Knollenberg Bernhard. Growth of the American Revolution: 1766-1775
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signed to seize rebel military supplies or to support groups of Tories out-
side Boston in places that could easily be reached by water.
On January , he shipped a detachment of men of the King’s
Own (Fourth) Regiment to Marshfield, Massachusetts, to protect a
group of Tories there. The detachment landed without resistance, and
remained in Marshfield until shortly after the day of Lexington and
Concord, when it was shipped back to Boston.¹⁴
On February , Gage shipped a detachment of men to Marble-
head, Massachusetts, by night to seize some cannon reported to be at
nearby Salem.¹⁵ The report was false or the cannon had been hidden,
and the detachment returned empty-handed.¹⁶ But a detachment sent
secretly by water on April to Fort Pownall, a Massachusetts outpost
on the Penobscot River, proved to be highly successful. It secured, with-
out fighting, cannon, nearly cannon balls, and much other mil-
itary matériel.¹⁷
In March, responding to an appeal for arms and ammunition from
Thomas Gilbert of Freetown, Massachusetts, a Tory colonel of militia,
Gage shipped to Freetown a quantity of both. Gilbert armed a consid-
erable band of Tory followers, but they scattered on the approach of a
much larger rebel force.¹⁸
Gage also took various other steps to strengthen his position if and
when war broke out. He secured assurance from Governor General
Guy Carleton of Quebec that he could count on the aid of a large force
of Canadians and Indians,¹⁹ built up a rather impressive espionage ser-
vice,²⁰ sent out a couple of officers who succeeded in mapping roads for
military operations as far west as Worcester,²¹ and sent out party after
party on marches in the vicinity of Boston,²² thus familiarizing his offi-
cers and men with the neighboring terrain.
As noted in the Introduction it was widely believed in Great Britain
that the colonists were a cowardly people
—a belief probably attribut-
able chiefly to letters from British officers serving in America during
the French and Indian War depicting the colonial troops as, in general,
egregiously lacking not only discipline but courage.²³
The belief in the cowardice of colonial troops, at least those of Mas-
sachusetts, evidently prevailed among Gage’s officers, whose letters home
’
repeatedly expressed contempt for the Massachusetts rebels and an itch
for orders from home to have a go at them.
On July , three weeks after his arrival at Boston, Captain William
Glanville Evelyn, writing his father of the expected arrival of additional
British troops, remarked, “With this force we have no apprehensions
from the very great numbers in this province...,for, though upon pa-
per they are the bravest fellows in the world, yet in reality I believe there
does not exist so great a set of rascals and poltroons.”²⁴
In December he wrote his cousin Mrs. John Leveson-Gower (mar-
ried to a first cousin of the Lord Gower who was a member of the Cab-
inet), “We are all in high spirits at the speedy return of the [warship]
‘Scarbro’ and of this re-inforcement of men-of-war. We hope they are
in earnest of the spirited resolutions of the people at home no longer
to suffer the treason and rebellion of these villains to go unpunished.
Never were any set of men more anxious to be employed on so laudable
a work. We only fear they will avail themselves of the clemency and gen-
erosity of the English, and by some abject submission evade the chas-
tisement due to unexampled villainy, and which we are so impatiently
waiting to inflict.”²⁵
A couple of months later Captain Evelyn had become, if anything,
even more contemptuous and impatient. “The hour is now very nigh,”
he wrote his father on February , “in which this affair will be brought
to a crisis....We have great confidence in the spirit and pride of our
countrymen that they will not tamely suffer such insolence and disobe-
dience from a set of upstart vagabonds, the dregs and scorn of the hu-
man species, and that we shall shortly receive such orders as will au-
thorize us to scourge the rebellion with rods of iron.”²⁶
Colonel Lord Percy, eldest son of the Duke of Northumberland and
a son-in-law of Lord Bute, wrote in similar vein. A letter from him to his
father in July, , scoffing at the “cowards” who “whenever we appear
...are frightened out of their wits,” was quoted in the Introduction.
Several days later he wrote a cousin, Henry Reveley, “The people here
are a set of sly, artful hypocritical rascals, cruel and cowards. I must own
I cannot but despise them completely.”²⁷
Before many months Percy, too, grew impatient for action against
the despised rebels. On November , describing “the People here” as
“the most designing Artfull Villains in the World...[without] the least
Idea of either Religion or Morality,” he wrote to the Reverend Thomas
Percy (editor of the celebrated “Reliques of Ancient English Poetry”)
that they “have now got to such lengths that nothing can secure the
Colonies to the Mother Country, but the conquest of them”; and on
February , , to General Edward Harvey, Adjutant-General of the
army, “We are waiting with impatience the determinations and orders
from your side of the water. Whatever they are I hope they will be
pointed and effectual....”²⁸
Major John Pitcairn, commanding officer of the marines stationed
under Gage in Boston, wrote in similar vein to Lord Sandwich, First
Lord of the Admiralty, on February . “The deluded people,” he said,
“are made believe that they are invincible....When this army is or-
dered to act against them, they will soon be convinced that they are very
insignificant when opposed to regular troops. I have sent your Lord-
ships enclosed with this the newspaper with the recent resolves of the
Provincial Congress....I often wish to have orders to march to Cam-
bridge and seize those impudent rascals that have the assurance to
make such resolves...but we have no orders to do what I wish to do,
and what I think may easily be done, I mean to seize them all and send
them to England.”²⁹
Three weeks later Major Pitcairn wrote Sandwich, “Orders are anx-
iously expected from England to chastise these very bad people. I am
satisfied that one active campaign, a smart action and burning one or
two of their towns will set everything to rights....The people behaved
[in the recent expedition to Salem, mentioned earlier in this chapter]
as I suppose they will ever do, make a great noise when there is nobody
to oppose them, but the moment they see us in arms they will talk very
differently.”³⁰
Gage’s letters disclose no such contempt for the New Englanders
as those of Evelyn, Percy, and Pitcairn; however, a letter from him to
Lord Barrington dated February indicates that he, too, was now im-
patient for orders to take the offensive though at the risk of counterat-
tack and war.³¹
This letter crossed the letter from Dartmouth to Gage of January ,
referred to in Chapter , which finally reached him on April .³²
’
DARTMOUTH’S LETTER
GALVANIZES GAGE INTO ACTION
D
’ to Gage of January , , stated that
the King and Ministry considered “the first & essential step to be
taken towards re-establishing Government, would be to arrest and im-
prison the principal actors & abettors in the Provincial Congress (whose
proceedings appear in every light to be acts of treason & rebellion) if re-
gardless of your Proclamation¹ & in defiance of it they should presume
again to assemble for such rebellious purposes...,” even though this
be “a Signal for Hostilities.”² However, said Dartmouth, “there are
other Cases that must occur, in which the affording the Assistance of the
Military will probably become unavoidable,” and “would become a
Test of the People’s resolution to resist....”³
Thus, though Dartmouth’s letter did not explicitly order Gage to
take the offensive, it strongly hinted that the King and Ministry ex-
pected him to do so.
If Gage had been able to carry out Dartmouth’s proposal that the
people’s “resolution to resist” be tested by seizing the principal actors
in the provincial Congress, the Revolution might perhaps have been
averted. Such action would almost certainly have been retaliated (as
the Continental Congress had advised)⁴ by the seizure of Crown offi-
cials stationed throughout North America, many of whom had influ-
ential British family and other connections. These hostages would have
given colonial Whigs a bargaining power for redress of colonial griev-
ances more immediate and compelling than the threat of economic
boycott.
But Dartmouth’s proposal, earlier suggested by Gage himself,⁵ was
no longer practicable after the provincial Congress moved from Cam-
bridge, only a few miles from Boston, to Concord, nearly twenty miles
away. By the time an expedition from there reached Concord, the mem-
bers of the Congress would almost certainly be warned in time to dis-
perse. Furthermore, arrangements for an expedition to Concord would
take some days to prepare, and Gage knew that the Congress was about
to rise and its members disperse.⁶
He evidently decided, however, that some incisive action must be
taken,⁷ and, knowing from his informers of a large quantity of rebel mil-
itary supplies at Concord,⁸ he decided to send out a strong force to de-
stroy them.*
Marching a force to a point so distant from Boston would, of course,
invite attack, but Dartmouth’s letter clearly implied that, far from this
being a deterrent, the administration would welcome an immediate test
of the rebels’ resolution to resist.
On April , Gage issued an order that the grenadier and light in-
fantry companies of all ten regiments in Boston were to be excused from
ordinary duty, ostensibly “in order to learn Grenadiers Exercize and
new evolutions,”⁹ but in fact, as soon developed, to form an expedition
to Concord.
Gage chose Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Smith of the Tenth Regi-
ment to lead the expedition consisting probably of around officers
and men.¹⁰ Major John Pitcairn, whose letters to Lord Sandwich were
quoted in Chapter , was second in command.¹¹ Gage’s orders to
Smith, issued April , stated:
“Having received Intelligence, that a Quantity of Ammunition, Pro-
vision, Artillery, Tents and small Arms, having been collected at Con-
cord, for the Avowed Purpose of raising and supporting a Rebellion
against His Majesty, you will March with the Corps of Grenadiers and
’
* Carl Van Doren, Secret History of the American Revolution (Clifton, N.J.: A. M. Kelly, ), –.
[B.W.S.]
light Infantry, put under your Command, with the utmost expedition
and Secrecy to Concord, where you will seize and destroy...[these].
But you will take care that the Soldiers do not plunder the Inhabitants,
or hurt private property.
“You have a Draught of Concord, on which is marked the Houses,
Barns, etc. which contain the above Military Stores....You will observe
by the Draught that it will be necessary to secure the two Bridges as
soon as possible; you will therefore Order a party of the best Marchers,
to go on with expedition for that purpose. A small party on Horseback
is ordered out to stop all advice of your March getting to Concord be-
fore you, and a small number of Artillery¹² go out in Chaises to wait for
you on the Road, with Sledge Hammers, Spikes etc.
“You will open your business, and return with the Troops, as soon as
possible, which I must leave to your own Judgment and Discretion.”¹³
The orders, it will be observed, gave Smith no direction as to what
he should do if rebel troops should try to block his march or fire on him
from cover.
The normal route for the expedition from Boston to Concord, which
lay north of the Charles River, would be to march by way of Boston
neck, Roxbury, and Brookline, which lay south of the river, to the bridge
over the Charles at Cambridge (where the familiar Larz Anderson
Memorial Bridge now stands), cross there, and proceed through Cam-
bridge to Concord. But marching through the populous village of
Roxbury would inevitably give early notice of the expedition to the
rebels, who, knowing or suspecting that it was headed for Concord, cer-
tainly would alarm the towns through which the expedition must pass
and might remove or destroy the bridge at Cambridge. Gage there-
fore arranged with Admiral Samuel Graves to ferry Smith’s troops to a
sparsely inhabited spot on the north shore of the Charles just across
from Boston in present Somerville.¹⁴
There is little contemporary evidence of what the rebel leaders were
doing at this critical juncture.
A letter of John Hancock, dated Lexington, April , discloses that
he had heard of some British officers on their way to Concord and said
he would send word of this to Concord, and minutes of a meeting of the
Committees of Safety and Supplies on the same day at Menotomy (now
Arlington), near the village of Cambridge, record various resolutions
concerning the disposition of military supplies.¹⁵
But the most important activity was the dispatch by someone in
Boston, said to have been Dr. Joseph Warren,¹⁶ of messengers to Lex-
ington to give warning of the impending expedition. Though the color-
ful story of the hanging of the lanterns to signal whether the British were
leaving Boston by land or by sea is drawn from statements made many
years later by Paul Revere,¹⁷ most famous of the messengers, there is
ample contemporary evidence that messengers were sent,¹⁸ that they
gave timely notice of the expedition, and that Revere was one of them.¹⁹*
Since the British detachment was marching out without baggage or
artillery, attack by the Massachusetts militia would be in conflict with
the resolution adopted by the Second Massachusetts Congress on
March , quoted in Chapter , authorizing attack only if Gage’s army
“or any part thereof to the Number of Five Hundred shall march out of
the Town of Boston with Artillery and Baggage.” But if the detachment
reached Concord before the provincials had time to remove all or part
of their military stores collected there, would they have timidly stood by
while these precious stores were destroyed?
If so, they would have gone far toward convincing the British that
they were, indeed, the poltroons whom Evelyn, Percy, and Pitcairn held
them to be. But they were not put to the test. Before the detachment
reached Concord, the shedding of American blood at Lexington had
destroyed whatever force the Congress’ cautious injunction might oth-
erwise have had.
’
* David Hackett Fischer, Paul Revere’s Ride (New York: Oxford University Press, ). [B.W.S.]
THE DAY OF LEXINGTON AND
CONCORD
:
APRIL 19, 1775
O
A , , the Massachusetts Committee of Safety dis-
patched the following message, which, forwarded by express rider
from one town committee to another as far south as Williamsburg, Vir-
ginia,¹ electrified the colonies:
“Watertown Wednesday Morning near oClock
“To all the Friends of American Liberty. Be it known that this Morn-
ing before Break of Day a Brigade consistg of about or Men
Landed at Phips’ Farm at Cambridge & marched to Lexington, where
they found a Company of our Colony Militia in Arms, upon which they
fir’d without any Provocation & killed Men & wounded others; by
an Express from Boston this Moment we find another Brigade are now
upon the March from Boston, supposed to be about ; the Bearer
Mr. Israel Bissel is charged to alarm the Country quite to Connecticut
& all Persons are Desired to furnish him fresh Horses as they may be
needed. I have spoken with several persons who have seen the Dead &
wounded....
“Jos. Palmer, one of the Committee.”²
Six days later the Essex Gazette of Salem gave a fuller report of the
provincial (Whig) version of the events of the fateful Day:
“Last Wednesday, the th of April, the Troops of His Britannick
Majesty commenced Hostilities upon the People of this Province, at-
tended with Circumstances of Cruelty, not less brutal than what our
venerable Ancestors received from the vilest Savages of the Wilderness.
The Particulars relative to this interesting Event, by which we are in-
volved in all the Horrors of a civil War, we have endeavoured to collect
as well as the present confused State of Affairs will admit.
“On Tuesday Evening a Detachment from the Army, consisting, it
is said, of or men,³ commanded by Lieut. Col. Smith, embarked
at the Bottom of the Common in Boston, on board a Number of Boats,
and landed at Phipps’s Farm, a little way up Charles River [in present-
day Somerville], from whence they proceeded with Silence and Ex-
pedition on their way to Concord, about Miles from Boston. The
People were soon alarmed, and began to assemble in several Towns, be-
fore Day-Light, in order to watch the Motion of the Troops.
“At Lexington, Miles below Concord, a Company of Militia, of
about men,⁴ mustered near the Meeting-House; the Troops came
in Sight of them just before Sun-rise; and running within a few Rods of
them, the Commanding Officer accosted the Militia in Words to this
effect:
—‘Disperse, you Rebels—Damn you, throw down your Arms and disperse’:
Upon which the Troops huzza’d, and immediately one or two Officers
discharged their Pistols, which were instantaneously followed by the
Firing of or of the Soldiers, and then there seemed to be a general
Discharge from the whole Body: Eight of our Men were killed, and nine
wounded.
“In a few Minutes after this Action the Enemy renewed their March
for Concord; at which Place they destroyed several Carriages, Carriage
Wheels, and about Barrels of Flour,⁵ all belonging to the Province.
Here about Men going towards a Bridge, of which the Enemy were
in Possession, the latter fired, and killed of our Men, who then returned
the Fire, and obliged the Enemy to retreat back to Lexington, where they
met Lord Percy, with a large Reinforcement, with two Pieces of Cannon.
“The Enemy now having a Body of about Men,⁶ made a Halt,
picked up many of their Dead, and took Care of their wounded....
[They then] continued their Retreat from Lexington to Charlestown
with great Precipitation; and notwithstanding their Field Pieces, our
People continued the Pursuit, firing at them till they got to Charlestown
Neck, (which they reached a little after Sunset,) over which the Enemy
passed, proceeded up Bunker’s Hill, and soon afterwards went into the
Town, under the Protection of the Somerset Man of War of Guns.
“In Lexington the Enemy set Fire to Deacon Joseph Loring’s House
and Barn, Mrs. Mulliken’s House and Shop, and Mr. Joshua Bond’s
House and Shop, which were all consumed. They also set Fire to several
other Houses, but our People extinguished the Flames. They pillaged
almost every House they passed by, breaking and destroying Doors,
Windows, Glasses, etc and carrying off Cloathing and other valuable
Effects. It appeared to be their Design to burn and destroy all before
them; and nothing but our vigorous Pursuit prevented their infernal
Purposes from being put in Execution. But the savage Barbarity exer-
cised upon the Bodies of our unfortunate Brethren who fell, is almost
incredible: Not contented with shooting down the unarmed, aged and
infirm, they disregarded the Cries of the wounded, killing them without
Mercy, and mangling their Bodies in the most shocking Manner.
“We have the Pleasure to say, that, notwithstanding the highest
Provocations given by the Enemy, not one instance of Cruelty, that we
have heard of, was committed by our victorious Militia; but, listening to
the merciful Dictates of the Christian Religion, they ‘breathed higher
sentiments of humanity.’. . .
“The following is a list of the Provincials who were killed or wounded:
[Here follows a list of forty-nine killed and thirty-nine wounded⁷
by towns from which they came: Lexington,⁸ Concord, Cambridge,
Charlestown, Watertown, Sudbury, Acton, Bedford, Needham, Med-
ford, Newton, Woburn, Billerica, Chelmsford, Framingham, Stow,
Dedham, Brookline, Salem, Danvers, Beverly, and Lynn.]
“We have seen an account of the loss of the enemy...by which it
appears that sixty-three of the Regulars and forty-nine of the Marines
were killed, and one hundred and three of both wounded...and about
twelve soldiers are prisoners....⁹
“The public most sincerely sympathize with the friends and rela-
tions of our deceased brethren, who gloriously sacrificed their lives in
fighting for the liberties of their Country. By their noble and intrepid
conduct, in helping to defeat the forces of an ungrateful tyrant, they
have endeared their memories to the present generation, who will
transmit their names to posterity with the highest honour....”¹⁰
The Gazette’s account is supported and amplified by depositions
quoted and discussed in the appendix to this chapter.