history of moral advance and political elevation through an ever-
extending penumbra of intelligence and liberty.
26
Of course, in figuring out how to historicize the progress narrative,
Macaulay understood that the old classical historiographical traditions
could still be of use. At his father’s knee, he had learned that Britain
possessed an Empire. But he had also learned that it was a new kind of
moral, post-classical (and hopefully indestructible) Empire, grounded in
the logic of progress and freedom.
27
While these reflec tions were never set
down in sy stematic fashion, they surface again and again at various points
in the younger Macaulay’s writings. They are admirably encapsulated in
an engraving by Gustave Doré, “The New Zealander,” which was inspired
by a passing comment in one of the historian’s review essays. The image of
the New Zealander was a passing fancy, but it was the kind of fancy in which
Macaulay was wont to indulge at critical moments in his life.
28
Having long
reflected on the transience of the ancient empires, his mind must have
proceeded through a sequence of recurrent images, a succession of imperial
cycles with their attendant epic historians – men whose literary monuments
alone can endure the ravages of time and decay: the Greek Polybius, with
the Roman victors, musing over the ruins of Carthage, and imagining that
Rome might someday suffer the same fate; then Gibbon musing over the
ruins of Rome, and wondering about their implications for the British
Empire of his own day; and finally, the New Zealander of the distant future,
musing over the decadence and grandeur that had been Britain, perhaps
inspired by Macaulay’s now-venerable text.
29
Macaulay’s hope, to put it in a nutshell, was to show how and why the
Empire of Britain might escape the fate of its predecessors. Where Roman
expansion had been limited by geography and technology, British expan-
sion was grounded in the premise of constant improvement, subject to no
necessary geographical limit. Unlike Rome, which ultimately collapsed
under the weight of its social and economic contradictions, Britain might
26
Ann Douglas, The Feminization of American Culture (New York, 1988), especially 165–99.
27
For example, see TBM to K. Macaulay, April 4, 1807; to C. Hudson, August 30, 1815;
and to Z. Macaulay, February 2, 1813, May 8, 1813, May 14, 1816, November 16, 1816,
February 5, 1819, and September 1819, in PLM, I: 5, 17–18, 30–1, 66–7, 77–9, 84–5,
118–21, 132–4.
28
Macaulay notes his frequent indulgence in such fantasies in his journal entry for
November 22, 1838, quoted in TLL, I: 458.
29
See The Histories of Polybius, trans. Evelyn S. Shuckburgh, 2 vols. (Bloomington, 1962), II:
528–30, for Polybius’s eyewitness account of the burning of Carthage, in which he reports
the Roman general Scipio’s fears that Rome might eventually be sacked in a comparable
manner. For Gibbon in Rome see Edward Gibbon, Autobiography (New York, 1961), 154,
and, of course, Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 3 vols. (New York,
n.d.).
112 Imagining a Greater Britain