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5. “2004 Election Overview: Most Expensive Races,” opensecrets.org.
6. This is the reason for the subtitle in Herrnson’s book: Congressional Elections:
Campaigning at Home and in Washington, 2nd edition (Washington, D.C.: CQ
Press, 1998), p. xii.
7. Phil Kuntz, “The Money Chase: A Day in Washington Is Just Another Day to
Raise More Dollars,” Wall Street Journal, October 23, 1995, p. A1.
8. Ellen Miller and Nick Penniman, “The Road to Nowhere: Thirty Years of Cam
-
paign-Finance Reform Yield Precious Little,” The American Prospect, August
12, 2002, p. 14.
9. David Cohen, “PAC Power: An Abuse of Power,” in Political Action for Business:
The PAC Handbook, ed. Ken Clair (Washington, D.C.: Fraser/Associates, 1981),
p. 313.
10. Ibid., p. 19.
302 I CHAPTER 11
Box 11.5 Lobbying Tactics Used by Accounting Industry
162
When Levitt said that “the SEC would insist on auditor independence
and, through enforcement actions if necessary, require that compa
-
nies adhere to the letter and spirit of the GAAP [generally agreed upon
accounting practices], the accounting industry questioned the need
for national standards.
It persuaded Congress to hold hearings on a proposed ruling by
the FASB to expense stock options. Silicon Valley, also large cam
-
paign contributors, were especially opposed, pointing out that weak
profits made cash compensation difficult. Senator Joe Lieberman, the
Connecticut Democrat, introduced legislation to bar the SEC from en
-
forcing the rule. He also sponsored a Senate resolution that declared
the FASB proposal would have “grave consequences for America’s en
-
trepreneurs.” The bill failed to pass, but the resolution did, by an over
-
whelming 88–9. Levitt consequently urged FASB members to back
down in favor of a current, weaker rule that requires companies to dis-
close stock options grants in the footnotes to income statements.
The industry was able to block an attempt by the SEC and the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants to pass a rule ban-
ning auditors from doing most kinds of consulting work for the same
companies they audited. Some 46 members of Congress sent letters
to Levitt opposing the measure. Furthermore, Senate Banking Com-
mittee chairman Phil Gramm warned Levitt that Congress was prepar-
ing an “appropriations rider” that would bar the agency from spending
taxpayer funds to enforce the rule. Faced with such threat to SEC in-
dependence, Levitt gave in and compromised. The final rules,
adopted on November 15, 2000, allowed auditors to perform up to
40% of a company’s internal audit work and an unlimited amount of
consulting—as long as all this was disclosed. (It turned out that in
2000, S&P 500 companies paid their auditors $1.2 billion in audit fees
and triple that amount, $3.7 billion, for nonaudit services.)
11. “’04 Elections Expected to Cost Nearly $4 Billion,” op. cit.
12. Lawrence Noble and Steven Weiss, “Op-Ed: Plenty of Individual Contribu
-
tions,” Miami Herald, November 25, 2004, as reprinted at www.open se
-
crets.org.
13. Good Morning America show, September 30, 2003; Jeanne Cummings, “Cash
Influx Tilts Campaign Calculus,” Wall Street Journal, October 1, 2003, p.
A12; Stephen Baker, “Click the Vote,” BusinessWeek, March 29, 2004, p. 102.
14. Thoms B. Edsall and Juliet Eilperin, “PAC Attack II; Why Some Groups Are
Learning to Love Campaign Finance Reform,” Washington Post, August 18,
2002, p. B2.
15. Glenn R. Simpson, “The Internet Begins to Click as a Political Money Web,”
Wall Street Journal, October 19, 1999, p. A28.
16. Coercion, however, may not be used to force a political contribution. This
does not mean that company executives may not be chided for failing to
contribute, which Richard J. Lane did when he was president of Bristol-
Myers’s worldwide medicines division and co-chairman of its employee
PAC. Concerned about “the politically motivated attacks against our indus
-
try … to shackle our industry with price controls,” his aggressive solicita-
tion resulted in a $2 million contribution to the party and its candidates
during the 2000 campaign, second only to Pfizer. Sheryl Gay Stolberg and
Gardiner Harris, “Industry Fights to Put Imprint on Drug Bill,” New York
Times, September 5, 2003, p. A1.
17. PACs could exceed legal giving limits, however, when making “independent
expenditures,” defined as “disbursements made to pay for a communica-
tion expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified can-
didate without the candidate’s cooperation.” Clair, op. cit., p. 186. Also see
“The Big Picture - Issue Ads/Expenditure & Communication Costs,”
www.opensecrets.org.
18. Jeffrey Milyo, David Primo, and Timothy Groseclose, “Corporate PAC Cam-
paign Contributions in Perspective,” Business and Politics, Vol. 2, No. 1,
2000, p. 77.
19. Jeanne Cummings, “Closing the Spigot: In New Law’s Wake, Companies
Slash Their Political Donations,” Wall Street Journal, September 3, 2004, p.
A4.
20. “’04 Elections Expected to Cost Nearly $4 Billion,” op. cit.
21. “Top PACs,” www.opensecrets.org/pads/toppacs.asp.
22. “Top 20 PAC Contributors to Federal Candidates, 2003–2004,” based on data
released by the FEC on October 25, 2004, www.opensecrets.org.
23. Thomas B. Edsall, “Study: Corporate PACs Favor GOP; Decisive Shift From
Bipartisan Giving Began in 1995–97,” Washington Post, November 25,
2004, p. A06.
24. Ibid.
25. Alan B. Krueger, “Economic Scene; Lobbying by Businesses Overwhelms
Their Campaign Contributions,” New York Times, September 19, 2002, p. C2.
26. Greg Hitt and Tom Hamburger, “New Campaign Law Restores PACs’ Ap
-
peal,” Wall Street Journal, July 29, 2002, p. A4.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. “2004 Election Overview; Top Self Funders,” www.opensecrets.org.
31. David Beiler, “Jon Corzine and the Power of Money,” Campaigns & Elections,
Vol. 22, April 2001, pp. 22–36.
ELECTORAL ACTIVITIES I 303
32. Ibid.
33. An update on December 8, 2004, showed that 527 groups raised a higher
amount, $409 million. See Political MoneyLine, www.tray.com.
34. “Soft Money to National Parties,” www.opensecrets.org.
35. Mary Beth Regan, “Campaign Finance ’96: It Doesn’t Get Much Sleazier
Than This,” BusinessWeek, October 28, 1996, p. 59.
36. “Coming to Terms: A Money-in-Politics Glossary,” Center for Responsive
Politics, www.crp.org/pubs/glossary/contents.htm.
37. Fred Wertheimer, “The Dirtiest Election Ever; The Spending Abuses of 1996
Should Shame Us Into Reform,” The Washington Post, November 3, 1996, p.
1.
38. Ibid.
39. Regan, op. cit. A notorious example is the acceptance by the Democratic Na
-
tional Committee of an illegal $250,000 donation from Cheong Am Amer
-
ica, a South Korean company. The committee returned the donation after
the Los Angeles Times exposed it as a violation of laws barring contributions
from foreign firms. See Glenn R. Simpson and Jill Abramson, “Foreign Ex
-
change: Legal Loopholes Let Overseas Contributors Fill Democrats’ Coffers,”
Wall Street Journal, October 8, 1996, p. A1.
40. Vicki Kemper, Deborah Lutterbeck, and Christin Davilas, “The Country
Club,” Common Cause, Vol. 22, Spring/Summer 1996, pp. 16–17.
41. Ibid., p. 238.
42. Ibid., p. 236.
43. Darrell M. West, Checkbook Democracy: How Money Corrupts Political Cam-
paigns (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2000), p. 7.
44. Amy Borrus and Mary Beth Regan, “The Backlash Against Soft Money,”
BusinessWeek, March 31, 1997, p. 33.
45. Ibid., p. 36.
46. Lisa Zagaroli, “GM Puts Brakes on ‘Soft Money’ contributions,” Detroit
News, June 1, 1997, p. A1.
47. Alan Murray, “Corporate America Sits Mostly on Side During This Election,”
Wall Street Journal, July 27, 2004, p. A6.
48. Ibid.
49. Jeanne Cummings, op. cit., p. A1.
50. “527s Not Filling Soft Money Gap,” June 25, 2004 press release,
www.opensecrets.org.
51. Mark Hosenball, Michael Isikoff, and Holly Baily, “The Secret Money War,”
Newsweek, September 20, 2004, pp. 24, 26.
52. Hosenball, et al., op. cit., p. 25.
53. Jeanne Cummings, “Political Money Flows Faster in ’04,” Wall Street Jour
-
nal, April 5, 2004, p. A6. They budgeted $95 million for the 2004 campaign
to hire thousands of canvassers to sign up voters in 17 swing states. The Me
-
dia Fund plans to use its $50 million budget to run issue ads in the same 17
states.
54. Jeanne Cummings, “Those 527 Fund-Raisers Prove Resilient,” Wall Street
Journal, December 6, 2004, p. A4.
55. Ibid.
56. John McCain, “Plugging the Loophole,” Newsweek, September 20, 2004, p.
24.
57. Ibid.
58. Lorraine Woellert and Lee Walczak, “Campaign Reform’s Dangerous After
-
shocks,” BusinessWeek, April 8, 2002, p. 42.
304 I CHAPTER 11
59. Glenn R. Simpson, “Democrats to Swivel Spotlight to ‘Mush’ Money Issue,”
Wall Street Journal, September 19, 1997, p. A16. However, the argument is
made that Section 501(c)(4) or 527 tax-exempt organization may pay for is
-
sue ads if they are unincorporated and they pay from funds donated by indi
-
viduals.
60. Jeanne Cummings, “Political Contributors Step up to the Plate,” Wall Street
Journal, July 29, 2004, p. A4.
61. Richard S. Dunham, “Hail to the Chief: Big Business Gets Behind Bush’s
Bash,” BusinessWeek, January 10, 2005, p. 13.
62. Jill Zuckman, “McCain Takes Aim at System of Campaign Financing,”
Boston Globe, July 1, l999, p. A6.
63. Phil Kuntz, “McCain’s Financing Stance Recalls Keating-Five Role,” Wall
Street Journal, December 17, 1999, p. A16. He mentioned this theme on
ABC’s Nightline.
64. Ron Unz, “McCain-Feingold Loses. There Is an Alternative,” Wall Street Jour
-
nal, October 20, 1999, p. A26.
65. From a Public Affairs Council PowerPoint presentation on “Campaign Fi
-
nance Laws,” SASM&FLLP, December 2, 2003.
66. David Rogers, “Senate Approves Measure to Curb Big Donations,” Wall Street
Journal, March 21, 2002, p. A24. Also Trevor Potter and Kirk L. Jowers,
“Summary Analysis of Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act Passed by
House and Senate and Sent to President,” www.brook.edu.
67. Cummings, Greenberger, and Hamburger, op. cit., p. A8.
68. “Campaign Law Actually Works, But Reformers Still Have a Job to Do,”
Newsday, November 9, 2004, p. A36.
69. Joanna Chung, “Battle Over Funding Continues After History’s Costliest
Presidential Race,” Financial Times, November 20, 2004, p. 9.
70. “527s Not Filling Soft Money Gap” June 25, 2004, press release,
www.opensecrets.org.
71. Richard Tedesco, “Issue Ads to Boost Political Spending,” Broadcasting & Ca-
ble, Vol. 128, September 7, 1998, pp. 11–14.
72. Glenn R. Simpson, “Democrats to Swivel Spotlight to ‘Mush’ Money Issue,”
Wall Street Journal, September 19, 1997, p. A16.
73. Mary Beth Regan, Stan Crock, and Paul Magnusson, “Campaign Finance: A
Deepening Cesspool of Politics and Cash,” BusinessWeek, July 22, 1996, p.
96.
74. See www.citizen.org.
75. Jack Brady, “Stumping for Ad Dollars; Newspapers Push for More Political
Advertising Revenue,” Newspaper Association of America, Inc., July–Au
-
gust 2004, Special Report, p. 28.
76. Greg Hitt, “‘527 Groups’ Use Tax Loopholes to Promote Politicians,” Wall
Street Journal, May 25, 2000, p. A28.
77. John M. Broder, “Clinton’s Drug Plan Attacked by Industry,” New York Times,
June 27, 2000, p. A22.
78. For a description of these various types of advocacy groups see
www.opensecrets.org/527s/types.asp.
79. Robin Toner, “The 2002 Campaign; The Drug industry; Democrats See a
Stealthy Drive by Drug Industry to Help Republicans,” New York Times, Oc
-
tober 20, 2002, p. 20. Also involved in the ad campaign was the 60 Plus As
-
sociation. Both were called “front organizations” by Merrill Goozner, a New
York University professor of business journalism who is writing a book
about the pharmaceutical industry. At least two groups were bankrolling
ELECTORAL ACTIVITIES I 305
opposing campaigns: the senior citizens’ lobby AARP’s $4 million issue ads
and the AFL-CIO’s $1.5 million campaign. Greg Hitt, “Drug Makers Pour Ad
Money Into Final Days of Campaign,” Wall Street Journal, November 4,
2002, pp. A1, A4.
80. Glen Justice, “Concerns Grow About Role in Interest Groups in Elections,”
New York Times, March 9, 2005, p. A20.
81. Greg Hitt, “Political Groups Swarm to Campaign-Finance Loophole,” Wall
Street Journal, March 20, 2000, p. A36.
82. Hitt, “‘527 Groups’ Use Tax Loopholes … ,” op. cit.
83. Dwyer, op. cit., p. 154.
84. Ibid.
85. These organizations were identified in the Annenberg Center’s examination
of television ad spending after Super Tuesday (from March 8–November 7,
2000). See Annenberg press release.
86. A review by the Wall Street Journal indicates that Democrats and moderate
Republicans are receiving support from newly approved tax-exempt organi
-
zations. Among the new groups approved by the IRS in 1997 are the Ameri
-
can Civil Rights Coalition, the Foundation for Responsible Government,
Americans for Clean Energy, the American Small Business Alliance, and
Americans for Job Security. The last is a trade association backed mainly by
the insurance industry; its founder is Robert Vagley, president of the Ameri-
can Insurance Association. Cummings, op. cit. These groups and individuals
were sometimes helped by Triad Management Services, a private consulting
firm that helps conservative Republicans funnel money to tax-exempt
groups and advises wealthy GOP clients on where to donate money. (“Triad”
stands for Tactical Resources in American Democracy.) The firm used two
affiliated nonprofits to take in $3 million in unpublished donations, and it
helped Citizens for the Republic and another nonprofit organization spend
millions of dollars in 1996 to influence congressional races.
87. Timothy Noah, “Environmentalists Take Leaf From Book of Right and Target
Enemies, Allies in Issue Campaigns,” Wall Street Journal, July 19, 1996, p. A14.
88. “Editorial: The Rise of the Non-Candidate,” Washington Post, November 5,
2000, p. B06.
89. These organizations were identified in the Annenberg Center’s examination
of television ad spending after Super Tuesday (from March 8–November 7,
2000). See Annenberg press release.
90. Jeanne Cummings, “Issue-Advocacy Groups to Play Bigger Role,” Wall Street
Journal, March 6, 1998, p. A16.
91. Greg Hitt, “Drug Makers Pour Ad Money Into Final Days of Campaign,” Wall
Street Journal, November 4, 2002, p. A1.
92. Jeanne Cummings, Robert S. Greenberger and Tom Hamburger, “Supreme
Court Upholds Key Parts of New Campaign-Finance Law,” Wall Street Jour
-
nal, December 11, 2003, p. A1.
93. Joshua Green, “Dumb and Dumber,” Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 294, July–Au
-
gust 2004, pp. 83–86.
94. Ibid., p. 86.
95. Green, op. cit., p. 86.
96. Based on paper by William Benoit in Advertising & Society; ibid., pp. 84–85.
97. Based on documentation by Roderick P. Hart, a professor at the University of
Texas; Green, ibid., p. 85.
98. Michael Pfau, R. Lance Holbert, Erin Alison Szabo, and Kelly Kaminski, “Is
-
sue-Advocacy Versus Candidate Advertising: Effects on Candidate Prefer
-
306 I CHAPTER 11
ence and Democratic Process,” Journal of Communication, Vol. 52, June
2002, p. 301.
99. Green, op. cit., p. 86.
100. Joseph J. Fanelli, “PAC Overview,” in Clair, op. cit., p. 27.
101. “Campaign Finance: How to Fix a Rigged System,” BusinessWeek, June 14,
2004, p. 74.
102. “2004 Election Overview: Incumbent Advantage—All Candidates,”
www.opensecrets.org.
103. David M. Halbfinger, “Deep Pockets: How Corzine Spent $35 Million in a
Primary,” New York Times, September 17, 2000, p. WK5.
104. David Beiler, “Jon Corzine and the Power of Money,” Campaigns & Elections,
Vol. 22, April 2001, pp. 22–36.
105. Ibid., p. 201.
106. See “2004 Election Overview: Incumbent Advantage—All Candidates,”
www.opensecrets.org.
107. Center for Responsive Politics.
108. Janet Hook, “Decision ’98: Big Spenders Can Be Losers in Campaigns; De
-
spite Wealth, Checchi, Harman, Issa and Others Came up Short in Political
Wars,” Los Angeles Times, June 5, 1998, p. A1.
109. Herrnson, op. cit., pp. 210–211. The first $100,000 spent adds 16.37% to
the candidate’s vote share; $200,000 adds 18.83%; $500,000 adds 22.09%.
Spending by the opponent, however, decreases vote shares by only slightly
less than the benefits cited for candidate spending.
110. Ibid., pp. 108, 206–208.
111. Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, “Lobbyists Rain Largess on Senate Incumbents,”
Washington Post, November 2, 2004, p. A05.
112. Jill Abramson, “Political Memo: 1996 Campaign Left Finance Laws in
Shreds,” New York Times, November 2, 1997, p. 1.
113. “BusinessWeek/Harris Executive Poll: Look Who Wants to Change the Sys-
tem,” BusinessWeek, March 31, 1997, p. 36.
114. Robert J. Wager, “Toward an Effective PAC: What to Do and How to Do It,”
in Clair, op. cit., p. 160.
115. Ibid., p. 164.
116. Tom Hamburger, Laurie McGinley, and David S. Cloud, “Influence Market:
Industries That Backed Bush Are Now Seeking Return on Investment,”
Wall Street Journal, March 6, 2001, p. A1.
117. Zachery Coile, “Senators Rap Ethanol Mandate; Energy Bill Provisions
Called ‘Corporate Welfare’ for Midwest Producers,” San Francisco Chronicle,
April 12, 2002, p. A4.
118. Chris O’Brien, “How Glaxo Sells Itself to Congress,” The News and Observer,
February 23, 1997, p. A1.
119. Larry J. Sabato, “PAC-Man Goes to Washington,” Across the Board, Vol. 21,
October 1984, p. 18. Also see his PAC Power: Inside the World of Political Ac
-
tion Committees (New York: Norton, 1984). The strength of Sabato’s assess
-
ment is his contention that findings associating PAC money with desired
congressional votes are based on “correlational studies” that, although
suggestive, are not conclusive. He cites the fallacy of the Common Cause
argument that the defeat of President Carter’s Hospital Cost Containment
Act of 1977 illustrates the effectiveness of the American Medical Associa
-
tion’s AMPAC. It gave $1.65 million during the 1976 and 1978 campaigns
to 202 of the 234 House members who voted for a crippling amendment.
But the correlation that those favoring the AMA amendment received more
ELECTORAL ACTIVITIES I 307
than $8,100 on average compared with the $2,300 received by the 122
members who voted against the amendment is not sufficient proof the PAC
payments influenced the vote. In proving that a correlation does not prove
causation, Sabato examines studies based on more sophisticated statistical
techniques that “hold steady” such variables as the party, ideology, and
past voting record of a congressman. He gives the historical example of the
1975 congressional vote for milk price supports, which, he argues, was
only slightly influenced by 1974 dairy PAC contributions. More relevant
was how important dairy production was in each legislator’s home district
as well as his or her ideology and party affiliation. Ibid., p. 22.
120. Ibid., p. 23.
121. Ibid., p. 25.
122. Jeanne Cummings, “Closing the Spigot: In New Law’s Wake, Companies
Slash Their Political Donations,” op. cit., p. A4.
123. Jonathan Weisman, “Adopting Union Tactics, Firms Dive More Deeply Into
Politics; Employees Targeted With Voter Guides, Turnout Efforts,” Wash
-
ington Post, October 24, 2002, p. A8.
124. Raymond L. Hoewing, “The State of Public Affairs: A Profession Reinvent-
ing Itself,” in Dennis, op. cit., p. 37.
125. Jeanne Cummings, “Political Contributors Step Up to the Plate,” Wall Street
Journal, July 29, 2004, p. A4.
126. Peter B. Kennerdell, Managing the Business–Employee PAC (Washington,
D.C.: Public Affairs Council, 1992), pp. 8–9.
127. Kennerdell, op. cit., p. 14.
128. A. John Adams, “Communications and Political Action Committees,” in
Clair, op. cit., p. 178.
129. Baker, op. cit., p. 279.
130. “Case Study: Corning’s PAC Publishes Newsletter; Potent but Possibly Divi-
sive Public Affairs Tool,” pr reporter, Vol. 21, June 26, 1978, p. 3.
131. Owen Ullmann, “Unions: Laboring Mightily to Avert a Nightmare in No-
vember,” BusinessWeek, October 19, 1998, p. 53.
132. Glenn Burkins, “AFL-CIO to Raise at Least $26 Million to Support Demo-
crats, GOP Moderates,” Wall Street Journal, February 18, 1999, p. A24.
133. Ibid.
134. Jeanne Cummings, “Closing the Spigot: In New Law’s Wake, Companies
Slash Their Political Donations,”op. cit., p. A1.
135. Murray, op. cit. Also see Cummings, ibid.
136. Raymond A. Hay in preface to The Candidates (Reagan vs. Mondale) Where
They Stand (Dallas: The LTV Corp., 1985). The booklet was provided by H.
J. (Jerry) Dalton, Jr., manager of corporate communications.
137. Phyllis S. McGrath, Action Plans for Public Affairs (New York: The Confer
-
ence Board, 1977), p. 43. The outcome of the new approach was not re
-
ported.
138. Philip Lesly, “Why Economic Education Is Failing,” Management Review,
Vol. 65, October 1976, pp. 17–23.
139. Myron Emanuel, Curtis L. Snodgrass, Joyce Gildea, and Karn Rosenberg,
Corporate Economic Education Programs: An Evaluation and Appraisal (Fi
-
nancial Executives Research Foundation, 1979), p. 303. This is the most
complete source of information on economic education programs used in
the 1970s.
140. Lee Ann Elliott, “The Do’s and Don’ts of Corporate Political Activity,” in
Kennerdell, op. cit.
308 I CHAPTER 11
141. Jean F. Grogan, “Using Partisan Communications to Aid a Candidate,” in
Kennerdell, op. cit., p. 165.
142. Ibid., p. 166.
143. Amy Borrus, “On the Stump, Online,” BusinessWeek, April 12, 1999, p.
123.
144. Ibid.
145. Ryan Lizza, “Campaign Journal: Dean.com,” The New Republic, June 2,
2003, pp. 10–12.
146. “Web Logs: Golden Blogs,” Economist, August 16, 2003, p. 55.
147. Catherine Seipp, “Online Uprising,” American Journalism Review, Vol. 24,
June 2002, pp. 42–47.
148. Richard S. Dunham, “Commentary: Why the Dean Bubble Popped,”
BusinessWeek, February 16, 2004, p. 38.
149. Stephen Baker, “Click the Vote,” BusinessWeek, March 29, 2004, p. 104.
150. David Bank, “Billionaires Back Online Activists’ Anti-Bush Ads,” Wall Street
Journal, November 11, 2003, p. A3. Also see Jeanne Cummings and Julia
Angwin, “Donors Look for the Loopholes to Campaign-Finance Limits,”
Wall Street Journal, December 12, 2003, p. A5. Also see Jeanne Cummings,
“A Hard Sell on Soft Money,” Wall Street Journal, December 2, 2003, p. A4.
151. Leslie Wayne, “Enron’s Many Strands: The Politics; Enron, Preaching De-
regulation, Worked the State House Circuit,” New York Times, February 9,
2002, p. C-1.
152. Kevin McCoy, “Enron’s Contributions Trail Reads Like a U.S. Road Map,”
USA Today, January 28, 2002, p. B1.
153. Wayne, op. cit.
154. McCoy, op. cit., p. 42.
155. Carla Marinucci, “Group Tallies Enron’s Contributions, Lobbying,” San
Francisco Chronicle, January 30, 2002, p. A10.
156. Tom Hamburger et al., op. cit., p. A1.
157. Joe Stephens, “Hard Money, Strong Arms and ‘Matrix’; How Enron Dealt
With Congress, Bureaucracy,” Washington Post, February 10, 2002, p. A1.
158. Albert R. Hunt, “Enron’s One Good Return: Political Investments,” Wall
Street Journal, January 31, 2002, p. A19.
159. Michael Schroeder and Greg Hitt, “Accounting Industry Is Taken to Task,”
Wall Street Journal, March 8, 2002, p. A12.
160. “Arthur Andersen: The Enron Scandal’s Other Big Donor,” The Center for
Responsive Politics; Greg Hitt, “Andersen Lobbyists Work to Ease Pressure
of Probes, Wall Street Journal, January 17, 2002, p. A16.
161. “Lexington: Beware the K-Street Conservatives,” The Economist, December
7, 2002, p. 36.
162. Arthur Levitt, “Arthur Levitt’s Crusade,” BusinessWeek, September 30,
2002, pp. 74–80.
ELECTORAL ACTIVITIES I 309
Chapter 12
Litigation Communication
Since the 1960s and 1970s, American society has continuously become
more litigious. Those were the decades when consumer and environ-
mental movements gained momentum and government responded
with an avalanche of regulations. Books and films such as A Civil Ac-
tion, Erin Brockovich, and The Rainmaker have popularized the role of
lawyers in society and reinforced the culture of a litigious society. Liti-
gation became one of the favorite tactics used against corporations by
consumer, environmental, and other public interest groups. For exam-
ple, seven environmental and public health groups filed a lawsuit in
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals to block industry-backed rules from
the U.S. EPA that would weaken pollution monitoring standards and
lead to increased emissions of mercury.
1
One of the groups, the Natural
Resources Defense Council, has become known as one of the most ef-
fective litigating groups on U.S. environmental issues. Almost a quar-
terofthestaffarelawyers.
2
In the context of issues management, litigation communication is
the fourth stage in the life cycle of an issue.
3
After laws are passed, rele
-
vant government agencies promulgate and enforce regulations. Laws
are seldom, if ever, sufficiently complete and clear on such matters as
enforcement standards and timetables for meeting legal requirements.
If a business disagrees with a government regulation, it may file a
challenging lawsuit. More likely, government, a public interest group,
or an aggrieved party will sue when its interpretation of a law or regu
-
lation suggests lack of compliance. Business has seen the need, there
-
fore, to extend its activities beyond legislation and into the judicial
branch of government in the form of litigation communication.
310
JUDGESHIPS ARE OFTEN ELECTIVE OFFICES
The judicial system is no longer an isolated part of the government, im
-
mune to political pressures. In some jurisdictions, judges are no differ
-
ent from other elective officials. Fortunately, most judges keep
themselves reasonably aloof from politics. Nonetheless, as members of
society, they, too, are influenced by the news media and other activities
that affect public opinion. The power of the judicial system is too im
-
mense to escape attention by corporate communication strategists.
In 38 states judges are elected, not appointed, so it is not surprising
that the judicial candidates act like other political candidates. They “run
attack ads, fill out questionnaires detailing their beliefs, and hit up big
donors on the phone”—activities that were once considered beneath the
dignity of the office.
4
The danger is that the image of an impartial judi
-
cial system is destroyed, as the core ideals of the American judiciary—
“that judges are fair, objective, principled, and nonpartisan”—are com-
promised.
5
Lawyers and other special interests with a stake in court de-
cisions attend fundraisers and contribute in other ways. When Pennzoil
sued Texaco, Pennzoil gave $10,000 to the judge assigned to hear the
case. Texaco struck back by making $72,700 in campaign contributions
to five Texas Supreme Court judges expected to make a final ruling in the
case. However, Texaco was outbid when Pennzoil ultimately contributed
more than $315,000 to Texas Supreme Court justices, including dona-
tions to three justices who weren’t running. The integrity of the court
system is obviously in question when, in states such as Texas, Califor-
nia, and Ohio, where tort reform was an issue, some judicial candidates
were known as the defense or plaintiff’s candidate. Trial lawyers and de-
fense attorneys who made contributions did so in the belief that the side
with the most judges wins.
6
Almost half (48%) of 894 elected judges surveyed in 2001 and 2002
by the Justice at Stake Campaign, a nonpartisan watchdog group in
Washington, DC, said they felt a “great deal” of pressure to raise money
during election years. When asked how much influence these contribu
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tions had on their decisions, 4% said “a great deal of influence,” 22% said
“some influence,” and 20% said “just a little influence.” The right answer
is supposed to be “no influence at all,” the response given by only 36%.
7
The Brennan Center for Justice, a judicial watchdog group based at the
New York University School of Law, reports that candidates for the
highest courts in 20 states raised $45.6 million in 2000, a 61% increase
from 2 years earlier. The trend is expected to continue.
8
Even when the judiciary is independent, parties to a lawsuit, recogniz
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ing the power of the courts, apply some of the same lobbying techniques
to the judicial branch that are used with the legislative and executive
branches of government. For example, an item in a 1995 Columbia Jour
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LITIGATION COMMUNICATION I 311