regional protection of human rights 355
Convention system does not contemplate an actio popularis.
53
Individuals
cannot raise abstract issues, but must be able to claim to be the victim of a
violation of one or more of the Convention rights.
54
However, the Court
has emphasised that:
an individual may, under certain conditions, claim to be the victim of a vio-
lation occasioned by the mere existence of secret measures or of legislation
permitting secret measures, without having to allege that such measures
were in fact applied to him.
55
A near relative of the victim, for example, could also raise an issue where
the violation alleged was personally prejudicial or where there existed a
valid personal interest.
56
The Court may only deal with a matter once all domestic remedies have
been exhausted according to the generally accepted rules of international
law and within a period of six months from the date on which the final
decision was taken.
57
Such remedies must be effective. Where there are
no domestic remedies to exhaust, the act or decision complained against
will itself normally be taken as the ‘final decision’ for the purposes of
article 26.
58
The need to exhaust domestic remedies applies also in the
limitations, Series A, vol. 310 pp. 27–9. Turkey had argued that if the limitations were
not upheld, the declarations themselves would fall. Not to adopt this approach would, the
Court noted, have entailed a weakening of the Convention system for the protection of
human rights, which constituted a European constitutional public order, and would run
counter to the aim of greater unity in the maintenance and further realisation of human
rights, ibid. See also the Commission Report in Chrysostomos v. Tu rk e y 68 DR 216.
53
See e.g. X v. Austria 7 DR 87 (1976) concerning legislation on abortion.
54
See e.g. Pine Valley v. Ireland, Series A, vol. 222, 1991; Johnston v. Ireland, Series A, vol. 112,
1986; Marckx v. Belgium, Series A, vol. 31, 1979; Campbell and Cosans v. UK, Series A, vol.
48, 1982; Eckle v. Federal Republic of Germany, Series A, vol. 51, 1982 and Vijayanathan
and Pusparajah v. France, Series A, vol. 241-B, 1992.
55
The Klass case, Series A, vol. 28, 1979, pp. 17–18; 58 ILR, pp. 423, 442. See also e.g. the
Marckx case, Series A, vol. 31, 1979, pp. 12–14; 58 ILR, pp. 561, 576; the Dudgeon case,
Series A, vol. 45, 1982, p. 18; 67 ILR, pp. 395, 410; the Belgian Linguistics case, Series A,
vol. 6, 1968; 45 ILR, p. 136 and Norris v. Ireland, Series A, No. 142, 1988; 89 ILR, p. 243.
56
See e.g. Application 100/55, X v. FRG,1Yearbook of the ECHR, 1955–7, p. 162 and Ap-
plication 1478/62, Y v. Belgium, Yearbook of the ECHR, 1963, p. 590. See also Cyprus v.
Turk ey, Judgment of 10 May 2001; 120 ILR, p. 10.
57
Article 35. See Akdivar v. Tu rk e y, Judgment of 16 September 1996. As to the meaning of
domestic or local remedies in international law, see below, p. 819.
58
See e.g. X v. UK, 8 DR, pp. 211, 212–13 and Cyprus v. Tur ke y , Yearbook of the European
Convention on Human Rights, 1978, pp. 240–2. Where, however, there is a permanent
state of affairs which is still continuing, the question of the six-month rule can only arise
after the state of affairs has ceased to exist: see e.g. De Becker v. Belgium,2Yearbook of the