Mises, Ludwig von. Theory and History: An Interpretation of Social and Economic Evolution

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162 DETERMINISM AND MATERIALISM

The Theme of the Philosophy of History

Philosophy of history looks upon mankind's history

from a different point of view. It assumes that God or

nature or some other superhuman entity providentially

directs the course of events toward a definite goal dif-

ferent from the ends which acting men are aiming at.

There is a meaning in the sequence of events which

supersedes the intentions of men. The ways of Provi-

dence are not those of mortal men. The shortsighted in-

dividual deludes himself in believing that he chooses

and acts according to his own concerns. In fact he un-

knowingly must act in such a way that finally the provi-

dential plan will be realized. The historical process has

a definite purpose set by Providence without any regard

to the human will. It is a progress toward a preordained

end. The task of the philosophy of history is to judge

every phase of history from the point of view of this

purpose.

If the historian speaks of progress and retrogression,

he refers to one of the ends men are consciously aiming

at in their actions. In his terminology progress means

the attainment of a state of affairs which acting men

considered or consider more satisfactory than pre-

ceding states. In the terminology of a philosophy of his-

tory progress means advance on the way that leads to

the ultimate goal set by Providence.

Every variety of the philosophy of history must an-

swer two questions. First: What is the final end aimed

at and the route by which it is to be reached? Second:

PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 163

By what means are people induced or forced to pursue

this course? Only if both questions are fully answered

is the system complete.

In answering the first question the philosopher refers

to intuition. In order to corroborate his surmise, he may

quote the opinions of older authors, that is, the intuitive

speculations of other people. The ultimate source of the

philosopher's knowledge is invariably a divination of

the intentions of Providence, hitherto hidden to the non-

initiated and revealed to the philosopher by dint of his

intuitive power. To objections raised about the correct-

ness of his guess the philosopher can only reply: An

inner voice tells me that I am right and you are wrong.

Most philosophies of history not only indicate the

final end of historical evolution but also disclose the

way mankind is bound to wander in order to reach the

goal. They enumerate and describe successive states or

stages, intermediary stations on the way from the early

beginnings to the final end. The systems of Hegel,

Comte, and Marx belong to this class. Others ascribe to

certain nations or races a definite mission entrusted to

them by the plans of Providence. Such are the role of

the Germans in the system of Fichte and the role of the

Nordics and the Aryans in the constructions of modern

racists.

With regard to the answer given to the second ques-

tion,

two classes of philosophies of history are to be dis-

tinguished.

The first group contends that Providence elects some

mortal men as special instruments for the execution of

its plan. In the charismatic leader superhuman powers

164 DETERMINISM AND MATERIALISM

are vested. He is the plenipotentiary of Providence

whose office it is to guide the ignorant populace the

right way. He may be a hereditary king, or a commoner

who has spontaneously seized power and whom the

blind and wicked rabble in their envy and hatred call a

usurper. For the charismatic leader but one thing mat-

ters:

the faithful performance of his mission no matter

what the means he may be forced to resort to. He is

above all laws and moral precepts. What he does is al-

ways right, and what his opponents do is always wrong.

Such was the doctrine of Lenin, who in this point de-

viated from the doctrine of Marx.

It is obvious that the philosopher does not attribute

the office of charismatic leadership to every man who

claims that he has been called. He distinguishes be-

tween the legitimate leader and the fiendish impostor,

between the God-sent prophet and the hell-born

tempter. He calls only those heroes and seers legitimate

leaders who make people walk toward the goal set by

Providence. As the philosophies disagree with regard

to this goal, so they disagree with regard to the distinc-

tion between the legitimate leader and the devil in-

carnate. They disagree in their judgments about Caesar

and Brutus, Innocent III and Frederick II, Charles I

and Cromwell, the Bourbons and the Napoleons.

But their dissent goes even further. There are rivalries

between various candidates for the supreme office

which are caused only by personal ambition. No ideo-

logical convictions separated Caesar and Pompey, the

house of Lancaster and that of York, Trotsky and Stalin.

On the doctrine of Marx see above, pp. 112 ff.

PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 165

Their antagonism was due to the fact that they aimed at

the same office, which of course only one man could get.

Here the philosopher must choose among various pre-

tenders. Having arrogated to himself the power to pro-

nounce judgment in the name of Providence, the philos-

opher blesses one of the pretenders and condemns his

rivals.

The second group suggested another solution of the

problem. As they see it, Providence resorted to a cun-

ning device. It implanted in every man's mind certain

impulses the operation of which must necessarily result

in the realization of its own plan. The individual thinks

that he goes his own way and strives after his own ends.

But unwittingly he contributes his share to the realiza-

tion of the end Providence wants to attain. Such was

the method of Kant.

It was restated by Hegel and later

adopted by many Hegelians, among them by Marx. It

was Hegel who coined the phrase "cunning of reason"

(Listder Vernunfi).

There is no use arguing with doctrines derived from

intuition. Every system of the philosophy of history is

an arbitrary guess which can neither be proved nor dis-

proved. There is no rational means available for either

endorsing or rejecting a doctrine suggested by an inner

voice.

Kant, Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbiirgerlicher

Absicht, Werke (Inselausgabe, Leipzig, 1921), I, 221^*0.

Hegel, Vorlesungen iiber die

PhUosophie

der Welt geschichte, 2,

83.

166 DETERMINISM AND MATERIALISM

The Difference between the Point of View of

History and That of Philosophy of History

Before the eighteenth century most dissertations deal-

ing with human history in general and not merely with

concrete historical experience interpreted history from

the point of view of a definite philosophy of history.

This philosophy was seldom clearly defined and par-

ticularized. Its tenets were taken for granted and im-

plied in commenting on events. Only in the Age of En-

lightenment did some eminent philosophers abandon

the traditional methods of the philosophy of history and

stop brooding about the hidden purpose of Providence

directing the course of events. They inaugurated a new

social philosophy, entirely different from what is called

the philosophy of history. They looked upon human

events from the point of view of the ends aimed at by

acting men, instead of from the point of view of the

plans ascribed to God or nature.

The significance of this radical change in the ideo-

logical outlook can best be illustrated by referring to

Adam Smith's point of view. But in order to analyze the

ideas of Smith we must first refer to Mandeville.

The older ethical systems were almost unanimous in

the condemnation of self-interest. They were ready to

find the self-interest of the tillers of the soil pardonable

and very often tried to excuse or even to glorify the

kings*

lust for aggrandisement. But they were adamant

in their disapprobation of other people's craving for

PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 167

well-being and riches. Referring to the Sermon on the

Mount, they exalted self-denial and indifference with

regard to the treasures which moth and rust corrupt,

and branded self-interest a reprehensible vice. Bernard

de Mandeville in his Fable of the Bees tried to discredit

this doctrine. He pointed out that self-interest and the

desire for material well-being, commonly stigmatized as

vices,

are in fact the incentives whose operation makes

for welfare, prosperity, and civilization.

Adam Smith adopted this idea. It was not the object

of his studies to develop a philosophy of history accord-

ing to the traditional pattern. He did not claim to have

guessed the goals which Providence has set for mankind

and aims to realize by directing men's actions. He ab-

stained from any assertions concerning the destiny of

mankind and from any prognostication about the in-

eluctable end of historical change. He merely wanted

to determine and to analyze the factors that had been

instrumental in man's progress from the straitened con-

ditions of older ages to the more satisfactory conditions

of his own age. It was from this point of view that he

stressed the fact that "every part of nature, when atten-

tively surveyed, equally demonstrates the providential

care of its Author" and that "we may admire the wisdom

and goodness of God, even in the weakness and folly of

men."

The rich, aiming at the "gratification of their

own vain and insatiable desires," are "led by an in-

visible hand" in such a way that they "without intend-

ing it, without knowing it, advance the interest of so-

ciety, and afford means for the multiplication of the

168 DETERMINISM AND MATERIALISM

species."* Believing in the existence of God, Smith could

not help tracing back all earthly things to him and his

providential care, just as later the Catholic Bastiat spoke

of God's finger.

But in referring in this way to God

neither of them intended to make any assertion about

the ends God may want to realize in historical evolu-

tion.

The ends they dealt with in their writings were

those aimed at by acting men, not by Providence. The

pre-established harmony to which they alluded did not

affect their epistemological principles and the methods

of their reasoning. It was merely a means devised to

reconcile the purely secular and mundane procedures

they applied in their scientific efforts with their re-

ligious beliefs. They borrowed this expedient from pious

astronomers, physicists, and biologists who had resorted

to it without deviating in their research from the em-

pirical methods of the natural sciences.

What made it necessary for Adam Smith to look for

such a reconciliation was the fact that—like Mandeville

before him—he could not free himself from the stand-

ards and the terminology of traditional ethics that con-

demned as vicious man's desire to improve his own ma-

terial conditions. Consequently he was faced with a

paradox. How can it be that actions commonly blamed

as vicious generate effects commonly praised as bene-

ficial? The utilitarian philosophers found the right an-

swer. What results in benefits must not be rejected as

morally bad. Only those actions are bad which produce

Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Pt. II, Sec. Ill,

ch.

3, and Pt. IV, ch. 1 (Edinburgh, 1813), 1, 243, 419-20.

Bastiat, Harmonies Sconomiques (2d ed. Paris, 1851), p. 334.

PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 169

bad results. But the utilitarian point of view did not pre-

vail. Public opinion still clings to pre-Mandevillian

ideas.

It does not approve of a businessman's success in

supplying the customers with merchandise that best

suits their wishes. It looks askance at wealth acquired in

trade and industry, and finds it pardonable only if the

owner atones for it by endowing charitable institutions.

For the agnostic, atheistic, and antitheistic historians

and economists there is no need to refer to Smith's and

Bastiat's invisible hand. The Christian historians and

economists who reject capitalism as an unfair system

consider it blasphemous to describe egoism as a means

Providence has chosen in order to attain its ends. Thus

the theological views of Smith and Bastiat no longer

have any meaning for our age. But it is not impossible

that the Christian churches and sects will one day dis-

cover that religious freedom can be realized only in a

market economy and will stop supporting anticapital-

istic tendencies. Then they will either cease to disap-

prove of self-interest or return to the solution suggested

by these eminent thinkers.

Just as important as realizing the essential distinction

between the philosophy of history and the new, purely

mundane social philosophy which developed from the

eighteenth century on is awareness of the difference

between the stage-doctrine implied in almost every

philosophy of history and the attempts of historians to

divide the totality of historical events into various pe-

riods or ages.

In the context of a philosophy of history the various

states or stages are, as has been mentioned already,

170 DETERMINISM AND MATERIALISM

intermediary stations on the way to a final stage which

will fully realize the plan of Providence. For many

Christian philosophies of history the pattern was set

by the four kingdoms of the Book of Daniel. The

modern philosophies of history borrowed from Daniel

the notion of the final stage of human affairs, the notion

of "an everlasting dominion, which shall not pass

away."

However Hegel, Comte, and Marx may dis-

agree with Daniel and with one another, they all accept

this notion, which is an essential element in every phi-

losophy of history. They announce either that the final

stage has already been reached (Hegel), or that man-

kind is just entering it (Comte), or that its coming is

to be expected every day (Marx).

The ages of history as distinguished by historians are

of a different character. Historians do not claim to know

anything about the future. They deal only with the past.

Their periodization schemes aim at classifying historical

phenomena without any presumption of forecasting

future events. The readiness of many historians to press

general history or special fields—like economic or social

history or the history of warfare—into artificial sub-

divisions has had serious drawbacks. It has been a

handicap rather than an aid to the study of history. It

was often prompted by political bias. Modern historians

agree in paying little attention to such period schemes.

But what counts for us is merely establishing the fact

that the epistemological character of the periodization

of history by historians is different from the stage

schemes of the philosophy of history.

Daniel 7:14.

PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 171

Philosophy of History and the Idea of God

The three most popular pre-Darwinian} philosophies

of history of the nineteenth century—those of Hegel,

Comte, and Marx—were adaptations of the Enlighten-

ment's idea of progress. And this doctrine of human

progress was an adaptation of the Christian philosophy

of salvation.

Christian theology discerns three stages in human his-

tory: the bliss of the age preceding the fall of man, the

age of secular depravity, and finally the coming of the

Kingdom of Heaven. If left alone, man would not be

able to expiate the original sin and to attain salvation.

But God in his mercy leads him to eternal life. In spite

of all the frustrations and adversities of man's temporal

pilgrimage, there is hope for a blessed future.

The Enlightenment altered this scheme in order to

make it agree with its scientific outlook. God endowed

man with reason that leads him on the road toward

perfection. In the dark past superstition and sinister

machinations of tyrants and priests restrained the exer-

cise of this most precious gift bestowed upon man. But

The Marxian system of philosophy of history and dialectic ma-

terialism was completed with the Preface, dated January 1859, of

Zur Kritik der Politischen Oekonomie. Darwin's The Origin of Species

appeared in the same year. Marx read it in the first part of Decem-

ber 1860 and declared in letters to Engels and Lassalle that in spite

of various shortcomings it provided a biological foundation ("natur-

historische Grundlage" or "naturwissenschaftkche Unterlage") for his

doctrine of the class struggle. Karl Marx, Chronik seines Lebens in

Einzeldaten (Moscow, Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, 1934), pp. 206,

207.