Mackesy P. The War for America, 1775-1783
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The garrisons of the British Leeward Islands were now sadly depleted. The May return at the end of the healthy
winter season was to show only 2,159 men present and fit for duty; and on the vital island of St Lucia four and a
half battalions had only 654 healthy men. Their protection was thus thrown entirely on the British Admiral,
crippling his freedom of movement. 'The very defenceless state of all our islands through the want of troops will
always oblige him to act on the defensive', Lord Robert Manners wrote a little later, 'as no island is safe but the one
we are immediately protecting . . .'.
Hood had twenty-two sail of the line fit for service at the beginning of 1782, when the North American ships had
all joined him. Against these de Grasse could range thirty. He had brought thirty-three ships of the line from
America, and was joined by another in the West Indies. Of the ten ships of the line which should have gone home
in the previous summer, three were sent down to San Domingo together with one of the Rhode Island ships to
convoy the much-delayed trade to Europe; but the rest, at some risk, he retained.1
De Grasse's main objective was Jamaica; but he could not store and victual his fleet till the expected convoy
arrived from France, and he used the waiting period to attack the British Leeward Islands. St Eustatius had been
surprised by the Marquis de Bouillé before Hood's return from America, and de Grasse's first choice was Barbados,
where the inferior British squadron lay; but after two unsuccessful attempts to work to windward, he turned against
St Kitts on 11 January and besieged the garrison on Brimstone Hill. Hood, short of provisions and stores after his
voyage from New York, made for Antigua to replenish them; and embarking General Prescott with five hundred
troops he sailed to the relief of St Kitts. His hope was to surprise the French at anchor; but on the voyage one of
his ships of the line ran on board a frigate, and precious time was lost in repairing her the parallel with Graves's
caution off the Chesapeake has been well made and thus the French had time to learn of the British approach and
put to sea.2 By a fine feat of seamanship Hood slipped into the position they had left; and anchoring on the edge of
a bank so that the enemy could not anchor outside his line, he repulsed de Grasse in two attacks on 26 January.
In this position Hood could hope to foil the enemy. The French siege guns had been lost in a wrecked transport, he
had taken a frigate laden with munitions, and he had the garrison commander's word that Brimstone
1 Three of the ships he had brought to America in 1781 foundered at sea on their way to England as prizes
after the battle of the Saints, and one of Barras's squadron was condemned at Halifax.
2 Possibly to protect their supplies from Martinique; but de Grasse had previously put out from the
Chesapeake rather than be attacked at anchor. See Sandwich, IV, 217.
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Hill could hold out. But he forgot the character of the inhabitants. At the foot of the hill lay guns and ammunition
which they had refused to remove; and with these and some ships' cannon the enemy battered down the defences
and forced the garrison's surrender. There was no longer duty or safety in the anchorage; and in the night of 14
February the British squadron stole away. 'A very unofficerlike action', said Rodney, 'and tending to discourage the
fleet in general, by a British fleet of twenty-two sail cutting their cables, putting out their lights, and running away
from an enemy's fleet of only twenty-seven sail of the line.' This comment once again reveals more of Rodney than
of Hood, and reminds us that Graves is in good company among the admirals who have refused to fight to a
decision against such odds.
De Grasse followed up his success by taking the little islands of Nevis and Montserrat. The events on Nevis will
show the dilemma which faced the smaller islands under enemy attack. When the French fleet stood in, the only
defence was three hundred militiamen indifferently armed and trained, and a few bad cannon without a single
artilleryman to direct their fire. The Council considered the propriety of a token resistance. But they had neither
trained their militia nor prepared redoubts, and judged it wiser not to irritate the enemy. Two of them went down to
St Kitts to negotiate a capitulation. The terms were satisfactory: the inhabitants were allowed to behave as neutrals
and export their produce anywhere in neutral vessels. Only the negroes and poorer whites imperilled the happy
arrangement by their communications with the British.1
Demerara and Essequibo rapidly followed Nevis into the French maw.2 But help was at hand. On 25 February
Rodney joined Hood at sea with his twelve sail of the line and repaired to St Lucia, where five more arrived in
ones and twos from England. Superiority had passed to the British; and had Rodney intercepted the reinforcements
and convoy which he learnt were on their way from France, the enemy fleet would have been reduced to
helplessness and the French islands to starvation. But Rodney assumed that the convoy would come in to
Martinique as usual from the south. Hood disagreed, and suggested as Middleton had done that the watch should
stretch northwards as far as the latitude of Guadeloupe.3 They were right; and on 20 March the French convoy
anchored safely in Fort Royal Bay. De Grasse thus received his reinforcements and provisions, and was ready for
the next move: the junction with Don Solano's fleet at San Domingo, and the invasion of Jamaica.
Rodney lay watching him from St Lucia. On 5 April he learnt that troops
1 Pares, West India Fortune, 979.
2 They had been captured from the Dutch by British privateers.
3 See above, p. 451, and Sandwich, IV, 217, 2436.
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had embarked; and on the evening of the 7th came the expected word from his cruisers. The enemy were on the
move. The battle fleet with which de Grasse intended to conquer Jamaica numbered thirty-three ships of the line,
and two ships of fifty guns shepherded the convoy. His numbers were made up as follows:
West India ships returned from America . . . .23
Barras's squadron from Rhode Island . . . . 5
Ship which had remained in West Indies? . . . .
1(Magnifique)
Total in Western Atlantic, Jan. 1782 .
. . .29
Reinforcements from Europe, 1782 . . . . . 4
Total, 7 April . . . . .
. . .
33
Not present
Escorting trade to Europe . .
. .4 (3 de Grasse, 1 Barras)
Unready at Martinique . . .
. .1 (de Grasse)
Dropped out since St Kitts . .
. .
1 (de Grasse)
6
Rodney had thirty-six ships of the line. Thus the hopeless inferiority of the previous September had been converted
in the course of the winter into a significant superiority by heavy reinforcement from home. These were the
elements which composed his fleet:
Hood's squadron from America . . . . .121
Lent by Digby . . . . . ... 5
From refit at Antigua . . . . . . . 1 (Russell)
From England at end of 1781 . . . . . .
1 (St Albans)
Total Jan. 1782 . . .
. . . . .19
Reinforcement of 1782 . . . . . . .17
Total 7 April . . .
. . . . .
36
Not present
Local convoy . . .
. .1 (Prudent, 64, from Digby)
To Jamaica with convoys for refits
.
3 (all from Hood)
4
To the disgust of at least one captain, Rodney waited for daylight to sail, though the fleet lay in an open bay.2
Nevertheless the French, with their cumbrous convoy, could not keep their lead. Early on the 9th Hood with the
advanced squadron overtook the enemy, and it became clear that de
1 Including the two ships which joined him from Jamaica after the battle of the Chesapeake. One of his
original 14 had been abandoned and burnt after the battle, and three others were worn out or crippled and
refitting (see list of ships not present).
2 The following account is based on James, Chevalier and Sandwich, IV.
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Grasse's hope of achieving his object by evasion was doomed. Instead he had a chance to crush the British van,
which had felt the wind as it emerged from the lee of Dominica and had become widely separated from the main
body. Its mutilation would have enabled the French to proceed to Jamaica with little fear of interruption; but de
Grasse refused the opportunity. Instead of falling on Hood, he modified his plan of evasion. He would send his
convoy to the safety of Guadeloupe, draw Rodney away, throw off the pursuit, and return to pick up the convoy for
the next lap of the voyage. He sent only a detachment against Hood, not to crush him but to win time for the
convoy's retreat. In calms and shifting breezes sporadic actions took place between the northern end of Dominica
and the Iles des Saintes, the French keeping their distance for fear of the British carronades.
Now began the erosion of de Grasse's strength. The pursuit continued throughout the 10th, and that night the Jason
ran on board the Zélé and retired with damage to Guadeloupe, where she was followed by the Caton, whose masts
had suffered in the action of the 9th. More time was lost when two ships dropped to leeward and had to be
supported. The next night the Zélé collided again with the flagship, lost her bowsprit and foremast, and had to be
taken in tow by a frigate to Guadeloupe. At daybreak she was sighted from the British fleet, six miles to leeward
with the French fleet twelve to fifteen mile off on the port bow. In the hope of drawing de Grasse back to her
rescue, Rodney detached four ships in chase, and the manoeuvre succeeded. The French turned back; and though
the chasing ships were recalled and the Zélé was soon in safety, de Grasse persisted on his course and drew into
action.
For the first time in the war a British Admiral engaged a main fleet of the enemy with the one vital requisite for
victory: a heavy superiority in ships and guns. He had thirty-six ships of the line, and de Grasse had been reduced
to thirty. Whether Rodney made the best use of his advantage whether he broke the French line by long considered
design, and whether the design was his own; whether the French would have suffered more if he had kept them
closely engaged from to leeward; whether the pursuit was lax: these points are still debated, but they do not matter
to our theme. By the end of the day de Grasse was a prisoner and five French ships of the line were in Rodney's
hands; two more struck to Hood a week later. The survivors rallied under Vaudreuil at San Domingo, and with a
fresh arrival from Martinique they numbered twenty-six French ships and with a dozen Spaniards. But Rodney was
on their heels, and the great attack on Jamaica, to which all the enemy's movements since Yorktown had been
directed, was abandoned. The battle of the Saints had yielded a limited harvest, and the enemy were not broken;
and yet there was some truth in Rodney's boast to Sandwich:
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'You may now despise all your enemies.' But the architects of the victory were no longer in power.
4
The Anatomy of Victory
In the Parliamentary History the naval strategy of the American War is reduced to a simple matter of discovering
the enemy's strength and overmatching it: to a rational calculation which could only be upset by the laziness,
cowardice or stupidity of Ministers. The manner in which Rodney's superiority at the battle of the Saints was
achieved proves the poverty of the view.
In the first place Rodney's great reinforcement was despatched on false intelligence of the French expedition from
Brest, and before anything could be known of de Grasse's strength in the Caribbean. If de Grasse had sent ten ships
home instead of four, the British reinforcement would have been excessive; if he had kept all ten, and had not lost
two in collisions immediately before the battle, it would have been inadequate.
Many other accidents might have intervened to alter the balance. If Darby had come home from his Channel cruise
as soon as he was recalled, a decisive force might have been ready to intercept the French reinforcements off Brest.
What would have been the consequence? De Grasse would have been deprived of the four ships which Vaudreuil
was taking out to him; but Rodney would probably not have been given the seven ships which were added to his
squadron on Kempenfelt's failure. If an interception had been achieved by using Bickerton's force which was
preparing for India, there might have been the added misfortune of Bickerton's absence from the Battle of
Cuddalore, and India as well as the West Indies would have suffered by Guichen's interception. If scurvy had been
expected at Minorca, a relief by a battle fleet might have been attempted at all costs in December: it would then
have been difficult or impossible to give Rodney the additional seven ships, most of which were taken from the
Channel fleet. If Guichen's force had not been scattered by the Christmas storm, the French reinforcements and
supplies would have reached Martinique in time for de Grasse to depart for Jamaica before Rodney arrived to
challenge him.
The superiority which gave Rodney the victory was the outcome not of precise calculation and circumstances
foreseen, but of intelligent guesswork and a determination to concentrate on the most vital of many competing
claims; and in the last resort of the incalculable but not impartial factor which generally favours the side with most
in hand: the factor of luck.
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Chapter XXVII
The End of the Ministry
1
The Departure of Germain
Parliament had assembled two days after the news of Yorktown, on 27 November. Both Germain and Sandwich
were said to seem shaken by the blow the latter 'near to death with fatigue and mortification'. But Lord North's
parliamentary equanimity was unshaken, and the debate on the Address was carried by 89 votes. The leaders of the
Opposition were quite unprepared to exploit the disaster, and the interval since the news had been too short for
them to gather their forces or form a plan. Their wild talk of vermin, scaffolds and the day of reckoning made little
impact on a House deeply moved by the national crisis. 'It is strange they should never have learnt that to show
exultation in a public calamity makes them odious.'1
The Opposition had been in a state of demoralisation for the past eighteen months. Since the Gordon Riots and the
initial successes in South Carolina they had made no headway against the Ministry. A large majority of the House
of Commons had accepted the Dutch War as just and necessary; and even Cornwallis's failure in the Carolinas had
not persuaded them that the reconquest of America was hopeless. Nevertheless the opening success of the Ministry
in the new session concealed only momentarily the gravity of the political crisis. In the course of the brief sitting
which ended on 20 December there were five debates on the future of the American War, and this became the
crucial question for the government's survival. There were signs that some of the Ministry's supporters would no
longer give North their vote for pursuing the struggle. Like former wars the present one had nearly doubled the
national debt; and the country gentlemen would not continue indefinitely to pour a high land tax into the American
War without return. When the Christmas recess arrived, most of the English county members were opposed to the
continuation of the American struggle.
Lord North had warned his colleagues in the previous winter that he could not finance the war for more than
another year; and in the course of the present session he moved, like most of his colleagues, towards the belief that
America must be abandoned. The King of course would never freely accept this conclusion; and within the Cabinet
Germain resisted it to the end. His attitude was clear, firm, and rational: 'that we can never
1 Carlisle, 539, 541. This chapter owes much to I. R. Christie's The End of North's Ministry.
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continue to exist as a great or powerful nation after we have lost or renounced the sovereignty of America'. He
foretold a continuing connection between America and France; the loss of Britain's American trade followed soon
by that of Nova Scotia, Newfoundland and Canada; enemy cruiser bases in Bermuda and the Bahamas to strangle
the homeward bound West India trade in time of war; and the West Indies themselves, bereft of all supplies except
from England, soon to fall to the French and Americans.1
Germain did not pretend that the hope of recovering America was bright. The betrayal of the loyalists in the
Yorktown capitulation might prevent them from trusting to British protection again. But he believed that the future
of Britain depended on keeping what was still held, and fighting through to a settlement on a basis of uti possidetis.
In possession of New York, Charleston and Savannah we would safeguard the extensive trade which he believed
was going through them, and retain summer stations and staging posts from which winter operations could be
mounted in the West Indies. Thus, he contended, the huge death-rate in the Caribbean could be reduced, by
seasoning troops from Europe and providing cool cantonments in the hot weather. If one considers how in the next
war with France the British army was wrecked by West Indian diseases, one cannot lightly dismiss this part of his
argument.2
How the struggle could be continued he suggested at the King's request in a memorandum circulated to the
Cabinet. With superiority at sea Nova Scotia, Penobscot, New York, Charleston, Savannah and East Florida could
all be defended by the forces already there; and any surplus could take up the plan so often recommended but
never seriously adopted, of attacking the rebel coasts in conjunction with inroads from Canada, and supporting any
loyalists bold enough to trust us after Yorktown. On the treatment of the loyalists in the Yorktown capitulation he
felt great bitterness3; and he touched
1 Wraxall Memoirs, II, 465; CL, Germain, preamble to the memorandum printed in Sackville, II, 216. This,
though dated 1782 by the Clements Library in the Germain and Shelburne papers, seems to me to belong to
the period between 28 Nov. (cf. G 3449) and 8 Dec. (cf. reference to possibility that no more fresh corps
may be sent to America, and Cabinet Minute in G 3462).
2 Preamble, loc. cit. Ideally, he said, troops should sail from England for the West Indies on 1 September, to
arrive at the opening of the healthy campaigning season in the Caribbean; but at that time enemy fleets were in
the Channel, inward bound convoys were expected, and no escort could be spared. Reinforcements therefore
tended to sail later, and arrive about the beginning of the hot weather: if they could be sent to a summer station
in America their losses could be avoided. The contention is supported in Mackenzie, 554; and cf. table of
losses in Appendix I, below.
3 He ordered the Admiralty to court-martial the captain of the Yorktown cartel ship (the ill-famed Bonetta) for
refusing to take off more than a dozen loyalists and neglecting those he did take. (CO 5/255, p. 124).
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too on the indiscipline and indiscriminate plundering of rebels and loyalists by the army, and the failure to establish
civil government. There must be, he said, one person with full power to treat and pardon, to direct the great
outlines of operations, to end the jealousies and misunderstandings of commanders. Even if limited offensives
proved beyond the present means, Britain should remain in a situation to receive and protect the Americans if their
dislike of their war government and of the French should turn them towards us. At all costs, we must hold what we
had.1
In all this there was no new talisman of victory: only the wearied repetition of a formula which he still believed to
be right. On 8 December the Cabinet took its decision to send only recruits to America, precluding any more
ambitious plan. On the 14th Germain could still declare in the House of Commons that the Ministry was
unanimous against abandoning America. How unanimous, North demonstrated by quitting the Treasury bench and
withdrawing to a seat behind it, while Germain faced his attackers alone. The disunity within the Ministry was
shown at a Cabinet meeting the same day, when a total silence was preserved on the pressing subjects of the
Commons debate and plans for America.2
Germain was certain that changes were being discussed. If the Ministry was to survive, scapegoats were needed.
As Sandwich told Admiral Graves, the choice of victims was a matter of chance rather than justice; and Sandwich
and Germain, the director of the navy and the chief protagonist of coercing the rebels, were the natural sacrifices.
Dundas and Rigby, who had despaired of recovering America, were determined that the two ministers must go and
independence be recognised: their defection would mean the loss of a dozen votes, and with desertions among the
country gentlemen it would kill the government's majority. Germain was inflexible in his opinions, but he did not
intend to cling to office: a wealthy man living within his means, he was not, like Sandwich and Carlisle, impelled
to seek office by financial necessity, and his only private ambition was a peerage to erase the stain of Minden.
When the King suggested Carleton as a proper successor to Clinton, he replied that though he could not serve with
Carleton after the letters they had exchanged, the King was unlikely to leave the seals in his hands for long. He
warned the King that among the real friends of government dislike of the American War was general, and that men
of high office and great political connections desired an accommodation. Before Christmas he urged the King to
release him, and perhaps offer the American Department and the Admiralty to the Opposition; but in vain.
The cause of the delay was a deadlock between the Prime Minister and
1 G 3449; Knox, 272; Sackville, II, 216.
2 G 3462, 3470.
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the King. The King insisted that if Germain retired his successor must equally oppose independence for America.
Under this condition North would have liked to bring in Jenkinson; but if Jenkinson refused, he would have
preferred to retain Germain's capable support in the House of Commons.1
Thus the American Department was thrown into confusion, as the Northern Department had been in 1779. Though
Germain still held the seals no decision could be taken about Clinton's successor, nor any instructions issued for
the next campaign. On 23 December the Cabinet agreed at an amicable meeting to relieve Clinton; but while
Germain stayed in office Carleton could not be named as his successor. On the same day North had a meeting at
the King's suggestion with Stormont and Hillsborough, the two Secretaries of State on whom peace negotiations
would fall. Their conversation was the exact counterpart of many which North had had with the King. He was
despondent about the war, talked of the country's reserves as nearly exhausted, but was against saying so in public.
He thought that such sovereignty as could now be maintained over the rebellious colonies was not worth fighting
for, adding that the King did not agree with him. But he showed no intention of adopting Independence, spoke in a
general way against discussing terms of peace in public, and was disposed to wait on events and see what might
come of negotiations with Holland. About Carleton and Germain he would not commit himself.2
The King had no objection to Germain having his peerage and retiring, provided it was understood that the cause of
his retirement was Carleton's appointment and not the abandonment of the struggle; but he would not move a step
in the matter till a successor was found for the American Department. North was in perplexity. Though he had
hedged to the Secretaries of State about America, he revealed his true feelings to Robinson: 'You see there is no
great objection to changing men, but a very great one to changing measures, and that it will be expected from me
to take upon myself alone to carry on that plan which appears to me in our present circumstances ruinous and
impracticable.'3
The King, then, was willing to dispense with Germain but not with his policy; while the Prime Minister, though he
disliked the policy, would have been willing to retain the man. Germain was not admitted behind the scenes, but
from the King's hedging about Carleton he guessed that his own removal was in the wind if the King could
penetrate North's views on America. He therefore thought it 'more proper and decent to keep out of the way' till his
future was decided; and with the King's permission he went down
1 G 3468, 3470, 3478; Knox, 273; Sackville, I, 1401.
2 G 3475, 3477, 3483, 3485.
3 G 3485; Abergavenny, 46.
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to Drayton, leaving Knox in charge of the office and freeing the ministerial coteries from the embarrassment of his
presence.
January drew on without a decision. 'We go on here with our usual amusements', Germain wrote from Drayton on
the 10th, 'as if all were peace and quiet. Lord North perhaps is doing the same at Bushey; but if he intends to make
any change among us, it is almost time to let us into the secret.' Knox in the meantime had been unreliably
informed of the proposed changes, and went to see North with a message from Germain which he read aloud.
North interrupted him to say it was measures, not men which should be changed; and at the end he launched into a
protestation that his own department occupied his full attention. Where, he demanded, was he to find taxes to
produce £800,000? Last year he had said he could do it for one year only: he had fulfilled his engagement and now
wished he were out: the enemy would not make peace with us. At this point Knox reminded him of Guichen's
misfortune and Rodney's consequent superiority in the West Indies, and suggested his old project of trying to
detach France's allies. North's reply was to walk about the room and call for his post chaise. Knox took this as a
civil way of telling him to get out of the room, and he went.1
It was high time for Germain to return to the game. Back in London on the 15th, he had an audience with the King
two days later, and asked him point blank whether he was still to regard himself as Secretary of State. The King
replied, by his own account, that no decision had yet been taken; and Germain described North's rebuff of Knox,
and pressed for an answer. He declared that he would never retract what he had said about American
Independence, and would rather leave office now than be forced to it later, as must certainly happen if vigorous
measures were not pursued. He left the closet with a promise that North would send for him.2
The next morning a summons for Germain arrived from Downing Street. Knox scribbled Robinson a hasty line to
warn the Prime Minister not to be inattentive, and to tell him that he had disposed Germain to treat with the
Americans on the basis of uti possidetis and a truce. Robinson hurried to Downing Street; but when North came
down he went, not into his room, but into a Cabinet meeting on Admiralty business. To this, and not to a private
conference, Germain found that he had been summoned. He sat the meeting out; but finding that North had no
intention of speaking to him he came away 'in a monstrous passion', and wrote a letter of resignation to the King.
Knox slipped away to Downing Street to fetch Robinson, who persuaded Germain to hold the letter back till after
the week-end.3
1 Knox, 18, 274; Sackville, II, 295.
2 Knox, 2745; G 3497.
3 Knox, 275.
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