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John Breuilly
Gauls and Franks) but they were too casual, impressionistic and detached
from actual political conflict to be significant. Above all, with the signif-
icant exception of anti-Semitism, such ideas were not able to generate a
nationalist programme. Either race mixing was good (Mill, Michelet) or bad
(Gobineau) but it was not something which could be made an aspect of
policy. Instead, significant racist nationalism took on Fenton’s third form:
race as civilisation.
Overseas imperial expansion redefined race. By 1800 there was a discourse
of non-European peoples as racially distinct and inferior, even if challenged
by civilisational or Christian arguments.
42
By mid-nineteenth century white
Europeans generally believed in a global race hierarchy with themselves at
the top. At elite level there were finer distinctions: black Africans, Native
Americans, Aborigines below members of decayed civilisations (Chinese,
Hindus, Muslims).
During the American Civil War few on the Union side argued that
Negroes were the equal of whites. The argument against slavery was
based more on degrading consequences for whites and concern about
the extension of slaver y into new territories (McPherson 1998, especially
ch. 6). Most notably, little connection was made between the ideologies
purporting to explain differences between Europeans and non-Europeans
and between different Europeans. This was clearest in the USA where the
discourse of nativism deployed against continental European immigrants
was distinct from race discourse about Negroes.
43
Even the race argument
lacked elaborate biological foundation because it was such a ‘natural’
attitude. This distance between nationalism, race ideology and biolog-
ical argument narrowed from the later nineteenth century for various
reasons.
First, the rapid expansion of formal overseas empire, especially in Africa.
Physical anthropology, which dispensed with culture or history as the
basis of difference, flourished and was popularised through exhibitions of
‘primitive’ peoples and the establishment of ethnographic museums. (For
the case of Germany around 1900 see Honold 2004; Zimmerman 2004.)
42 This was not the only or even dominant view in the first encounters between Europeans and peoples
in Asia, Africa and the Americas. See for example Jackson and Jaffer 2004, a catalogue linked to an
exhibition at the Victoria and Albert Museum. Of course, the story has in turn to differentiate by
region and type of encounter as well as much else.
43 Partly on practical grounds as both Confederate and Union politicians hoped to enlist white immi-
grant support. See McPherson 2003. I have benefited from reading an unpublished conference paper:
Towe r s 2006.
104
On the principle of nationality
Second, race arguments acquired a new force following the publication
of Darwin’s Origins of Species in 1859.
44
Popularisation of the notion of
necessary struggle, leading to ‘survival of the fittest’ could be applied in
racial terms.
45
Whether in Darwinian or non-Darwinian form (denying
common origins to races), the idea of race became explicitly biological.
This radicalised and essentialised difference and justified hierarchy or
separation or ultimately murder.
46
Third, these arguments were extended into Europe, underpinning claims
about Germanic, Latin and Slav peoples, or the distinct racial qualities of
Jews.
47
Rapid industrial and urban growth and cross-border immigration
brought together ethnically distinct peoples, often in conflict over jobs and
housing. Germany became a country of net immigration from the 1890s,
just as race ideas were applied to poor Polish, Russian and Jewish immi-
grants. Conversely, pogroms against Jews in western Russia contributed
to this migration and also were justified with race arguments. The rapid
development of mass politics was associated with a populist nationalism
reacting against elite nationalism and the class and confessional creeds of
labour and Catholic parties. Radical nationalism, including anti-Semitism,
figured prominently in such populist politics.
48
Nevertheless, perceiving national difference within Europe as a mat-
ter of biological race was still marginal by 1914. In Western Europe the
44 Ironically Darwin later lost influence amongst biologists because he was unable to explain the
selective transmission of favoured differences, indeed his assumption that traits from parents were
mixed in their offspring undermined his own argument of selection. Only after 1918,withthe
rediscovery of Mendel’s findings on genetic selection, did the rise of neo-Darwinism beg in. See
Kohn 2004.
45 The phrase ‘survival of the fittest’ was in fact coined by Herbert Spencer in relation to competition
between human beings, both individuals and societies, but acquired a pseudo-scientific meaning
through its association with Darwin’s notion of evolution. There is a huge literature on this subject.
For a good introduction to the ‘internal’ intellectual history of the subject, see Banton 1998.
46 Even if one assumed – as the influence of Darwin largely led most thinkers to do – common origins
and progressive evolution, the time span involved meant this had no practical significance where
people perceived major racial differences. Much depended on further beliefs about how traits were
inherited and what would be the consequences of racial interbreeding. Beliefs of the time tended
towards purity, hierarchy and discrimination. Whereas Mill and Michelet had envisaged advantageous
racial blends, this was excluded from the later discourse of biological race.
47 One telling example is how the interest in classifying peoples through skull measurement, taken up
in overseas empire, was extended in Germany with a similar exercise – this time involving hair, skin
and eye colour – carried out in many schools and treating Jews as distinctive in these respects. As
the survey involved some six million pupils, one can imagine that it also had some impact on the
attitudes of many young Germans. See Zimmermann 2004.
48 Again, the literature is vast. Generally see MacMaster 2001. For a good comparative survey for Britain
and Germany, see Kennedy and Nicholls 1981. For a specific example of populist nationalism see
Coetzee 1990.
105
John Breuilly
assumption of advanced race mixing rendered it impossible to make such
ideas programmatic and beyond Europe the sense and practice of white
superiority was so embedded in imperial rule that it did not need a
programme. Where one might think race ideas could be deployed in a
class sense, in east-central Europe, it was rather a sense of national dif-
ference based on an amalgam of historical, cultural and ethnic factors
that were used instead, though anti-Semitism was a significant exception.
While nation as civilisation, history or ethnicity had become the basis of
political claims and programmes, nation as race had not achieved this by
1914.
49
8 Nationality as dominant norm
By 1914 the language of nationalism dominated political discourse. The for-
mation of nation states in Europe advanced this process. In domestic affairs
the growth of mass party politics focused on influential, if not sovereign par-
liaments, promoted specialised political rhetoric and organisation in which
the claim to advance the interests of the electorate (‘nation’) was central.
That rhetoric was taken up in the expanding print media by pressure groups
and sectional interests.
In international affairs German unification and the growing power of
the German state stimulated a reorganisation of diplomatic alignments.
Foreign policy, even if still controlled by rulers and elite politicians, deployed
nationalist rhetoric in justifying itself to domestic public opinion. Once an
enemy had been publicly demonised (e.g. anti-German publicity in Britain
after 1900) or a policy declared vital to the national interest (e.g. German
battle-fleet building), it was difficult for a government to act against such
opinion (Kennedy 1980).
Every group adapted nationalist language to its interests. It is pointless
to discriminate between ‘true’ nationalism (say, ethnic or racial creeds)
and other beliefs (e.g. distinctions between patriotism and nationalism,
ethnic and civic nationalism).
50
Differences rather indicate interests. One
French nationalist advocated overseas empire as vital, another denounced
it as a distraction from revenge for 1870/71 and regaining Alsace-Lorraine.
49 There is a very large literature on the subject, less because of the significance of the subject before
1914 than because of the subsequent rise of Hitler and Nazism to power. A classical intellectual
history from this perspective is Mosse 1966.
50 A good collection of essays in which a critique of this distinction is central is Baycroft and Hewitson
2006.
106
On the principle of nationality
One German nationalist insisted on conferring citizenship on children of
Germans to promote Germandom abroad, another opposed it when a
German colonist married a local woman in South-West Africa (Gosewinkel
2004; Weber 1959). More significant is the consensus on foregrounding the
principle of nationality in political discourse. With that established, groups
shifted ground, adopting different elements of nationalist discourse as and
when circumstances demanded.
The nation state itself nationalised political discourse. Tariff protection-
ism after 1880 nationalised economic space. Restrictions on immigration
nationalised citizenship. Compulsory mass schooling promoted the teaching
of national history. Welfare innovations turned pensions and medical care
into national goods. Increased tensions between European powers intensi-
fied the use of nationalist stereotypes.
The behaviour of powerful nation states served as a model for others. The
Tsar pursued Russianisation policies. Franz Josef acknowledged nationality
differences between Czechs and Germans. Magyars imposed assimilation
policies. The USA joined the drive for overseas empire. Japan justified its
successful wars against China and Russia in nationalist terms. Yet one should
note the limitations of nationalism. First, if everyone adopts nationalist dis-
course, then in everyday politics what matters are the internal differences.
At another level, the very basic assumption of nationality made in the con-
flicting forms of nationalism, helps nationalism reproduce itself ‘naturally’,
banally. That also shapes political values and means that in a crisis, specific
appeals to nationalism can succeed (Billig 1995).
51
Second, the nation state remained an objective rather than an achieve-
ment. Much of east-central Europe and most of t he world beyond Europe
was organised on non-national grounds. For many subjects of nation states,
the national interest, especially abroad, was a remote matter of indifference
(Porter 2004). It mattered more as one went up the social scale and got
closer to state power.
In 1914 the Romanov Empire remained strong. Historians have argued
that the Habsburg Empire was more stable than hindsight judgements
after 1918 assumed (Cornwall 1990). The Ottoman Empire, having lost
the Balkans, was energetically reforming in its remaining territory (Macfie
1998). All three empires sustained mass warfare for several years.
51 For the argument that constant contestation over what is ‘true’ national identity actually strength-
ens nationalism, indeed is essential to its continued importance, see Hutchinson 2005, especially
ch. 4.
107
John Breuilly
Yet even if not essential for political strength and stability, the
principle of nationality shaped the post-war settlement. All three empires
were defeated.
52
The eventual victors – Bolsheviks and western Allies –
incorporated the principle of nationality into successor states. The Bol-
sheviks retained control of a multiethnic empire but constructed national
republics (Smith 1999). The Allies created a series of nation states in the
territories of the losers (Sharp 1991). That made the principle of nationality
even more central to the politics of the twentieth century than it had been
to that of the nineteenth century. But that is another story (Mazower 2000).
9 Concluding points
I have outlined how and why the principle of nationality shifted from the
margin to the centre of political discourse. The focus of attention has been
on political discourse. This might imply that discourse was the moving force
in the rise of nationalism.
I do not have the space to engage with complex debates on nationalism
(for a good introduction, see Smith 1998). However, it is necessary to dis-
tinguish between ideas, sentiments (that is, the emotional affect of national
identity) and politics. These are closely related but they can occur indepen-
dently of one another and there is no one or even dominant relationship
between these three aspects of nationalism. The principle of nationality as
an ideology is neither cause nor effect of nationalist sentiments or politics.
The empirical assertion that there is a nationality took on new form when
applied to a whole society rather than just a high culture or political elite.
This empirical conception of nationality is closely linked to changes that
undermine fixed social distinctions, such as the rapid growth of commercial
agriculture and manufacturing. It was also linked to the need for specialised
political languages and institutions used to co-ordinate and mobilise diverse
and larger sections of the population.
The normative assertion that nationality is a value, demanding loyalty
and commitment, requires one to specify these qualities in terms of history,
52 What if Germany and her allies had won the war? Would the preservation of the Habsburg and
Ottoman empires and the extension of German rule across Western and Central Europe have blocked
the nationality principle? One can never answer such speculative questions. However, it is difficult
to see nationalist movements declining in importance in the two multinational empires (just as they
were taken into account explicitly in the Soviet Union). For Germany perceptive observers like Max
Weber were concerned that over-extension would undermine the national character of the German
state and thought it would be necessary to concede autonomy to other nationalities such as Poles
and Ukrainians.
108
On the principle of nationality
culture, language, religion and customs. The nationalist argument blends
democratic with cultural claims.
Finally, the programmatic demand for self-determination requires one to
envisage autonomy as a series of territorially distinct states (in some cases,
federal units within a state). Only under modern conditions of sovereign,
participatory states with sharply bounded and exclusive territories can such
a programme become a core feature of politics.
Thus develops a political discourse which appeals to the people (democ-
racy) in a glorifying self-referential way (the nation) and sets itself the goal of
national self-determination. It is an ideological discourse which thoroughly
mixes empirical and normative claims in a way that makes it incapable of
disproof. It invokes different elements to identify and venerate the nation –
civilisation, history, institutions, language, religion, culture, race – and can
always adapt to changing circumstances by shifting emphasis from one to
another feature. Its greatest success in modern times is that it is no longer
considered a principle but a matter of fact.
109
4
Hegel and Hegelianism
frederick c. beiser
1 Problems of interpretation
Seen from a broad historical perspective, Hegel’s political philosophy, as
expounded in his 1821 Philosophie des Rechts, was a grand synthesis of all
the conflicting traditions of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth cen-
turies. Its theory of the state wedded liberalism with communitarianism;
1
its
doctrine of right fused historicism, rationalism and voluntarism; its vision
of ideal government united aristocracy, monarchy and democracy; and its
politics strove for the middle ground between left and right, progress and
reaction. Such an account of Hegel’s achievement is not an ex post facto
rationalisation; it is a simple restatement of his intentions. For Hegel saw
himself as the chief synthesiser, as the last mediator, of his age. All the
conflicts between opposing standpoints would finally be resolved – their
truths preserved and their errors cancelled – in a single coherent system.
The power of Hegel’s political philosophy lay here, in its syncretic designs,
References to Hegel’s works in this chapter are to the following editions: EPW = Die Enzyklop
¨
adie
der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1817), Heidelberg. ER =
¨
Uber die Englische Reformbill,
Werkausgabe xi,pp.83–130.GW= Gesammelte Werke (1989), ed. Rheinisch-Westf
¨
alischen Akademie
der Wissenschaften. Hamburg: Meiner. H = Philosophie des Rechts. Die Vorlesung von 1819/20 in
einer Nachschrift (1983), ed. Dieter Henrich. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp – cited by page number. PG =
Ph
¨
anomenologie des Geistes, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister. Hamburg: Meiner. PR = Grundlinien der Philoso-
phie des Rechts (1821).Werkevii – cited by paragraph number (§). Remarks are indicated by an R,
additions by an A. SS = System der Sittlichkeit, in volume v of Gesammelte Werke (1989), ed. Rheinisch-
We s t f
¨
alischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Hamburg: Meiner. VD = Die Verfassung Deutschlands.
Werke i,pp.451–610.VG= Die Vernunft in der Geschichte (1955), ed. J. Hoffmeister. Hamburg:
Meiner. Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction (1975), trans. H. B. Nisbet. Cam-
bridge. VNS = Vorlesungen
¨
uber Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft. Heidelberg 1817/18. Nachgeschrieben
von P. Wannenmann (1983),ed.C.Beckeret al. Hamburg: Meiner – cited by paragraph number (§).
VVL = Verhandlungen in der Versammlung der Landst
¨
ande der K
¨
onigsreichs W
¨
urttemberg im Jahr 1815 und
1816. Werkausgabe iv,pp.462–597.
1 The
terms ‘liberalism’ and ‘communitarianism’ are anachronistic; I use them here only as short-
hand to designate some trends in late eighteenth-century thought akin to modern liberalism and
communitarianism.
110
Hegel and Hegelianism
in its capacity to accommodate all standpoints; any critique of the system,
it seemed, came from a standpoint whose claims had already been settled
within it.
Some of the greatest problems in understanding Hegel’s political phi-
losophy arise from his systematic ambitions, his syncretic intentions. The
most obvious problem is to provide a balanced interpretation, one that does
justice to every side of Hegel’s system. The flaw of most interpretations is
that they are one-sided, stressing one aspect of his system at the expense of
another. Hence Hegel’s theory of the state has been construed as a defence
of communitarianism against liberalism; his theory of right has been read
exclusively as rationalism, voluntarism or historicism; and his politics has
been understood as either radical or reactionary. None of these extreme or
one-sided interpretations can be correct, given that it was Hegel’s intention
to unify all standpoints in his system.
Another even more formidable problem lies in a treacherous field, one
into which few historians or political theorists like to venture: metaphysics.
Metaphysics is the heart and soul of Hegel’s system, the source of its unity,
the basis of its synthetic designs. Since, however, metaphysics is contro-
versial, and since it is beyond the ken of most political theorists, most
recent interpretations of Hegel’s politics are non-metaphysical, as if it were
comprehensible in its own right apart from his metaphysics.
2
But these
interpretations suffer fatal flaws. For one thing, they are viciously anachro-
nistic: they impose a modern academic division of labour upon a more
holistic era; and they force a modern positivistic spirit upon an age scepti-
cal of positivism. Even worse, they are flatly contrary to Hegel’s intention,
which was to place politics on a firm metaphysical foundation.
3
Wo r s t o f
all, most of Hegel’s central political ideas are irreducibly and inescapably
metaphysical. Hence his reason in history theme is based on his absolute
idealism; his notion of freedom depends on his concept of spirit (Geist); his
doctrine of right rests upon his Aristotelian ontology and teleology; and
2 For the non-metaphysical approach to Hegel’s social and political philosophy, see Franco 1999,pp.83–
4, 126, 135–6, 140, 143, 151–2, 360–1 n.4; Hardimon 1994,p.8; Patten 1999,pp.16–27; Pelczynski
1971,pp.1–2; Plamenatz 1963, ii,pp.129–32;Rawls2000,p.330;Smith1989, p. xi; Tunick 1992,
pp. 14, 17, 86, 99; and Wood 1990,pp.4–6. For some recent protests against this approach, see Dickey
1999; Peperzak 2001,pp.5–19;andYovel1996,pp.26–41.
3 In the introduction to his 1803 Naturrecht essay, Hegel criticised both the empiricist and rationalist
traditions of natural law for their lack of a metaphysical foundation. See Werke ii,pp.434–40.Hesaw
his
o
wn distinctive contribution to this tradition as the attempt to establish just such a foundation.
Never did he depart from this programme; the 1821 Rechtsphilosophie was its final culmination.
111
Frederick C. Beiser
his methodology, which he saw as his distinctive contribution to political
philosophy, demands that we grasp ‘the concept’ ( der Begriff )ofathing,
which is its ‘formal-final cause’.
The task of this essay is to explain, as far as possible in a confined com-
pass, Hegel’s political philosophy according to its holistic and metaphysical
intentions.
4
We will consider how Hegel’s theory of law united voluntarism,
rationalism and historicism, how his theory of the state joined liberalism
and communitarianism, and how his theory of history joined radicalism and
conservatism.
2 Reason in history
Any general treatment of Hegel’s political thought should begin with the
central event of his age: the French Revolution. Like so many thinkers in the
1790s, Hegel forged his social and political philosophy in the crucible of this
epochal event. Some of the central themes of his mature political thought
grew directly out of his response to the issues raised by the Revolution.
Hegel himself paid handsome tribute to the influence of the Revolution
on his thinking when he called it, and the quarter-century following it,
‘possibly the richest years that world history has had, and for us the most
instructive, because it is to them that our world and ideas belong’ (VVL iv,
pp. 507, 282).
When the Bastille was stormed in July 1789, Hegel was only nineteen,
a student at a seminary, the illustrious T
¨
ubinger Stift. Along with his two
famous friends at the Stift, F.W. J. Schelling and Friedrich H
¨
olderlin, Hegel
greeted the Revolution as the dawn of a new age and celebrated the end
of the despotism, privilege and oppression of the ancien r
´
egime. According
to legend, Hegel, Schelling and H
¨
olderlin planted a liberty tree, formed
a secret club to read new revolutionary literature and made contacts with
republicans in France.
5
This was not just youthful enthusiasm, however.
Although many of Hegel’s contemporaries quickly became disillusioned
with the Revolution, Hegel remained true to its fundamental ideals: libert
´
e,
´
egalit
´
eetfraternit
´
e and the rights of man. Even in his final years, he would
toast Bastille day, admire Napoleon and condemn the Restoration.
4 The interpretation here has been worked out in more detail in Beiser 2005.
5 The source of the legend is Rosenkranz 1972,pp.29, 32–4. For an appraisal of the sources, see H. S.
Harris 1972,pp.115–16 n.2.
112
Hegel and Hegelianism
Hegel drew three great lessons from the Revolution. First, that the con-
stitution of the modern state should be based upon reason, not precedent
or tradition (VVL iv,pp.506, 281). Second, that its constitution should
be founded upon the idea of freedom, the idea that man as such is free
(PG xii,pp.527–9). Third, that the modern state should include repre-
sentative institutions, so that the people have some share in government
(VD i,pp.572/234). In short, Hegel’s rationalism, his belief in human
rights and his faith in representative institutions were all a legacy of the
Revolution.
Although Hegel endorsed the ideals of the Revolution, he repudiated its
practice. He disapproved of violent social change from below, a cataclysm
that would sweep away all laws and institutions, leaving nothing to build
upon. Like many of his contemporaries who had witnessed the turmoil
in France, Hegel stressed the value of gradual reform from above, directed
by the wise and educated.
6
All successful social and political change, he
believed, should take into account the existing circumstances of a coun-
try, its economy, geography, culture and legal system (PR §§258R, 272,
274, 298A). Social and political ideals should not be imposed upon these
circumstances according to some abstract blueprint, but they should evolve
from them. Hegel developed this moderate attitude early, for even in the
1790s he was critical of the methods of the Jacobins and advocated timely
reform to prevent revolution.
7
The chief philosophical problem that the Revolution posed for Hegel,
and indeed his entire generation, concerned the proper relationship between
morality and politics, theory and practice. Should our moral principles dic-
tate or derive from our political practice? Are these principles justifiable by
pure reason alone, as Kant argued, so that they provide categorical require-
ments to which our practice should conform? Or are they justifiable by
experience alone, as Burke maintained, so that they should conform to our
actual practices and institutions? Such were the questions debated between
left and right throughout the 1790s in Germany. This debate began in 1793
with the publication of Kant’s famous ‘Theory-Practice’ essay in the pages
of the Berlinische Monatsschrift.
8
Kant’s essay was a reply to Burke’s Reflections
6 See VVL iv,pp.464–71/247–54. Cf. VVL i,p.273 and VVL xi,pp.86/297.
7 See VVL i,p.273 and Hegel’s 24 December 1794 letter to Schelling (Hegel 1961, i,p.12) where he
criticises ‘die Sch
¨
andlichkeit der Robespierreroten’.
8 ‘
¨
Uber den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht f
¨
ur die Praxis’, first
published in Berlinische Monatsschrift 22, 1793,pp.201–84;inKant1902, viii,pp.273–314.
113