee, A Study of History, Abridgment of Volumes

I-VI by D. C. Somervell (Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 254.

HISTORICISM 225

sorted to to alter them. Thus ideas are the main theme of

the study of history. Ideas are not an invariable stock

that existed from the very beginning of things and that

does not change. Every idea originated at a definite

point of time and space in the head of an individual.

(Of course, it has happened again and again that the

same idea originated independently in the heads of var-

ious individuals at various points of time and space.)

The genesis of every new idea is an innovation; it adds

something new and unheard of before to the course of

world affairs. The reason history does not repeat itself

is that every historical state is the consummation of the

operation of ideas different from those that operated in

other historical states.

Civilization differs from the mere biological and phys-

iological aspects of life in being an offshoot of ideas.

The essence of civilization is ideas. If we try to distin-

guish different civilizations, the differentia specified can

be found only in the different meanings of the ideas

that determined them. Civilizations differ from one an-

other precisely in the quality of the substance that char-

acterizes them as civilizations. In their essential struc-

ture they are unique individuals, not members of a class.

This forbids us to compare their vicissitudes with the

physiological process going on in an individual man's or

animal's life. In every animal body the same physiolog-

ical changes come to pass. A child ripens in the mother's

womb,

it is delivered, grows, matures, decays, and dies

in the consummation of the same cycle of life. It is

quite another thing with civilizations. In being civiliza-

tions they are disparate and incommensurable because

226 EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF HISTORY

they are actuated by different ideas and therefore de-

velop in different ways.

Ideas must not be classified without regard to the

soundness of their content. Men have had different

ideas concerning the cure of cancer. Up to now none

of these ideas has produced fully satisfactory results.

But this would not justify the inference that therefore

future attempts to cure cancer will also be futile. The

historian of past civilizations may declare: There was

something wrong with the ideas upon which those civ-

ilizations that decayed from within were built. But he

must not derive from this fact the conclusion that other

civilizations, built on different ideas, are also doomed.

Within the body of animals and plants forces are op-

erating that are bound to disintegrate it eventually. No

such forces could be discovered in the "body" of a civ-

ilization which would not be the outcome of its partic-

ular ideologies.

No less vain are efforts to search in the history of

various civilizations for parallelisms or identical stages

in their life span. We may compare the history of vari-

ous peoples and civilizations. But such comparisons

must deal not only with similarities but also with differ-

ences.

The eagerness to discover similarities induces

authors to neglect or even to conjure away discrepan-

cies.

The first task of the historian is to deal with his-

torical events. Comparisons made afterward on the

basis of a knowledge of events as perfect as possible

may be harmless or sometimes even instructive. Com-

parisons that accompany or even precede study of the

sources create confusion if not outright fables.

HISTORICISM 227

6. Undoing History

There have always been people who exalted the good

old days and advocated a return to the happy past. The

resistance offered to legal and constitutional innova-

tions by those whom they hurt has frequently crystal-

lized in programs that requested a reconstruction of

old institutions or presumably old institutions. In some

cases reforms that aimed at something essentially new

have been recommended as a restoration of ancient law.

An eminent example was provided by the role Magna

Charta played in the ideologies of England's seven-

teenth-century anti-Stuart parties.

But it was historicism which for the first time frankly

suggested unmaking historical changes and returning to

extinct conditions of a remote past. We need not deal

with the lunatic fringe of this movement, such as Ger-

man attempts to revive the cult of Wodan. Neither do

the sartorial aspects of these tendencies deserve more

than ironical comments. (A magazine picture showing

members of the Hanover-Coburg family parading in

the garb of the Scottish clansmen who fought at Cullo-

den would have startled the "Butcher" Cumberland.)

Only the linguistic and economic issues involved re-

quire attention.

In the course of history many languages have been

submerged. Some disappeared completely without leav-

ing any trace. Others are preserved in old documents,

books, and inscriptions and can be studied by scholars.

Several of these "dead" languages—Sanskrit, Hebrew,

228 EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF HISTORY

Greek, and Latin—influence contemporary thought

through the philosophical and poetical value of the

ideas expressed in their literature. Others are merely

objects of philological research.

The process that resulted in the extinction of a lan-

guage was in many cases merely linguistic growth and

transformation of the spoken word. A long succession

of slight changes altered the phonetic forms, the vocab-

ulary, and the syntax so thoroughly that later genera-

tions could no longer read the documents bequeathed

by their ancestors. The vernacular developed into a new

distinct language. The old tongue could only be under-

stood by those with special training. The death of the

old language and the birth of the new one were the

outcome of a slow, peaceful evolution.

But in many cases linguistic change was the outcome

of political and military events. People speaking a for-

eign language acquired political and economic hegem-

ony either by military conquest or by the superiority

of their civilization. Those speaking the native tongue

were relegated to a subordinate position. On account

of their social and political disabilities it did not matter

very much what they had to say and how they said it.

Important business was transacted exclusively in the

language of their masters. Rulers, courts, church, and

schools employed only this language; it was the lan-

guage of the laws and the literature. The old native

tongue was used only by the uneducated populace.

Whenever one of these underlings wanted to rise to a

better position, he had first to learn the language of

HISTORICISM 229

the masters. The vernacular was reserved to the dullest

and the least ambitious; it fell into contempt and finally

into oblivion. A foreign language superseded the native

idiom.

The political and military events that actuated this

linguistic process were in many cases characterized by

tyrannical cruelty and pitiless persecution of all oppo-

nents.

Such methods met with the approval of some

philosophers and moralists of precapitalistic ages, as

they have sometimes won the praise of contemporary

"idealists" when the socialists resort to them. But to the

"spurious rationalistic dogmatism of the orthodox lib-

eral doctrinaires" they appear shocking. The historical

writings of the latter lacked that lofty relativism which

induced self-styled "realistic" historians to explain and

to justify all that had happened in the past and to vin-

dicate surviving oppressive institutions. (As one critic

reproachfully observed, in the utilitarians "old institu-

tions awake no thrill; they are simply embodiments of

prejudice.")

It does not need any further explanation

why the descendants of the victims of those persecu-

tions and oppressions judged in a different way the ex-

perience of their ancestors, still less why they were in-

tent upon abolishing those effects of past despotism

which still hurt them. In some cases, not content with

eliminating still existing oppression, they planned to

undo also such changes as did not harm them any

longer, however detrimental and malignant the proc-

Leslie Stephens, The English Utilitarians (London, 1900), 3,

70 (on J. Stuart Mill).

230 EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF HISTORY

ess that had brought them about had been in a distant

past. It is precisely this that the attempts to undo lin-

guistic changes aim at.

The best example is provided by Ireland. Aliens had

invaded and conquered the country, expropriated the

landowners, destroyed its civilization, organized a des-

potic regime, and tried to convert the people by force

of arms to a religious creed which they despised. The

establishment of an alien church did not succeed in

making the Irish abandon Roman Catholicism. But the

English language superseded the native Gaelic idiom.

When later the Irish succeeded step by step in curbing

their foreign oppressors and finally acquiring political

independence, most of them were no longer linguis-

tically different from the English. They spoke English

and their eminent writers wrote English books some of

which are among the outstanding works of modern

world literature.

This state of affairs hurts the feelings of many Irish.

They want to induce their fellow citizens to return to

the idiom their ancestors spoke in ages gone by. There

is little open opposition to these pursuits. Few people

have the courage to fight a popular movement openly,

and radical nationalism is today, next to socialism, the

most popular ideology. Nobody wants to risk being

branded an enemy of his nation. But powerful forces

are silently resisting the linguistic reform. People cling

to the tongue they speak no matter whether those who

want to suppress it are foreign despots or domestic

zealots. The modern Irish are fully aware of the ad-

vantages they derive from the fact that English is the

HISTORICISM 231

foremost language of contemporary civilization, which

everyone has to learn in order to read many important

books or to play a role in international trade, in world

affairs, and in great ideological movements. Precisely

because the Irish are a civilized nation whose authors

write not for a limited audience but for all educated

people, the chances of a substitution of Gaelic for Eng-

lish are slim. No nostalgic sentimentality can alter these

circumstances.

It must be mentioned that the linguistic pursuits of

Irish nationalism were prompted by one of the most

widely adopted political doctrines of the nineteenth

century. The principle of nationality as accepted by all

the peoples of Europe postulates that every linguistic

group must form an independent state and that this

state must embrace all people speaking the same lan-

guage.

From the point of view of this principle an

English-speaking Ireland should belong to the United

Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the mere

existence of an independent Irish Free State appears

irregular. The prestige which the principle of national-

ity enjoyed in Europe was so enormous that various

peoples who desired to form a state of their own the in-

dependence of which was at variance with it tried to

change their language in order to justify their aspira-

tions in its light. This explains the attitude of the Irish

nationalists, but it does not affect what has been said

about the implications of their linguistic plans.

A language is not simply a collection of phonetic

Mises, Omnipotent Government (New Haven, Yale University

Press,

1944), pp. 84-9.