Langbein Hermann. People in Auschwitz
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from Wörl and that I have no right to put Wörl at risk. Wirths assures me
that nothing will happen to Wörl or to me.
I concluded my account of this momentous conversation with these words:
‘‘When I am already at the door, Wirths says in a soft voice: ‘I ought to be
grateful to both of you.’ ss men are out in the corridor, and I can’t let them
see that I am overjoyed. I pass them with a serious, diligent mien and go to
my little office. On the next day there are no injections, nor are there any the
following day. Otherwise nothing has changed. No indication, no word.’’
The results are described in letters from the Polish resistance organiza-
tion. In November the number of injections was given as thirty to sixty, but
a letter smuggled out to Cracow in late April 1943 says: ‘‘About ten injec-
tions a day.’’ In the first half of May the following information was sent out
of the camp: ‘‘General relaxation. The patients stay in the infirmary until they
are completely cured and their strength has returned.’’ At the same time cal-
cium gluconicum is requested because patients with active tuberculosis could
also be treated: ‘‘We already have 100 sufferers from this disease.’’ At a later
date Dr. Entress was transferred to Monowitz, and Klehr also left the main
camp.
The clerk of Block 20, Stanislaw Glowa, who knew the number of those
killed by injections of phenol, testified that, between the spring of 1942 and
late 1943, 30,000 people in his block were killed in this way. Stanislaw Klod-
zinski estimates the number of these at 25,000 to 30,000 and adds that 90 to
95 percent of them were Jews. An unnamed Polish major whose memoir ap-
peared in the United States in November 1944 writes that an ‘‘Aryan’’ had to
be gravely ill to be injected, whereas 80 to 90 percent of the Jews who were
sent to the infirmary were murdered in this fashion.
In exceptional cases Germans were among those injected, and it was this
fact that made the discontinuance of this method of killing possible. How-
ever, even later some inmates were killed by having phenol injected into their
hearts. Hans Sauer, the last block elder of Block 20, gave the following tes-
timony under oath: ‘‘In a case known to me, Germans were among those in-
jected; it happened around May or June 1944.They were eight or ten criminals
who had been sent to Auschwitz from Breslau. I assume that this was done
on special orders.’’
Désiré Haffner, the chronicler of the infirmary in the men’s camp at Bir-
kenau, confirms that the improvement of living conditions was not limited
to the main camp. Haffner writes that beatings were forbidden in early April
1943. ‘‘Even if this prohibition is only a theoretical one, the scenes of cruelty
and blood lust that we were accustomed to witnessing are now the exception.’’
Haffner adds that in those days a primitive washing facility was installed, the
34 n Introduction
food was improved, and a change of underwear every two weeks was ordered.
Typhus also waned in the Birkenau men’s camp.
The result of such improvements may be seen in the number of deaths. De-
spite thetyphusepidemic thatbroke out in the newlypopulated Gypsycamp in
May 1943—a letter fromtheresistance movement speaks of up to thirtydeaths
a day—the percentage of dead in relation to all internees was reduced from
15.4 in March 1943 to 10.3 in April and 5.2 in May. This reduction cannot be
attributed only to the more favorable season. We have no comparative figures
for the women’s camp and know only the number of deaths, but these show
the same trend. In March 3,991 women died, in April 1,859, and in May 1,237.
Stanislaw Klodzinski speaks of a ‘‘normalization of infirmary life in a positive
sense’’ in 1943 and 1944.
n To be sure, one should not lose sight of the relative value of ideas such as
‘‘improvement’’ and ‘‘normalization.’’ Selections continued to be made, espe-
cially in the infirmaries of the labor camps. The victims were taken to the gas
chambers either directly or with an intermediate step in the hkb in the main
camp or in Birkenau.
Robert Lévy reports that almost every Saturday patients were transferred
to the hkb in Birkenau from satellite camps, particularly the murderous coal
mines. According to Lévy, ‘‘Many young men were included.’’ Some could be
saved, but most of them were the victims of the next selection. The young
prisoners asked whether death by poison gas was painful. Older ones wrote
farewell letters that never reached theiraddresses, and many begged to inform
the world at a later date of what had happened.
I have given the following description of such a transfer to the hkb of the
main camp:
In front of a block of the hkb there is a Sanka (Sanitätskraftwagen, am-
bulance). ‘‘Medical transport from Golleschau,’’ says the gatekeeper. They
are coming out of the vehicle now; the sight of these walking skeletons is
always frightening. One can tell that the last man out is at death’s door by
his complexion and his pointed waxen nose. He is piteously feeble and can-
not negotiate the three steps leading to the block gate by himself. But when
he reaches the double door, he clings with his two skeletal hands to the
part that is closed. His eyes tell me that he is panic-stricken and does not
want to enter. At first the doorman drags him, but this doesn’t work. He
yells at him in Polish, but the patient does not understand him or doesn’t
want to. I look for his number and insignia: He is a Jew; who knows what
country he is from and what his mother tongue is? Was he an artisan or
a scholar, a merchant or a profiteer, earlier, when he still had a life? Now
The History of the Extermination Camp n 35
he stands there and clings to the wooden door with all the strength of a
creature who refuses to die. The doorman slaps his fingers with a wooden
stick, but the man won’t let go.
Far more drastically than former prisoners, the accused Stefan Baretzki, a
former block leader, described for the Frankfurt court in the harsh, intense
speech of an ethnic German the fate of the prisoners who were transferred
to Birkenau from the satellite camps. ‘‘Let me explain about the Muselmänner
[a term used to denote feeble, apathetic inmates of both genders] from the
satellite camps.There’sjust a transferand a handing-over.Usually the patients
come on Saturday at noon.They always go to section B II d, and those coming
from the satellite camps are sick anyway. On Monday they’re presented to the
physician. The prisoners who are handed over don’t even come to the camp.
As a block leader I’m not allowed to open the gate. Being handed over means
to go to the gas chamber.’’ When he was asked whether the patients had to
disrobe, Baretzki answered:
Yes, they took off their clothes, but not in the camp. If they’re admitted
to the camp, it has already happened. You’ve got to picture it this way: On
Saturday a car or two comes, a man stands by the gate, anotherblock leader
is in the room, and a guard has a slip of paper in his hand. The car stops in
frontof the gate;the driver says, ‘‘This is a transfer’’; I open the gate; thecar
drives in; and now there are two different kinds of people in it. The driver
doesn’t wait; he just dumps his load, and now the two types of prisoners
are all jumbled up. How are you going to tell them apart and get all their
numbers? The old man (the ss camp leader) is going to eat me alive if I sign
transfers into the camp. So I call the camp elder and tell him: ‘‘Danisch,
leave them all standing there!’’ They’re notcominginto the block, for they’d
just louse it up.They’ll get into thewashroom, but onlyat night, and during
the day they’ll stand outside. On Monday morning they’ll be registered for
rations, but they won’t get anything to eat until noon. The people who are
being handed over won’t get any food even then because they’re practically
dead.
That is how Baretzki remembered the routine that continued while condi-
tions in the infirmaries were being normalized.
n The fall of 1943 witnessed the most momentous changes in the personnel
of the camp administration. I learned about events that contributed to these
changes.
As a reaction to the requirement to report an ever increasing number of
prisoners employed in the arms industry, a demand that grew ever more in-
36 n Introduction
sistent after the defeat at Stalingrad, the head physician of all concentration
camps sent a circular to all of thegarrison physicians.In it, heordered them to
decrease the number of deaths in their camps. According to my observations,
such circulars rarely produced changes. Wirths, however, took the order seri-
ously, for it offered him a chance to take a stance against the mass killings of
prisoners, and to do so without incurring the reproach that he was too soft
on the inmates. I knew about the order, observed Wirth’s reaction, and en-
deavored to provide him with documents that would enable him to intervene
effectively.
The conduct of Entress clearly proved that Wirths could not rely solely on
the reports of his camp physicians and medics. To prevent prisoners detailed
to work in the infirmaries from becoming known as his informants and thus
being put at risk, I proposed that every camp physician or sdg give a weekly
report indicating how many deaths were reported in his camp every day. One
benefit of this was that if, for example, an average of ten to fifteen deaths per
day were to be reported for his camp, but that number soared to seventy-five
on a weekday, it was evident that around sixty people had been killed that day.
This would not have been the case with summary reports.
The Political Department maintained a prison in the basement of Isolation
Block 11. From time to time it lined up prisoners against the Black Wall that
had been erected at one end of the locked courtyard between Blocks 10 and
11 and shot them. The official report said, however, that the men murdered in
this way had been transferred to the infirmary and died of some disease there.
I called the ss garrison physician’s attention to the discrepancies that these
bunker selections caused in the daily mortality figures for the main camp and
explained the reason for it. The following conversation is again drawn from
my Bericht.
‘‘That won’t do,’’ said the garrison physician. ‘‘The Political Department
must bear the responsibility for these deaths. Why doesn’t Entress report
this to me?’’
‘‘Herr Doktor, I believe there are many things you aren’t told about.’’
‘‘List for me the days with high figures. But is that really so?’’
‘‘Yes sir.’’
‘‘How do you know?’’
‘‘I know it from inmates who wouldn’t repeat this to you or any other
member of the ss.’’
‘‘But I need some proof.’’
‘‘In Auschwitz it is very hard to find proof that people are being mur-
dered.’’ At that point I thought of something. ‘‘Herr Doktor, you would find
proof in the death records of the main camp. All deaths are entered there
The History of the Extermination Camp n 37
together with a diagnosis and the time of death. In the case of those who
die in Block 11, there are never temperature charts or medical histories. So
all you need to do to get proof is to ask for these.’’
Wirths rings. He always acts so quickly. Ontl, his sergeant, comes in.
‘‘Ontl, I’d like to see the death records of the main camp right away.’’
The stone is rolling, but in what direction? Now there will be a clash with
the Political Department. I overhear a conversation over the field telephone
in which Entress and Klehr are ordered to report to the garrison physician.
I have little appetite this noon.
Tadeusz Paczula, the roll call clerk of the hkb, was ordered to bring all the
death records to the ssinfirmary. As he later remembered, therewere so many
volumes that he had to use a handcart. I continue quoting from my book: ‘‘It
seems that there really was a catastrophe. Yesterday it wasn’t possible to talk
with Wirths, he was very nervous and curt. Today he dictates only a letter to
Lolling, his superior, in which he asks to be transferred from Auschwitz. As
thereason for his request he states that ssSecondLieutenant(Untersturmführer)
Grabner, the head of the Political Department, told the camp commandant
that Wirths’s conduct was unbecoming of an ss officer. This was surely in
connection with the reports from Block 11.’’
n At that time an accident triggered an investigation of corruption. After the
end of the war Dr. Konrad Morgen, the ss judge in charge of the investiga-
tion, gave the following report: ‘‘The police of the Protectorate [of Bohemia
and Moravia] determined that there was illegal trafficking in gold in the Pro-
tectorate, and these acts were traced to Berlin. The Customs Investigation
Department in Berlin-Brandenburg identified persons on duty in Auschwitz
and turned the investigation over to the ss and police court in Berlin. This is
where I learned of it, and I assumed responsibility for the investigation of this
trafficking.’’
When he appeared as a witness at the Auschwitz trial in Frankfurt, Morgen
added:
The investigation of ssmen in the Auschwitz concentration camp was trig-
gered by a package found in the army post office. Because of its striking
weight it was confiscated, and it turned out that it contained three gold
nuggets, one the size of a fist and two smaller ones. It was high-carat den-
tal gold that was sent by a medic on duty in Auschwitz to his wife. I esti-
mated that this amount of gold corresponded to about 100,000 corpses if
one considered that not every person has gold fillings. It was incompre-
hensible that the culprit had been able to stow away such a large amount
of gold without being noticed.
38 n Introduction
That was not the first affair of this kind. Robert Mulka, who was a legal
officer in Auschwitzforatime, rememberedthat an exceptionally valuabledia-
mond ring was found in the possession of an ss sergeant at the dental office
in the Hotel de Kattowitz. The sergeant, who was on leave at the time, was
searched on orders from Mulka, and gold ingots were found in his luggage.
Mulka, who was well acquainted with the general corruption of the guards
because of Canada, drew no particular conclusions from this and simply told
the Frankfurt court, ‘‘I don’t know what his punishment was.’’
Dr. Morgen, however, took the case more seriously and went to Ausch-
witz. There he quickly learned of the mass extermination but saw no way to
expand his investigation in that direction. Dr. Gerhard Wiebeck, his deputy,
laterendeavored to explain to the Frankfurt judges thelimitations of that com-
mission’s authority: ‘‘We had to combat corruption and actions that crossed
the line—for example, unauthorized killings.’’ More closely questioned, the
ss jurist responded: ‘‘An investigation of general killings was not permitted. I
heard that the extermination of the Jews had been verbally ordered by Hitler.’’
That ss judges considered such an order entirely possible and were deterred
from investigating such extensive and evident crimes by no more than a ref-
erence to a verbal order by the Führer is more revealing of the conditions of
that time than lengthy analyses.
The investigation by Morgen and his group showed that Grabner was re-
sponsible for murders that ‘‘crossed the line.’’ The large-scale gassing of Jews
wasreported in Berlin with thenotation sb,standing forSonderbehandlung (spe-
cial treatment), a euphemism for killing. This made Morgen conclude that
the Central Office desired these killings. However, those who were lined up
against the BlackWall and shot were not reported in this camouflaged fashion
but were listed as having died of natural causes. From this Morgen concluded
that it was not certain that the Central Office approved of these killings. Be-
sides, most of the victims of the Political Department were Poles, but Hitler’s
verbal order of the extermination was supposed to refer to Jews. For this rea-
son Morgen looked into the shootings, and in the course of this research he
came into contact with Wirths. In 1946 he testified as follows:
With a gleam in his eyes, the garrison physician pointed to the precipitate
decline of the high numbers since his arrival. (He meant the number of
deaths. On a wall in his office was a large table with graphs depicting the
number of prisoners and the number of deaths. I had provided him with
the documentation for these statistics.) At the same time he mentioned
Grabner, who had suggested that pregnant Polish women be killed. This
the physician had rejected as incompatible with his professional duties.
Grabner had not relented, and therewas a showdown in the commandant’s
The History of the Extermination Camp n 39
office, though neither Rudolf Höß nor Robert Ernst Grawitz, whose title
was Reich physician ss (Reichsarzt-ss), said anything about it. When I hap-
pened to walk up to him, Wirths was facing a terrible conflict and asked
me, ‘‘What shall I do?’’ I told him that what he had done—namely, a down-
right refusal—was absolutely right and that I was going to arrest Grabner
thenextday.
Dr. Gerhard Wiebeck also confirmed that Wirths supported the commis-
sion in its investigation of Grabner: ‘‘The garrison physician was an adversary
of Grabner and kept a daily journal in which he gathered material against him.
When the camp was evacuated, he told me, ‘If you need documents, I can give
you some.’’’
Grabner was dismissed and arrested in October 1943, and this step led
to others. On November 11, Camp Order 50/43 contained an announcement
that ss Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Liebehenschel would replace Commandant
Höß. Dr. Rudolf Mildner, the Gestapo chief of Kattowitz and Grabner’s su-
perior, was also transferred. That man had presided over the dreaded courts-
martial in the bunker block, events that regularly ended with mass execu-
tions. Utilizing the situation, Wirths also managed to obtain the transfer of
Dr. Entress, a confidant of Grabner.
This change in commandants was accompanied by a tripartition of the
camp, which had become the largest complex of all concentration camps.
The main camp was designated as Auschwitz I, the Birkenau camp complex
was called Auschwitz II, and the labor camps that had proliferated at vari-
ous arms factories and were centralized in Monowitz were collectively called
Auschwitz III. Each of these camps was given its own commandant, but they
were not completely independent. Liebehenschel was both the commandant
of Auschwitz I and ss senior garrison commander (Standortältester) of Ausch-
witz and thus the superior of the commandants of Auschwitz II and III. The
Political Department and the medical system remained the same for all three
camps. Prisoners could still be transferred without the formalities normal for
a transfer from one kz to another, and their records remained centralized. At
a later date Auschwitz I and II were recombined.
This radical change certainly cannot be explained by assuming that an un-
suspecting administration first learned of the crimes in Auschwitz from re-
ports of the investigating committees. That this was not the case is demon-
strated by the fact that although Grabner was arrested as a scapegoat, Höß
was promoted to department head in the central administration of all con-
centration camps. This was done even though the ss investigating committee
had uncovered not only his complicity in the mass murders that ‘‘crossed the
line’’ but personal offensesas well. Also, Mildner, Grabner’ssuperior, received
40 n Introduction
a leading position in Denmark. Entress was appointed to the position of ss
garrison physician at Mauthausen and finally promoted to the rank of ss cap-
tain (Hauptsturmführer).Wirths had steadfastly refused to propose him for this
overdue promotion.
These transfers are attributed to information that had leaked out of Ausch-
witz. Stanislaw Dubiel, an inmate who worked as a gardener at Höß’s villa,
testified on August 7, 1946, that he had been able to overhear snatches of a
conversation between Himmler and Höß in the garden. According to him,
Himmler said that Höß would have to leave Auschwitz because the British
radio was reporting too much about the extermination of prisoners in Ausch-
witz. Höß is said to have declared that his activities in the camp constituted
good service to the fatherland.This statement was overheard by Sophie Stipel,
a Jehovah’sWitness who was also employed in Höß’s villa.Wilhelm Boger tes-
tified on July 5, 1945: ‘‘When news about the mass deaths in Auschwitz went
beyond the unsuspecting German people and reached the world in the fall of
1943, changes were suddenly made in the leading positions in the camp and in
the Gestapo at Kattowitz (Dr. Mildner).’’ In the Cracow prison Grabner stated
that Höß could not remain in Auschwitz any longer ‘‘for reasons of foreign
policy.’’
n Liebehenschel started a new epoch in the history of Auschwitz. His first
reforms related to Block 11; after all, the capricious shootings in that block
had provided the impetus for all of the changes. Liebehenschel stopped the
periodic selections with subsequent shootings in the bunker. It is true that
this did not end executions, but these were carried out away from the camp,
in the crematoriums of Birkenau. The new commandant ordered the destruc-
tion of stand-up cells, which offered no means for sitting or lying down and
which were used to punish inmates. He proclaimed a general bunker amnesty
and later had the Black Wall torn down. In addition, he rescinded the order
to shoot any prisoner trying to escape; all sorts of things could be interpreted
as preparations for such an escape, and under the guise of this order it had
been easy to eliminate any prisoner who was out of favor. From now on, es-
capees who had been caught and were in the bunker awaiting their execu-
tions were transferred to another kz. In the Auschwitz trial at Cracow, where
Liebehenschel was among the defendants, the Pole Marian Bialowiejski tes-
tified that Liebehenschel had forbidden the Political Department to lock in-
mates in the bunker without orders from him. He is said even to have barred
members of that department from entering the camp without his express per-
mission.
A conversation that I was once able to have with Commandant Liebehen-
schel was consequential, and therefore I shall reproduce it here. Even the
The History of the Extermination Camp n 41
events that led to it were extraordinary. I was locked up in the bunker at the
time Grabner was relieved of his position. Following an intervention by thess
garrison physician, Grabner’s successor, Hans Schurz, ordered my release. On
the day before that happened, Józef Cyrankiewicz was brought there, having
been accused of preparing his escape. A search of his possessions turned up
a wig, highly incriminating evidence. Via the clerk of the bunker block, Jan
Pilecki, we were in contact with Józek, as Cyrankiewicz was known among us
in theresistance movement.We sent him news of the change of commandants
and the hopes connected with it.
One day Józek wrote us that Stanislaw Dorosiewicz had come to see him
in the bunker and invited him to join him in an escape. That man, the block
elder of Block 15, was as well known as he was feared. Since he was a trusty of
the Political Department and was in charge of many informers, he was called
Spitzelcapo (informer capo). As a consequence of his connections he evidently
had grasped the reasons for Grabner’s dismissal more quickly than anyone
else, and he thought his preferential position would be jeopardized if the ac-
tivities of the Political Department were subjected to closer scrutiny. He could
easily gain access to the strictly isolated bunker. At that time Józek already
knew that Dorosiewicz had betrayed him. Since he was bound to regard his
offer as a provocation, he wrote us that we could use his information as we
saw fit and need have no scruples regarding the informer.What happened next
is in my Bericht:
After a long nocturnal conversation (with Ernst Burger) we reached a deci-
sion. We must run the risk. After all, I have a new lease on life, and it is no
longer mine alone. Józek must be saved!
I say to Wirths at the next opportunity: ‘‘Herr Doktor, I recently told you
about the informers in the Political Department. Today I have a case that
clearly shows the methods with which they are working.’’ After telling him
about Józek and the block elder, I say: ‘‘As long as the informers use such
methods in the camp, there will always be attempts to escape from it. The
informers are the ones who cause unrest in the camp.’’
Wirths listens with interest. It seems that he is gathering evidence
against the Political Department. ‘‘Put that in writing. A simple note will
do. I believe ss Lieutenant Colonel Liebehenschel will be interested.’’ Then
he goes on dictating letters.
He drives off but returns shortly and rings. ‘‘I’ve seen the commandant,
and he was satisfied with your report. He opposes working with informers
in the camp and would like to know what you would advise us to do with
the informer in question.’’
This is better than I expected. ‘‘He can’t do anything yet. If he has the in-
42 n Introduction
former interrogated, he will of course deny everything, and it goes without
saying that the Political Department will back him up. There is no proof of
the conversation. Now we have to wait and observe the informer. The only
important thing is that nothing is done to the Pole in the meantime.’’
‘‘No, the commandant took down his number.’’
Today I find it hard to sit quietly in front of my typewriter and bang out
long, boring lists. I’d really like to tell everything to Zbyszek (a Pole in our
detail) and the others, but I’m not saying anything. I write the lists and
think of Józek.
The next day thewhole camp talks of nothing else.This is what our mes-
senger tells me: ‘‘The Blockowi (a Polish form of Blockältester that was in
general use) of 15 has escaped. With the Jew from Canada—you know, the
informer. The two took with them an ss sergeant from the Political De-
partment whom they know well. They told him they knew a spot near the
camp where gold is buried. He guided them through the chain of guards,
then they killed him on the other bank of the Sola River and were gone.’’
The ss is on alert and searches the entire area. Wirths is also excited:
‘‘Haveyou heard?’’ I just nod. ‘‘Isn’tthat theinformer you told me about yes-
terday in connection with the Pole? The one I told the commandant about?’’
‘‘Yes sir.’’ ‘‘So that’s all correct.’’ ‘‘Yes.’’
The Kalendarium issued by the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum says that
Dorosiewicz escaped with Hersz Kurcwajg on December 21, 1943, and that the
resistance movement issued an urgent warning because it feared that Dorosie-
wicz would continue his informing activities on the outside and reveal con-
tacts with the camp. Dorosiewicz, who murdered Kurcwajg, was not appre-
hended. I shall continue quoting from my book:
In the afternoon ss Sergeant Richter comes to ouroffice in a state of excite-
ment. ‘‘Langbein,grabyour notepad andcomewithme.The garrison physi-
cian is in the commandant’s office and phoned to say that he wants you.’’
This is it.The ssofficer on duty in the office takes me right to the comman-
dant’s office. Padded double doors. ‘‘Inmate No. 60-3-55 at your service.’’
Dark furniture,includinga big desk.Behindit Commandant Liebehenschel
and facing him, with his back to me, the garrison physician. My heart is
pounding, and my nerves are no longer that strong. ‘‘So there you are. Yes-
terday’s report from you was very valuable to me.’’ A brief pause. Then
Wirths says: ‘‘Langbein, tell the commandant what you told me about the
informers in the camp.’’ ‘‘Yes, go ahead.’’ ‘‘Lieutenant Colonel, I have a re-
quest to make.’’ ‘‘What is it?’’ ‘‘May I speak as if I weren’t an inmate?’’ An-
other brief pause. ‘‘Yes, please talk quite frankly.’’ ‘‘Then I beg you not to
The History of the Extermination Camp n 43