Knollenberg Bernhard. Growth of the American Revolution: 1766-1775
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chusetts regiment in the Seven Years’ War and now a leading Tory, to
raise “a corps of irregulars”;²⁷
To propose in Parliament that “the associated Colonies should be
prohibited for a limited time from trading to any other ports than those
of Great Britain, Ireland & the Islands in the West Indies, and also re-
strained from carrying on the fishery.”²⁸
This plan to put commercial pressure on the recalcitrant colonies to
submit, and at the same time prepare to compel submission by force if
commercial pressure proved insufficient, was carried out during the
next few months.
The additional troops, together with three general officers
—William
Howe, John Burgoyne, and Henry Clinton
—were sent to America,²⁹
and Gage was instructed to encourage Ruggles to raise his proposed
corps of Tories.³⁰
A bill was promptly (February ) introduced and passed prohibit-
ing shipment by water of any New England products to any place but
Great Britain, Ireland, or the British West Indies; prohibiting vessels
owned in New England to fish anywhere on the Newfoundland banks
or the coast of North America; and prohibiting importation by water
into the New England colonies of any goods whatever except articles
from Great Britain, Ireland, or the British West Indies. The first pro-
vision was to take effect July ; the second, July ; the third, Septem-
ber , .³¹ (An act was soon afterwards passed imposing similar
restraints on the commerce of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland,
Virginia and South Carolina.)³²
The Cabinet’s plan was, however, not limited to the application of
commercial pressure and preparation for war. At the Cabinet meeting
on January , some member, probably Dartmouth, proposed that
commissioners be sent to America to try to work out “a nearer Union
with the Colonies for the mutual Interest of both parts of the Em-
pire....”³³ This proposal was not adopted. But on January , the King
informed Dartmouth that he planned to offer Sir Jeffery Amherst the
command of the British troops in North America in place of Gage, not
only for military reasons but also “the political one” of “having some
one in America unattached to any particular Province, ready to trans-
mit the sentiments of those who wish well to English Government....”
This plan, the King pointed out, would “be a good succedanium to
your original idea of a Commission; for, as he [Amherst] is respected by
the Colonies, they will give more credit to his assertions than those of
any other person” and hopefully might bring the “deluded people to
due obedience without putting the dagger to their throats.”³⁴
The plan fell through when Amherst declined the offer.³⁵ But on Jan-
uary , the Cabinet adopted a plan apparently designed to secure a
peaceful settlement, namely to ask both Houses of Parliament “to de-
clare that if the Colonies shall make sufficient and permanent provision
for the support of the civil government and administration of justice and
for the defence and protection of the said Colonies, and in time of war
contribute extraordinary supplies, in a reasonable proportion to what is
raised by Great Britain, we will in that case desist from the exercize of
the power of taxation, except for commercial purposes only....”³⁶
Pursuant to this plan, North, on February , moved in the House
of Commons for a resolution that Parliament would forbear taxing any
colony which contributed its proportion to the common defense and for
the support of its own civil government in such amounts as the King and
Parliament approved. Any duties imposed by Parliament for the regu-
lation of commerce collected in such a colony were to be credited to the
account of the colony. However, there was no indication of what amounts
would be acceptable, nor was there any proposal for suspension, amend-
ment, or repeal of the Intolerable Acts of ³⁷ or amelioration of the
acts restricting colonial trade.
Benjamin Franklin wrote that North’s proposal, coupled with the
sending of reinforcements of troops to the colonies, was like that of “a
Highwayman, who presents his Pistol and Hat at a Coach Window, de-
manding no specific Sum, but if you will give...what he is pleas’d to
think sufficient, he will civilly omit putting his own Hands into your
Pockets; if not, there is his Pistol.”³⁸
Chatham denounced it as “mere verbiage, a most puerile mockery,”
and Richard Champion, a moderate English Whig, described it as
“falsely termed conciliatory,” declaring that North “knew it could not be
adopted, and had no other hope than that it would delude and divide, if
not the Colonies, at least the few friends the Americans had at home.”³⁹
Edmund Burke, a prominent member of the Rockingham party and
London Agent for New York, wrote, “Last Night my Lord North pro-
duced his resolution for forcing the Colonies, by a continuance of Penal
Statutes and the sending of Troops, to offer such a revenue as...shall
be agreeable to our fancy...Yet this was held out to us as a plan of con-
ciliation; though at the same time, Lord North plainly told us that he
was convinced the Colonies would not accept it.”⁴⁰
North’s motion was carried to .⁴¹ No list of voters has come to
light, but of those known to have spoken, nine, including John Dunning,
Isaac Barré, and Edmund Burke, members of the opposition, opposed
the motion because it offered too little toward conciliation, the other
five because it offered any concession at all.⁴²
Speaking in support of his motion, North declared that his plan was
presented in the hope of laying the basis for a peaceful settlement of the
dispute with the colonies.⁴³ But a letter from him to the King, written
the day before, stating, “Lord North hopes for great utility (if not in
America at least on this side of the water) to arise to the publick from
this motion. He is confident it gives up no right,...[and] will greatly
facilitate the passing the Bill now in the House for restraining the trade
of New England...,”⁴⁴ lends color to the suspicion of Burke and oth-
ers recently quoted.
Without waiting to hear from the Ministry, Lord Chatham had
made a dramatic move in the House of Lords for reconciliation. On
January , the day after Parliament reconvened following the Christ-
mas recess,⁴⁵ he spoke at length in favor of repeal of all British acts levy-
ing taxes for revenue on the colonies, concluding with a motion for an
address to the King “to advise and beseech” him that, “in order to open
the way for a happy settlement of the dangerous troubles in Amer-
ica,...orders may be despatched to General Gage for removing his
Majesty’s Forces from the Town of Boston....”⁴⁶ The motion was de-
feated by a vote of to .⁴⁷
Three days later, a plea for “healing remedies” was made to the
House of Commons in a petition presented on behalf of “the Merchants,
Traders, and others of the City of London, concerned in the Commerce
of North America,”⁴⁸ by George Hayley, one of the members for the
City of London. This petition was in effect shelved by the defeat, to
, of a motion for consideration of the petition by a select committee
instead of by the House sitting in Committee of the Whole.⁴⁹
Undeterred by the defeat of his motion for removal of the troops
from Boston, Chatham, on February , presented to the Lords, an elab-
orate plan for conciliation.
Its outstanding features were for Parliament to:
Declare its authority “to bind the people of the British Colonies in
America, in all matters touching the general weal of the whole Domin-
ion of the Imperial Crown of Great Britain, and beyond the competency
of the local representatives of a distinct Colony, most especially...to
make and Ordain laws for regulating navigation and trade”;
Declare that no tax would be levied in the colonies without the con-
sent of the Assembly of the colony on which the tax was to be imposed;
Pass acts confining the jurisdiction of colonial admiralty courts to
matters generally recognized as within the jurisdiction of admiralty
courts and forbidding trials for capital offenses to be held other than in
the colony in which the alleged offense was committed;
Temporarily suspend all other acts objected to by the First Conti-
nental Congress in its Petition to the King, and repeal them “from the
day that the due recognition of the Supreme Legislative authority and
superintending power of Parliament over the Colonies shall have been
made on the part of the said Colonies.”
On their part, the colonies represented at the forthcoming Second
Continental Congress were to “take into consideration...the making
a free grant...of a certain perpetual revenue...to the alleviation of
the National debt” and fix the proportion to be borne by each of the col-
onies of any revenue so granted.⁵⁰
Chatham’s plan, if adopted, might have achieved conciliation,⁵¹ but
the plan was rejected by a vote of to .⁵²
Various projects for conciliation discussed by Benjamin Franklin
with two leading English Quakers, encouraged by Dartmouth, and with
Admiral Lord Howe, which are described in an appendix to this chap-
ter, also came to nothing.
Final efforts for peace were made by Burke and David Hartley in the
House of Commons in March, .
On March , Burke proposed that Parliament go on record as
waiving the right to tax the colonies for revenue and relying on a favor-
able response by the several colonial Legislatures to requisitions (ap-
peals) by the Crown for funds for imperial purposes. He supported his
proposal by a speech justly famed for its eloquence.⁵³ But he spoke in
vain; in a test vote, his proposal was rejected to .⁵⁴
On March , Hartley moved to suspend, for a period of three years,
operation of the Boston Port Act and Massachusetts Regulating Act.
But his proposal was defeated without even a division.⁵⁵
The measures of the administration pursuant to the Cabinet deci-
sions of January and , described earlier, were supplemented by two
other measures, taken, so far as is known, without formal action by the
Cabinet.
One was a motion, supported by an opinion of the Attorney- and
Solicitor-Generals,⁵⁶ for an Address to the King declaring that “a re-
bellion at this time actually exists” in Massachusetts, and asking him to
“take the most effectual measures to enforce due obedience to the laws
and authority of the supreme Legislature. . . .” This motion, presented
by North to the Commons on February , was promptly adopted by
large majorities in both Houses.⁵⁷
The other was a letter from Dartmouth to Gage of January ,
(quoted in Chapter ),⁵⁸ which, as we shall see, led directly to the
British march to Concord and the outbreak of war.
THE COLONIAL RESPONSE
TO THE CONGRESS
T
of the Continental Congress for the general
adoption of a uniform non-importation, non-exportation, and
non-consumption Association was accompanied (it will be recalled
from Chapter ) by a resolution for establishment of local committees
to enforce the Association.
Such committees were promptly established throughout the colo-
nies represented at the Congress.
On November , , a meeting called by the Philadelphia com-
mittee described in Chapter , chose a committee of sixty-six to en-
force the Association in the city and suburbs of Philadelphia.¹ A few
weeks later, the new committee published notice directing consignees
of banned goods imported after December to notify the committee
whether they chose to send back such goods, to store them, or to deliver
them to the committee to be sold, and describing the procedure that
would be followed in selling goods so delivered. The notice also re-
minded consignees of the provision in the Association for publication
of the names of any who violated its terms.²
On November , a meeting engineered by the New York Commit-
tee of Fifty-One, described in Chapter , in collaboration with a local
committee of mechanics,³ chose an enforcement committee of sixty
members.⁴
On December , a Boston town meeting elected a similar commit-
tee of sixty-two members “to carry the Resolutions of the Continental
Congress into Execution.”⁵
At Charleston, fourth of the leading colonial ports, some group, pre-
sumably members of the committee elected in July, , described in
Chapter , assumed responsibility for enforcing the Association there.⁶
The establishment of enforcement committees was, however, not
limited to the four leading port cities.
According to Governor Lord Dunmore of Virginia, by the end of
December, , “A Committee has been chosen in every County [of
Virginia] whose business it is to carry the Association of the Congress
into execution, which Committee assumes an authority...to watch
the conduct of every inhabitant, without distinction, and...to stigma-
tize, as they term it, such as they find transgressing what they are now
hardy enough to call the Laws of the Congress...[by] inviting the
vengeance of an outrageous and lawless mob to be exercized upon the
unhappy victims.”⁷ There also is evidence of the establishment and
effective activity of enforcement committees in the other colonies rep-
resented at the Congress.⁸
The outbreak of war a few months after the committees were formed
defeated the original purpose of securing redress of colonial grievances
by a commercial boycott. But, as observed in earlier chapters, they
proved to be of immense value as a network of local units ready and
able promptly to help execute the war measures adopted by the Second
Continental Congress.
The response to the Congress’ proposal for a Second Continental
Congress also was generally favorable. By April , , the regular As-
sembly or a special convention in eleven of the twelve colonies repre-
sented at the First Congress had approved its proceedings and elected
delegates to the Second Continental Congress.⁹
Only New York held back. In February, , the New York As-
sembly refused to approve the proceedings of the First Continental
Congress or elect delegates to the proposed second.¹⁰ A New York
provincial convention eventually elected delegates to the Second Con-
gress, but not until after the outbreak of war.¹¹
Except for Nathaniel Folsom of New Hampshire (replaced by John
Langdon), Isaac Low and John Haring of New York, and Joseph Gal-
loway and Samuel Rhoads of Pennsylvania, the delegates who had
served at the First Congress were reelected to and served in the Sec-
ond.¹² In addition, John Hancock of Massachusetts, John Hall and
Thomas Stone of Maryland, and Philip Schuyler, George Clinton,
Lewis Morris, Francis Lewis, and Robert R. Livingston of New York
were chosen delegates from their respective colonies.¹³
Seven of the colonial Assemblies or conventions also responded fa-
vorably to the Congress’ recommendation “to be in all respects pre-
pared for every contingency,”¹⁴ i.e., for war.
As early as October , a Massachusetts convention began the war-
like preparations described in the next chapter, and at its October ses-
sion, the Connecticut General Assembly passed an act that “the several
towns in this Colony...provide as soon as may be double the quantity
of powder, ball and flints that they were heretofore by law obliged to
provide....”¹⁵
The Rhode Island General Assembly, meeting in December, ,
adopted a number of warlike measures summarized in a letter of De-
cember from Samuel Ward, one of the Rhode Island delegates to the
recent Congress, to John Dickinson. The Assembly, he wrote, had “or-
dered the Cannon at our Fort...[near Newport] to be sent to Provi-
dence where it will be safe and ready for Service; blls of Powder and
a proportionate Quantity of Lead and Flints and several pieces of brass
Cannon for the Artillery Company were ordered to be purchased; a
Major General was appointed, several Companies of Light Infantry,
Fusileers and etc. were established, the Militia was ordered to be disci-
plined and the Commanding Officers impowered to march our Troops
to the Assistance of any Sister Colony....”
“The Idea,” Ward added, “of taking up Arms against the parent
State is shocking to Us who still feel the strongest Attachment to our
Sovereign and warmest affection for our Brethren in Britain...but if
We must either become Slaves or fly to Arms I shall not (and hope no
American will) hesitate one Moment which to choose....”¹⁶
A New Hampshire convention, meeting in January, , approved
a circular letter to the officers of the colony’s militia urging them to
learn “the manual exercise...best calculated to qualify persons for
real action” and “to improve themselves in those evolutions which are
necessary for infantry in time of engagement.”¹⁷ (Several hundred New
Hampshire men had previously taken steps to secure arms and ammu-
nition by descending on Fort William and Mary at the entrance to
Portsmouth harbor and carrying off over a hundred barrels of powder,
sixteen cannon, and a large number of muskets.)¹⁸
In December, a Maryland convention resolved that “if the late Acts
of Parliament relative to the Massachusetts Bay shall be attempted to
be carried into force in that Colony; or if the assumed power of Parlia-
ment to tax the Colonies shall be attempted to be carried into execu-
tion by force in that or any other Colony,...this Province will support
such Colony to the utmost of their power.” This resolution was accom-
panied by another advising the immediate formation of military com-
panies throughout the province and the raising of £, by the coun-
ties of the province, according to quotas stated in the resolution, to
purchase arms and ammunition.¹⁹
In January, , a South Carolina convention passed a resolution
recommending “to all the Inhabitants of this Colony that they be dili-
gently attentive in learning the use of Arms, and that their officers be
requested to train and exercize them at least once a fortnight.”²⁰
The Virginia convention, third and last of those outside New En-
gland to prepare for war, did not meet until March , , because of
the expectation, until well into the new year, of a meeting of the House
of Burgesses at which action would be taken.²¹
However, long before March , the people in many counties of Vir-
ginia had begun to prepare for war by organizing so-called “indepen-
dent” companies, i.e., independent of the provincial militia commanded
by officers appointed by, and subject to, the orders of the Crown-
appointed Governor of the colony.
On January , George Washington wrote an unidentified correspon-
dent, “In this County [Fairfax], Prince William, Loudoun, Fauquier,
Berkley and many others round about,...Men are forming themselves
into independent companies, chusing their officers, arming, equipping
and training for the worst Event.”²² Washington’s correspondence and
diary from mid-October to March of – are full of references to
his own activities in forming, equipping, and inspecting the Fairfax and
Prince William Counties independent companies.²³
Meeting March –, the Virginia convention gave its stamp of
approval to these military preparations by recommending that every
county in the colony “form one or more companies of Infantry and
Troops of Horse...to be in constant training and readiness to act on
any emergency” and that county committees raise funds “sufficient to
purchase half a pound of Gunpowder, one pound of Lead, necessary
Flints and Cartridge Papers for every tithable person in their County.”
The convention also chose a central committee to act as purchasing
agent for such counties as “may not be apprized of the most certain and
speedy method of procuring the articles before-mentioned....”²⁴
According to James Parker of Norfolk, Virginia, Patrick Henry tried
to have the convention take over the reins of government and levy taxes
to raise and equip a provincial army, but was defeated.²⁵
“The convention at Richmond,” wrote Parker, “is over now....
There was a motion made by P. Henry supported by T. Jefferson, G.
Washington and Richard Henry Lee for referring to a committee the
raising eighty-six men out of each county, and equipping them with
arms, ammunition etc.²⁶ This was carried by a majority of to , but
the Committee could not agree upon the ways and means for their sup-
port. What flattened them all down was a Plea presented by P. Henry,²⁷
no less than taking of Government into their hands, appointing magis-
trates and levying money. The Treasurer [Robert Carter Nicholas],
Coll. B. Harrison, Bland and Coll. Ruddick [Riddick] saw into this and
formed an opposition which overset the scheme....”²⁸
However, even if the convention would not go as far as Henry
wished, it encouraged and offered to facilitate the preparations for war
already under way in the colony.
New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,²⁹ Delaware, and North Car-
olina took no measures to make or encourage preparations for war, and
New York and Delaware even gave their delegates to the Second Con-
tinental Congress instructions apparently designed to deter them from
supporting any warlike resolutions that might be proposed there.³⁰ But
when the Second Congress met, following the outbreak of war in Mas-