Koditschek Theodore. Liberalism, Imperialism, and the Historical Imagination: Nineteenth-Century Visions of a Greater Britain
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from which he sought this assistance was not Britain, but France. For
a time, the British thought they could work with the Holkar family as a
Maratha counterweight to Sindia, but its unreliability forced the EIC’s
hand. Like Scott’s barba rian Highlanders and his own barbarian
Sikhs, Malcolm’s Maratha princes possess many fine heroic qualities
of devotion and loyalty. They are, however, too uncivilized and erratic to
absorb the complex ideas and institutions of progress on their own.
Condemned to an endemic state of lawlessness, they are in need of the
firm paternal guidance of the already progressive British, who can force
them into the order that they cannot achieve on their own. As with
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Scotland, so with early nineteenth-
century India, British expansion and integration is offered as an oppor-
tunity for barbarians who are capable of something better, but cannot
quite achieve modern civilization by themselves. In this formula, British
conquest brings order to the colonial hinterland and then enlists the
conquered barbarians as fresh cannon fodder and fierce shock-t roops,
to be sent out for an even greater British conquest of more distant
barbarians somewhere else.
36
So far, Malcolm’s British Indian romance was quite similar to that of
Tod. There was however one important difference. For where Tod
hoped to see the Rajputs remain independent, tied into a consensual
union with Britain, Malcolm was enough of a realist to understand that
such expectations were naive. Britain had no choice but to break up the
Maratha state, decisively trouncing the warlords – sending some into
exile while turning others into vassals of client principalities. But was
it possible for a once-proud prince like Sindia to accept dependence
on the British government without losing the aristocratic pride on which
he formerly stood? All too often, in practice, Malcolm acknowledged,
the princely “puppet” regimes that British suzerainty permitted were
sad shells of their former selves, presided over by demoralized
ex-potentates and sunk in indolence, ostentation, and gross sensuality.
British Residents could try to persuade or pressure, but “when it [inter-
ference] descends to minute checks and interferences in the collection
of the revenue [or] the administration of justice” nominal political
independence becomes “no t mere ly impolitic, but dangerous, as his
[the Prince’s] condition must be felt by himself and all attached to his
person or family as a mockery and degradation.”
37
36
Malcolm, Central India,I:58–580; Malcolm, Sketch of the Sikhs, 131.
37
John Malcolm, The Government of India (London, 1833), 31; Malcolm, Central India,I:
141. See also Kaye, Life and Correspondence of Malcolm, II: 340–1; John Malcolm,
Instructions on Intercourse (London, 1828), 220–1.
John Malcolm and the romance of British India 75
No less than Tod, Malcolm wanted to apply the Waverley romance to
India, but unlike Tod, he understood that British India was fundamen-
tally different from Anglo-Scotland, where the cause of Union could
draw on a common language, culture, economy, and geography.
The cause which has compelled, and will continue beyond all others to compel us
to increase our dominion lies deep in the character of our power. We have,
whenever our authority is in question, no retreat. Our situation is unlike that of a
national government which is associated in language, prejudices, habits, and
religion with the people it governs. This want of a natural root in the soil forces
us to adopt a course of action, which a state differently circumstanced might
avoid. The necessity of not injuring the impression upon which the very founda-
tion of our authority rests, obliges Government to carry through, at all hazards,
every dispute and contest with the inhabitants of our provinces, or those of any
State which we protect.
38
To make India British would be a vast, revolutionary undertaking of
wholesale societal transformation that would necessarily meet with much
internal resistance since it would entail overturning many of the most
venerable traditions that the Indians held most dear. The cultural and
political recognition that Scott had demanded as the price for Anglo-
Scottish Union might have to be withheld from the indigenous Indians in
this more difficult and distant case. Indians might not merely lose control
of their past to scholar-imperialists like Malcolm. They would also lose
control of their future to a new breed of British official, who favored much
more direct colonial expansion and penetration on pragmatic, utilitarian
grounds. Since India had porous eastern and western borders this new
logic of control would likely require an indefinite course of further annex-
ation. As British incursions destabilized frontier social relations and pre-
cipitated tribal warfare or resistance, this would then provide a further
pretext for British power to intervene. Like Tod, Malcolm preferred to
govern India indirectly through its traditional maharajahs and nobles, but
he understood that this might prove to be impossible.
If forced by circumstances to depart from this course, better assume the direct
sovereignty of the country at once than leave to the mock and degraded instru-
ments of our power any means of avenging themselves upon a State which renders
them the debased tools of its Government ... Territory is coming too fast upon
us. We cannot prevent accessions, and the period may arrive when the whole
peninsula will be under our immediate rule; but every consideration requires this
period to be delayed, and every effort should be made to regulate a march in
which we must proceed.
39
38
Malcolm, Central India, II: 267–8.
39
Quoted in Kaye, Life and Correspondence of Malcolm, II: 373–4.
76 Imagining a British India
But the British Indian juggernaut had already left the Calcutta Station,
and there was no way of knowing whe re and when it might stop. When
Malcolm finally got his Governorship of Bombay in 1827, the India of
his imagination was scarcely to be seen. The old borderer was not happy
cooped up in the pinnacle of high office. The man who believed in
government by patronage, victor’s largesse, and noblesse oblige was forced
to preside over a period of fiscal retrenchment, taking his marching
orders from a cadre of EIC accountants who were determined that the
runaway costs of government be reduced. The man who believed in
decentralized local, ari stocratic government was forced to preside over
the construction of a centralized authoritarian state. Unhappy with the
way things were going in India, Mal colm retired early from Bombay.
The Britain to which he returned in 1830 was a strange country, and it
had paid scant attention to the message of his books. Uninterested in the
distant problems of India, it was obsessed with its own internal drama of
industrial change. Malcolm’s love of aristocracies, his worship of
Wellington, and his deepening mood of misanthropic nostalgia all
combined to turn him into a hidebound Tory – even as he continued
to exhibit the manners of cultural liberality.
40
4 Mountstuart Elphinstone and the project of Indian
modernization
More adept at negotiating the currents of the post-1820 period was
Malcom’s friend and fellow Scotsman Mountstuart Elphinstone. The
two had met during the Second Maratha War of 1803, when
Elphinstone was a young attaché, fresh from Fort William College,
assigned to General Wellesley’s staff. Brilliant, well educated, and
from aristocratic stock, Elphinstone had many of the advantages that
Malcolm lacked. As the years passed, their friendship deepened, yet
tensions also began to accumulate underneath. Malcolm’s penchant for
Indian princes, his worship of the Wellesleys, and his romantic
Scottophilia all struck Elphinstone as over the top. Elphinstone was by
no means immune to the romance of India, but his critical intellect
and depressive personality made him skeptical of simple solutions in
40
Malcolm, Government of India; “I will not compress the concerns of an empire into a
ledger, or calculate its destinies like an account current,” avowed Malcolm in a Speech on
East India Company Charter (London, 1833), 5. But the bottom line was that this was what
his EIC employers expected him to do. See also Kaye, Life and Correspondence of Malcolm,
II: 495–621; McLaren, British India and British Scotland, 114–15.
Mountstuart Elphinstone and Indian modernization 77
which the welfare of India and the interests of Britain could supposedly be
magically reconciled.
41
Appointed as envoy to Afghanistan in 1808, he published a report
in which he noted the “strong resemblance [of that country] to Scotland
in ancient times.” The primitive freedom and rough independence of
the Afghans appealed to Elphinstone, and he forgave their habitual
turbulence, dissimulation, and occasional cruelty. Although “there is
scarcely a tribe ... that is not in a state of actual war or suspended
hostility,” the violent episodes were usually intermittent, and might be
settled by customary ritu als of propitiation by calling an inter-tribal
Jurga (assembly) or by appeal to the higher authority of a Khan or a
King. On the other hand, the Afghans’ politeness, hospitality, religious
observances, and treatment of women all struck Elphinstone as exem-
plary. The main danger to Afghanistan lay in meddlesome foreigners
(perhaps including himself) who were liable to upset the delicate balance
of internal affairs.
42
By contrast, Elphinstone’s perspective on India was quite different, for
here Scottish social evolutionary theory suggested a different approach.
Unlike Afghanistan, India was a sede ntary, agricultural society in which
the land had accumulated the improvements of many generations, and
had spawned significant pools of commercial wealth. Here tribal unrest
and endemic warlordism were not a viable way of life but a social
catastrophe, which left whole swathes of villages pillaged, deserted, and
burned. Given that the Asian alternative to chaos was oriental despot-
ism, British intervention was morally justified to save Indians from
themselves. In 1809, Elphinstone was appointed as Resident to the
Maratha court at Pune, and he watched as it self-destructively imploded.
Even more than Malcolm, Elphinstone was fascinated with the
Marathas, and began to contemplate studying them with a full-dress
history.
It would comprise the dissolution of the Mogul Empire, with the causes and
formation of the present order of things ... The struggles of Sivajee and his
successors, the splendid conquests and tremendous reverses of the first Peshwas,
the re-establishment of their power by their adoption of the European art of
war, the crimes and distractions of the succeeding period, and the final close of
41
T. E. Colebrooke, The Life of Mou ntst uart Elphinstone,2vols.(London,1884),I:
1–229, 315; R. D. Choksey, Mountstuart Elphinstone: The Indian Years (Bombay,
1971), 1–60.
42
Mountstuart Elphinstone, Account of the Kingdom of Cabul [1815] (Oxford, 1972), 196–
401, quotes on 217–18 and 230; Choksey, Elphinstone,61–106.
78 Imagining a British India
the Maratha turbulence and Maratha greatness in the Treaty of Bassein [1802]
would afford no bad material for a judicious historian.
43
In the event, the treachery of the last Peshwa in 1817 obliged
Elphinstone to defer his studies and to abandon the writing for the making
of history. Once again, he was thrown together with Mal colm in a crisis
that tested their resources of intelligence and tenacity. In the eyes of their
superiors, Elphinstone’s quick thinking, even more than Malcolm ’s
generalship, saved the day. By anticipating Baji Rao’s duplicity, he
had prevented a massacre and facilitated the strategy by which the
Peshwa was bloodlessly deposed. Deeply chagrined at this eclipse of his
glory, Malcolm had to watch as his junior colleague was assigned the task
of reorganizing the former Peshwa’s territories and bringing them into
the framework of British rule.
44
Faced with this daunting and formidable challenge, Elphinstone aban-
doned all thoughts of his Maratha History. Th e Marathas were now
gone, and the British directly or indirectly controlled most of the sub-
continent. Under thes e circumstances, where Britain was responsible
for India’s future, it was no longer so easy to see the relevance of
Indian history. The notion that the Briti sh could simply replace the
Mughals or Marathas was now dismissed as completely erroneous.
The British were not just another conqu eror. Only by bringing India
the benefits of social and economic progress could they justify their
distant and improbable hegemony. At the same time, the road to
socio-economic modernization was fraught with dangers, most of
which were as yet unknown. Initially, Elphinstone hoped to preserve
traditional Indian customs, institutions, and elites. Yet this was for him a
pragmatic rather than an ideological goal. Faced with the daunting
task of administering all 50,000 square miles of the former Maratha
province, he tried a number of different experiments. In the end how-
ever most of the land was incorporated directly into British India. Here
it was ove rseen by a cadre of British collectors who were endowed
with near-dictatorial powers to raise revenue, try cases, and issue admin-
istrative decrees. While this entailed stripping traditional Indian elites
of their former authority, it also involved traini ng new western-educated
native sub-officials to help the British collectors and assistants in
43
Mountstuart Elphinstone, Selections from the Minutes and Other Writings of the Honourable
Mountstuart Elphinstone, ed. George W. Forrest (London, 1884), 224–55, quoted in
Colebrooke, Life of Elphinstone, I: 348–9; Choksey, Elphinstone, 107–51.
44
Colebrooke, Life of Elphinstone, I: 230–340, II: 1–99; Choksey, Elphinstone, 152–212. For
details of the events leading up to Baji Rao II’s deposition, see R. D. Choksey (ed.), The
Last Phase: Selections from the Deccan Commissioner’s Files, Peshwa Daftar, 1815–1818
(Bombay, 1948).
Mountstuart Elphinstone and Indian modernization 79
their bureaucratic work. In a clear departure from the Bengali model,
minor litigation was handed over to native juries called panchayats, and
the land was settled directly on ryotwa ri cultivators so that the former
aristocratic landholders could be circumvented entire ly.
45
When he came to consider how to deal with refractory feudal hold-
overs, disloyal landowners, and discharged soldiers of the former
regime, Elphinstone turned neither to the pages of Sir Walter Scott
nor to his own unwritten Maratha History . Rather, to his own surprise,
he found guidance in the writings of Jeremy Bentham – a thinker whom
he had previously found uncongenial, but whom he now came to respect
and admire. What Elphinstone found attractive in Bentham was his
utilitarian contempt for obstructive forms and conventionalities when
they impeded the path of rational policy implementation. Perhaps in
Britain, with its long-established progressive history and constitutional
traditions, such restraints might be desirable as checks and balances
against the risk of executive autocracy. In India, however, where these
traditions were deemed reactionary – and where power was now being
exercised by benevolent despots like himself – political centralization
and administrative efficiency were more likely to promote the greatest
happiness for the greatest number.
46
These Benthamite tendencies were greatly reinforced after 1819,
when Elphinstone’s conquered districts were annexed to the Bombay
Presidency, and he was appointed Governor (in preference to Malcolm)
over both domains. At this time, the urban population of Bombay was
approximately 200,000, having nearly tripled over the previous sixty
years. Yet Elphinstone and other forward-looking British officials envi-
sioned an even more spectacular future growth based on capitalist enter-
prise. In this vision, the peasants of Gujarat and Maha rashta would
generate vast consignments of cotton, which Bombay m erchants would
sell to Lancashire in return for British manufactured goods. Not long
detained by the disas ter this would wreak on India ’s textile artisans,
Elphinstone did recognize the state’s obligation to create new, market-
savvy colonial subjects through mass education. Here again, he found
himself moving in directions that he had not originally anticipated.
Instead of patronizing the old-style Hindu academies, left over from
the days of Baji Rao, he decided to concentrate on urban secular
45
Mountstuart Elphinstone, Territories Conquered from the Paishwa: A Report (Delhi, 1973),
1–106, 168–74. See also Kenneth Ballhatchet, Social Policy and Social Change in Western
India, 1817–1830 (Oxford, 1957), 1–134, 193–200, 234–47; Choksey, Elphinstone,
213–54.
46
Elphinstone, Territories Conquered from the Paishwa, 146–73; Ballhatchet, Social Policy,
35–42, 77–83, 217–91.
80 Imagining a British India
education for the middle class. In 1818, a Bombay Education Society
was founded, and plans for sever al schools were set afoot. Elphinstone
agreed to provide modest subsidies for thei r operation, and the scheme
met with almost instantaneous success. By the mid-1820s, a chain of
lower and higher schools was in operation, and the only question was
whether the latter should impart western learning in Indian vernaculars,
or the teaching of advanced subjects should be confined to the English
language.
47
For his part, Elphinstone favored the first alternative, since he wished
to educate not merely an haute bourgeois elite, but also a cadre of
competent native teachers who would go out into the countryside and
teach the peasants to read and write. Mass education, Elphinstone
suggested, would remove popular prejudices against the British, by
helping peasants to understand the new system and, where necessary,
to defend their own rights. Through education, the peasant might learn
the advantages of prudence, frugality, delayed marriage, and self-respect.
These virtues, while making Indians more British, woul d not necessarily
be conducive to indefinite British rule. “ When the natives get m ore
extended notions,” he wrote to a friend, “they will expect first a share
of their own Government and then the whole.” Yet “it will be better,” he
concluded, “to lose the country by the effects of our liberality, than to
keep it like Dutchmen or Spaniards.”
48
Elphinstone was of course unusually perceptive in his insight that
the paradoxical result of making India British would be to facilitate her
final independence from imperial rule. Nevertheless, by the 1820s and
1830s, many other British officials were beginning to draw the conclu-
sion that the best way for modern India to move into the future would
be to cast off th e chains of her unfortunate history. “The diffusion of
European knowledge and morals among the people of India” was “essen-
tial to their well being,” argued the new Governor-General, Lord
William Bentinck, in 1833. “The development of the natural resources
of the country depends mainly on the introduction of Europ ean capital
and skill.”
49
Yet the transition from Brahma to Bentham might not be
47
Elphinstone, Selections from the Minutes,77–116; Ballhatchet, Social Policy, 135–262;
Colebrooke, Life of Elphinstone, II: 100–200; Bayly, Indian Society,69–71, 129–31.
48
Ballhatchet, Social Policy, 250–5, 262–319, quote on 250. On the education controversy,
see Bruce Tiebout McCully, English Education and the Origins of Indian Nationalism
(Gloucester, 1966); M. A. Laird, Missionaries and Education in Bengal, 1793–1837
(Oxford, 1972); and Gauri Viswanathan, Masks of Conquest: Literary Study and British
Rule in India (Columbia, 1989); Choksey, Elphinstone, 255–401.
49
Eric Stokes, The English Utilitarians in India (Oxford, 1959); John Rosselli, Lord William
Bentinck: The Making of a Liberal Imperialist, 1774–1839 (Berkeley, 1974), quote on 195.
Mountstuart Elphinstone and Indian modernization 81
quite so seamless as these words implied. As Bentinck himself well
knew, it required one final, dispositive Scottish-Indian History.
5 James Mill and the British assault on Indian history
If books are not to be judged by authorial intent ions but by audience
effects, then James Mill’s massive six-volume History of British India
proved to be an extraordinarily influential work. Read by many leading
politicians and policy-makers after its appearance in 1818, it became
the set text for EIC training-school cadets. Even after 1844, when
H. H. Wilson published a critical edition that noted its many flaws,
the book continued to be the main source from which British readers
got their Indian history. Arriving just when the Marathas were departing,
Mill’s History became, in fact, a tract for the times. Its arrogant indictment
of Indian civilization corresponded all too well with the needs of an
imperial power whose rapidly expanding might and influence had
made it the dominant force in the subcontinent. Mill’s great accomplish-
ment was to puncture the prestige of orientalism. His role was to shatter
the romance of EIC officials such as Malcolm and to dispel the allure
of Indian history. To an increasingly self-confident and arrogant Raj,
Mill offered a welcome ideological justification of unconditional British
cultural and historical superiority. To a British administration that no
longer felt the need to compromise with Indians, or even to placate the
sensitivities of indigenous elites, Mill’s History showed why it was neith er
necessary nor desirable to make such conc essions.
50
Mill’s re-valuation of Indian civiliza tion rests on a deconstruction of
the work of Sir William Jones. Jones’s exaggerated claims about the
sophistication of ancient Hindu learning had been made on the basis
of evidence whose provenance Mill thought questionable, at best. Men
like Jones and Colebrooke had given the Indians too much credit out
of a generous but misplaced sense of noblesse oblige.
51
Did the Hi ndus
vaunt the subtlety of their Sanskrit language? Mill (who did not think it
worth learning) dismissed it as “loose, vague, wavering, obscure and
50
James Mill, The History of British India, 6 vols., notes by H. H. Wilson (New York, 1968).
An abridged one-volume edition is also available, edited and with a good introduction by
William Thomas, hereafter referred to as British India (Chicago, 1975). For a good general
discussion of Mill’s History of British India, see Javed Majeed, Ungoverned Imaginings: James
Mill’s “The History of British India” and Orientalism (Oxford, 1992); Lynn Zastoupil, John
Stuart Mill and India (Stanford, 1994), 7–27; and C. H. Philips, “James Mill, Mountstuart
Elphinstone and the History of India,” in C. H. Philips (ed.), Historians of India, Pakistan
and Ceylon (Oxford, 1961), 217–29.
51
Mill, British India, especially 197–205, 216–38.
82 Imagining a British India
inconsistent.” Did the Hindus exalt the purity and elevation of their
religion? Mill condemned it as a farrago of absurd rituals and insane
self-mortifications, “which subjects to its votaries the grossest images of
sensual pleasure, and ... which ascribes to the supreme God an immense
train of obscene acts.”“Volumes would hardly suffice to depict at large a
ritual which is more tedious, minute, and burthensome; and engrosses a
greater portion of human life, than any which has been found to fetter
and oppress any other portion of the human race.” Was India reputed to
be a land of great riches? This was an illusion, fostered by the superfluous
profusion of unproductive gold and silver, which kept “the great body of
the people” in “a state of poverty and wretchedness.”
52
As a Scottish student of Dugald Stewart, Mill well understood that
both Britons and Indians had entered history as barbarians. Yet while
Britain had moved upward to the heights of civilization, India (notwith-
standing its own passage into agriculture and commerce) had remained
in a state of cultural barbarism. Mill attributed this stagnation to the
enduring dominance that the privileged Brahmans had exercised over
the rest of society. “A whole race of men were set apart and exempted
from the ordinary cares and labours of life.” Establishing their influence
“by artfu l contrivances for deceiving the people, ” these pernicious
priests had devised the malignant caste system to maintain their inequit-
able system of degradation and pro fligacy. The result of this breath-
taking imposition was the maintenance of the majority Hindu
population in a state of gross ignorance and moral degeneracy. Indians,
Mill complained, were habitually lazy and dishonest. Lacking courage
and resolution, they resorted to lawsuits and perjury. Their treatment of
women was disgraceful, the surest proof of barbarity.
53
So closely did Mill’s anathemas resonate with the ethnocentrism of
Victorian imp erialists that later readers may have assumed that he shared
their elitist and anti-democratic views. In fact this was very far from the
case. For Mil l saw himself as a radical anti-imperi alist, a principled
believer in political democracy, and a staunch opponent of aristocratic
privilege in all its forms. So far from being a racist, he was a steadfast
52
Mill, British India, 151, 182, 210, 163, 242–5.
53
Jennifer Pitts, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France
(Princeton, 2005), 123–33; Mill, British India,3–250, quotes on 209. In contrast to
Malcolm, who criticized the patriarchal excesses of Islam, Mill credits the “fierce,
manly” Muslim invaders of the subcontinent with bringing India to the threshold of
historical activity. Only the British, however, could bring full civilization. Mill, British
India, 251–99; Bruce Mazlish, James and John Stuart Mill: Father and Son in the Nineteenth
Century (New York, 1965), 116–45; Majeed, Ungoverned Imaginings, 195–200; Stokes,
Utilitarians in India,53–65, 86–93.
James Mill and the British assault on Indian history 83
believer in human equality who repudiated all notions of biological
inferiority. A vigorous proponent of nurture over nature, he insisted
that human behavior was shaped entirely by environmental forces.
With the benefit of proper educati on and training, he insisted, all people
could achieve the same high level of civilization and morality. Yet this
offer of political equality was made contingent on a refusal of reco gnition
to Hindu culture. Mill’s harsh indictment of Indians was thus intended
to help them – to liberate them from the chains of their repellent
history.
54
If progress in India was to be brought by Britons, it seemed
only logical to make a clean break with indigenous tradition and to
re-write the progress narrative in an anglocentric frame.
In fact, it is a slight oversimplification to describe Mill’s History as
“anglocentric,” for he saw that the deadweight of a dysfunctional past
also operated in Britain, impeding the triumph of reason and progress
at home. Indeed, it has been argued that Mill’s virulent assault on
Hinduism was actually a displacement of his own hatred of the English
aristocracy. By this theory, his attack on Brahman priestcraft was
obliquely targeted at th e Anglican establis hment, and his acidic response
to the oriental character was a cover for his frustration at ignorance and
credulity in the metropolis.
55
In truth, Mill’s projection of cowardice
onto the defenseless Hindu his own coward ice, since he treated the same
corruption with a good deal more deference when he encountered it in
powerful vested interests at home. As a radical who had lived through
the Age of Revolution, he knew the high costs of taking on the British
establishment directly. In writing about India, he cleverly disguised the
extremity of his own progress narrative, diverting it to a target that he
knew was undefended and would not bring him into conflict with the
powerful and the great. Mill may well have rationalized this prudential
approach with the logic of his own felicific calculus: what, after all, was
the modest unhappiness of ten million Britons against the abject misery
of forty-five million benighted Indians, whose best hope for progress was
to adopt the (admittedly still flawed) anglocentric way?
56
54
James Mill, The Article Colony, Reprinted from the Encyclopedia Britannica (London, n.d.);
Mazlish, James and John Stuart Mill, 132–45. Majeed, Ungoverned Imaginings, 123–94,
takes Mill’s radicalism seriously, while Uday Singh Mehta, Liberalism and Empire: A Study
in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought (Chicago, 1999), 87–97, focuses on the
exclusionary, even racist, side of his work. The challenge is to explain how these two
contradictory strands could have co-existed in Mill’s History of British India.
55
Majeed, Ungoverned Imaginings; William Thomas, “Introduction,” in Mill, British India,
xxxiv–xxxviii; Joseph Hamburger, James Mill and the Art of Revolution (New Haven,
1963).
56
Alexander Bain, James Mill: A Biography (London, 1882), 1–158.
84 Imagining a British India