wasworkingeverywherewithdazzlingsuccess—exceptwithourownalliesin
Saigon.Thefactwas,asHaigpointedout inacable,that“wearenowatthehard
point,andyourmeetingwithThieuthismorningbecomescrucial.”
Fortunately(giventhecircumstances),Hanoimadeonemista kethat
providedarealjustificationforprocrastination.Thedistinguishedjournalist
ArnauddeBorchgravesuddenlyhadbeengrantedavisatovisitHanoi.What
madetheeventevenmoreremarkablewasthathehadnotaskedforit.Once
there,hewasgrantedaninterviewbyPrimeMinisterPhamVanDong,whichhe
hadnotrequested.TheinterviewwastobepublishedonOctober23,whileIwas
stillinSaigon,whenHanoiknewIwouldbeintheprocessofobtainingSouth
Vietnameseconcurrence.[
WereceivedanadvancetextonOctober21;deBorchgrave
tradedhisunexpurgatedversionforAmbassadorGodley’spermittinghimtouseEmbassy
communicationsinVientianetotransmithisstorytoNewYork,nootherquickandreliable
cablefacilitiesbeingavailable.]PerhapsHanoihadarrangedthestorywhenitwasstill
operatingontheearlier“shedyule”thatwouldhaveseenmealreadyinHanoion
thedateofpublication.Theinterviewineithercasewasaninsultingactofbad
faith,andbecauseofthedelay,anearlyfatalone.ForPhamVanDonginhis
interviewputforthatendentiousNorthVietnameseinterpretationofthedraft
agreementatvariancenotonlywithourinterpretationbutwiththetextofwhat
hadbeennegotiated.Thieuwasdescribedas“overtakenbyevents”;a“three‐
sidedcoalitionoftransition”wouldbesetup;alldetaineesonbothsides
(includingcivilians)wouldbereleased;Americahadtopayreparations.De
BorchgravereportedthatHanoiwasalreadyinformingforeigndiplomatsofthe
completedagreementandwaspreparingfestivitiesthatlookedtohimlike
“victorycelebrations.”ThePhamVanDonginterviewwasboundtoprovokethe
SouthVietnameseandcompoundtheirgravestsuspicions.Italsoputusonnot ice
thatTho’srecentflexibilityhadbeenimposedbynecessity,notachangeofheart.
Buttheinterviewexhibitedweaknessaswellasduplicity.PhamVanDong
admittedthatThieuwouldstayafterasettlement.Undernea ththetendentious
phraseologyhehadmadeitclearthattheagreementwasessentiallyastandstill
cease‐fire,heretofor econtemptuouslyrejectedbyHanoi.The“twoarmiesand
twoadministrations”wouldremaininexistenceintheSouth.
AtaboutthesametimeatelegramarrivedfromNixoninstructingmefor
whatweallagreedwouldbethedecisivemeetingwithThieuonthemorningof
October22.IwastopushThieutothelimitwithoutcausingablowup.Iwastodo
thesamewithHanoi.Thebestsolutionwouldbetodeferthefinalagreement