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tioning the impartiality of the media and therefore relying on their own

communication channels with members, these groups realize it is im

portant to enlist the support of public opinion and to “democratize” the

media. Charlotte Ryan supports this view in Prime Time Activism: “But

our society is heavily media-dependent and if we ignore mainstream

media, we abandon audiences with little or no access to alternative and

opposition media.”

She helps “challengers” understand how to make

their causes and activities “newsworthy.” She describes how Local 26, in

seeking a new master contract with 14 large Boston hotels, at first de

spaired of not being able to get media coverage for its cause, but learned

how to play the game.

AGENDA SETTING

In serving their watchdog function, the news media also set the agenda

for society. As described by Donald L. Shaw and Maxwell E. McCombs,

“The mass media may not be successful in telling us what to think, but

they are stunningly successful in telling us what to think about.”

However, the media’s effectiveness goes beyond this modest function of

agenda setting. There is mounting evidence that the modern mass media

shape how people think about an event or issue.

Framing

The media influence how people think about a topic by framing it: draw-

ing attention to certain features of an issue while minimizing attention

to others. As described by Joseph N. Cappella and Kathleen Hall Jamie-

son, “The act of framing determines what is included and excluded,

what is salient and what is unimportant. It focuses the viewer’s atten-

tion on its subjects in specific ways.”

The act of framing thus shifts the

focus from what is said to how it is said.

This process is illustrated by an analysis of U.S. newspaper coverage

of the merger of the automobile manufacturers Daimler-Benz and

Chrysler in 1998. A major public relations effort created the mythic

frames of “marriage”—establishing an equilibrium of two partners—

and “birth.” In this way the global relevance of the merger and the oligo

polistic tendencies of the car industry, as well as other divisive issues,

were avoided. “The PR departments were successful mythmakers who

established the overall frame of reference for the coverage. Unlike the fa

miliar agenda-setting dictum, public relations told the journalists what

to think about and how to think about it.”

In addition to framing, journalists engage in priming, which refers to

the frequency with which they refer to a story. When a political issue re

ceives more news attention than other issues, people assign greater

weight to that issue when judging politicians who had some direct re

sponsibility for it.

Priming thereby serves to establish criteria for

judgment.

92 I PART III

Framing techniques are routinely used by television news commen

tators and newspaper reporters, as described in Dirty Politics by

Kathleen Hall Jamieson.

By using a script or story form schema, re

porters condition audiences to see a political campaign as a “game” or

“war” between a “front runner” and an “underdog” in which each can

didate’s goal is winning.

She adds, “Schemas influence how we per

ceive new information, how we remember old information, and how

we relate the old and new.”

By using a horse race analogy, reporters

in effect define policy issues, or substance, as lying outside the orbit of

real news.

Because framing labels events and issues, corporate public affairs pro

fessionals must pay attention to its impact. For example, public percep

tions are more severe when an accidental spill of toxic chemicals into a

river is called an environmental disaster rather than an incident. Framing

also judges events: Does the collapse of scaffolding at a construction site

indicate criminal negligence by a construction company? Is a payment to

a foreign political figure a sign that a company is corrupt?

How words influence choices is illustrated in an experiment in which

audiences were asked about the desirability of military intervention by

the United States in defending a hypothetical foreign country from in-

vasion by one of its neighbors. The first scenario reminded readers of the

Vietnam War by mentioning “chinook helicopters” and briefings taking

place in “Dean Rusk Hall.” A second scenario, which indirectly cued

memories of World War II, used phrases such as “blitzkrieg invasion”

and briefings in “Winston Churchill Hall.” The second scenario resulted

in greater support for intervention than did the first. As the example

suggests, the words used invoke different inferences and arouse

“well-established knowledge structures.”

Arbiter Function of the Media

Louis Banks, a respected journalist whose editorial career with Time,

Inc., spanned nearly 30 years, summarized this expanded role of the

media. He said the media are not only conveyers of news, but arbiters of

its content as well: “The news industry—television, radio, magazines,

newspaper—stands as the principal arbiter of social attitudes toward

business (and all institutions).” His view was, “Broadly speaking, mass

media news selection and interpretation feeds the public’s suspicions

about corporate practice … and interprets corporate affairs with a nega

tive bias.”

Because of the power of the media, Banks advises that a business’s ba

sic media relations strategy must be to compete in the marketplace of

ideas. Warning against merely being reactive to media inquiries, he

urges business to systematically, factually, and carefully engage in in

tellectual debates such as those that were previously lost by default. His

thesis is that “not only is an ‘issues’ campaign the soundest long-range

MEDIA STRATEGIES I 93

strategy for business-media relationships, but also that the effort in

volved is intricately connected with the future of the freedom of large

corporations to operate as centers of independent managerial decision

making.”

Banks reminds businesspeople that although the news industry

stands as the principal arbiter of social attitudes toward business, “to

day the thoughtful elements of the media are willing to listen to corpo

rate arguments on specific issues—if they are rational, and shown to be

in the public interest.”

He says what a corporation or an industry can

offer the media is its technical know-how, its experience or point of view

on a particular issue. Business, in other words, possesses valuable

information that the media need.

Despite this advantage, business executives have been hesitant to fol

low Banks’s advice to engage in the marketplace of ideas, because of fear

of media hostility. Having seen what damage the media can inflict on

companies such as Exxon and Dow Corning, some companies simply

prefer to avoid talking to journalists.

BUSINESS DEVELOPS A MULTIPRONGED STRATEGY

When businesses recognized the shortcomings of the news media and

growing public hostility toward them, they and other organizations de-

veloped a multipronged strategy to guide their media relations. They

have also, as discussed in chapter 8, become defensive and feel that the

best strategy is to operate “under-the-radar of media attention” and go

directly to their audiences.

Figure III.1 depicts the major public communication strategies that

businesses use. The horizontal boxes show the central role of the news

media as the intermediary between an organization and the general

public. The news media are the main channels through which informa

tion and views are disseminated.

The circles in the diagram indicate the three major ways an organiza

tion deals with the news media: (a) proactive media relations, (b) broad

cast appearances, and (c) advocacy advertising. It should be noted that

the arrows stemming from the circles have different penetration dis

tances. These reflect the degree of control the organization can exercise

over the media. The proactive media relations circle merely touches the

news media box, and the broken line below the box indicates that the

message may or may not reach the general public; if it does, it may ap

pear in a distorted form. In this type of situation the media are classified

as uncontrolled. Chapter 4 examines proactive media relations as a

means of seizing the initiative and exerting countervailing pressure on

the media.

The arrow from the broadcast appearances circle penetrates halfway

through the news media box, indicating semicontrol over the media.

Chapter 5 examines this special opportunity. When spokespersons rep

94 I PART III

resenting an organization appear on a television talk show, for example,

they have no control over the questions that will be asked, but they do

have control over their answers. Media training helps spokespersons de-

velop skills that enable them to exercise considerable control; thus, the

arrow may have even greater penetration than the halfway point

shown in the diagram.

When a company wants complete control over a message dissemi-

nated through the news media, it can buy advertising space or time.

When ideas rather than products are featured, such advertising is called

either advocacy advertising or issues advertising. As discussed in chap

ter 6, a corporation determines exactly how the message will appear in a

print medium: It chooses all the words, their size, their position in the

ad, the date the ad will appear, and sometimes, as with op-ed ads, the

place in a newspaper or magazine where it will appear. An advocacy ad,

therefore, is a controlled medium.

Besides deciding on these three options in dealing with the news me

dia, business can decide on two more extreme strategies: (a) to hold the

media accountable and, if necessary, to sue, and (b) to bypass the news

media entirely. The broken line on the left of Fig. III.1 shows an aggres

sive strategy that business employs to put pressure on the news media.

As discussed in chapter 7, it seeks to hold the media accountable for the

stories they disseminate by reminding them of their reciprocal obliga

tion to their First Amendment rights. Media accountability is achieved

primarily through such means as media analysis centers and news

councils and, if these ways are ineffective, by suing them for libel or

MEDIA STRATEGIES I 95

FIG. III.1. Public communication strategies.

fraud. The intended message to the media is “You’re being watched, be

careful about what you say.”

As depicted by the broken line on the right of the figure, a corporation

may decide to bypass the news media and communicate directly with

relevant segments of the general public. Several traditional means of by

passing the media are available, such as direct mail and the use of pri

vate media in various constituency communications to employees,

shareholders, customers, and other groups. The new medium of the

Internet increasingly provides another vehicle to reach audiences. In

2001 more than 475 million people worldwide had Internet access at

home. In the United States, 55% of American households (174 million)

had an Internet connection, of which about 60% were “active” users

each month. Internet users spent an average of 17 hours a month online

in December 2001.

ENDNOTES

1. “Strong Opposition to Media Cross-Ownership Emerges,” The State of the

News Media 2004, Pew Research Center for People & the Press, http://people-

press.org/reports/display.

2. Robert Frank et al., “Scandal Scoreboard,” Wall Street Journal, October 3,

2003, p. B1.

3. Lewis M. Simons, “Follow the Money,” American Journalism Review, Vol. 21,

November 1999, p. 55.

4. David Lieberman, “TV’s New Look: All Business, All the Time,” USA Today,

January 14, 2000, pp. 1A, 2A.

5. Elfriede Fursich, “Nation, Capitalism, Myth: Covering News of Economic

Globalization,” Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, Vol. 70, Sum-

mer 2002, p. 356.

6. “Business Coverage Impacted by Reports of Corporate Scandal,” Public Rela-

tions Tactics, January 2003, p. 7.

7. Stephan Lesher, Media Unbound: The Impact of Television Journalism on the Pub

lic (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), p. 4.

8. Ibid., p. 6.

9. “PRSA Cmte Chair Asks, `Is Public Relations ‘Media Soft,’” pr reporter, Vol. 37,

May 16, 1994, p. 3.

10. Ibid.

11. From June 11, 2004 news release of pr newswire. See http://www.prnewswire.com.

12. For more information, see Otto Lerbinger, The Crisis Manager: Facing Risk

and Responsibility (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997), pp.

153–154.

13. Ibid.

14. Charlotte Ryan, Prime Time Activism: Media Strategies for Grassroots Organiz

ing (Boston, Mass.: South End Press, 1991), p. 29.

15. Ibid. The local union bought ads in four consecutive issues of the Sunday

Boston Globe Magazine, each centering on a single employee, who described

his or her job and economic plight; took out an ad on WBZ radio; organized

several union members to call local radio talk shows; and obtained televi

sion coverage through a “chance encounter with a TV reporter.” It also held

a union rally that filled Boston’s historic Arlington Street Church to over

96 I PART III

flowing (which made for good TV coverage). Local leaders and national fig

ures such as Cesar Chavez led the crowd in songs, one of which was

expressly written for the union by a local musician, reiterating social justice

themes: “We’re Boston’s hotel workers and we’re fighting for our rights. We

want justice, we want dignity, and we want respect” (p. 39).

Ryan alerts the reader to the typical biases of the news media once the ob

stacle of being considered unnewsworthy is overcome. One is their tendency

to lump all labor issues together as “unrest,” blaming unions for disrupting

orderly life (a value strongly held by the media). Typically the main union

activities that get coverage are picket lines, sit-ins, and large events with

good visuals. The theme of social injustice tends to be ignored (p. 44).

16. Donald L. Shaw and Maxwell E. McCombs, “The Agenda-Setting Function of

Mass Media,” Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 36, Summer 1972, pp. 176–187.

17. Joseph N. Cappella and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Spiral of Cynicism: The Press

and the Public Good (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 38,

45–46.

18. Fursich, op. cit., p. 367.

19. Ibid., p. 52.

20. Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Dirty Politics: Deception, Distraction, and Democracy

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).

21. Ibid., pp. 163–164.

22. Ibid., p. 166.

23. Ibid., pp. 42–43.

24. Louis Banks, “Taking on the Hostile Media,” Harvard Business Review, Vol.

56, March-April 1978, pp. 123–130.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid., p. 129.

27. Brian Moskal, “Why Companies Avoid the Limelight,” Industry Week, Vol.

206, July 21, 1980, p. 56.

28. “Even Media Pros Now Question Validity of Current ‘News’; Another Reason

to Go Under-the-Radar Directly to Publics,” pr reporter, Vol. 37, March 21,

1994, p. 1.

29. Leslie Miller, “Web Growth Slows, But Time Online Rises,” USA Today, March

28, 2002, p. 3D.

MEDIA STRATEGIES I 97

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Chapter 4

Proactive Media Relations

When a company engages in proactive media relations, it not only re-

sponds to media inquiries but also seizes the initiative to convey its mes-

sages to the public. The goal of proactive media relations is to gain

maximum control over the media so that organizational objectives,

such as promoting its public issues agenda, can be achieved. Proactive

media relations requires a company to take an aggressive, high-profile

approach in dealing with the media. However, such a strategy often

conflicts with a corporation’s deeply held preference to maintain a low

profile with the media and with the public: It does not hold news confer-

ences or send out news releases; instead it limits its activity to warily re-

sponding to telephone calls by journalists.

Disney follows this low-profile approach, says Steve Crescenzo, a

writer who tried to get the company to respond to criticism about vari-

ous controversies, such as boycotts by different religious groups, ani-

mated movies that offend some groups, and the proposed theme park 4

miles from the Manassas National Battlefield and near Bull Run. Disney

“communication personnel” wouldn’t answer any questions; nor

would several Disney beat reporters at major California outlets who

were afraid they would jeopardize their access to the company. Said one

anonymous agency person, “They feel that because they’re so big, and

nobody else does what they do, that they can ignore all the bad press and

just keep churning out this positive image of the company.” When one

of the two people in charge of corporate public relations did return a call

to Crescenzo, he was bluntly told that answering his questions—he had

submitted a list of them—“isn’t something we do.… We just don’t talk

about what we do. Sorry.” “Click” went the phone.

Disney was using a

high-profile approach for its entertainment news but a low one on other

company matters.

The usual rule is that a low-profile approach works if there is little

public interest in a company. This is ordinarily not an option for a large

or visible organization, especially a consumer goods company, because

both the media and the public want to know what is going on. In either

case, however, a low profile is a deficit when a crisis occurs because there

is little or no good will with the media or public to fall back on. Opportu

nities to win favorable mention and to build a positive corporate image

are forfeited. Disney had to retreat from its plan to build a theme park

near Civil War battlefields in Virginia because its soft-and-fuzzy image

was portrayed as mean, arrogant, and insensitive.

CEO Michael Eisner

found himself “besieged on all sides: from the courts, from former direc

tors (including Walt’s nephew, Roy Disney) and even from supposedly

sleepy shareholders,” said The Economist.

Robert L. Dilenschneider, a

veteran public relations consultant, states, “A good image—one that’s

well made and well cared for—can survive everything, including the

test of time. Scandal. Change. Bad earnings.”

The greater loss incurred by a low profile is the lost opportunity to

advance company views on public issues. Most companies affected by

government action have therefore rejected the low-profile strategy in

favor of proactive media relations. They use several approaches: (a) in-

tervene in the news creation process, (b) take a tough media stance, (c)

make their corporate news “irresistible,” and (d) take advantage of the

enlarged media menu.

INTERVENE IN THE NEWS CREATION PROCESS

To be proactive means to take action before something happens. Media

relations professionals must intervene in the news creation process.

They can do this in four ways: “jump start” the news, engage in pre-

emptive communication, “correct” the news—take out the impurities

(inaccuracies) and add desirable ingredients (positive statements)—and

influence reporting (e.g., by hiring media people with connections).

“Jump Start” News

The White House does not wait for news to happen. It knows that as a

major newsmaker it can serve as the gatekeeper for major news from all

federal departments and agencies. In a well-established procedure, all

agencies submit important news stories to the White House daily, so

that the president’s communications staff can select the “story line of

the day.”

As Michael Deaver, President Reagan’s chief of staff, ex

plained, the president “must figure out a strategy and game plan” to

maintain the upper hand with the media.

Attempting to emulate the success of the White House, public rela

tions professionals in other organizations try to “make news happen.”

In “Is the Press Any Match for Powerhouse PR?” Alicia Mundy, a contrib

uting editor to Washingtonian Magazine, discusses the “new aggressive

ness” in media relations, saying public relations firms have learned new

100 I CHAPTER 4

tricks in “media manipulation.”

A key technique is to jump start news

by arranging to have outside third parties—an expert or other credible

source—speak up on an issue of concern to one’s organization, in the

expectation that the news media will report on his or her comments.

Care must be taken, however, not to violate ethical norms.

A much publicized incident occurred after Iraq seized Kuwait and the

United States was deciding whether to intervene. Television networks

showed a 15-year-old girl telling the American people she saw Iraqi sol

diers pull tubes from babies’ incubators, leaving them to die. What was

not said, however, were three facts: The public relations firm of Hill &

Knowlton arranged this interview, the girl was the daughter of the Ku

waiti ambassador to the United States, and she did not actually witness

the act. News was indeed generated, but in this case manipulation of the

press backfired when the identity of the girl and the truth of the situa

tion were exposed.

In an attempt to gain news coverage by keeping self-interested

sources of information secret, a related practice is to use credible persons

to author articles that are actually ghostwritten by someone else. To

suit client interests, some public relations firms have purportedly paid

prominent doctors to sign their names to ghostwritten scholarly re-

views about new drugs for publication in medical journals. In an ex-

treme case, a journal editor, who attempted to speak with the so-called

senior author of an article, discovered the person had no idea of what

had been written.

(See Box 4.1 for the argument that funding source

should be disclosed.)

PROACTIVE MEDIA RELATIONS I 101

Box 4.1 Disclosure of Funding Sources

Dr. Troyen A. Brennan of the Harvard School of Public Health urges

researchers who write articles to disclose the source of funds. He

argues that monetary motivation skews the integrity of the scientific

process, even if the views expressed are truly the author’s. He told the

New England Journal of Medicine that he was offered $2,500 by a

prominent public relations firm to write an editorial on liability issues

that might arise from prescribing drugs with sedative side effects,

such as antihistamines.

As medical journals extend their coverage to social and political is

sues, public affairs professionals may join marketers in exploiting the

use of these journals. For example, in spring 1990 the Journal of the

American Medical Association published a special issue on the unin

sured and underinsured in health coverage. Its editor, Dr. George

Lundberg, frankly stated that he wanted to have an impact on politi

cians and hoped “to create an aura of inevitability that this problem

will be solved.” In the same issue the influential former editor of the

New England Journal of Medicine, Dr. Arnold Relman, attacked for-

profit health care.