AformerAmbassadortoLaos,thenheadoftheDepartment’sVietnamWorking
Group,Sullivanhadcarriedoutmanythanklessassignmentswithskill,daring,and
anunusualwillingnesstoassumeresponsibility.Heperformedonmystaffwith
panache.HeaccompaniedmeonmyOctoberaround‐the‐worldtripasmy
deputy.HebriefedtheLaotianandThaileadersonournegotiations. Andhe
headedthetechnicaldiscussionswiththeVietnameseinthelastphase.Sullivan’s
contributiontothefinalroundofnegotiationswasindispensable.
MyscheduleforOctober13showstheintensityofourpreparations.Ispent
from10:45to11:05A.M.withSullivanandNegroponte;11:05to11:09with
Sullivanalone;12:40to1:05p.m.withSullivanandNegroponte;2:40to3:30with
SullivanandNegroponte;3:35to4:09withthePresident;5:36to6:24with
Sullivan,Lord(justreturnedfromParis),andNegroponte;and8:20to8:55with
LordandNegroponte.
ThatdayacablearrivedfromEllsworthBunkerwithawarningthat,
whatevertheagreement,wemightbesailingintostormyseasinSaigon.Ashad
becomecustomaryThieuwasunavailabletobebriefed;hisstallingwasnowpart
ofeveryexchange—lasttimeithadbeenatetanusshot,nowitwasanupset
stomach.Nhahelpfullysuppliedanotherreason:Thieuwassurprisedthatthe
AmericanEmbassywasopenonFridaythethirteenth.Bunkerreplieddrylythat
hehadclearedtheproblemwithhisastrologer.Hewarnedme,however,that
Thieuwassettlingintoasiegementalityreminiscentof1968.Hewouldalmost
surelytrytostareusdown,whateverwebroughthim.Heseemedconvincedthat
ifthewarcontinuedhewouldbe“inpositiontomakeabettersettlementayear
ortwoyearsfromnow,”buthegaveusnoideainwhatrespectitwouldbebetter
orhowwecouldsustainawarwithnogoaltheAmericanpubliccouldunderstand
afterHanoihadacceptedourownproposalsonOctober8.
ItoldBunkertogiveThieuasummaryofwherewewereheading:
PriortomyarrivalinSaigon,nowtentativelyscheduledforWednesdaynight,Iwillbe
seeingMinisterXuanThuyandanticipatethattheothersidewillproposeapoliticalformula
whichwillrequirefarlessofThieuthanthealternatearrangementsoutlinedtohimbyHaig
duringhisrecentvisit.Thiswouldbecombinedwithacease‐fireinplacetogointoeffectas
earlyastwoweeksfromthetimethatanoverallagreementinprincipleisarrivedat.Inviewof
thislikelihood,itisessentialthatThieuunderstandnowthatwecouldhavesettledtheconflict
longagoundertermswhichwouldhaveremovedhimfrompower.Therefore,hecannot
approachhisupcomingmeetingwithmeinthecontextofaconfrontationbutratherwitha