Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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seemingsympathy,askedpenetratingquestions,suggestedmodifications,

discusseddetailsofimplementation.Hesaidheagreedwithmethatthe

prospectsfornegotiationswerenotverybright;thishadarelaxingeffectonhim.

ThieudoubtedthatHanoiwouldofferaceasefire.Acease‐fireworkedtooone‐

sidedlyinourfavor,hesaid.Itwouldbea“gift”toPresidentNixonanditwould

beapsychologicalsetbacktothemoraleoftheCommunists,sincetheywouldbe

layingdowntheirarmswithoutanypoliticalachievement(argumentshewould

bitterlyrejectfiveweekslater).IagreedthatHanoiwouldprobablynotgiveupits

politicaldemands,butIremindedhimthatwewereinfactcommittedtowhatwe

hadproposedpublicly:“Iftheycomeback—Idon’twanttomisleadyou—andsay

thatthereshouldbeacease‐fire,wemustacceptit.”



Thieuhandedmeaneight‐pagememorandumcriticizingLeDucTho’s

August1proposal.Ithadbeencraftedinmeticulous,nitpickingdetailbyDuc.

Afterskimmingit,IsaidwithironythatIwasleftwiththeunavoidableimpression

thatSaigonwasnotacceptingeverydetailofHanoi’sproposal,butthenneither

wouldwe.AttheendoftheconversationInotedagain—forthethirdtime—that

ifHanoiacceptedourMay8proposalwewouldhavenochoicebuttogoalong.



Thenextday,August18,againatthePresidentialPalace,Thieuhandedme

anewmemorandum,thisoneoffourpages,containingsometwentyproposed

changesinourplan.Aboutfifteenofthesewereeasilyassimilated;others

presentedgreaterdifficulty.Thieuwantedtoalterthephrase“standstillcease‐

fire’’to“generalcease‐fire”forreasonsnevermadeclearunlessitwasthatthe

SouthVietnamesefo rceshadnointentionofstandingstillafteracease‐fire.Thieu

objectedtothetripartiteCommitteeofNationalReconciliationeveninourfifty‐

fiftyversion.Itwould enshrinetheCommunists’tripartiteprinciple,hesaid;itwas

boundtoraisedoubtsamongthepopulationofSouthVietnam.Irespondedby

explainingourstrategyonceagain.Wewantedtogaintime.Wewantedto

protectourselvesagainstHanoi’sgoingpublicwithitsproposals.Weweremerely

spellingoutwhatwehadofferedforovertwoyears.Wehadalwaysstated

publiclythatallelementsincludingCommunistswouldberepresentedonthe

electoralcommission.Wewereineffectburyingthecoalitiongovernment.For

thesepurposeswewantedtokeepsomeformulationsambiguous;wecouldnot

affordtohavethetalksbreakdownovertheologicalpoints.Ontheotherhand,I

pointedout,foryetafourthtime,thatifHanoiproposedanunconditionalcease‐

firewewouldhavetoaccept.Thieureiterated(again,withlaterirony)hisbelief

thattheNorthVietnamesewereafraidofaceasefirebecause“oncetheyaccepta

cease‐firetheycanneverstartagainandwewillprolongthepoliticaltalks

forever.”Thieuseemedaboveallafraidthatwemightmakepoliticalconcessions;

thecease‐firetimingconcernedhimless.Thisturnedouttobea

misapprehension;Thieuopposedwhateveraspectappearedclosetoasolution.

Inanyevent,wefinallydecidednottoaltertheexistinglanguageonthecease‐

fire.



ButtherewasadeeperreasonforThieu’sambivalance.Hehadnodifficulty

pointingoutambiguitiesinnegotiatingdocumentsdesignedtobridgethegap

betweenmortalenemies.Butnoneofthesedraftingchangeswenttotheheartof

theproblem,whichforThieuwasdomesticandultimatelyinvolvedthesurvivalof

thenon‐CommunistpoliticalstructureinSouthVietnam:“Mydutytothepeople,

thearmy,politicalgroupsandtheNationalAssemblyisfirstofallnottoshock

them.”Hehadtoconvincehispeoplethatanagreementwasnotadefeatnora

threattoSouthVietnam’sinternalstability.Forthishewouldalwaysneedtime.

“Evenifweacceptyourproposalwehavetostudyhowtoexplainit.”InthisThieu

wasquiteright,andweweretoenduppressinghimtooquicklyforhisown

domesticstability.ButitwasalsotobetruethatThieu’sowninfuriating

negotiatingstyledeprivedusofanyrealinsightintohisthinking.



Onlygraduallydiditdawnonusthatwefacednotadraftingdifficultybuta

fundamentalphilosophicaldivision. TherootfactwasthatThieuandhis

governmentweresimplynotreadyforanegotiatedpeace.Theyhadafewvague

ideasthatamountedtoanunconditionalsurrenderbyHanoi.Theywerenot

satisfiedwithsurvival;theywantedaguaranteethattheywouldprevail.They

preferredtocontinuethemilitarycontestratherthanfaceapoliticalstruggle.As

BunkersaidonAugust31whenhe,thePresident,andImetinHonolulutoreview

thebidding:“Theyfearthattheyarenotyetwellenoughorganizedtocompete

politicallywithsuchatoughdisciplinedorganization.”



Butwehadourownimperatives.Wehadstruggledandsufferedforfour

yearsoverawarfromwhichweweretryingtodisengage.Wehadaccepted

nearlyunbearablefissuresinoursocietytomaintainourhonorandcredibility.

Wehadsustainedoureffortonlybyconvincingourpublicthattheoneissueon

whichwewouldnotcompromisewastoimposeaCommunistgovernmentonan

ally.ButifHanoiweretoacceptourofferofacease‐fire,wewouldnotbeableto

respondwithanopen‐endedcommitmenttocontinue thewarinpursuitof

unconditionalvictory.IfNixondecidedotherwise,theCongresswouldmakeour

nightmarerealandvoteusoutofthewarwithoutanysignificantconditions,

underminingtheauthorityoftheAmericanPresidencyineverycornerofthe

globe.



NeitherThieu—norI, forthatmatter—couldcomeupwithaconvincing

militarystrategytochangethebasicbala nceofforcesinIndochinashould

negotiationsbreakdown.I playedwiththeideaofatwo‐daySouthVietnamese

landingoperationalongtheNorthVietnamesecoasttodrawNorthVietnamese

regularunitsawayfromSouthVietnam.Thieuwasmildlyinterested,butweboth

recognizedthatthiswasagimmick,notastrategy.NordidThieu’scrystalball

showaclear‐cutalternative.HeexpressedtheviewthatbyDecember1973—

fifteenmonthsaway—“ifwedon’tsignanything…theywillhavelesssupplies,

lessmanpowerandlessregularunits inDecember1973thantheyhadin

December1971orMarchof1972.”Inotherwords,afteranotherlongstretchof

fightingpresumablybackedbyunimpairedAmericanairpower,wecouldlook

forwardtoabalanceofforcessimilartothatwhichhadproducedonlystalemates

inthepast.WedidnotthinkthateitherourpublicortheCongresswouldhold

stillforthisprospect.AndIknewthatbudgetarystringencywouldsoonforceus

toreduceouraugmentationforces.



ThedialoguebetweenSaigonandWashingtonthusdevelopedlikeaGreek

tragedyinwhicheachsideinpursuitofitsownnecessitiesproduceswhatitmost

dreads.Forinessencebothsideswereright.Thieuwasa patriotandahighly

intelligentman.Hehadseenhiscountrythroughasearingwarwithabilityand

dedication.HedidnotdeservetheopprobriumAmericanopponentsofthewar

heapedonhimasanoutletfortheirfrustrationandasanalibiforthesurrender

theywantedtoforceontheirgovernment.Buttheimperativesonhimwere

almostdiametricallytheoppositeofours.



Hewas,inhisviewandours,thelegitimateheadofthegovernmentof

SouthVietnam.Forhimtoacceptthepotentiallegitimacyofthoseseekingto

subvertitwastounderminethepsychologicalbasisofhisrule.Yettheir

acceptanceinsomeformwasinherentineventhemostattenuatedcompromise

proposal.Thieu’sdomesticimperativesimposedintransigence.Wecouldsustain

oursupportforhimonlybyashowofconciliation.Ourgoalwashonor;wecould

(asthephrasewent)runariskforpeace.ButThieu’sproblemwassurvival;he

andhispeoplewouldbeleftindefinitelyafterwedeparted;hehadnomarginfor

error.



NorwereThieu’spremonitionsunfounded.Intheprocessofmeetingthe

demandsofourinsatiableopponent sinthemediaandtheCongress,wehad

alreadyreducedourtermstoalevelfarbelowthatwhichhadbeenthought

necessarytomaintainthesecurityofSouthKoreaundermuchmorefavorable

circumstancesandovertwentyyearsaftertheendoftheKoreanWar.Whereas

50,000AmericancombattroopswerestillstationedinKorea,weproposedto

withdrawallourtroopsfromVietnam,whichhadmuchlongerandmuchless

easilydefendedfrontiersandanevenmoreimplacableenemy.AllThieuwould

getwhilethemilitarybalancewasbasicallyinhisfavorwasacease‐firewithan

enemywhohadobservednoagreementsince1954.InexchangetheUnited

Stateswouldtotallywithdraw,notlikelytoreturn.Thieuwouldhavemostliked

unabatedUnitedStatessupportuntilhisenemydisintegrated.



Ourconstantsearchforsomecompromiseformulailluminatedthecultural

gapbetweenusandtheVietnamesebecausetheveryconceptofcompromise

wasalientobothVietnameseparties.



Wehadnowayofunderstandingtheprimevalhatredthatanimatedthe

twosides.Theyhadfoughteachotherforageneration.Theyhadassassinated

eachother’sofficials,torturedeachother’sprisoners.Thechasmofdistrustand

mutuallyinflictedsufferingwasunbridgeablebygoodwillorthesortof

compromiseformulastowardwhichAmericansincline.EachVietnameseparty

sawinasettlementthestartingpointofanewstrugglesometimeinthenottoo

distantfuture.EverydeliberatelyvagueformulaIputforward wastestedbyeach

sidetodeterminetowhatextentitrepresentedanopportunityto inflicta

humiliationonthedespisedopponent.Andbothsidesweremarvelouslysubtle

andingeniousinchangingphraseologytoscoresuchvictories,particularlyinthe

Vietnameselanguagewithitsfinelyshadedmeaningsquitebeyondourgrasp.



Luckily,noneofthiswasapparenttomeattheendofAugustorelseI

mightnothavehadthecouragetolaunchmyselfintowhatfollowed;evenThieu

mayhavegraspeditonlydimly.Infact,heandIhadengagedinaminuet,stately

initscarefulavoidanceoftherealissues,courtlyinitspretenseofcontinued

partnership,inherentlyinconclusiveinconfiningitselftotraditional,now

irrelevant,patterns.Thieucertainlycomplicatedmattersbynevermakinghis

objectionsexplicit.Instead,likeLeDucThoinParis,hefoughtwithcharacteristic

VietnameseopaquenessandwithaculturalarrogancecompoundedbyaFrench

Cartesianismthatdefinedanydeviationfromabstract,unilaterallyproclaimed

principlesasirreconcilableerror.



IleftSaigonwithafalsesenseofhavingreachedameetingoftheminds.

ThieuandIhaddecidedthatwewouldsettlethefewremainingdisagreements

overourdraftproposalbyexchangingmessagesthroughBunker.Therewas

plentyoftime—nearlyfourweeksuntilmynextmeetingonSeptember15.



Instead,Thieuenvelopedhimselfinsilence;weheardabsolutelynothing

fromthePalace.AndNhabega ntoplayhislittlegameswiththemedia.After

whatwehadenduredinourdomesticdebateonbehalfofSaigon,wewere

perhapsoverlysensitivetotheattacksonourmotivesthatfo undtheirway

increasinglyintotheSaigonnewspapersfromtheofficeoftheegregiousNha.

CertainlytheirtreatmentofEllsworthBunker,who,theninhisseventies,had

sustainedSaigonforfiveyears,vergedonthede spicable.Bunker’srequestsfor

appointmentswithThieuwentunansweredorweregrantedaftersomuchdelay

thattheirsubjectmatterhadbecomemoot.Forexample,wehadinvitedBunker

tocomeonAugust31toHonoluluwhereNixonwasmeetingwiththenew

JapanesePrimeMinister,KakueiTanaka.Thepurposewastoreviewmy

negotiationswithLeDucTho.BunkerwastoconsultwiththeSouthVietnamese

sowewouldhavethebenefitoftheirthinking.Iwashopingtousetheoccasion

tocompletethedraftproposaltobesubmittedonSeptember15.Butdespite

repeatedefforts,BunkerfailedtoobtainanappointmentwithThieuintime.Nor

wouldSaigonreplytoourcommentsonthememorandumhandedtomeby

Thieu,whichwehadwiredfromtheplaneonAugust19.



OnceagainweacceptedmostofDuc’squibbles,includingsomethatinour

judgmentweremorefavorabletoHanoithanouroriginaldraft.(Wedidnot,for

example,acceptachangeproposedbySaigonthatwouldhavesingledout

AmericanPOWpilotsforearlyrelease;wedidnotthinkitpropertomake

distinctionsamongbranchesofourservices.)Butthatwasnottheheartofthe

matter.NosoonerhadwesolvedoneissuethantheindefatigableDucandNha

wouldcomeupwithanothernitpick.ThemajorboneofcontentionwasSaigon’s

objectiontoourproposedcompositionoftheCommitteeofNational

Reconciliation.Thedifferencedependedonthehairsplittingissueofwhetherits

threesegmentsshouldbespecificallynamed,aswesuggested,orreferredtoonly

inageneralmanner,asSaigonwished.(Graduatestudentswhoareinterested

mayreadtheformulationsinthenotesattheback.)



AtourmeetinginHawaii,BunkerstressedtoNixonandmethathethought

wewereontherightcourse.ItoldBunkerthatwecountedonhimtotellusifwe

wenttoofar;hewasourconscience.“Wehavenotsacrificedalltheseyearsin

ordertoselloutnow,”Itoldhim.“Ifyouthinkthisisunreasonable,we’llchange

it.Andwe’llpaywhateverpricewehaveto.”Bunkerreaffirmedhisviewthatout

policywassound;itwasindeedtheonlyonepossible.Asaresultofour

conversationswithBunker,aPresidentiallettertoThieuwasdraftedandNixon

signedit.ItreassuredThieuthat“wewillnotdonowwhatwehaverefusedtodo

intheprecedingthreeandahalfyears,”thatis,abandonSouthVietnam.The

proposalsinquestion,Nixonargued,wouldsafeguardSaigon’sinterestsif

acceptedbytheenemyandifrejectedwouldstrengthensupportintheUnited

Statesforourjointcourse.



BunkerreturnedtoSaigononSeptem ber5.ArmedwiththePresidential

letter,hewasatlastreceivedbyThieuonSeptember6,onlytobetoldthatthe

responsetoourmemorandawouldbegiventhenextday.Wewerenowonlya

weekawayfrommymeetingwithLeDucThoandonlytwodaysfrommyleaving

forMoscow.IwiredBunker,pointingoutthatour“new”proposalwasineffect

theJanuary25proposalwiththecompositionoftheelectoralcommission—in

whichwehadalwaysstatedtheCommunistswouldberepresented—spelledout

insomewhatmoredetail.



OnSeptember7,ThieuappliedhisnowfamiliartacticstoBunker.Heasked

Bunkerperceptivequestionsaboutourdraftandwhatwewoulddoifitwere

rejected.HelistenedasBunkercarefullypointedouttherevisionswehadmade

inourproposalinresponsetoSaigon’ssuggestions.HeleftBunkerwiththe

impressionthathewouldgoalong,whichpromptedmetocongratulateBunker

onthe“encouraging”results.ThenonSeptem ber9DucandNhagaveBunkera

newdraftthatreopenedadditionalissues.OnSeptember10—alreadyenrouteto

Moscow—Iacceptedmostofthem,askingforsomediscretionaryflexibilityonly

onthecompositionoftheCommitteeofNationalReconciliation.OnSeptember

13,afteramonthofback‐and‐forthingandforty‐eighthoursbeforemymeeting

withLeDucTho,Thieuagainrejectedourproposalforthecompositionofthe

Committee.ThieuturneditdownnotbecausetheCommitteebotheredhim,but

becausehewasnotreadyforacease‐fire.



Insolenceisthearmoroftheweak;itisadevicetoinducecourageinthe

faceofone’sownpanic.Butthatisclearertomenowthanitwasthen.In

September1972asecondVietnameseparty—ourownally—hadmanagedto

generateinmethatimpotentragebywhichtheVietnamesehavealways

tormentedphysicallystrongeropponents.Aftera monthofexchangesThieuhad

duginonapointsoperipheraltothefinalresultthatwewouldneverbeableto

justifytoourpeoplebreakingupanegotiationoverit.Ifwesimplystonewalled

onSeptember15andHanoiwentpublic,wewouldstartfroma muchworse

position.IfweacceptedThieu’sconduct,allcoordinateddiplomacywouldvanish;

wewouldhavereachedtheconditionthatourdomesticcriticshadaccusedusof

permitting:Thieuwouldhaveanabsolutevetooverourpolicy.



OurstrategyatthisjuncturewassimplywhatIhadadvocatedinmy1968

ForeignAffairsarticleandininnumerablememora ndaandnegotiationssince:to

separatethemilitaryandpoliticalissues;tosettlethemilitaryissues(cease‐fire,

prisoners,withdrawal)first,and toleavethepolitical issuesfornegotiatio n

betweentheVietnamese—givingouralliesinSaigon,whomwehadstrengthened

formanyyears,theopportunity toflourishbytheirownefforts.



IhadexplainedmystrategyatgreatlengthtoThieuonAugust17and18.I

hadalsooutlineditinamemorandumtoNixononAugust25:



(1)Wewanttoconcludeanegotiatedsettlement,oratleastabreakthroughin

principle,onhonorableterms.Intheseefforts,wedrawthelineatimposingacommunist

governmentormakingitsemergenceinevitable.



(2)Ifareasonablesolutionisnotpossible,wewanttomakethebestpossiblerecordfor

publicopinion.Inthiscase,wehavetoensurethatthenegotiationsbreakupovertheother

side’sexorbitantpoliticaldemandssoastoisolatethoseinourcountrywhowouldhaveus

acceptignominiousterms.



HanoiandSaigonbothrejectedmystrategypreciselybecauseitinvolved

compromiseandbecausebothVietnamesepartiesstillyearnedforadecisive

victory.DobrynintoldmeonAugust22thatLeDucThoobjectedforreasons

surprisinglysimilartothoseofThieu.LeDucTho,accordingtoDobrynin,was

convincedthatallmyformulationshadoneoverridingpurpose:toendthe

militaryphaseofthewarwhiledefiningthepoliticaloutcomeingeneralprinciples

whoseimplementationHanoiwouldthenhavetonegotiatewiththeSouth

Vietnamese,“aprocesswhichmighttakeforever.”Theupshotwouldbethatthe

SouthVietnamesepoliticalstructurewouldsurvive.Hanoifoundthisimpossible

toswallow.Thieuhadthesameobjectiontothepossibilitiesofphysica lsurvival

oftheCommunists.Neitherpartyfeltsecureenoughtoriskanyletupinthe

demandfortotalvictory.Bothseemedtofearthepoliticalstrugglethatwould

followacease‐fire.BothstrovemightilytopushmeoffthenarrowlineIwas

tryingtowalkingivingHanoiaface‐savingpoliticalformulatoarrangewhat

amountedtoasettlementofthemilitaryissuesonlyandthepreservationofthe

politicalstructureofourallies.



LeDucThotriedtogetmetogobeyondformintoasubstancethatwould

infactundermineSaigon.Thieusoughttoblockmyconcessionsonformtoavoid

havingtofacethecease‐fire,whichwashisrealconcernandwhichwouldspell

thewithdrawalofAmericanforcesandanendtoourbombing.Soattheendof

thewarwemanagedto“unite”thetwoVietnamesepartiesafterall—intheir

commonalarmatAmericanobjectivesandeventuallytheircommondislikeand

distrustoftheprincipalAmericannegotiator.



Ifmyanalysiswascorrect,wehadtomakesomecosmeticconcessionagain

attheSeptember15meetinglestHanoiconcludethatwewerestallingandgo

publicwithseeminglyconciliatorypositionsthatwouldunravelourdomestic

support.



Wenowhadthreestrategicchoices:first,toattempttosettlebeforeour

election;second,tobringmatterstoaheadbydrasticescalationimmediately

aftertheelection;third,tocontinuetheconflictatitscurrentpaceinthehope

thatsomewherealongthelineHanoiwouldcrackandofferevenbetterterms.I

favoredthefirstcourse;Nixonthesecond.Hesoughtessentiallythesameterms

asI,buthepreferredtoachievethembyadramaticshowofforceimmediately

afterwinninganewpopularmandate.Thethirdoptionwasmoreapparentthan

real.Obstaclestoourcont inuingonthecurrentcourseweregrowing,bothwithin

andoutsidethegovernment.InAugust,MelLaird,seekingtoeasethestrainon

hisdefensebudget,hadsentamemorandumtothePresidentrecommendingan

immediate20percentcutinouraugmentationforces(thosesentsincethe

enemyoffensivebegan),a40percentreductionintherateofaircraftsorties,and

acutintheammunitionsupplies.WhenNixonrefused,Lairdputforwardthe

proposalforanevendeepercuteffectiveJanuary1(describedearlier). Such

pressureswouldbeboundtoaccelerateasthebudgetaryprocesswentforward.



Moreover,wewereagainlockedintothewithdrawalsyndrome.OnAugust

29Nixonannouncedanotherwithdrawalof12,000men,whichreducedour

forcesinVietnamto27,000(wellbelowwhatwestillhadinSouthKorea).The

PresidentandIwantedtoleaveopenthepublicpossibilitythatthismightbea

permanentresidualforcewhichHanoicouldgetustoremoveonlybymaking

concessions.ButthePentagonimmediatelyleakedthatitdidnotconsiderthisthe

endofthewithdrawals.Insixmonths’timewewouldundoubtedlyface

budgetarypressures,ledbyLaird,andCongressionalandmediademandsto

completeatotalunilateralwithdrawal,deprivingourselvesofanothernegotiating

asset.



AssoonasCongressreturnedinJanuarywewouldbeinevitablyconfronted

byanewfloodofre solutionssettingaterminaldateforourinvolvement,atbest

ontermslessfavorablethanthosewemightbeabletoachieveinParis.Inshort,I

thoughtHanoiwasmiscalculatingwhenitjudgedthatNixonwouldbemuch

strongeraftertheelection.Ifwedidnotstrikewhiletheironwashotbefore

November7,Hanoiwouldsoonseethefragilityofourposition.Wewouldthen

confrontagainthemaddeningmixtureofprocrastination,ambiguousconcession,

andoccasionalmilitary“highpoints”withwhichHanoihadsoughttogrindus

down.



IcouldfavorNixon’soptionofescalatingdramaticallyaftertheelection

onlyasalastresortincaseofatotalnegotiatingdeadlock;itwaspreferableto

theinterminableagonyofanotherlongstretchofopen‐endedconflict.Butit

couldnotbeourpreferredstrategy.ItwouldmeanthatNixonwouldbeginhis

secondtermamiddomesticuproar;thewoundsthattheVietnamwarcausedin

oursocietywouldbecomeevenmoredifficulttoheal.Congressionalpressures

wouldbeaccelerated;andwewouldbepushedupagainsttheJanuary3deadline

ofCongress’sreturn.Andforallthiswewouldnotachievetermssignificantly

betterthanwhatatlastwasbeginningtoappearpossible.Wecouldnotatthis

latestageraisetheanteinParisbeyondwhatwehadbeenproposingfortwo

yearsandmostexplicitlyonJanuary25andMay8—allofwhichwentbeyondthe

Congressionalconsensus.



ThusifHanoidecidedtosettlebeforetheelection,wehad,inmyview,an

opportunitythatmightbeunlikelytoreturn.AfterNovember7,whichevercourse

wechose—enduranceorescalation—wouldhavetobepursuedwithouta

deadlineonHanoi;wewouldbepushedagainstthegrindstoneofCongressional

pressures.WemightnotevenbeabletocountonSovietandChinese

acquiescenceindefinitely, orwemightbeaskedtopaysomepriceforitinour

relationswiththem.Ithoughtitwisertoexploitaunique conjunctionof

circumstancesthatputusinthestrongestdomestic,military,andinternational

positionsinmanyyears.Itwastimetoseektoextractthemaximumconcessions

fromHanoi.



ThesewerethereasonsthatinducedmetorecommendtoNixonthaton

September15wesubmitaproposalthatwasonlyaminorelaborationofthe

electoralcommission,whichhadbeenthestapleofourpositionsinceMay1969.

ItincludedtheprovisiononthecompositionoftheCommitteeofNational

ReconciliationthatThieuhadnotaccepted.IcabledNixon,requestinghis

approval:



Iftheothersideacceptsourproposal,whichwebelievequiteunlikely,thenthefactthat

GVNwasnottotallyonboardtothelastdetailwillbeobscuredbymyriadothercomplexitiesin

whatwillessentiallybeanewballgame.Insuchaneventuality,itisinconceivablethatGVN

wouldfinditinitsinteresttosurfacewhatfewdifferenceswemayhavehad…



Ifontheotherhand[the]othersiderejectsouroffer,aswethinkfarmorelikely,GVN

willhaveabsolutelyeveryincentivetogoalongwithus.Wecannotimaginethattheywould

wanttopubliclyintimatetheexistenceofanypastdivergenceswithusonceourreasonable

offerisoutintheopen,Hanoihasdeclinedit,andweareinanexcellentpositiontocounter

anypubliceffortsbytheothersidebypointingtonegotiatinginitiativeofourown.



Nixonwasfarfromenthusiastic.HewasbolsteredbyaLouHarrispublic

opinionpollpublishedonSeptember11,whichdisclosedthatasubstantial

majorityofAmericanvoters(55percentto32percent)supportedthecontinued

heavybombingsofNorthVietnam,anda64‐10‐majoritysupportedtheminingof

NorthVietnameseharbors.A47‐to‐35pluralitywasopposedtoacoalition

governmentinSouthVietnam(thewidestpluralityeveronthatquestion).By51

percentto26percent,amajorityofthepublicdidnotagreewithMcGovern’s